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-P, 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR 

OF 1812 



THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES 
ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 



By the liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph.D., of New 
York City, the Johns Hopkins University has been 
enabled to provide an annual course of lectures on 
Diplomatic History. The courses are included in the 
regular work of the Department of History and are 
published under the direction of Professor John 
H. Latan6. 



THE ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON 
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 1914 



THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WAR 

OF 1812 



BY 

FRANK A. yPDYKE, Ph.D. 

IRA ALLEN EASTMAN PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 



BALTIMORE 

The Johns Hopkins Press 

1915 






Copyright, 1915 
By The Johns Hopkins Press 



PRESS OF 

THE NEW ERA PRINTING COMPANY 

LANCASTER, PA. 



©CI,A401009 



To E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS, LL.D. 
TEACHER AND FRIEND 

STRONG, FEARLESS, SINGLE-MINDED, LARGE-SOULED, WHOSE DEVO- 
TION TO DEMOCRATIC IDEALS HAS INSPIRED THE LIVES OF THOU- 
SANDS TO HIGH INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ENDEAVOR 



CONTENTS 

Page 
Preface ix 

Chapter I. Impressment i 

Chapter IL Neutral Trade 6i 

Chapter III. Declaration of War and Peace 

Proposals 125 

Chapter IV. Acceptance of Great Britain's 

Proposal for Direct Negotia- 
tions 165 

Chapter V. The Opening of Peace Negotia- 
tions at Ghent 198 ~ 

Chapter VI. The Indian Question and the 

Canadian Boundary 235 

Chapter VII. Modification of British De- 
mands 277 ^ 

Chapter VIII. Conclusion of the Peace Nego- 
tiation 320 '^ 

Chapter IX. Ratification and Reception of 

the Treaty 358 ■^' 

Chapter X. The Execution of the Treaty 

of Ghent 399 

Chapter XL Settlement of Controverted 

Questions Omitted in the 
Treaty of Ghent 437 

Index 479 

vii 



CHAPTER I 

Impressment 

■"^ The fundamental cause of the War of 1812 was the 
irreconcilable conflict of the British navigation acts 
with the commercial development of the United States. 
The more concrete causes, all of which were connected 
with the British naval and commercial policy, were the 
right of search for deserters on neutral vessels and the 
impressment of American seamen upon the high seas, 
restrictions upon American trade through the revival 
by Great Britain of the "Rule of 1756," and the pro- 
mulgation of orders which established the principles of 
blockade against neutral commerce where, in fact, no 
legal blockade existed. 

The treaty of peace of 1783 failed to bring about 
an amicable relationship between Great Britain and the 
United States. John Adams, the first American 
minister to Great Britain, wrote to the American 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs a few weeks after his 
arrival in London, as follows : " The popular pulse 
seems to beat high against America. The people are 
deceived by numberless falsehoods industriously cir- 
culated by the gazettes and in conversation, so that 



2 IMPRESSMENT 

there is too much reason to believe that, if this nation 
had another hundred milhon to spend, they would soon 
force the ministry into a war against us. . . . Their 
present system, as far as I can penetrate it, is to 
maintain a determined peace with all Europe, in 
order that they may war singly against America, if 
they should think it necessary."^ In another letter 
written August 6, 1785, Adams said : " Britain has 
ventured to begin commercial hostilities. I call them 
hostilities, because their direct object is not so much 
the increase of their own wealth, ships, or sailors, as 
the diminution of ours. A jealousy of our naval 
power is the true motive, the real passion which 
actuates them ; they consider the United States as their 
rival, and the most dangerous rival they have in the 
world."- Later, on October 15, Adams wrote: "I 
have the honor to agree fully with you in your opinion, 
that ' it is manifestly as much the interest of this 
country to be well with us, as for us to be well with 
them;' but this is not the judgment of the English 
nation ; it is not the judgment of Lord North and his 
party; it is not the judgment of the Duke of Port- 
land and his friends ; and it does not appear to be the 
judgment of Mr. Pitt and the present set. Li short, 
it does not at present appear to be the sentiment of 

1 Adams to Jay, July 19, 1785 ; Works of John Adams, VIII., 
282. 

2 Adams to Jay, Aug. 6, 1785; Works of John Adams, VIII., 
290-291. 



IMPRESSMENT 3 

anybody ; and, I am much inclined to believe, they will 
try the issue of importance with us."^ In Adams's 
last two letters to the Secretary of State, one in 
November and the other in December, 1787, we find , 
the following passages : " If they can bind Holland in 
their shackles, and France, by her internal distractions, 
is unable to interfere, she [Great Britain] will make 
war immediately against us." " No answer is made 
to any of my memorials or letters to the ministry, nor 
do I expect that any thing will be done while I stay."* 

Great Britain failing to send a minister to the 
United States, Adams, at his own request, was recalled 
in February, 1788. It was not until 1792 that his post 
was filled. Thomas Pinckney was then appointed 
minister to Great Britain, a position which he retained 
only two years. The causes of friction between Great 
Britain and the United States steadily grew in volume 
during the next two decades, culminating at last in the 
War of 1812. The most aggravating and the most 
persistent of these causes was impressment. For 
twenty years it was the object of serious diplomatic 
negotiations. 

As early as 1792 we find Thomas Jefferson, Secre- 
tary of State, advising Thomas Pinckney, American 

3 Adams to Jay, Oct. 15, 1785; Works of John Adams, VIII., 
320. 

4 Adams to Jay, Nov. 30, 1787; Works of John Adams, 
VIII., 463. Adams to Jay, Dec. 16, 1787; Works of John 
Adams, VIII., 467-468. 



4 IMPRESSMENT 

minister at London, to confer with the British Foreign 
Secretary in order to make some satisfactory arrange- 
ment upon the subject of impressment. The British 
Government had proposed that American seamen 
should be required always to carry about with them a 
certificate of citizenship. Jefferson was opposed to 
this requirement as it would be impracticable always 
to carry such certificates. He upheld the position that 
the vessel outside of foreign jurisdiction protected 
the men on board, yet, in order to prevent a vessel 
from becoming an asylum for fugitives, he was willing 
that the number of men to a vessel should be limited 
in proportion to the tonnage of the vessel and that one 
or two officers be allowed to board a vessel to ascer- 
tain the number of men on board. No press gang 
should be allowed to go on board until it should be 
found that there were more than the stipulated num- 
ber of seamen on board, and until the masters had 
refused to deliver the extra men, who were to be 
named by the master himself. Even under these cir- 
cumstances the American consul, in every instance, 
was to be called in.^ 

Later, in referring to Pinckney certain complaints, 
made by the merchants of Virginia, of sailors being 
taken from American vessels on the coast of Africa 
by the commander of a British armed vessel, Jefferson 

5 Jeiiferson to Pinckney, June ii, 1792; American State 
Papers, For. Rel, III., 574- 



IMPRESSMENT 5 

wrote: "So many instances of this kind have hap- 
pened, that it is quite necessary that their Govern- 
ment should explain themselves on the subject, and 
be led to disavow and punish such conduct."^ A 
month later he writes again with respect to the exercise 
of the practice and says: "It is unnecessary to de- 
velop to you the inconveniences of this conduct, and 
the impossibility of letting it go on."'' 

The inconveniences of impressment were brought 
to the attention of the American minister not alone 
through the correspondence of the Secretary of State, 
but through the hundreds of letters addressed to him 
by prisoners in the various prisons in England and in 
prison ships on the British coasts imploring his efforts 
for their release. Pinckney was successful in securing 
the discharge of most of the persons thus impressed, 
but he was unable to secure from the British Govern- 
ment any assurance of the discontinuance of the 
practice. 

When, in 1794, Jay was engaged in the negotiations 
relating to""!, convention for indemnities and for com- 
mercial arrangements, he alluded to the hardships suf- 
fered by American citizens under the practice of im- 
pressment. He expressed his confidence that the 

^Jefferson to Pinckney, Oct. 12, 1792; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 574. 

^Jefferson to Pinckney, Nov. 6, 1792; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 574. 



O IMPRESSMENT 

\ justice and benevolence of the King would lead him, 
j immediately, to liberate American citizens wrongfully 
detained and that His Majesty's officers, in the future, 
would abstain from such proceedings.V' 

Lord Grenville replied that if American seamen had 
been impressed into the King's service, it had been con- 
trary to the King's desire, though he admitted such 
cases might happen, owing to the difficulty of dis- 
criminating between British and American seamen. 
, American citizens, he stated, were invariably released 
and British officers understood that they were to use 
proper precaution.*^ No statement, however, upon im- 
pressment was contained in the treaty which was 
signed by Jay and Grenville. 

Impressment still continuing, the United States, in 
order to make all possible accommodation to prevent 
the excuse for the practice, passed a law. May 28, 
1796, which provided for certification of American 
seamen. Pickering, Secretary of State, transmitting 
this law to Rufus King, American minister at London, 
urged the importance of obtaining satisfaction from 
the British Government upon the subject of impress- 
ment. He expressed the opinion, as Jefferson had 
before, that the vessel should protect the seamen on 

8 Jay to Grenville, July 30, 1794 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., I., 481. 

9 Grenville to Jay, Aug. i, 1794; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., I., 481-482. 



IMPRESSMENT 7 

board ; but stated that he would regard it as a great 
advance if this principle could be secured merely on 
the high seas.^** 

He argued that the principle was needed in the in- 
terest of humanity, for the withdrawal of seamen on 
the ocean exposed hves and property to destruction as 
well as vessels, inasmuch as vessels usually carried no 
more sailors than they actually needed. The same 
principle, it was maintained, should operate also in the 
British colonies and especially in the West Indies, be- 
cause here the detention in consequence of impress- 
ment was attended with serious loss of life and prop- 
erty due to climatic conditions. The remoteness of 
these districts from the place of supreme authority 
made the danger of abuse greater than elsewhere. In 
lieu of impressment, it was suggested that a law might 
be passed requiring every master of a vessel, upon his 
arrival in any port of the British colonies, to report 
his crew at the proper office. If afterwards any addi- 
tions were made in the way of British subjects, these 
might be taken away. Impressment of British sub- 
jects found in ports of Great Britain and Ireland 
might be admitted, but this should be controlled by 
proper regulations to prevent insults and injuries and 
to insure prompt relief when mistakes occurred.^^ 

^° Pickering to King, June 8, 1796 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 574-575- 
11 Ibid. 



8 IMPRESSMENT 

Pickering differentiated three classes of men whom 
Great Britain had no right whatever to impress. These 
were native American citizens, American citizens 
wherever born who were such at the time of the 
definitive treaty of peace, and foreigners other than 
British subjects saiHng in American vessels. A fourth 
class in connection with the question of impressment 
consisted of British born subjects who had become 
American citizens subsequent to the treaty of peace, or 
might thereafter be admitted to the rights of citizen- 
ship. These were not to be abandoned by the United 
States, but certain classes especially deserved the pro- 
tection of the American Government, such as those 
who had served in American vessels public or private 
for the same term of years as that in which foreigners 
serving in British vessels acquired the rights of British 
subjects, which was understood to be three years, and 
those persons, originally British subjects, who had 
resided in the United States for five years and had been 
formally admitted to the rights of citizenship according 
to the laws of the United States. Inasmuch as sailors 
were likely to lose their certificates, Pickering believed 
that some provision should be made for the admission 
of other reasonable proof of their citizenship, such 
as their own oaths with those of their masters, mates, 
or other credible witnesses. He proposed that the 
rolls of the crew should be authenticated by the col- 
lector of customs and that these then should be ad- 



IMPRESSMENT 9 

mitted with equal validity with the individual cer- 
tificates.^^ 

When reporting to King several cases of impress- x 
ment of seamen from American vessels in the fall 
of 1796, Pickering again urged the importance of 
taking up the question with the British Government.^^ 
In a letter to King, October 26, 1796, he pointed out 
that the British naval officers had impressed Swedes, 
Danes, Portuguese, and French, which showed that 
impressment of sailors was not confined to Americans, 
who were claimed to resemble Englishmen so closely 
that it was impossible always to distinguish.^* He 
complained that Americans were not so promptly re- 
leased as hitherto owing to the fact that writs of 
habeas corpus taken out by American agents were 
no longer given recognition by the British authorities. 

In order to avoid the friction attendant upon the im- 
pressment of American citizens under the supposition 
that they were British subjects. Minister King pro- 
posed to the British Government that American consuls 
should be authorized to grant certificates of citizenship 
to such American seamen as should prove themselves 
entitled to receive them, and British naval officers 

12 Pickering to King, June 8, 1796; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 574-575- 

13 Pickering to King, Sept. 10, 1796; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 575- 

1* Pickering to King, Oct. zd, 1796 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 575- 



V 



lO IMPRESSMENT 

should be instructed by their Government to respect 
such certificates.^^ 

The British Government objected to King's proposal 
as afifording no sufficient security that British subjects 
would not be protected under the guise of American 
citizenship. They similarly objected to the general law 
that Congress had passed with regard to certification 
of American seamen and also to the order which the 
President had issued to the collectors of the several 
districts prescribing the evidence on which certificates 
of citizenship might be granted by such collectors. It 
was held that the proposed method was subject to the 
greatest possible abuse and that practice founded on 
this arrangement " would not differ at all in its effect 
and consequences, though in name and appearance it 
might, from a resolution to discharge at once every 
British seaman on his own assertion, that he is an 
American citizen."^® 

In the spring of 1799 King again protested to Lord 
Grenville, as he had on former occasions, against the 
indiscriminate seizure of seamen from American 
vessels on the high seas. Grenville gave no satisfaction 
that it would stop, but promised that all Americans 
who by mistake had been seized should be discharged 

15 King to Grenville, Jan. 28, 1797 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., II., 147-148. 

16 Grenville to King, March 27, 1797; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., II., 148-150. 



IMPRESSMENT II 

upon application. The American minister considered 
this of Uttle account. Indeed, said he, " to acquiesce 

in it is to give up the right."^^ 

^ The following year John Marshall, then Secretary 
of State, wrote a most able letter to King in which 
he discussed the American position upon the subject of 
impressment. He said : " The United States therefore 
require positively that their seamen who are not British 
subjects, whether born in America or elsewhere, shall 
be exempt from impressments. The case of British 
subjects, whether naturalized or not, is more question- 
able ; but the right even to impress them is denied. 
. . . Alien seamen, not British subjects, engaged in 
our merchant service, ought to be equally exempt with 
citizens from impressment."^^ Here we have set forth 
the two principal objections which the United States 
maintained to the British practice of impressment. 
One was the actual seizure of American seamen under 
the claim of taking British deserters, and the second 
was the right of searching neutral vessels on the high 
seas for deserting seamen. 1 If these two points could 
have been kept distinct throughout the negotiations, it 
might have been easier to come to an agreement upon 
the subject of impressment. As to the impressment 
of American seamen. Great Britain, in general, dis- 

i''^ King to Pickering, March 15, 1799; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 583. 

18 Marshall to King, Sept. 20, 1800; American State Papers, 
For. Rel, II., 486-490. 



12 IMPRESSMENT 

claimed any such intention, so that it should not have 
been impossible to adjust that point. With respect to 
the right of search, each nation might have agreed to 
enact a law compelling the commanders or masters of 
vessels to surrender deserters to the nation from which 
they had deserted. 

Complaint was made by the British Government to 
the so-called "protections" given American seamen, 
on the ground that they were frequently fraudulent in 
their intentions and were granted without a proper 
examination of facts by inferior magistrates and 
notaries. These, it was held, could easily be procured 
by natural born British subjects who wished to desert 
the service of their own country. Under such circum- 
stances it was not to be expected that the commanders 
of British ships of war should pay any regard to such 
papers. As a means of allaying the present trouble it 
was proposed that there be no refuge allowed in the 
territory or vessel of either party to deserters from the 
other state, and that all such deserters be delivered up 
on demand to the commander of the vessel from which 
the desertion had been made or to the commanding 
officers of the ships of war of the respective nations, or 
to such other persons as might be duly authorized to 
make requisition on their behalf, provided proof were 
made that the deserters so demanded were actually 
part of the crew of the vessel in question. Consuls 
and vice-consuls, it was stated, might cause the arrest 



i 



IMPRESSMENT 1 3 

of those who had deserted from their country, apply- 
ing to the courts for the necessary power, to be granted 
upon proper proofs. Neither of the parties was to 
demand the delivery of any sailors or subjects or 
citizens belonging to the other party who had been 
employed on board the vessels of either of the nations, 
and who had in time of war voluntarily entered the 
service of their own sovereign or nation, or who had 
been compelled to enter such service. It was proposed 
that the two states should agree to adopt effectual 
measures for the apprehension and delivery of desert- 
ing seamen, and that public ships of war, forts, garri- 
sons, or posts should not forcibly be entered to compel 
the delivery of such persons as might have deserted. ^^ 
This proposal would have appeared to recognize the 
pretensions of the British claims to impressment with 
reference to merchant vessels. The American Secre- 
tary of State, being desirous of acceding to the main 
proposition but unwilling to grant an indirect sanction 
to the principle always denied by the American Gov- 
ernment, offered a counter-project which contained 
reciprocal engagements for the surrender of deserters 
upon condition that the practice of impressment should 
be discontinued in respect to private vessels as well as 
public vessels.^" 

i» Listen to Pickering, Feb. 4, 1800; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 5/6-577. 

20 Pickering to Liston, May 3, 1800; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 577-578. 



14 IMPRESSMENT 

The purpose of the proposed scheme for the mutual 
restoration of deserting seamen being so desirable in 
order to remove the alleged necessity of Great Britain'^ 
resorting to impressment, the President submitted the 
question to the other members of his Cabinet for sug- 
gestions. Secretary Wolcott of the Treasury thought 
that the British proposal did not sufficiently provide 
against the impressment of seamen, and he proposed 
a counter-project similar to that of the Secretary of 
State. He suggested that the proof of desertion should 
be required within two years from its occurrence. He 
thought that the commander or other officers should 
not be empowered to enter a public or private vessel 
of the other party on the high seas ; and that it should 
be " expressly declared to be the understanding of the 
contracting parties, that the mutual restitutions of 
persons claimed as deserters shall only be made by the 
free and voluntary consent of the military officers em- 
ployed in the land service, or the commanders of the 
public or private ships or vessels of the two parties, or 
in pursuance of the decisions of the courts.""^ The 
Secretary of War objected to the British minister's 
proposal that the United States should demand the de- 
livery of such seamen as had been employed on board 
British vessels and who had in time of war or threat- 
ened hostilities voluntarily entered the British service, 

21 Wolcott to Adams, April 14, 1800; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 579. 



IMPRESSMENT 



15 



or who had been compelled to enter it according 
to the law and practice of Great Britain.^^ The 
Attorney-General expressed his concurrence with the 
project as drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury.^^ 
The Secretary of the Navy agreed with the proposed 
reply of the Secretary of State. He considered that 
the British proposal secured to Great Britain all that it 
could desire, but that it afforded no security to the 
United States against the practice of which the United 
States complained. The Secretary of the Navy pre- 
ferred to have no article rather than not to include in 
it the prohibition of impressment from merchant 
vessels on the high seas.^* The opinions of the 
Cabinet displayed the degree of unity of American 
sentiment upon the subject of impressment. Great 
Britain, however, paid little attention to American 
feeling, and the proposal of the Secretary of State was 
rejected; but when the general pacification of Europe 
occurred in 1801, and the treaty of Amiens brought a 
respite to British ships of war, impressment ceased for 
the time as there was no need of the practice to secure 
sailors. 

Minister King, who during the war had endeavored V^ 

22McHenry to Adams, April 18, 1800; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 579-580. 

23 Lee to Adams, April 30, 1800; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 581. 

24 Stoddart to Adams, April 23, 1800; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 580. 



1 6 IMPRESSMENT 

to obtain an agreement that, after hostilities should 
cease, neither party would upon the high seas impress 
or take any seamen or other persons out of the vessels 
of the other, continued to urge the subject upon the 
British Government. When it appeared likely that 
war between Great Britain and France would be re- 
newed, King prevailed upon Lord Hawkesbury, British 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Lord Vincent, First 
Lord of the Admiralty, to consent to a convention which 
provided against impressment in the following terms: 
" No seamen nor seafaring person shall, upon the high 
seas and without the jurisdiction of either party, be 
demanded or taken out of any ship or vessel belonging 
to the citizens or subjects of one of the parties, by the 
public or private armed ships or men of war belonging 
to, or in the navy of the other party ; and strict orders 
shall be given for the due observance of this engage- 
ment."^^ Each state was to prohibit its citizens or 
subjects from carrying away from the territories or 
colonial possessions of the other any seamen belonging 
to such other ports. The treaty was to be in force for 
five years. 

Before this treaty was actually signed the British 
commissioners, after consultation with Sir William 
Scott, the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, pro- 
posed that the narrow seas should be excepted in the 

25 King to Secretary of State, July, 1803; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., II., 503-504- 



IMPRESSMENT 1/ 

operation of the article. With that exception they ex- 
pressed their willingness to sign the convention. King 
considered this action as a mere subterfuge and an 
extravagant pretension for Great Britain to revive the 
doctrine of mare clausum. He felt compelled "to 
abandon the negotiation, rather than to acquiesce in 
the doctrine it proposed to establish." King returned 
to the United States in the summer of 1803 and was 
succeeded by James Monroe, who had been appointed 
April 18 of that year. 

In the instructions given to Monroe with reference 
to a treaty, which it was hoped that he might be able 
to negotiate, all other questions in dispute were to be 
omitted, if only agreement could be secured on im- 
pressment, blockades, visit and search, contraband, and 
trade with the enemies' colonies. ^^ 

The Secretary of State enclosed a projet of a treaty 
giving the articles both as the American Government 
would prefer that they should be, and also as they 
might ultimately be agreed upon, if the British Govern- 
ment insisted. The first article of the projet dealt 
with impressment. In the preferred form it was pro- 
vided that no person should " upon the high seas and 
without the jurisdiction of either party, be demanded 
or taken out of any ship or vessel belonging to citizens 
or subjects of one of the parties, by the public or 

2*5 Madison to Monroe, Jan. 5, 1804; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 81-89. 



f 



1 8 IMPRESSMENT 

private armed ships belonging to, or in the service of, 
the other, unless such person be at the time in the 
military service of an enemy of such other party."^'^ 
In the article used as an ultimatum it was provided, in 
addition to the foregoing statement, " it is to be under- 
stood that this article shall not exempt any person on 
board the ships of either of the parties from being 
taken therefrom by the other party, in cases where 
they may be liable to be so taken according to the 
laws of nations, which liability, however, shall not 
be construed to extend in any case to seamen, or 
seafaring persons being actually part of the crew of 
the vessel in which they may be, nor to persons of any 
description passing from one port to another port of 
either of the parties." A second article provided that 
subjects or citizens of one state, being in the dominions 
of the other, should not be compelled to serve on board 
of any vessel public or private belonging to the other 
party; and all subjects or citizens serving under com- 
pulsion should be liberated forthwith. 

In communicating this project. Secretary Madison 
discussed the alleged right of impressment on the 
part of Great Britain. The right was denied, first, 
because no treaties, British or other, could be found to 
sanction it. ! Whilst treaties " admit a contraband 
of war by enumerating its articles, and the effect of a 

2'^ Madison to Monroe, Jan. S, 1804; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 81-89. 



IMPRESSMENT 1 9 

real blockade by defining it, in no instance do they 
afifirm or imply a right in any sovereign to enforce his 
claims to the allegiance of his subjects on board neutral 
vessels on the high seas ; on the contrary, whenever 
a belligerent claim against persons on board a neutral, 
vessel is referred to in treaties, enemies in military! 
service alone are excepted from the general immunity 
of persons in that situation; and this exception con-* 
firms the immunity of those who are not included \ 
in it."28 

If there be a right of allegiance in time of war, it v^ 
was averred, the same must exist in time of peace, 
and the exercise of sovereign rights outside of the 
nation's jurisdiction in time of war would imply a 
corresponding exercise of power in time of peace. 
The law of allegiance upon which the principle of im- 
pressment was built up by Great Britain, Madison 
maintained, was a municipal law and as such was not 
rightfully enforceable outside of the jurisdiction of 
Great Britain; that if it might be enforced on board 
foreign vessels on the high seas with regard to persons, 
it might with equal propriety be enforced against 
articles of property if these were exported in violation 
of a domestic law. Thus every commercial regulation 
in time of peace as well as of war would be obligatory 
upon foreigners and their vessels, not only within the 

28 Madison to Monroe, Jan. 5, 1804; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 81-89. 



20 IMPRESSMENT 

jurisdiction of a given state, but in every sea, at an) 
distance, where an armed vessel might be met with. 
The admission of the practice of impressment, it was 
shown, impHed the right of search for such subjects, 
and this was the source of serious inconvenience. 
Madison argued that the alleged right was not only 
unsupported by treaties, but that every principle of 
justice and reason was against the practice. By its 
exercise persons were deprived of a regular trial which 
was granted when property was involved, and decisions 
were left to the caprice and personal interest of 
officers, when such decisions in the case of property 
were made by an impartial court, not by the captain 
himself.^^ 

It was pointed out that the very resemblance of 
American and British seamen, which the British Gov- 
ernment alleged as one of the reasons for the enforce- 
ment of impressment, made it more important not to 
leave the decision to interested officers. Madison de- 
clared that, if the practice were to be allowed, the most 
obvious and just rule would be to require that proof 
of allegiance be made, instead of the reverse which 
had been the British practice. The inconsistency of 
Great Britain's action with reference to impressment 
was clearly shown. She had herself refused to give 
up American seamen who had voluntarily engaged in 

29 Madison to Monroe, Jan. S, 1804; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 81-89. 



IMPRESSMENT 21 

her service ; she had also refused to release impressed 
American citizens if they had either settled or married 
within British dominions.^'' 

The Secretary of State held that the British practice 
of impressment was much less needful than was com- 
monly supposed, as the number of British seamen em- 
ployed upon American vessels was never large. Of the 
2059 cases of impressment from 1797 to 1801 only 102 
had been detained as being British subjects; 1042 were 
discharged as not being British subjects ; while 805 
others were detained for further proof, with the pre- 
sumption in favor of American citizenship. Thus it 
was evident that for every British seaman gained 
through impressment ten others were made victims 
of this system. Monroe was instructed not to admit 
the narrow sea jurisdiction which had been proposed 
in the former negotiation.^^ 1_ 

In a letter a few weeks later Madison notified s^ 
Monroe that the boundary treaty negotiated by King 
with Lord Hawkesbury, May 12, 1803, had been rati- 
fied with the exception of the fifth article. Monroe was 
instructed to proceed to the exchange of ratifications 
if the British Government consented to accede to the 
change.^^ The objection made to the fifth article 

30 Madison to Monroe, Jan. 5, 1804; American State Papers, 
For. Rel, III., 8i-8g. 

31 Ibid. 

32 Madison to Monroe, Feb. 14, 1804; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 89-90. 



22 • IMPRESSMENT 

arose from the fact that the signature and ratifications 
of the treaty were made subsequent to the treaty with 
France ceding Louisiana to the United States, and it 
was feared that the line to be run in pursuance of the 
fifth article might be found to abridge the northern 
extent of the Louisiana acquisition. The British Gov- 
ernment subsequently refusing to accede to this ex- 
ception, the treaty remained unratified. 
V', Monroe, on April 2, 1804, informed Lord Hawkes- 
bury of his instructions to negotiate a treaty covering 
the disputed maritime questions.] He found Hawkes- 
bury friendly and apparently in sympathy with the 
objects proposed. Hawkesbury requested from Mon-> 
roe a projet of a treaty which he promised upon receiv- 
ing to submit to the Cabinet. Monroe complied with 
the request, and submitted a projet in the form which 
Madison had directed. This provided against im-'i 
pressment on the high seas except in case of persons 
at the time in the military service of an enemy of the 
impressing state. , Provision was made against com- 
pelling a subject or citizen of one state being within 
another state to serve on board the vessels of the latter 
state; and all so held were to be liberated and given 
adequate compensation for their return home. As a 
complementary article to that upon impressment was 
one providing for the mutual restoration of deserters. 
The treaty also included articles upon the procedure in 
the exercise of the right of search and definition of 



IMPRESSMENT 23 

blockaded ports. It was proposed that the treaty 
should be in force for five years.^^ 

Shortly after this pro jet was presented changes oc- 
curred in the British Cabinet which postponed any con- 
sideration of the American claims. Lord Harrowby 
replaced Lord Hawkesbury as Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, and Lord Melville took the place of Lord Vin- 
cent at the head of the Admiralty. During the last 
weeks of the old Ministry, when a change was ex- 
pected, Monroe thought it useless to press matters. 
Two months passed after the new Ministry came into 
power, and no attention was given to the American 
pro jet submitted to Lord Hawkesbury, or to the con- 
sideration of the treaty on boundaries which had been 
referred to the British Government. Lord Harrowby 
when informed of the change in the treaty of bound- 
aries protested against the American method of ratify- 
ing parts of a treaty, which he declared to be " new, 
unautliorized, and not to be sanctioned."^* 

Monroe found Lord Harrowby less friendly than his 
predecessor. He reported to Madison that " the con- 
duct of Lord Harrowby through the whole of this con- 
ference was calculated to wound and to irritate. Not 
a friendly sentiment towards the United States or their 

33 Monroe to Madison. April 15, 1804; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 91-92. 

34 Monroe to Madison, June 3, 1804; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 92-94. 



24 IMPRESSMENT 

Government escaped him.' . . . ' Every thing that he 
said was uttered in an unfriendly tone, and much more 
was apparently meant than was said."^^- Monroe ex- 
pressed his surprise at a deportment of which he had 
seen no example before since he arrived in the country. 
He considered that the subjects of the negotiations 
were indefinitely postponed. 

The British Cabinet at this time were discussing a 
coalition of Great Britain with the northern Powers, 
especially Russia and Sweden. With such coalition 
in view it was considered by Monroe that the tone of 
the British Government to neutral Powers would be 
less friendly. The American minister was, however, 
strongly in favor of peace with Great Britain " from 
a knowledge," as he wrote, "that much expense and 
injury must result from war, while it is impossible for 
us to derive any advantage from it," yet he asserted 
the need of firmness in councils against Great Britain 
to resist and to punish the injuries inflicted by her.^^ 

On August 3, Monroe had a conference with Lord 
Harrowby during which he again urged the supreme 
importance of a satisfactory adjustment of the im- 
pressment question. A month later the subject was 
again presented by Monroe in the form of a treaty 

35 Monroe to Madison, June 3, 1804; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 92-94. 

36 Ibid. 



^11 



IMPRESSMENT 2$ 

which he proposed for adoption. Lord Harrowby 
promised to submit the proposition to the Cabinet. In 
the proposed treaty Monroe omitted the article on 
contraband which had been suggested by Madison, be- 
cause he considered it hkely that such an article would 
bring into discussion the subject of provisions, which 
it was to the interest of the United States not to admit. 
The article upon procedure in prize courts was also 
omitted because it conformed to the existing practice, 
and needed no agreement upon the subject.^' 

Monroe, receiving no response from Lord Harrowby, 
was in doubt whether to consider the negotiation at an 
end or to consider it merely suspended.^^ He felt that 
there were objections to the first course, because a 
declaration to Lord Harrowby that the negotiation was 
ended would imply that it had failed in its object and 
might appear to be a sort of rupture between the two 
countries; and in the second place a measure of such 
tone was too strong for the previous note of the 
British minister, which had sought only delay, and in 
a conciliatory manner. It might, he thought, cause a 
resentment on the part of the Ministry and perhaps 
of the country in view of the condition of British 
affairs at the time. Again, he considered that such a 
measure with the implications connected with it was 

^■^ Monroe to Madison, Sept. 8, 1804; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 95-97. 

38 Monroe to Madison, Oct. 3, 1804; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 98-99. 



26 IMPRESSMENT 

not justified by fact or the true interest of the United 
States. The negotiation had not failed in its great 
objects, for American commerce never was so much 
favored as during the last three years, nor was there 
ever less cause of complaint furnished by impressment. 
Such a declaration, it was conceived, would be contrary 
to the spirit in which the negotiation had been begun, 
and would not be authorized by the instructions. 
Further, if the negotiation was kept open, it would be 
easier for the United States to renew it at any time. 
For these reasons Monroe decided to meet the friendly 
sentiments of Lord Harrowby with like sentiments, 
and, while regretting the delay, to admit that the state 
of affairs might impose it.^^ 

Monroe thought that employing moderation while 
still making earnest efforts to settle all differences by 
peaceful measures would strengthen the American 
Government in any of the most vigorous measures 
which might be thought necessary. "A virtuous and 
free people," said he, " will be more united in support 
of such measures, however strong they may be, when 
they see, by the clearest evidence, that the cause is not 
only just, but that their Government has done every 
thing in its power which the national honor and 
interest would permit, to avoid such an extremity."*" 

3» Monroe to Madison, Oct. 3, 1804; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 98-99. 
40 Ibid. 



IMPRESSMENT 2/ 

From the Treaty of Amiens, March, 1802, to the / 
middle of 1804, the United States had had little cause 
for complaint with regard to commerce and impress- 
ment, but during the last six months of 1804 the 
British practice again created a most serious condi- 
tion, which steadily grew worse throughout the follow- 
ing year. In the spring of 1805 Madison again wrote 
to Monroe urging the necessity of securing some relief 
from the practice of impressment. He said: "The 
experience of every day shows more and more the 
obligation on both sides to enter seriously on the means 
of guarding the harmony of the two countries against 
the dangers with which it is threatened, by a persever- 
ance of Great Britain in her irregularities on the high 
seas, and particularly in the impressments from Ameri- 
can vessels."*/ He mentioned the growing sensibility 
in the United States on the subject of impressment, 
seen in the vote of the House of Representatives call- 
ing upon the Department of State to submit papers 
dealing with impressment and in the passage of an act 
of Congress authorizing certain proceedings against 
British officers committing on the high seas trespasses 
or torts on board American vessels. 

After the interruption in the negotiations between 
Monroe and Lord Harrowby, in September, 1804, it 
was nearly a year before the consideration of impress- 

*i Madison to Monroe, March 6, 1805 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 99-101. 



28 IMPRESSMENT 

ment could be renewed. Monroe was absent from 
London from October, 1804, until the following sum- 
mer, having been appointed special minister to adjust 
the controversy between the United States and Spain 
with respect to the boundaries of the newly acquired 
territory of Louisiana. Upon his return he attempted 
to renew the negotiations with Lord Mulgrave, who 
now held the office of Secretary of Foreign Affairs. 
Monroe found this gentleman as little inclined as his 
predecessor to agree upon any arrangement upon im- 
pressment which would be satisfactory to the United 
States."- 

The American minister from the treatment which 
he had received felt that the attitude of Great Britain 
towards the United States at this time was one of 
studied delay, designed to subject American commerce 
to every restraint in its power. He attributed the 
attitude of Great Britain to her great jealousy of the 
increasing prosperity of the United States and to her 
determination to leave nothing untried which would 
tend to impair that prosperity.J Great Britain's indif- 
ference to the United States, Monroe conceived, arose 
from the general feeling in Great Britain that a popular 
government, such as the United States, would be 
utterly incapable of any vigorous or persevering action 
and in consequence would be unable to resist a system 

*2 Monroe to Madison, Oct. 18, 1805; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 106-108. 



IMPRESSMENT 29 

of commercial hostility on the part of Great Britain, 
but must yield. Monroe, though in favor of peace, 
would not shrink from war if that should be neces- 
sary. [He urged that the United States ofifer resistance 
to the British seizures even at the risk of war. " Per- 
haps no time," said he, " was ever more favorable for 
resisting these unjust encroachments than the present 
one. ; The conduct of our Government is universally 
known to have been just, friendly, and conciliating 
towards Great Britain, while the attack by her Gov- 
ernment on the United States is as universally known 
to be unjust, wanton, and unprovoked. The measure 
has wounded deeply the interests of many of her own 
people, and is not a popular one. The United States 
furnish them at all times one of the best markets for 
their manufactures, and at present almost the only 
one. Her colonies are dependent on us. Harassed 
as they are already with war, and the menaces of a 
powerful adversary, a state of hostility with us would 
probably go far to throw this country into confusion. 
It is an event which the ministry would find it difficult 
to resist, and therefore cannot, I presume, be willing 
to encounter."^^ 

With a change in the British Ministry, caused by the 
death of Pitt in January, 1806, it was thought by 
Monroe that American interests might receive more 
favorable attention. While the King wanted to ap- 

^3 Monroe to Madison, Oct. 18, 1805 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 106-108. 



30 - IMPRESSMENT 

point Lord Hawkesbury in Pitt's place, he was obliged 
to yield to the opposition, and so appointed Lord Gren- 
ville Prime Minister and Charles Fox Secretary of 
■; Foreign Affairs. Though Fox was a man of liberal 
views and had shown in the American Revolution 
most pronounced favoritism for the United States, 'Jt \ 
was soon discovered that not even he could avail 
against the pronounced and prejudiced views of the 
body of English statesmen upon the subject of im- 
pressment and neutral trade. In the Cabinet were 
several who had differed with Fox on former occasions 
in respect to the policy of 'Great Britain towards the 
United States. In the first interviews with Fox, Mon- 
roe was extremely hopeful of being able to accomplish 
something satisfactory, especially with regard to the 
trade with the colonies of England's enemies.^* In his 
hopefulness of the outcome Monroe advised that for 
the present no hostile measures be adopted by Congress, 
and if any should have been adopted that their execu- 
tion be postponed.*^ Monroe discussed with Fox the 
various matters in dispute between the two countries, 
such as the rights of neutral trade, impressment, and 
boundaries. In reviewing the history of the negotia- 
tion on impressment he explained the project which had 

** Monroe to Madison, Feb. 12, 1806; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 112-113. 

*5 Monroe to Madison, Feb. 28, 1806; American State Papers, 
For. Rel, III., 113. 



IMPRESSMENT 3 1 

been offered to Lord Hawkesbiiry as intended "to 
prevent abuses and the ill consequences incident to 
them, not to acquire any advantage to the United 
States by the establishment of controverted principles 
in the one, or unreasonable pretensions in the other 
case." 

The seriousness of the situation, rather than con- 
fidence in a friendly disposition on the part of the 
British Ministry,'! led the American Government, in the 
spring of 1806, to appoint William Pinkney and James 
Monroe as Commissioners Extraordinary and Plenipo- 
tentiary " to settle all matters of difference between the 
United States and the united kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, relative to wrongs committed between the 
parties on the high seas, or other waters, and for estab- 
lishing the principles of navigation and commerce 
between them."*® In the instructions to Monroe and 
Pinkney, given May 17, 1806, Madison stated that the 
President insisted upon some adequate provision re- 
garding impressment as indispensable to any stipula- 
tion requiring a repeal of the act shutting the market of 
the United States against certain British manufactures. 
The commissioners might substitute for the ultimatum 
upon impressment given in the instructions of January 
5, 1804, the following: "No seamen nor seafaring 

^6 Monroe to Fox, Feb. 25, 1806; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 113-114. Madison to Monroe, April 23, 1806; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 117. 



32 . IMPRESSMENT 

persons shall, upon the high seas, and without the juris- 
diction of either party, be demanded or taken out of 
any ship or vessel belonging to the citizens or subjects 
of one of the parties, by the public or private armed 
ships or men of war, belonging to or in the service of 
the other party ; and strict orders shall be given for 
the due observance of this engagement."*^ These were 
the terms of the article agreed to by King and Hawkes- 
bury, which had been frustrated through the insist- 
ence by Lord St. Vincent, First Lord of the Admiralty, 
that an exception be made to its application in the case 
of the narrow seas. 

Shortly after the arrival of Pinkney, Fox was taken 
seriously ill and the negotiation was in consequence 
delayed. Finally, Lord Auckland and Lord Holland 
were appointed commissioners to treat with the Ameri- 
can ministers. This news was communicated to the 
American commissioners at a dinner given b}^ Lord 
Grenville at which were present, besides the Ameri- 
cans, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Howick, Lord Auck- 
land, Lord Holland, Erskine, and others of distinction. 
At this meeting. Lord Auckland invited Monroe and 
Pinkney to visit him in the country, saying, " I trust 
we shall be able to do some good to mankind, if your 
powers are sufficiently extensive."*^ 

^■^ Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 17, 1806; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 1 19-124. 

48 Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Aug. 15, 1806; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 132. 



IMPRESSMENT 33 

In formally announcing the appointment of Lord 
Auckland and Lord Holland, Fox observed that " His 
Majesty, in this appointment of commissioners, has 
given a fresh proof of his most anxious and constant 
desire to bring to a speedy termination all discussions 
between the two countries, and to form such arrange- 
ments as may tend to render perpetual a system of 
mutual friendship and cordiality so conducive to the 
honor and interests of both."*^ This language was, of 
course, purely formal. 

On August 28 the commissioners of the two coun- 
tries met and discussed the various controverted sub- 
jects. Four days later the British requested to learn 
more precisely the American views and particularly 
to be informed as to what stipulation in connection 
with impressment was proposed for restoring British 
seamen who had deserted. The American commis- 
sioners presented as a project on this point the form 
contained in the instructions to Monroe in January, 
1804, providing for the mutual restoration of deserters 
and a renunciation of impressment.^^ 

The British ministers manifested a strong aversion 
to any formal renunciation or abandonment of their 
alleged claims to impressment, and they urged as a 

49 Fox to Monroe, Aug. 20, 1806; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 132. 

50 Monroe and Pinkney to Holland, Sept. 10, 1806; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 136-137. 



34 ■ IMPRESSMENT 

substitute for such an abandonment a promise that the 
persons composing the crews of American ships should 
be furnished with authentic documents of citizenship, 
the nature and form of which should be settled by 
treaty ; that these documents should completely protect 
those to whom they related ; but that subject to such 
protections,, the ships of war of Great Britain should 
continue to visit and impress on the high seas as ' 
before. ^^ The American commissioners took the posi- 
tion that it was impossible for the United States to 
allow the practice as it was derogatory to the rights of 
sovereignty.. An interval of two months now elapsed 
during which the negotiations were suspended owing 
to the critical illness and death of Fox, who was the 
uncle of Lord Holland. 

When the American commissioners again reported 
to their home Government, November ii, 1806, they 
had not yet abandoned all hopes of securing a satis- 
factory arrangement upon some of the points in dis- 
pute, but they admitted that there was an insurmount- 
able difificulty attached to the subject of impressment.^". 
They said that they had advanced every argument 
possible and had proposed every suitable expedient that 
they could devise, consistent with the principle, to 

SI Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Sept. 11, 1806; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 133-135. 

s2 Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Nov. 11, 1806; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 137-140. 



IMPRESSMENT 35 

obviate the inconveniences that were urged on both 
sides as likely to result from its admission, but that 
all their efforts had been without avail. ' The British 
still insisted upon the right of their Government to 
seize its subjects on board neutral merchant vessels 
on the high seas, and maintained that the relinquish- 
ment of the right at that time would go far to over- 
throw their naval power, upon which the safety of their 
state essentially depended.' The American proposition 
to give the aid of the local authorities of the United 
States to apprehend and restore deserters from their 
vessels in exchange for a renunciation of the claim 
to impressment, the British held, did not afford an 
adequate remedy for the evil complained of. De- 
serters, it was alleged, might go into the country, but 
would more likely go on board American vessels im- 
mediately putting out to sea, where the American flag 
would then protect them. Desertions were also likely 
to occur in neutral ports, in which case the law pro- 
posed would be unavailing. The British urged the 
American commissioners to stipulate that Congress 
would pass a law (to be reciprocal) which should 
make it a penal offense for the commanders of an 
American vessel to receive British subjects deserting 
from a vessel of Great Britain, and which should 
provide that these be restored upon their arrival in 
the United States on suitable application. The Amer- 
ican ministers expressed their willingness to provide 



2,6 IMPRESSMENT 

a remedy, which they considered was found in the pro- 
posed article for mutual restoration of deserters. The 
British objecting that the term deserters was not suffi- 
ciently broad and suggesting the addition of the words 
" seafaring people quitting their service," the Ameri- 
cans acquiesced in the change. The British commis- 
sioners then appeared to give their consent to the 
article upon impressment, but when it was presented to 
the Cabinet it was at once rejected, the Board of 
Admiralty and the Crown officers being opposed to it. 
The American ministers no longer had hopes of secur- 
ing any satisfactory stipulation on impressment. 

Later, the British commissioners proposed as a 
counter-project the passage of laws which, on the one 
hand, should make it penal for British commanders to 
impress American citizens on board American vessels 
on the high seas, and on the other hand, should make 
it penal for the officers of the United States to grant 
certificates of citizenship to British subjects. As this 
proposition would not stop the exercise of the practice 
of impressing British subjects upon American vessels, 
the American commissioners regarded it as inadequate 
and refused to consider it. It would fail, they said, to 
remedy the evils and would be an abandonment of their 
rights.^* The British commissioners stated that, while 
their Government could not disclaim or derogate from 

S3 Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Nov. ii, 1806; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 137-140. 



IMPRESSMENT 37 

a right which had been uniformly maintained and in the 
exercise of which the security of the British navy 
might be involved, they had, nevetheless, authorized 
their commissioners to give the most positive assurance 
that instructions had been given and should be re- 
peated and enforced for the observance of the greatest 
caution in impressing seamen.^* 

The British proposing that they proceed to the other 
subjects, leaving impressment out of the question for 
the time, the American commissioners consented, be- 
lieving that it was the intention of the British Govern- 
ment no longer to exercise the practice of impress- 
ment, but that they were merely unwilling to renounce 
a claim which had long been held valid. Monroe 
believed that the informal explanation of the British 
commissioners upon impressment was sufficient to 
warrant the American commissioners in going forward 
with the other questions. He considered such action 
justifiable because by it the rights of the parties were 
reserved and the negotiations could be continued on 
those particular topics, after a treaty should have been 
formed upon the others. Great Britain, he maintained, 
would be bound not to trespass on those rights while 
that negotiation was depending; and in case she did 
trespass on them, in the slightest degree, the United 
States would be justified in breaking off the negotia- 

5* Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Nov. ir, 1806; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 137-140. 



\.- 



38 IMPRESSMENT 

tions and appealing to force in vindication of her 
rights.^'' " The mere circumstance," said he, " of 
entertaining an amicable negotiation by one party for 
the adjustment of a controversy, where no right had 
been acknowledged in it, by the other, gives to the 
latter a just claim to such a forbearance on the part of 
the former. But the entertainment of a negotiation for 
the express purpose of securing interests sanctioned by 
acknowledged rights, makes such claim irresistible."^'' 

With impressment removed from the discussion, the 
commissioners were not long in coming to an agree- 
ment upon the other subjects and a formal treaty was 
concluded. This treaty, signed December 31, 1806, 
contained provisions which were in many respects 
more favorable to the United States than those con- 
tained in the Jay treaty of 1794.^^ 

While the negotiations were in progress news came 
of the Berlin decree, which was issued November 21. 
The purpose of this decree was to injure Great Britain 
through an attack upon her commercial trade. The 
British Government claimed that for neutrals to sub- 
mit to this decree would be to concur in the hostile 
object of the enemy. Therefore the British commis- 

^5 Monroe to Madison, Feb. 28, 1808 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., i73-i83- 

56 Ibid. 

5" Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 3, 1807 ; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 142-147- 



IMPRESSMENT 39 

sioners were instructed to secure assurance from the 
Americans that the United States would not allow 
its trade with Great Britain to be interfered with 
without resistance. The American commissioners 
were unable to make any such assurances, which would 
have virtually allied the United States with Great 
Britain in hostile opposition to France. Holland and 
Auckland, when signing the treaty, presented a protest 
against the Berlin decree, reserving to the British Gov- 
ernment the right, should the decree be actually en- 
forced against neutrals and be submitted to by them, 
to take such measures of retaliation as might be deemed 
expedient.^® In transmitting the note to Washington 
the American representatives said, " We do not con- 
sider ourselves a party to it, or as having given it in any 
the slightest degree our sanction. "^^ The treaty failed 
to provide not only against impressment, but also for 
the settlement of indemnities claimed by the United 
States against Great Britain. The British had objected 
to the American claims on the ground of the appear- 
ance of coercion. An offer had been made to consider 
them later. 

President Jefferson, upon receiving intimation from , 
the American commissioners that they were about to ■ 

S8 Note from Holland and Auckland, Dec. 31, 1806; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 151-152. 

^* Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 3, 1807; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 142-147 



40 IMPRESSMENT 

proceed to the negotiation of a treaty with merely an 
informal understanding upon impressment, at once ob- 
jected to the plan as not comporting with his views 
of national sentiment or legislative policy.*''' In the 
opinion of the President it was better that the negotia- 
tion should terminate without any formal compact 
whatever if no stipulation regarding impressment could 
be secured. Under such circumstances the commis- 
sioners were instructed to terminate the negotiation 
with merely an informal, friendly understanding upon 
the subjects under discussion. As long as this rela- 
tionship should be duly respected in practice, particu- 
larly with reference to neutral trade and impressment, 
the United States would refrain from putting the non- 
importation act into operation. The British commis- 
sioners in the course of their negotiations had alleged 
that there were no recent causes of complaint on im- 
pressment. The Secretary of State refuted that asser- 
tion, and declared that in American seas, including 
the West Indies, impressments had never been more 
numerous or vexatious. 

Before these instructions had reached the commis- 
sioners, however, the treaty had been signed. This, 
when submitted to the President, was rejected by him 
without being referred to the Senate. Jefferson re- 
fused to sign a treaty with impressment omitted, be- 

60 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, Feb. 3, 1807; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 153-1S6. 



IMPRESSMENT 4 1 

cause, he said, " a concession on our part would violate 
both a moral and political duty of the Government to 
our citizens."''^ In announcing the rejection of the 
treaty the Secretary of State informed the American 
commissioners that the President had authorized them 
in case the British rejected every other arrangement 
upon impressment to admit the following article : " It is 

agreed that, after the term of months, computed 

from the exchange of ratifications, and during a war 
in which either of the parties may be engaged, neither 
of them will permit any seaman, not being its own 
citizen or subject, and being a citizen or subject of the 
other party, who shall not have been for two years, at 
least, prior to that date, constantly and voluntarily in 
the service, or within the jurisdiction of the parties, 
respectively, to enter or be employed on board any of 
its vessels navigating the high seas ; and proper regula- 
tions, enforced by adequate penalties, shall be mutually 
established for distinguishing the seamen of the parties, 

respectively, and for giving full effect to this stipula- 
tion."«2 

Soon after the proposed treaty was transmitted to 
America and while the commissioners were negotiating 
over a supplemental project respecting boundaries, 

^1 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 20, 1807; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 166-173. 
62 Ibid. 



42 IMPRESSMENT 

another change in the British Ministry occurred. Lord 
Grenville and his associates were obliged to retire and 
the friends of the late Pitt came again into power. 
Canning succeeded Lord Howick in the Foreign 
Office."^ The change in the Administration halted 
diplomatic negotiations for several months. The much 
praised efficiency of ministerial government was dis- 
credited again. 
\y The American commissioners had barely opened 
negotiations with the new Ministry when word was 
received of an occurrence which made the question of 
impressment the one great object of the United States. 
This event was the attack of the British ship of war 
Leopard upon the American frigate Chesapeake, and 
the impressment of four sailors claiming to be Ameri- 
cans. This was the first instance of impressment 
from a public vessel of the United States, and it 
aroused the indignation of the country. It was con- 
sidered the logical result of the illegal practice and 
therefore to call for immediate resistance. 

The President at once issued a proclamation inter- 
dicting the use of American waters to all British armed 
vessels, and he caused instructions to be sent to the 
minister at London to make a demand for reparation 
from the British Government. The least, said he, that 
was to be expected in this regard was a disavowal of 

^2 Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, April 22, 1807 ; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 160-162. 



IMPRESSMENT 43 

the act and a restoration of the men impressed. In 
(■addition, an entire aboHtion of the practice of impress- 
! ment was deemed " an essential and indispensable part 
~of the satisfaction . . . and, if possible, without the 
authorized rejection from the service of the United 
States of British seamen who have not been two years 
in it."*^* The American Government, it was stated, 
had a right to expect not only ample reparation, but 
reparation made without delay. Monroe was ordered, 
in case the expectation of reparation should fail, to 
hasten home all American vessels in British ports and 
to communicate the state of affairs to all American 
war vessels in the Mediterranean. He was instructed 
to cease all negotiations with the British Government 
on other subjects " until satisfaction on this be so 
pledged and arranged as to render negotiation honor- 
able."«= 

There was a strong popular demand for war in the 
United States, but Madison considered its unjustifiable 
at that time, inasmuch as the act had probably been 
that of a British admiral alone and unauthorized by 
the British Government. A declaration of war at once 
was, in Madison's judgment, tactically unwise because 
of the numerous British cruisers in American waters 

«* Madison to Monroe, July 6, 1S07 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 183-185. 
65 Ibid. 



44 IMPRESSMENT 

which could have readily seized American ships as 
they gradually returned from foreign seas.^^ 

Even before Monroe had officially learned of the 
attack upon the Chesapeake, Canning had informed the 
American minister of the fact and had hastened to 
express his regret, giving assurances that, if the British 
officers were found to be culpable, the American 
Government should be offered a "most prompt and 
effectual reparation " for the act."^ 

Monroe, before he had received his instructions, 
thought it was incumbent upon him to press the British 
Government for reparation. He, therefore, addressed 
a note to Canning in which he referred to the attack 
of the Leopard upon the Chesapeake as an attempt " to 
assert and enforce the unfounded and most unjustifi- 
able pretension to search for deserters." He asked for 
a frank disavowal of the principle upon which the 
search was made and an assurance that the officer who 
had been responsible should suffer punishment.*'^ 

Canning, apparently irritated by Monroe's letter, re- 
plied a few days later in a rather harsh tone, stating 
that Great Britain would make reparation when all the 
facts were known. He disclaimed any pretension on 

^^ Madison to Monroe, July 6, 1807 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 183-185. 

8'^ Canning to Monroe, July 25, 1807; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 187. 

«8 Monroe to Canning, July 29, 1807 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 187. 



IMPRESSMENT 45 

the part of Great Britain of a right to search ships of 
war in the national service of any state for deserters. 
If the facts should prove as represented, he assured 
Monroe, the British Government would disavow the 
act and reprove the conduct of their officers.®^ 

The two countries were now on the verge of war. 
The American people generally took a defiant attitude, 
and in Great Britain there was a strong war party 
made up of ship owners, the navy, East and West India 
merchants, and leading politicians.''*' The British Gov- 
ernment strongly resented the proclamation of the 
President, which had been issued " without requiring 
or waiting for any explanation "''^ from Great Britain. 
This formed a pretext for delaying action on the part 
of the British Government. 

The special joint negotiation of Monroe and Pinkney 
having been suspended by the affair of the Chesapeake, 
Monroe alone made a formal demand upon the British 
Government for reparation. In presenting this claim, 
he urged the general question of impressment from 
merchant vessels, maintaining with forceful argument 
that the objections to impressment from ships of war 
were equally applicable in the case of merchant ships, 

^* Canning to Monroe, Aug. 3, 1807; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 188. 

'''0 Monroe to Madison, Aug. 4, 1807; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 186-187. 

'^'^ Canning to Monroe, Aug. 8, 1807 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 188. 



46 IMPRESSMENT 

for public law and private rights were violated in both 
cases and the liability to individual suffering was the 
same.'^^ 

Monroe suggested to Canning as a suitable way of 
making reparation the return of the impressed men to 
the ships from which they were taken, the punishment 
of the officers involved in the affair, the suppression of 
impressment from merchant vessels, and the announce- 
ment of such reparation through the medium of a 
special mission. The British Government held that 
the proclamation of the President interdicting British 
vessels from American waters was an act of redress, 
while the American minister maintained that it was 
merely a police measure and not an act of retaliation/V 

Canning argued that the affair of the Chesapeake 
was different from the practice which the British 
alleged as a right, and should not be brought into a 
discussion of the general question. The right to search 
ships of war, Canning stated, was not insisted upon, 
not because the employment and detention of British 
marines on board national ships was any less injuri- 
ous to Great Britain than on merchant ships, but 
because the redress in the one case was to be sought 
by the Government from the other Government and 

72 Monroe to Canning, Sept. 7, 1807 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., iSgr-igi. 

■^3 Monroe to Madison, Oct. 10, 1807; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 191-193, 



IMPRESSMENT 47 

need not be summarily enforced by the unauthorized 
officer of a ship of war. Canning declared that it was 
important to find out whether the Government of the 
United States had been guilty of refusing to discharge 
British seamen in its national service previous to the 
hostile acts of the British officers. He expressed re- 
gret that the American minister had coupled with the 
discussion the question of impressment of seamen from 
merchant vessels. This right, he maintained, had been 
exercised by Great Britain from the earliest ages of 
the British naval power, even without any qualifica- 
tion or exception in favor of national ships of war, 
and the distinction which had been omitted had been 
observed for a century.'^* 

Monroe proposed to take up the subject of impress- 
ment informally, but Canning refused utterly to treat 
of impressment until after the question of the Chesa- 
peake had been settled. Canning refusing to treat of 
the Chesapeake in connection with the general subject 
of impressment, and Monroe refusing to separate the 
two questions, the negotiations ended. Monroe shortly 
after returned to the United States, leaving Pinkney 
as his successor. He found upon reaching home that 
his popularity had suffered because of the treaty which 
he had signed, and that the friends of Madison had 

■^^ Canning to Monroe, Sept. 23, 1807 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 199-201. 



48 IMPRESSMENT 

made much capital out of this in promoting Madison's 
candidacy over him for the presidency. 

The British Government now decided to send 
George Henry Rose as a special minister to America 
to adjust the differences over the Chesapeake affair. 
This minister was instructed to confine himself to this 
subject alone and to entertain no proposition respecting 
the search of merchant vessels.. He was further for- 
bidden to enter upon any negotiation for reparation, 
until the proclamation of the President should be with- 
drawn.'^^ 

Rose upon his arrival at Washington urged the im- 
portance of the withdrawal of the alleged hostile act 
of the President upon the grounds that it prejudiced 
the interests of Great Britain ; that it was discreditable 
to the British flag; and that it resulted in a spirit of 
ill feeling and retaliation. It might be held, Rose 
stated, " to affect materially the question of the repara- 
tion due to the United States, especially inasmuch as its 
execution has been persevered in after the knowledge 
of His Majesty's early, unequivocal, and unsolicited 
disavowal of the unauthorized act of Admiral Berkeley, 
his disclaimer of the pretension exhibited by that officer 
to search the national ships of a friendly Power for 
deserters, and the assurances of prompt and effectual 
reparation, all communicated without loss of time to 

■^5 Monroe to Madison, Oct. lo, 1807 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 191-193. Rose to Madison, Jan. 26, 1808; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 213-214. 



IMPRESSMENT 49 

the minister of the United States in London, so as 
not to leave a doubt as to His Majesty's just and 
amicable intentions."'® 

Secretary Madison replied to Rose that the demand 
of the British Government that the proclamation of 
the President be revoked before the negotiations for 
reparation be entered upon might justly suggest the 
simple answer, that, before the proclamation of the 
President could become a subject of consideration, 
satisfaction should be made for the acknowledged 
aggression which preceded it, and that this was agree- 
able to the order of time, to the order of reason, and, 
it might be added, to the order of usage, as maintained 
by Great Britain, whenever, in analogous cases, she was 
the complaining party. The American Government 
absolutely refused to withdraw the proclamation until , 
the British minister should disclose the exact nature " 
of the reparation which he had been instructed to offer. , 
It was implied that such reparation should include a 
pledge for the discontinuance of the practice of im- 
pressment." The British minister having expressed 
his inability to comply with the terms of the American 
Government, the negotiation terminated, and Rose re- 
turned home. 

^6 Rose to Madison, Jan. 26, 1808; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 213-^14. 

■'"Madison to Rose, March 5, 1808; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 214-217. 



50 IMPRESSMENT 

Secretary Madison in communicating the result of 
the Rose mission to Minister Pinkney at London 
stated that advances to renew the negotiation must be 
made by the British Government either in London or 
Washington. If they should be made in London, 
Pinkney was authorized to accept the reparation of- 
fered provided that it involved no condition and in- 
cluded a disavowal of the attack on the Chesapeake; 
the immediate restoration of the impressed seamen; 
and the punishment of the guilty officers. The repara- 
tion, it was added, would be the more acceptable if it 
included also the restoration of the seamen to the very 
ships from which they were taken and if provision 
should be made for the wounded survivors and the fami- 
lies of those whose lives had been lost in the encounter. 
In case the reparation included the points which were 
made as an ultimatum it was promised that the procla- 
mation of the President should be revoked. Pinkney 
was instructed, in the event of satisfactory pledges 
for reparation for the aggression on the Chesapeake 
and the repeal of the British orders, " to enter into in- 
formal arrangements for abolishing impressments alto- 
gether, and mutually discontinuing to receive the sea- 
men of each other into either military or merchant 
service. 

Pinkney believed that it would be better that the 

78 Madison to Pinkney, April 4, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 221^22. 



IMPRESSMENT 5 1 

British Government renew the negotiation relative to 
the Chesapeake in Washington, and recommended that 
the necessary powers be given to Erskine, British 
minister in America.''' The British Government acted 
upon this suggestion, and authorized Erskine to enter 
into a special negotiation with the American Govern- 
ment upon the subject of reparation. 

Erskine wrote in his note to the Secretary of State 
that since the British Government had been informed 
that the United States Congress had shown an inten- 
tion of placing the relations of Great Britain with the 
United States upon an equal footing with the other 
belligerent Powers, his Government had instructed him, 
in event of such laws being enacted, to offer an honor- 
able reparation for the attack upon the Chesapeake. 
The reparation which he was prepared to propose con- 
sisted of a restitution of the men forcibly taken from 
the Chesapeake and a suitable provision for those who 
had suffered from the aggression, in addition to the 
disavowal of the act and the recall of the officers which 
had immediately taken place after the act was com- 
mitted.^** The American Government expressed its 
satisfaction with this offer, but at the same time made 
it plain that the removal of the non-intercourse act had 

"^^ Account of unofficial conversation between Canning and 
Pinkney, Jan. 18 and 22, 1809; American State Papers, For. 
Rel., III., 299-300. 

80 Erskine to Smith, April 17, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 295. 



52 IMPRESSMENT 

been decided upon from other and distinct considera- 
tions.^^ 

Upon the success of this negotiation, and in view of 
the repeal of the non-intercourse act, Erskine informed 
the American Government that Great Britain purposed 
sending an envoy extraordinary invested with full 
powers to conclude a treaty on all the points of dispute 
between the two countries.^^ 

The official note of the American Government con- 
taining the acceptance of the proffered reparation con- 
cluded with these reproachful words : " I have it in 
express charge from the President to state, that, while 
he forbears to insist on a further punishment of the 
offending officer, he is not the less sensible of the 
justice and utility of such an example, nor the less 
persuaded that it would best comport with what is due 
from His Britannic Majesty to his own honour."^^ The 
words were considered impertinent and were so deeply 
resented by the British Cabinet that the negotiations 
with reference to the Chesapeake were broken off and 
Erskine was severely censured for transmitting a note 
containing language so discourteous and unbecoming. 
Erskine was later recalled on the ground of his hav- 

81 Smith to Erskine, April 17, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 295-296. 

82 Erskine to Smith, April 18, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 296. 

83 Smith to Erskine, April 17, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 295-296. 



IMPRESSMENT 53 

ing departed from his instructions in agreeing to a 
stipulation for the repeal of the orders in council. He 
was succeeded by Francis Jackson, who arrived at 
Washington in October, 1809. 

Jackson, in his first formal note to the Secretary of 
State, made known his powers to renew the offer of 
reparation made by Erskine.^* The American Secre- 
tary pertinently inquired in what particular his offer 
differed from the reparation tendered by Erskine and 
accepted by the United States; and also in what re- 
spects the reparation by the former British minister 
differed from the instructions given to him.^^ Jackson 
then presented a memorandum containing the condi- 
tions on the basis of which he was authorized to draw 
up an official agreement. This paper stated that, since 
the President's proclamation had been annulled, the 
British Government were willing to restore the seamen 
taken out of the Chesapeake except such as might be 
proved to be natural born citizens of Great Britain or 
deserters from the British service; and that provision 
would be made for the families of such as had been 
killed on the Chesapeake provided that no bounty 
should be extended to the family of any man who 
had been a natural born subject of Great Britain or a 

8^ Jackson to Smith, Oct. 11, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 308-311. 

85 Smith to Jackson, Oct. 19, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 311-314. 



54 IMPRESSMENT 

■deserter from the service of that country.^" Such an 
arrangement being entirely unsatisfactory to the 
United States, no official notice was taken of it. Jack- 
son's explanation of the disavowal by the British Gov- 
ernment of the arrangement made under the negotia- 
tion of Erskine was unsatisfactory. His insinuation 
that the American Government had carried on negotia- 
tions with Erskine while knowing that he was exceed- 
ing his powers was denied ; and upon his reiteration of 
that insinuation he was informed that no further com- 
munication would be received from him. The Ameri- 
can minister in London was ordered to request Jack- 
son's recall. This was done by Pinkney, and the 
British Government finally recalled Jackson after a 
delay of a year and a half. 

For more than a year the government of Great 
Britain was represented at Washington by a charge 
d'affaires. The American Government believed that it 
was the purpose of Great Britain by this action to 
humiliate the United States. Accordingly, Pinkney 
left London in February, 1811, and left a charge in the 
person of John S. Smith to represent the United States 
there. Great Britain then decided to send a minister to 
the United States. The person selected was Augustus 
J. Foster, who arrived in America in June, 181 1. 
Foster was instructed by his Government to make such 

86 Jackson to Secretary of State, Oct. 27, 1809; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 316. 



IMPRESSMENT 55 

reparation for the attack upon the Chesapeake as the 
American Government should require, not derogatory 
to Great Britain. He offered again the disavowal on 
the part of the British Government of the act of 
Admiral Berkeley; the immediate restoration of the 
impressed seamen to the deck of the Chesapeake ; 
and suitable pecuniary provision for those wounded 
and for the families of those slain.^^ The Ameri- 
can Government, while intimating its displeasure that 
the officer responsible for the attack had merely been 
removed from one command to another, yet accepted 
the offer and the negotiation was closed.*® 

The general subject of impressment was introduced 
a few months later when Foster complained to the 
Secretary of State that certain British seamen desert- 
ing from the service had received protection upon 
American vessels, and that others had been seduced 
from the British service by American citizens. He 
expressed the hope that some measure might be dis- 
covered to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and 
declared his willingness to exert every effort to pro- 
cure the release from British vessels of any persons 
claimed as native American citizens. He requested 
that a list of such be sent him.®^ 

8'^ Foster to Monroe, Nov. i, i8ii; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 499-500. 

88 Monroe to Foster, Nov. 12, 181 1; American State Papers, 
For. Rel, III., 500. 

89 Foster to Monroe, April 15, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 454. 



\v 



56 IMPRESSMENT 

Secretary Monroe stated in reply to Foster that the 
deserting British seamen had received no encourage- 
ment from the constituted authorities of the United 
States ; that if they had received such encouragement 
from American citizens it was a cause of regret, but an 
act not cognizable by American laws. To Foster's offer 
to secure the discharge of native American citizens 
when impressed he answered : " It is impossible for 
the United States to discriminate between their native 
and naturalized citizens, nor ought your Government 
to expect it, as it makes no such discrimination itself. 
There is in this ofhce a list of several thousand Ameri- 
can seamen, who have been impressed into the British 
service, for whose release applications have, from time 
to time, been already made ; of this list a copy shall be 
forwarded you, to take advantage of any good offices 
you may be able to render."^° 

June I, Foster presented to the Secretary of State 
several papers relating to English seamen claimed to 
have been detained against their will on board certain 
ships of war of the United States. This showed, the 
British minister said, " that it is not on this side of the 
water alone that the inconvenience necessarily resulting 
from the similarity of habits, language, and manners 
between the inhabitants of the two countries, is pro- 
ductive of subjects of complaint and regret. These 

8° Monroe to Foster, May 30, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 454- 



IMPRESSMENT 57 

are, however, at the same time, natural and strong in- 
ducements for a conformity of interest, and most par- 
ticularly for a readiness to give and receive mutual ex- 
planations upon all subjects of difference." He stated, 
in less qualified language this time, that the British 
Government would continue to give positive orders 
against the detention of American citizens on board 
British ships, and that no difficulties, beyond what were 
necessary for clearly ascertaining the national char- 
acter of the individuals brought before the Lords Com- 
missioners of the Admiralty, would be interposed to 
prevent or delay their immediate discharge.^^ 

Monroe resented the attempt of the British minister 
to deduce an analogy between American practice with 
respect to seamen and the British practice in order to 
derive a justification for the latter. He contrasted the 
regulations of the two states as follows : The United 
States prohibited the enlistment of aliens into their 
vessels of war, while Great Britain did not ; the United 
States forbade enlistments or impressments by force, 
while Great Britain not only practiced that system 
within her own legal jurisdiction, but had extended it 
to foreign vessels on the high seas ; most of the States 
in the United States had enacted laws providing for 
the restoration of seamen deserting from merchant 
vessels, while Great Britain had made no such pro- 
vision whatever. With reference to the assurance 

^1 Foster to Monroe, June i, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 459-460. 



58 IMPRESSMENT 

that the British Government would give orders against 
the detention of American citizens on board British 
ships of war, Monroe asserted that if these orders 
were to prohibit the impressment of seamen from 
American vessels at sea, they would show a disposition 
on the part of Great Britain to do justice and to pro- 
mote a good understanding between the two countries. 
Should such action be taken the United States would 
be ready to substitute for the practice the most liberal 
arrangement on the subject. He maintained that the 
proposal of the British minister offered objections, in 
that it gave no assurance for the release of American 
citizens, except those recognized as such by British 
officers ; and further that it made no provision for the 
release of aliens. There would be no security against 
detention inasmuch as it was not sufficient to prove 
that the seamen taken from American vessels were 
not subjects of Great Britain or the subjects of the 
enemy.^^ 

Ten days after this note was sent by Secretary 
Monroe to the British minister, war was declared. In 
his war message communicated to Congress June i, 
Madison presented impressment as one of the justifi- 
able causes for war with Great Britain. He said : 
"Against this crying enormity, which Great Britain 
would be so prompt to avenge if committed against her- 
self, the United States have in vain exhausted remon- 

^- Monroe to Foster, June 8, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 464. 



IMPRESSMENT 59 

strances and expostulations."^^ In the report of the 
committee of the House recommending war, June 2, 
impressment was mentioned as the principal cause of 
the war. It said : " While this practice is continued, it 
is impossible for the United States to consider them- 
selves an independent nation. Every new case is a 
new proof of their degradation. Its continuance is 
the more unjustifiable, because the United States have 
repeatedly proposed to the British Government an 
arrangement which would secure to it the control of its 
own people. An exemption of the citizens of the 
United States from this degrading oppression, and their 
flag from violation, is all that they have sought."^* 

When, later, it became known that the other main V' 
cause of the war, the British orders in council, had 
been repealed before the announcement of war reached 
England, the American Government still decided to 
continue the war, unless the British Government should 
renounce their practice of impressment. Russell, who 
became charge d'affaires upon the departure of Pink- 
ney from London in March, 181 1, proposed an arm- 
istice, upon the condition that the British Government 
would relinquish the practice of impressment, on the 
assurance that the Government of the United States 
would pass a law prohibiting the employment of British 

83 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
499 et seq. 

94 Report of Committee on Foreign Relations, June 3, 1812; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 567-570. 



6o IMPRESSMENT 

seamen in the public or commercial service of the 
United States.^^ The British Government refused, 
stating that " they cannot consent to suspend the exer- 
cise of a right upon which the naval strength of the 
empire mainly depends, until they are fully convinced 
that means can be devised, and will be adopted, by 
which the object to be obtained by the exercise of that 
right can be effectually secured."®^ 

A proposal for an armistice made by Admiral 
Warren, in September, 1812, was rejected by the 
American Government because Warren was unable to 
give any assurance that the practice of impressment 
by his Government would be relinquished even during 
the time of the armistice. A similar proposal made by 
Sir George Prevost, Commander-in-Chief of the British 
forces in America, was also declined by the President, 
principally on the ground that it contained no provision 
for redress against the practice of impressment. 

Thus impressment, one of the principal causes for 
which war was declared, because the sole cause for 
which it was continued. Twenty years of diplomacy 
conducted under twelve distinct negotiations and 
carried on, at times, by the broadest minded statesmen 
of America and England failed to bring about a satis- 
factory adjustment of this vexed question. 

^5 Russell to Castlereagh, Aug. 24, 1812 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 589. 

^^Castlereagh to Russell, Aug. 29, 1812; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 589-590. 



CHAPTER II 
Neutral Trade 

While the uncompromising attitude of Great Britain v 
in her practice of impressment and the abuses of such 
practice gave the sentimental basis for the second war 
with England, that which brought the general support 
of the country to hostile measures was the British 
aggressions upon American trade. It mattered not 
whether the British acts were conceived with hostile 
intent toward the United States in order to thwart the 
growth of the commerce and naval power of that 
state, or whether they were merely retaliatory acts 
upon France, the effects were the same. The United 
States had from political considerations adopted a 
policy of neutrality as between the belligerent Powers. 
When Great Britain and France went to war with each 
other the commerce of the United States, which was 
becoming important and profitable, was seriously 
affected by the various measures of retaliation adopted 
by the two belligerent states. 

The first restrictive acts affecting American trade \/ 
were those in connection with commerce carried on 
between the United States and the colonies of the 
belligerents. The colonial policy of all states in the 

6i 



62 NEUTRAL TRADE 

1 8th century was to utilize the colonies for the benefit 
, of the parent state. Colonies were allowed to trade 
only with the mother-country and her possessions. 
' Before the American Revolution there had grown up a 
large trade between the United States and the British 
West Indies. This trade consisted of lumber, live 
stock, and provisions from the American colonies, 
which were exchanged partly for molasses and rum, 
and partly for specie. This was a trade highly bene- 
ficial to both parties. When the treaty of peace ; 
recognized the independence of the United States, the i 
right of trade with the West Indies no longer belonged 
to America as a part of the British Kingdom. 

Had William Pitt been able to secure the passage 
of a bill which he proposed in the House of Commons 
in 1783 a broad foundation would have been laid for 
an open commercial policy which would have brought 
lasting peace and harmony between the two countries. 
His proposed bill would have repealed all statutes of 
regulation or prohibitions of intercourse which had 
been enacted. It would have admitted to the ports of 
Great Britain the ships and vessels of citizens of the 
United States upon the same footing as before the 
war. This would not only have placed the United 
States upon the same footing as other sovereign states, 
but would have allowed the products and merchandise 
of American growth or manufacture to be imported 
into England upon payment of the same duties as 



NEUTRAL TRADE 63 

were paid upon the property of British subjects im- 
ported in British-built vessels navigated by British 
natural-born subjects. The bill failed to become a law, 
and no such favorable commercial arrangement was 
made for more than thirty years. With respect to 
trade with the British colonies Pitt's bill was equally 
liberal, allowing freedom of trade between the United 
States and these colonies, subject only to the same 
duties as the same goods would be obliged to pay if 
they were the property of British subjects and im- 
ported in British vessels manned by British seamen.^ 

A vote of censure upon the peace negotiations of 
1783 passing the House of Commons caused the 
resignation of Lord Shelbourne and Pitt. The new 
Ministry that succeeded, formed by a coalition of Lord 
North and Charles Fox, demolished the entire system 
of friendly intercourse with America. Because of 
lack of unity in the Cabinet the whole regulation of 
commercial intercourse was committed to the discre- 
tion of the King in council. 

One of the first results of this act was an order in 
council which restricted the trade between the United 
States and the British colonies to a very small number 
of articles, and forced this to be carried exclusively in 

1 [J. Q. Adams], "Documents from the Department of 
State, relative to the Colonial Trade," in American Quarterly 
Review, II., 267-306. 



V 



64 NEUTRAL TRADE 

British ships. This order was dated July 2, 1783, and 
was continued by annual acts of Parliament and orders 
in council until February, 1788, when the prohibitions 
were made permanent by a statute which took effect 
April 2 of that year. When the first enactment of 
these prohibitions was made it was feared by Great 
Britain that the United States might retaliate, but Con- 
gress under the Articles of Confederation did not have 
the power. Four of the states, however. New Hamp- 
shire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, did 
pass discriminating laws against Great Britain. These, 
naturally, had slight effect. One of the chief reasons 
for the adoption of the new constitution and the 
organization of a stronger government lay in the need 
of a stronger concerted commercial policy against 
Great Britain. Laws establishing discriminating duties 
of tonnage and impost were passed by the first Federal 
Congress in 1789.^ 

These discriminating measures were proposed by 
Madison, who dwelt with great earnestness upon the 
importance of teaching those nations which had refused 
commercial treaties with the United States, particu- 
larly Great Britain, to respect the new republic. He 
expressed his own preference for freedom of com- 
merce, but avowed his determination to meet interdict 

2 [J. Q. Adams], "Documents from the Department of 
State, relative to the Colonial Trade," in American Quarterly 
Review, II., 267-306. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 65 

with interdict " until we should be allowed to carry to \ 
the West India islands, in our own vessels, the produce j 
of America, which necessity compels them to take."^ 
Madison further believed that the discriminating ton- 
nage duties would aid in the development of a navy 
and seamen, which he conceived as necessary in view of 
the maritime dangers. He said : " It is a tax, and a 
tax upon our produce, but it is a tax we must pay for 
the national security. I reconcile it to the interest of 
the United States that this sacrifice should be made; 
by it we shall be able to provide the means of defence, 
and by being prepared to repel danger, is the most 
likely way to avoid it. This tax, therefore, may pre- 
vent the horror of a war, and secure to us that respect 
and attention which we merit."^ 

After the passage of the discriminating impost and 
tonnage duties, Washington authorized Gouverneur 
Morris to hold informal conferences with the British 
Ministry in order to learn whether they were disposed 
to enter into an arrangement, by mutual consent, which 
might regulate the commerce between the two nations 
on a principle of reciprocal advantage. Though no 
stipulation was obtained from Great Britain, the acts 
did, to a very satisfactory degree, increase American 
shipping and add to the commercial prosperity of the 
United States. 

3 Annals of Congress, 1st Cong., ist sess., 210. 
*Ibid., 247, 



66 NEUTRAL TRADE 

n/ The first of the long series of executive orders which 
restricted and eventually almost annihilated American 
commerce was passed June 8, 1793. This order pro- 
vided that all vessels laden wholly or in part with 
breadstuffs for any port in France or place occupied by 
the French armies might be seized and sent to England, 
where their cargoes should be disposed of or security 
given that they should be sold only in the ports of a 
country at peace with Great Britain.^ Five months 
later, November, 1793, a second order directed British 
commanders to detain neutral vessels laden with the 
produce of the French colonies and all vessels carrying 
provisions or other supplies for the use of such col- 
onies. This order claimed to revive the rule adopted 
in the w^ar of 1756 which declared it unlawful for 
neutral nations to carry on trade in time of war with 
the colonies of a belligerent when such trade had been 
prohibited in time of peace. This order was made the 
more exasperating by the fact that it was put into 
force without previous notice being given to American 
merchantmen. 
V January 8, 1794, the last order was revoked and re- 
placed by another which directed all vessels to be 
seized and brought in for adjudication which were 
laden with merchandise of the French West India 
Colonies and going from the said colonies to any port 
in Europe. Vessels laden with merchandise no mat- 

f' American State Papers, For. Rel, III., 264. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 6/ 

ter to what port they were bound were ordered to be 
seized if the merchandise was the property of a French 
subject. All vessels attempting to enter the blockaded 
ports of the said colonies were to be seized as well as all 
vessels that had on board naval or military stores des- 
tined to these ports.^ 

This order was continued until January 25, 1798, 
when it was replaced by one which ordered all vessels 
laden with merchandise of any possession of France, 
Spain, or the United Provinces, and coming from any 
port of such colonies to any port in Europe not a 
port of Great Britain or of that country to which such 
neutral ships belonged, were to be apprehended and 
brought in for adjudication. In like manner, all ves- 
sels having on board enemy's goods, vessels attempting 
to enter blockaded ports, and vessels having on board 
naval or military stores were to be seized.'^ March 18, 
1794, the French West India islands were declared to 
be in a state of blockade, and August 18 of the same 
year the order of June 8, 1793, was revoked. From 
this time ships laden with foodstuffs were taken with- 
out any provision for the purchase of their cargoes 
being made by the British Government. 

The American Congress was in session when the 
first news reached America of the action of the British 
assizes and prize courts acting under the orders of 

^ American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 264. 
7 Ibid., 264-265. 



68 NEUTRAL TRADE 

November 6, 1793. Great indignation was felt and 
petitions for redress poured into Congress. Retalia- 
tory measures were urged. President Washington, in 
order to prevent hostile legislation by Congress, acted 
promptly and appointed John Jay, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, as a special envoy to the court of St. 
James. 

Jay was sent to England primarily to seek indemnifi- 
cation for American vessels and goods confiscated 
under the claim that foodstuffs were contraband, and 
for injuries sustained and captures made in connec- 
tion with blockades the existence of which was not yet 
known in all quarters. A second object of the mis- 
sion was to draw up an agreement upon all the points 
of difference between the United States and Great 
Britain concerning the Treaty of Peace. This task was 
especially assigned to Jay because he had been one of 
the signers of the treaty. A third subject mentioned 
in the instructions was that of a commercial treaty 
which he was to consider should the first two objects 
be secured.^ 

Jay arrived in England June 8, and, as soon as pos- 
sible, entered into negotiations with Lord Grenville. 
He experienced some delay in the negotiations due to 
a change in the Ministry.^ July 30, Jay addressed a 

8 Instructions to Jay; American State Papers, For. Rel., I,, 

472-474- 

^Jay to Randolph, July 9, 1794; Amjsrican State Papers, 
For. Rel., I., 478-479. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 69 

note to Grenville setting forth the American claims for 
indemnities. He suggested that some less expensive 
method than the present be adopted by which appeals 
might be made from the Vice-Admiralty Courts; and 
that at least all vessels captured might be permitted to 
enter both their appeals and their claims. ^° Lord 
Grenville, while replying in a general way, to the effect 
that His Majesty wished to do the most complete and 
impartial justice to the citizens of the United States, 
showed in fact little inclination to grant anything. 
The cases of persons referred to by Jay, who had pre- 
viously omitted to prefer claims, Grenville referred 
to the regular courts of law for settlement; the cases 
of others who up to the present had made no appeals 
from the sentences of condemnation in the first in- 
stance might be allowed a longer time for preferring 
their appeals. Apprehending that the cases thus men- 
tioned would form a very considerable part of the in- 
juries alleged to have been suffered by the Americans, 
he proposed that no definite judgment be expressed 
upon the remaining cases until the former ones should 
have been settled in the courts. In very cautious lan- 
guage he went on to say that, " if cases shall then be 
found to exist to such an extent as properly to call for 
the interposition of Government, where, without the 
fault of the parties complaining, they shall be unable, 

10 Jay to Grenville, July 30, 1794; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., I., 481. 



JO NEUTRAL TRADE 

from zvhatever circumstances, to procure such redress, 
in the ordinary course of law, as the justice of their 
cases may entitle them to expect, His Majesty will be 
anxious that justice should, at all events, be done, and 
will readily enter into the discussion of the measures 
to be adopted, and the principles to be established for 
that purpose. "^^ While the negotiations turned, in the 
main, to the subject of indemnities, a number of in- 
formal interviews took place upon other points, such 
as the carrying away of negroes contrary to article 
seven of the Treaty of Peace and the failure of the 
British to evacuate the military posts in the North- 
west.^- Jay also presented to Grenville a projet of a 
commercial treaty. 

A treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation was 
finally signed November 19, 1794." Jay believed that 
in this he had secured all the concessions that Great 
Britain would make. The treaty was approved by 
President Washington and, after a long and spirited; 
debate in the Senate, was ratified with the omission 
of the twelfth article by a bare two-thirds vote. The 
omitted article permitted direct trade between the 
United States and the British colonies in the West 
Indies in vessels not exceeding seventy tons, but ex- 

11 Grenville to Jay, Aug. i, 1794; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., I., 481-482. 

12 Jay to Randolph, Sept. 13, 1794; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., I., 485-487. 

13 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 590-606. 



NEUTRAL TRADE ^1 

pressly prohibited American vessels from carrying cer- 
tain articles, the produce of those islands, to any part 
of the world except to the United States. To consent 
to such restrictions would have been to deprive the 
United States of a great part of the advantage which 
she derived from her position as a neutral state. It 
was better to run the risk of the trade with the West 
Indies rather than to suffer such limitations even 
though protected by treaty. 

The other chief provisions of the Jay treaty as affect- 
ing trade relations were as follows : American vessels 
were allowed to trade with British ports in Europe and 
the East Indies upon the same terms as British vessels ; 
the colonial coasting trade, and trade between Euro- 
pean and British East Indian ports, were left subject 
to the permission of Great Britain ; the vessels of Great 
Britain were admitted to American ports upon the most 
favorable terms granted to any nation. 

The treaty was assailed and its author denounced be- 
cause, in addition to the fact that it contained no article 
upon impressment, there was an omission of any 
provision for the remuneration of slaveholders for their 
negroes claimed to have been carried away during the 
war, while, on the other hand, payment was allowed to 
British citizens for debts contracted before the Revolu- 
tion. The opposition to the treaty was largely polit- 
ical, and was made by those who were strongly anti- 
British in feeling and who were ready to condemn the 



V 



^2 NEUTRAL TRADE 

treaty even before its provisions were made known. 
Great Britain acceded to the omission of the twelfth 
article, and ratifications were exchanged in London 
October 28, 1795. 

American trade continued to suffer at the hands of 
Great Britain, France, and Spain. Neutral vessels 
were seized by these belligerent nations for having on 
board goods of the enemy, whether such goods were 
contraband or not; for trading with ports declared to 
be under blockade ; and for carrying goods claimed to 
be contraband. In the early years of the war between 
Great Britain and France, the most serious aggressor 
was France. The vessels taken by Great Britain were 
in nearly every case released upon application of the 
American Government.^* Seizures of American 
vessels by British cruisers steadily increased, however, 
and February 24, 1801, the House of Representatives 
called for a report upon the depredations committed on 
the commerce of the United States by vessels of Great 
Britain of which complaint had been made to the De- 
partment of State. Secretary Marshall submitted a 
report of seventeen cases complained of since January 
I, 1800.^^ 

American trade with the West Indies particularly 
suffered, British cruisers seizing American vessels and 

"Report of Secretary of State, June 21, I797; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 28-29. 

15 Report of Secretary of State, Feb. 27, 1801 ; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 345-346. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 73 

sending them into port. If there were found on board 
any goods the produce or manufacture of any coun- 
tries at war with Great Britain, the vessels were con- 
demned. Property on board not belonging to Ameri- 
can citizens was either confiscated or held till proofs 
could be obtained of the citizenship of the owner. The 
detention and expenses in connection with vessels not 
found subject to condemnation, as well as the loss of 
those confiscated, made the trade extremely precarious, 
and insurance rates advanced from ten to thirty per 
cent.^^ Secretary Marshall in instructions to Minister 
King September 20, 1800, complained of the conduct 
of the British Admiralty Courts, which he declared had 
made unjust decisions and had failed to inflict penalties 
upon those captains who made seizures without justifi- 
able causes. The Courts of Vice-Admiralty, it was 
alleged, whatever might be the case, seldom acquitted, 
and when they did never awarded costs and damages 
for detention. ^^ The American complaint against the 
unjust decision of the lower courts was justified by the 
statement of Lord Hawkesbury, in the House of Com- 
mons April 29, 1 801, that out of 318 appeals from the 
Vice-Admiralty Courts only 35 of the condemnations 
were confirmed by the higher court, 

16 Thomas Fitzsimmons to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 17, 
1801 ; American State Papers, For. Rel., II., 347. 

i'^ Marshall to King, Sept. 20, 1800; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., II., 486-490. 



V 



74 NEUTRAL TRADE 

The American minister protested to the British Gov- 
ernment against the practice of the Vice-Admiralty 
Courts of condemning all American vessels bound to an 
enemy's colony provided they had on board any article 
the growth or manufacture of a nation at war with 
Great Britain. This particularly affected the American 
trade with the Spanish colonies in the West Indies. 
Minister King was able to secure from the British Gov- 
ernment a modified interpretation of the rule of 1756, 
to this effect : that trade between a neutral and the 
enemy's colonies was permitted ; and that the produce 
of the colonies of the enemy actually imported into a 
neutral country might be re-exported thence to any 
other place, even to the mother-country of that colony 
which supplied the produce.^^ This opinion of the 
King's Advocate, having been communicated to the 
judges of the Vice-Admiralty Courts for their guid- 
ance, brought great relief to American vessels ; and at 
once there sprang up a large and lucrative commerce 
by means of circuitous voyages from the United States 
to the Spanish colonies, thence returning to the United 
States, and thence going to Spain and France. 

When, by the signing of the treaty of Amiens, 1802, 
peace ensued between Great Britain and France, the 
neutral commerce of the United States lost the advan- 
tage which it had had during the war. Minister King 

18 Report of the King's Advocate, May 23, 1801 ; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 49^497- 



NEUTRAL TRADE 75 

at London was urged to secure some relaxation of the 
British navigation laws, in order that the United States 
might be placed upon a more equal footing of trade. 
Particularly was it to be desired that the United States 
should be allowed to export to the British West Indies 
certain articles which hitherto had been prohibited ; and 
that the carrying of such articles, as well as of the 
exports from the West Indies to the United States, 
should be permitted to American vessels.^® 

The American minister wrote to the Secretary of 
State, August lo, 1802, that the British Government 
had consented to the abolition of all discrimination in 
duties affecting the navigation and commercial inter- 
course between the United States and Great Britain; 
but when the bill dealing with duties on exports and 
imports and the tonnage on vessels was finally passed 
it was discovered to work even greater hardship to 
American commerce than that which was produced by 
the former regulations." With respect to the West 
India trade, King was unable to secure any positive 
statement. Lord Hawkesbury said that no decision 
could be reached until a more careful investigation 
could be made of the condition of the West India 
islands.^"/ 

In the spring of 1803, hostihties between Great 

19 King to Hawkesbury, Feb. 3, 1802 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., II., 498-500. 

20 King to Secretary of State, Aug. 10, 1802; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 501-502. 



V 



76 NEUTRAL TRADE 

Britain and France broke out afresh, and the measures 
employed by Great Britain in the last war affecting 
neutral trade were, in general, renewed by orders in 
council issued June 24 of that year. One modification 
was made in this respect, that, while permitting 
neutrals to carry on trade between their own country 
and enemy's colonies, and between their own country 
and that of the enemy in Europe, they were no longer 
allowed to carry the produce of these colonies to Great 
Britain as was permitted by the instructions of 1798. 
Another principle which was now applied was that a 
vessel upon a return voyage was liable to capture 
by the circumstances of her having, on the outward 
voyage, conveyed contraband goods to an enemy's 
port.^^ 

In the renewal of the war France adopted a con- 
certed policy of weakening Great Britain by attacking 
her commerce. As the ports of Europe gradually be- 
came closed to British trade the effects became felt by 
British merchants, particularly by those of the West 
Indies. Complaints were made that the hostile colonies 
through neutral shipping had advantages over the 
British colonies. A pamphlet published at this time 
entitled, " War in Disguise," written by James 
Stephens, advanced the argument that the immense 
trade which was being carried on under the American 
flag with the enemies of Great Britain was essentially 

21 Report of Secretary of State, Jan. 25, 1806; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., II., 728. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 77 

an act of war. Demands were made for the re-adop- 
tion of the rule of 1756. Pitt proceeded cautiously, 
fearing that a general war might result from the 
attempt to establish the rule, and realizing also that 
Great Britain was in fact materially benefited by the 
trade, which the West India merchants, with mistaken 
view, wished to be suppressed. The Lords of Appeal 
brought about the change in policy, which suited the 
British merchants. The influence that caused the 
court to recede from its former decisions was com- 
mercial. This change in policy was made in connection 
with the determination as to what constituted a con- 
tinuous voyage. In the case of the American ship 
Essex, in May, 1805, it was held by the court that the 
vessel in question was subject to condemnation on the 
ground that the continuity of its voyage between the 
enemy's colony and the parent state was established by 
the fact that the duties on the cargo when imported 
to the United States had not been actually paid in 
money, and therefore the cargo was not a bona fide im- 
portation.^- Previous to this decision the Lords Com- 
missioners of the Appeals Court had held that it was 
not a continuous voyage if the goods had been landed 
in the United States and duties had been paid upon 
them.^^ 

22 Alexander Baring, An Enquiry on Orders in Council, 
page 82. 

23 Robinson's Admiralty Reports, II., 368-270. Case of the 
Polly. 



78 NEUTRAL TRADE 

'^ The decision with respect to the Essex, establishing 
a change in policy, was not communicated to the 
American Government, although British privateers and 
cruisers soon learned of it, and at once busied them- 
selves in apprehending American vessels which had 
cleared in ignorance of the new principle established 
by the Court of Appeals. Merchants of New York 
presented a memorial to Congress, in December, 1805, 
protesting against the new interpretation that had been 
placed upon direct trade. They especially complained 
because the ships had suddenly been seized ^while they 
were "confiding in the justice and friendly dispositions 
of the Government of Great Britain, and entertaining a 
correspondent expectation that no unusual restrictions 
would be imposed on neutral commerce without ade- 
quate motives and the most ample notice : presuming, 
especially, that commercial enterprises, commenced 
under the sanction of established principles, would, on 
no account, be affected by a change of system." The 
memorialists denied that the rights of commerce which 
they claimed were to be deemed as favors from Great 
Britain, but said that they were based upon the law of 
nations which recognized the principle " that the goods 
of a neutral, consisting of articles not contraband of 
war, in a neutral vessel, employed in a direct trade 
between neutral countries and ports of a belligerent 
country, not invested or blockaded, are protected." 
The merchants did not wish to leave the impression 



NEUTRAL TRADE 79 

that they were appealing for their own financial in- 
terests alone. They attempted to play upon the public 
feeling for seamen's rights with these words : " The 
constancy and valor of the seamen of the United States 
are justly themes of patriotic exultation ; from their 
connexion with us we consider their cause as our 
cause, their rights as our rights, their interests as our 
interests. Our feelings are indignant at the recital of 
their wrongs, and we request, in addition to the protec- 
tion of a naval force, that, at least in the American 
seas, our brave countrymen may be permitted to display 
their energy in their own defence."^* A similar 
memorial was presented to Congress by merchants of 
Philadelphia. These memorialists protested not alone 
against the new enforcement by Great Britain of the 
rule of 1756 in connection with the doctrine of " con- 
tinuous voyage " ; but they complained even more 
of the action of France and Spain in allowing Ameri- 
can vessels to be seized and confiscated contrary to any 
established principle of the law of nations and in 
derogation of special treaty obligations. They urged 
upon Congress to use every measure, not inconsistent 
with the honor of the nation, to obtain redress and 
security.^V 

Monroe in the meantime, in London, complained to 

24 Memorial of Merchants of the City of New York; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., II., 72,7-729- 

25 Memorial of Merchants of Philadelphia; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., II., 740-741. 



80 NEUTRAL TRADE 

the British Government of the seizures of numerous 
American vessels under the rule of 1756, in accord- 
ance with which colonial trade denied to neutrals in 
time of peace was declared illegal in time of war. .He 
also opposed the principle laid down by the British 
court in the case of the Essex and other vessels. He 
found the British Government unwilling to relax in the 
slightest degree the doctrine laid down by the decisions 
of the Admiralty Courts and Court of Appeals,' which 
Monroe asserted had the effect of cutting up by the 
roots American commerce in the produce of the 
enemy's colonies except for consumption in the United 
States. The British Government quite generally freed 
the American vessels, when complaint was made; but 
refused to give up the principle upon which the vessels 
were seized. Monroe, thinking that more serious ac- 
tion might be deemed necessary by the United States, 
despatched American emissaries, Bowdoin and Erving, 
to Paris and Madrid, respectively.^® 

Monroe considered that the coalition with Russia 
and Sweden had afifected the British policy upon 
neutral trade. In her treaty of 1801 with Great 
Britain, Russia had been compelled to abandon the 
right to the direct trade between colonies of an enemy 
and the parent country, and to agree to accept the posi- 

28 Monroe to Madison, Aug. 20, 1805; American State 
Papers, For. Rel, III., 105. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 8 1 

tion which the United States might hold in that 
respect.^'^ 
^ When Fox became Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 
the new Cabinet after the death of Pitt, in January, 
1806, Monroe was hopeful of a more favorable con- 
sideration of American trade. British captures of 
American vessels had continued, until now the total 
numbered between one and two hundred. Monroe 
soon made the discovery that, while Fox was inclined 
to meet the United States half way, the Cabinet of 
which he was a member was an inharmonious body, 
being in fact a' coalition, and that, therefore, no agree- 
ment favorable to the United States could be expected. 
Monroe in a letter to the Secretary of State suggested 
that Congress adopt coercive measures, leaving to the 
President's discretion putting them into operation,^^ 

In one of the interviews between Monroe and Fox, 
the latter proposed that Great Britain suspend her 
alleged right, leaving the United States in the enjoy- 
ment of the colonial trade. He explained that this 
would not call upon Great Britain to renounce her 
rights nor afford the United States justification for 
pressing her claims. Monroe refused to agree to this 
plan, which would have meant an abandonment of the 

2^ Monroe to Madison, Oct. 18, 1805; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 106-108. 

28 Monroe to Madison, March 31, 1806; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 115. 



82 NEUTRAL TRADE 

United States claims for indemnities. He refused to 
compromise.-^ 

V When instructions were issued to Monroe and Pink- 
ney, who were commissioned to negotiate a treaty with 
Great Britain, it was declared desirable that the gen- 
jeral principle upon the right of neutral trade be laid 
'jdown; but, if that was found to be impracticable, the 
commissioners were authorized to abridge the right in 
practice, as was done in the supplement of October, 
1801, to the treaty of June of that year between Russia 
and Great Britain; "not omitting to provide that, in 
case Great Britain should, by her treaties or instruc- 
tions, leave to any other nation the right in a greater 
extent than it is stipulated to the United States, they 
may claim the enjoyment of it in an equal extent." 
The commissioners w^ere instructed to oppose the 
British theory of " continuous voyagCj," and to demand 
as a minimum in the West India trade the admission 
of American vessels with American goods, which in 
British vessels were not prohibited, on the same terms 
on which British vessels laden with colonial produce 
were admitted to American ports.^° 

\iy The treaty which Monroe and Pinkney negotiated 
with Lord Holland and Lord Auckland in 1806 con- 
tained a provision in relation to colonial trade which, 

29 Monroe to Madison, April 28, 1806; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 117-118. 

20 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 17, 1806; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 1 19-124. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 83 

had the treaty been ratified, would have left no room 
for misunderstanding upon the question of the con- 
tinuity of neutral voyage. Article eleven of that treaty 
provided that, during the period of a war, articles 
which were the growth, produce, or manufacture of 
Europe might be carried from the United States to the 
port of any colony, not blockaded, belonging to His 
IMajesty's enemies, provided such goods should previ- 
ously have been entered and landed in the United 
States, ' and should have paid the ordinary duties on 
such articles and, on re-exportation, should, after the 
drawback, remain subject to a duty of not less than one 
per cent, of the value of the goods. In like manner 
colonial goods might be shipped from the United States 
to European ports, provided such goods should have 
entered and landed, paid the ordinary duties, and, upon 
re-exportation, should have paid a dut}^ of two per cent, 
ad valorem.^V The levying of a special duty upon re- 
exportation, particularly upon colonial goods, w^as to 
foster competition with American shipping. 

This treaty was rejected by the American Govern- 
ment, mainly on two grounds : because it failed to pro- 
vide any article upon impressment, and because on the 
subject of colonial trade it restricted to the market of 
Europe the re-exportation of colonial produce, and to 

31 Treaty of Amity. Commerce, and Navigation, between His 
Brittanic Majesty and the United States of America; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 147-151. 



84 NEUTRAL TRADE 

European articles the supplies to the colonial trade.^^ 
N/j British cruisers, under the new doctrine of continuous 
; voyage, brought in for adjudication American vessels 
; in large numbers. The British prize courts in some 
instances held that American vessels trading with 
France and complying with the French decree, which 
required the use of certificates of origin in order to 
bar out goods of British growth or manufacture, were 
engaged in unneutral service and, therefore, were sub- 
ject to confiscation.^^ 

The causes of complaint in relation to the capture of 
American vessels were numerous prior to the begin- 
ning of the year 1807, but after that date they were 
vastly multiplied, and constituted, from this time on, 
the most important factor determining the war between 
Great Britain and the United States. ' The system of v 
official orders and decrees, under which neutral rights 
were disregarded and American commerce was crushed, 
began when Great Britain, May 16, 1806, in order to 
attack Napoleon, proclaimed the coast of the Continent 
from the river Elbe to Brest in a state of blockade. 
The strict enforcement of the blockade was to extend 
from Ostend to the mouth of the Seine. Napoleon 
six months later, November 21, 1806, exulting in his 
victory at Jena, which brought Prussia into subjection, 

32 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 20, 1807; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 166-173. 

33 Officers of Insurance Companies to Secretary of State, 
Dec. ID, 1805; American State Papers, For. Rel., II., 769. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 85 

issued a decree from Berlin declaring the British 
islands under blockade, and prohibiting all trade in Eng- 
lish goods. No vessel proceeding to or coming from 
England, or the English colonies, was to be admitted 
to any French port.^*. Great Britain, without waiting 
to learn the effects of this impossible decree, retaliated 
with an order in council, dated January 7, 1807, which 
forbade all vessels to engage in the coastwise trade of 
France and of her allies or of any ports to which 
British vessels were denied access.^^ Later, alarmed at 
the success of Napoleon in building up his Continental 
system, and especially disturbed by the alliance of 
Russia with France, cemented by the treaty of Tilsit, 
July 7, 1807, the British Government adopted still 
stronger measures for retaliating upon Napoleon and 
for crippling American trade. The order in council 
promulgated November 11, 1807, ordered a blockade 
of all ports and places of France, of her allies, and of 
all countries from which British ships were excluded. 
All trade in articles produced or manufactured in such 
blockaded countries was proclaimed unlawful, and 
vessels engaging in it were subject to capture and con- 
demnation together with the goods. It was further de- 
clared that any vessel that carried a certificate of origin 

3* Imperial Decree, Nov. 21, 1806; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., II., 806. 

35 Howick to Monroe, Jan. 10, 1807; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 5. 



86 NEUTRAL TRADE 

issued by France was to be considered good prize.^® 
Another order of the same date permitted neutral 
vessels to carry goods from the enemy's ports to the 
ports of Great Britain upon payment of duties, and to 
re-export from these, subject to British regulations. 
V The British Cabinet held that the blockade which 
the Berlin decree proclaimed was in violation of the 
established law of nations and that in consequence 
Great Britain was justified in retaliating upon the 
enemy with a similar interdiction of commerce. The 
ink had hardly become dry upon the British document 
when Napoleon replied with a decree issued from 
Alilan, December 17, 1807, declaring that every vessel 
that should submit to search by an English vessel should 
thereby become denationalized and hence be lawful 
prize. The British islands, it was stated, were to be 
under conditions of blockade, both by land and sea; 
and any ship sailing from the ports of England or of 
the EngHsh colonies or of the countries occupied by 
English troops was to be regarded as lawful prize. 
This decree was in turn declared by Napoleon to be in 
retaliation upon Great Britain for her transgression of 
the law of nations. "The provisions of the present 
decree," it was announced, " shall be abrogated and 
null, in fact, as soon as the English abide again by the 

3*5 Order in Council, Nov. 11, 1807; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 29-31, 



NEUTRAL TRADE 8/ 

principles of the law of nations, which are also the 
principles of justice and of honor."^^ 

The United States refused to acquiesce in any of 
these orders and decrees, and through both diplomatic 
and legislative channels sought to make her resistance 
felt. It is true that the British order creating a 
blockade from the river Elbe to the port of Brest 
was not considered especially inimical to the United 
States. Our minister at London expressed the opinion 
that the order showed a disposition to consider the 
needs of the United States in that it put an end to 
seizures, except within a special restricted blockaded 
region from Ostend to the mouth of the river Seine, 
leaving the remaining portion blockaded for purposes 
of retaliation upon France, but not prohibiting therein 
the trade of neutrals. The order was at first con- 
sidered liberal, also, because it allowed neutral trade 
in the productions of the enemy's colonies in every 
route except the direct route between the colony and 
the parent state.^® Monroe believed^^ that the author 
of the measure, Charles Fox, had drawn it with a view 
to meeting the American objection with regard to the 
restriction upon American trade with enemies' colo- 

37 Imperial Decree, Dec. 17, 1807; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 290-291. 

38 Monroe to Madison, May 17, 1806; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 124-125. 

25* Monroe to Madison, May 20, 1806; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 125-126. 



88 NEUTRAL TRADE 

nies. The results of the order later showed that Mon- 
roe's optimism was ill founded. 

The news of the Berlin decree reached London while 
negotiations were pending between the American and 
the British commissioners. It had a marked effect upon 
the negotiation. The British would have been glad 
to suspend negotiation until it could be ascertained 
what attitude the United States would take in regard 
to the decree. If the United States should submit to a 
violation of their neutral rights by France, it was held 
by the British commissioners that it would be im- * 

possible for Great Britain to respect them. The 
British commissioners proposed that the treaty which 
they agreed upon should be subject to a reservation in 
respect to its ratification, depending upon the resistance 
of the United States to the French decree. The 
American commissioners declared that this was inad- 
missible. The British Cabinet insisted that, if the 
American Government did not give the satisfaction 
they desired, either by suitable assurances before the 
ratification of the treaty or by its conduct afterwards, 
the British Government would make a reservation of 
their rights to counteract the policy of France.*" The 
British commissioners, therefore, when offering to sign 
the treaty, submitted a note which reserved to the 
British Government the right to adopt retaliatory meas- 

*o Monroe and Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 3, 1807 ; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 142-147. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 89 

ures against France and affecting neutral commerce, 
in the event that the United States should acquiesce in 
the French decree.^^ 

The American commissioners, without giving their 
consent, transmitted the note to their home Govern- 
ment along w^ith the treaty, w^hich, we have seen, was 
rejected. The promulgation of the order in council in 
November of the following year, it was claimed by the 
British Government, was rendered necessary because 
" countries not engaged in the war had acquiesced in 
the orders of France." As a matter of fact the United 
States had not in any proper sense acquiesced in the 
French decrees. , As soon as the American minister at 
Paris had learned of the Berlin decree he demanded an 
explanation as to its effects upon neutral nations, and 
whether American vessels would be seized in the event 
of their going to or from the ports of Great Britain.*^ 
The Minister of Marine and Colonies assured Minister 
Armstrong that the imperial decree made no modifica- 
tions of the regulations at present observed in France 
with regard to neutrals or of the convention made 
between France and the United States, September 30, 
1800. He said that seizures contrary to the existing 
regulations would not be allowed and that American 
vessels would not be taken because of their going to or 

41 Note from Holland and Auckland, Dec. 31, 1806; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 151-152. 

*~ Armstrong to Minister of Marine and Colonies, Dec. 10, 
1806; American State Papers, For. Rel., II., 805. 



go NEUTRAL TRADE 

coming from the ports of England. The regulations 
set forth in the decree were, in his opinion, domestic 
in their application.*^ 

The American Government was not satisfied with the 
explanation of the Minister of Marine alone, but de- 
sired to have this confirmed by the express authority of 
the Emperor. Madison, Secretary of State, accordingly 
directed Minister Armstrong to ascertain whether or 
not it was the intention of the Emperor to execute the 
decree in the limited manner explained by the Minister 
of Marine. Should it appear that the decree was to 
operate in all its latitude Armstrong was to ofifer a 
protest, on the grounds of the principles of public law 
and the express stipulation of the treaty of 1800. He 
was to urge, on the supposition that the law was not 
to be unfavorably interpreted, that the French Gov- 
ernment despatch orders to their cruisers in every 
quarter so as to prevent a construction of the decree 
favorable to their cupidity.** 

Armstrong, while apparently unable to secure any 
unequivocal statement in relation to the decree as a 
whole, did secure from the French minister, the Em- 
peror still being absent from Paris, certain definite 
modifications as follows: Vessels leaving ports of the 
United States before a knowledge of the decree had 

43 Minister of Marine and Colonies to Armstrong, Dec. 24, 
1806; American State Papers, For. Rel., II., 805-806. 

4-1 Madison to Armstrong, May 22, 1807; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 242. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 9 1 

been promulgated there were not subject to the rule; 
vessels not coming directly from a British or French 
port were not subject to the rule; cargoes of vessels 
coming directly from a British to a French port and 
offered for entry, on proof that the touching of the 
ship in England was involuntary were to be sequestered 
until the proofs offered should have been investigated. 
The vessels themselves were in any case to- go free. 
This was a modification of the former rule whereby 
both ships and cargoes were sequestered.'*^ 

When a month later the Emperor returned to 
Paris, Armstrong, on two occasions, secured an audi- 
ence with him. In these interviews Napoleon's de- 
sign of forming a union of all the commercial states 
against Great Britain became apparent. One of 
these audiences occurring just after the attack of 
the Leopard on the Chesapeake, Napoleon, referring 
to the attack, said to the American minister : " This is 
abominable; they have pretended hitherto to visit mer- 
chantmen, and that they had a right to do so ; but they 
even they, have set up no such pretensions with respect 
to armed ships. They would now arrange it by giving 
up a right or usage which never existed; but they 
will arrange it ; they are afraid to go to war with your 
country."^'' Here was evident the desire which Na- 

45 Armstrong to Monroe, July 7, 1807; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 242-243. 

*6 Armstrong to Madison, Aug. 3, 1807; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 243. 



92 NEUTRAL TRADE 

poleon continued to cherish of arraying the United 
States in war against Great Britain ; while Great 
Britain's poHcy was no less that of forcing the United 
States to break with France. A number of American 
vessels having been seized and brought into Spanish 
ports under color of a Spanish order issued in con- 
formity to the French decree, the American minister 
at Paris urged the French Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to explain the French practice under the decree, as this 
would regulate the practice in the Spanish prize courts.*^ 
The French minister, after referring the subject to the 
Minister of Justice, replied to Armstrong that the Em- 
peror regarded " every neutral vessel going from Eng- 
lish ports, with cargoes of English merchandise, or of 
English origin, as lawfully seizable by French armed 
vessels."*^ 

This disavowal by the French Government of any 
exception to be made in the treatment of American 
vessels, followed, as it was soon after, by the confisca- 
tion of the principal part of the cargo of the Horizon, 
an American vessel shipwrecked on the coast of 
France, greatly embarrassed the American Govern- 
ment in its negotiations with Great Britain when it was 
attempted to prove that the United States had not suf- 
fered from the French decree. The confiscation of 

*'' Armstrong to Champagny, Aug. 9, 1807 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 243. 

*8 Champagny to Armstrong, Oct. 7, 1807 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 245. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 93 

these goods, openly declared to be in conformity to the 
decree of November 21, brought forth a strong protest 
from the American minister as being contrary to treaty 
obligations and the assurances given earlier with re- 
spect to the application of the decree. Armstrong's 
letter was a cogent, strongly assertive document, which 
made the British charge that the United States truckled 
to France utterly groundless.*^ 

What the British Government desired most was to 
bring about an estrangement between the United 
States and France. War between the United States 
and France would have been still more pleasing to 
the British Government. To this end the ministers 
insisted, practically, upon hostile resistance to the de- 
cree of the French Government. The British minister 
at Washington informed the Secretary of State that it 
could not be expected that the British Government 
would permit the commerce of their enemies to be 
carried on by neutral nations, if they submitted to the 
prohibition which France had decreed against the com- 
merce of British subjects.^" Erskine at the same time 
apprised the American Government of the British order 
of January 7, 1807, which prohibited all trade between 
any two ports of the enemy. 

49 Armstrong to Champagny, Nov. 12, 1807; American State 
Papers, For. Rel, III., 245-247. 

50 Erskine to Madison, March 12, 1807; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 158. 



94 NEUTRAL TRADE 

Secretary Madison replied to Erskine that the Amer- 
ican Government considered the British order illegal, 
unless a genuine blockade were contemplated in con- 
nection with each of the ports of the enemy from 
which neutral commerce was interdicted. He de- 
clared that even were the French decree to be enforced 
in its literal sense, and contrary to the treaty between 
the United States and France, the British order, being 
peremptory in its import, and immediate in its execu- 
tion, might justly be regarded as premature and un- 
friendly; the uncertainty whether the French decree 
was to be enforced in the sense in which it was taken, 
and whether it might not embrace the commerce of the 
United States, made the British order especially a 
ground for serious complaint and remonstrance.^^ 

The British Foreign Secretary in London com- 
plained to the American commissioners there with 
reference to the failure of the American Government 
to take efifectual steps against the decree of France. In 
reply to the American note returning the unratified 
s/ treaty, /Canning, October 22, 1807, stated that the 
United States had not acted with reference to France 
in such a way as to do away with the reservation con- 
tained in the note delivered by the British commis- 
sioners at the time of the signing of the treaty.^^ This 

^1 Madison to Erskine, March 29, 1807; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III.. 159. 

^2 Canning to Monroe and Pinkney, October 22, 1807; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 198-199. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 95 

statement was to prepare America for the announce- , 
ment which was to follow in the promulgation of the i 
order in council of November ii, 1807. 

When Pinkney was informed of the new order in 
council he made a vigorous protest against it on the 
ground of its effect upon American commerce and on 
the ground that it was uncalled for. ^He took the posi- 
tion that it was not justified by the Berlin decree, for 
this, he maintained, was municipal in character, and had 
made no modification of the regulations as they were 
then observed in France with reference to neutrals. 
He asserted, upon the authority of the French Minister 
of Marine, that the declaration with regacd to the : 
British blockade did not at all change the present < 
French laws concerning maritime capture. He had, 
of course, not learned of the later interpretation of the 
French Emperor. ' The American minister maintained 
that, while the French decree afifected neutral com- 
merce but slightly, being limited to neutral ships pass- 
ing from British ports to those of France and her i 
allies, the British orders in council, on the other hand, 
annihilated the whole of the public law of Europe in 
relation to maritime prizes and substituted a sweeping 
system of condemnation and penalty in its place. He 
insisted that the United States had not submitted to 
the French decree, but had done all within its power in 
the way of protest.^^/ 

53 Pinkney to Madison, Nov. 23, 1807 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 203-206. 



96 NEUTRAL TRADE 

The British orders in council, now recognized to 
have been a mistaken poHcy, were at the time popular 
in England. Those who did not understand, and few 
did, the policy which dictated them, supported them be- 
cause they had the appearance of vigor suited to a 
crisis. The peril at the hands of Napoleon was felt to 
be very great; and unusual and extraordinary efforts 
were deemed necessary. Some believed that the pro- 
hibitive orders would create a pressure upon Napoleon 
which would compel him to emancipate neutral com- 
merce from restrictions ; but it is doubtful whether the 
British Government were actuated by any motives 
favorable to neutrals. .' President Jefferson, learning of 
the new order in council before official communication 
was received, urged upon Congress, December 18, the 
passage of an embargo act. Congress acted promptly, 
and such a measure was passed December 22. This 
act resulted in more injury to the United States than 
to Great Britain or France. January 26, 1808, Min- 
ister Pinkney explained to the British Secretary the 
nature of the embargo act. In the same interview he 
complained of the hardship to American vessels result- 
ing from the order in council which practically pre- 
vented such vessels from returning home, after being 
warned not to enter a British port.^* In a subsequent 
interview, in which was discussed the question of the 
duty imposed by the order in council upon the re-ex- 

^* Pinkney to Madison, Jan. 26, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 206-207. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 97 

portation of cotton from British ports, Pinkney ob- 
tained little satisfaction with respect to the orders in 
council. He wrote the Secretary of State that, 
" although Mr. Canning's manner was extremely con- 
ciliatory, not a word escaped him to encourage a hope 
that the orders of council would be in any degree 
abandoned."^^ 

When the British minister at Washington informed 
the American Government of the British order in 
council, he stated that the British Government had great 
reluctance in thus inconveniencing neutral commerce. 
This was shown, he said, in the exceptions which had 
been made especially affecting the United States. Such 
exceptions were the permission to carry on direct trade 
between the United States and the colonies of the 
enemy, which, it was claimed, was a deviation from the 
old established rule ; admission with the privilege of 
re-exportation of colonial produce of the enemy into 
the ports of Great Britain when brought from the 
United States to Great Britain ; the issuance of licenses 
for the importation of flour, meal, all grains, tobacco, 
and other articles the produce of the soil of America, 
with the exception of cotton, through the ports of Great 
Britain to the enemies without payment of duty.^*^ 

^s Pinkney to Madison, Feb. 2, 1808 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 207. 

56 Erskine to Madison, Feb. 23, 1808; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 209-210. 
8 



98 NEUTRAL TRADE 

^ I The Secretary of State, writing to Erskine March 
25, complained of the new order in counciLbecause it 
disregarded the remonstrances of the American Gov- 
ernment to the order in council of January 7 ; and 
the British Government had now added restrictions 
upon the commerce of a still more serious character.! 
The order, it was stated, was based upon the false as- 
sumption that the United States had acquiesced in an 
unlawful application of the French decree, and that the 
right of retaliation, accruing to one belligerent against 
a neutral, through whom an injury is done by another 
belligerent, is not to have for its measure that of the 
injury received, but may be exercised to suit the pleas- 
ure of the complaining party. The American Secre- 
tary denied that the British Government at the time of 
issuing the second order could have had any knowledge 
of a single case of the application of the French decree 
to the commerce of the United States. ^'^ 

The British minister at Washington being unable to 
grant any satisfaction to the American Government, 
diplomatic negotiations were transferred to London, 
where, under the able and experienced Pinkney, it was 
hoped that repeal of the British orders might be ob- 
tained. Pinkney put forth his utmost efforts to secure 
this result. In accordance with instructions which he 
had received from Washington, he informed the British 

s'^ Madison to Erskine, March 25, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel, III., 210-213. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 99 

Government that, if the orders should be revoked, the 
United States would repeal the embargo act, as far as it 
affected Great Britain. He said that such action would 
be more comformable to the objects which the British 
Government desired, and in accord with justice, for by 
the repeal of the orders on the part of Great Britain 
and the suspension of the embargo act by the United 
States commercial intercourse would be restored, while 
the embargo in its operation upon France would take 
the place of the orders in council, unless France con- 
sented to repeal her decrees, in which case all the rights 
of trade would be secured. ^^ The American minister 
expressed the wish that the carrying out of his sug- 
gestion might not only remove the immediate obstacle 
to trade between the two countries, but prepare the 
way for a satisfactory adjustment of every question 
important to their future friendship. 

The proposal made by the American minister was 
considered by the British Cabinet, and, after a month's 
delay, the decision was communicated by Canning. 
This was in effect that Great Britain could not consent 
" to buy off that hostility, which America ought not to 
have extended," to her " at the expense of a concession 
made, not to America, but to France," and that Great 
Britain felt herself obliged to adhere to the principle 

58 Pinkney to Canning, Aug. 23, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 228. 



lOO NEUTRAL TRADE 

embodied in the orders in council so long as France ad- 
hered to thait system by which the retaliatory measures 
of Great Britain had been occasioned and justified.^^ 
It was claimed that the embargo act was unjust, for as 
a measure of redress it should have been directed only 
at the party which originated the wrong; that if the 
measure were to be regarded only as a municipal regu- 
lation, which afifected none but the United States, and 
with which no foreign state had any concern, then 
Great Britain had no right to complain, and did not; 
that under this last view there was no assignable rela- 
tion between the repeal of the measure of self-restric- 
tion by the United States and the surrender by Great 
Britain of her right of retaliation against her enemies. 
The Berlin decree. Canning stated, was intended " not 
merely to check or impair the prosperity of Great 
Britain, but utterly to annihilate her political existence, 
through the ruin of her commercial prosperity." In 
this attempt, the minister maintained, practically all the 
Powers of Europe had been compelled to assist ; and 
the American embargo, while not so intended, had, 
nevertheless, come to the aid of the blockade of the 
European continent at the very time when, if the 
blockade could have succeeded at all, this interposition 
of the American Government would have contributed 
to its success.^" 

59 Canning to Pinkney, Sept. 23, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 231-232. 

60 Ibid. 



NEUTRAL TRADE lOI 

Canning dwelt upon the seriousness of the British 
struggle against the " Continental system " of France. 
He regarded it as important that the system should be 
broken up through the determination and ability of 
Great Britain and in no way purchased by any con- 
cession; and that, therefore, "no step, which could 
even mistakenly be construed into concession, should be 
taken on her part, while the smallest link of the con- 
federacy remains undissolved, or while it can be a 
question whether the plan devised for her destruction 
has, or has not, either completely failed, or been un- 
equivocally abandoned."''^ The orders in council, it 
was admitted, might perhaps be altered to suit new 
conditions, but not to abate their spirit or impair their 
principle, in such a way as to combine practical relief to 
neutrals with a more severe pressure upon the enemy. 

The British Foreign Secretary avowed that Great 
Britain had no less a desire than the United States that 
the differences between the two countries should be ad- 
justed ; that His Majesty the King desired to cultivate 
the most friendly intercourse with the United States ; 
that the prosperity of the United States was essentially 
the prosperity of Great Britain, and that the strength 
and power of Great Britain were not for herself only, 
but for the world. He expressed the belief that when 
the adjustments alluded to were made it would afford 
a " pledge for the continuance of the good under- 

^1 Canning to Pinkney, Sept. 23, 1808; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 231-232. 



102 NEUTRAL TRADE 

standing between the two countries, that they will have 
learned duly to appreciate each other's friendship ; and 
that it will not hereafter be imputed to Great Britain, 
either on the one hand that she envies American in- 
dustry as prejudicial to British commerce, or on the 
other hand that she is compelled to court an intercourse 
with America as absolutely necessary to her own exist- 
ence."*^- Great Britain, it was held, would not hesitate 
to aid in the restoration of the activity of American 
commerce, and would make any sacrifice for the repeal 
of the embargo, if that could be done without appear- 
ing to deprecate it as a measure of hostility. 

The President's proclamation, issued after the attack 
on the Chesapeake, interdicting the public ships of 
Great Britain from the ports of the United States, was 
alluded to by Canning as an unfriendly act, especially 
since Great Britain had offered to remove the cause 
upon which the measure was founded. This, he said, 
was " an inauspicious omen for the commencement of 
a system of mutual conciliation " ; and the American 
minister's omission of any notice of the President's 
proclamation was in itself a defect in the overture 
which had been made. Canning concluded his note 
with the statement that " on this, and every other point 
in discussion between the two Governments, His 
Majesty earnestly desires the restoration of a perfect 
good understanding, and that His Majesty would de- 

^2 Canning to Pinkney, Sept. 23, 180S; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 231-232. 



NEUTRAL TRADE IO3 

cline no measure for the attainment of that object 
which should be compatible with his own honor and 
just rights and with the interests of his people."®^ 

In December, 1808, Great Britain modified her order 
in council to the extent of suspending export duties on 
articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any 
state at amity with her where such articles had been im- 
ported into Great Britain directly from a neutral state. 
Such suspension of duties on exportation was also 
made applicable to goods which had been or might be 
condemned as prize.^* These changes did not meet the 
American objection, and Minister Pinkney, after re- 
ceiving information of the alterations, made known to 
the British Government that the United States required 
the repeal of the entire system, not a mere modification 
of this or that order.^^ 

During the year the attitude of France in the en- 
forcement of her decrees had been such as decidedly to 
weaken the position which the United States had taken 
in her negotiations with Great Britain when discussing 
the efifect of the French decrees upon neutral com- 
merce. In the case of the condemnation of tlie Hori- 
zon the American Government still sought an explana- 
tion in an extension of municipal law which could not 

63 Canning to Pinkney, Sept. 23, 1808; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 231-232. 

6* Order in Council, Dec. 21, 1808; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 240. 

65 Pinkney to Canning, Dec. 28, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 240. 



I04 NEUTRAL TRADE 

Strictly be regarded as an infraction of neutral rights, 
N^ -but [after the Milan decree was issued, December 17, 
1807, it was no longer possible to regard the French 
decrees in the light of municipal laws, for in this latest 
order instructions were given and executed which 
violated not only the stipulations of the treaty of 1800, 
but also the principles of public law. When the decree 
became known the American minister in Paris was in- 
structed to make a formal remonstrance in such lan- 
guage as might either bring about a recall of the illegal 
measure, so far as it related to the United States, or 
might have the " effect of leaving, in full force, all the 
rights accruing to them from a failure to do so." If it 
should be contended that the decree was justified as a 
retaliatory measure upon Great Britain, at the expense 
of neutral states, because of the acceptance of the prior 
measures of Great Britain, it was to be denied that the 
United States had made any such acquiescence. Re- 
taliation, it was urged, ought not to be enforced at the 
expense of neutrals, without giving a reasonable time 
for neutrals to choose between measures against the 
prior wrong and an acquiescence in both. , The copy of 
the American protestations against British action would 
prove that the United States had not acquiesced in the 
British orders ; and would also explain the grounds on 
which the execution of the French order of November, 
1806, had been an object of just remonstrance. The 
French decree was the more objectionable, in that while 



NEUTRAL TRADE IO5 

the inability of France to enforce it made it only a 
slight menace, it afforded a pretext for severe retalia- 
tion on the part of Great Britain.*''' 

A copy of the embargo act was sent to Minister Arm- 
strong, which, he was to explain to the French Govern- 
ment, was an act rendered necessary for the pro- 
tection of American property and seamen in view of 
the conduct of France and Great Britain, and was not 
to be regarded as a hostile measure. The American 
minister was to point out to the French Government 
that the duration of the act was not fixed, but that its 
revocation would follow the repeal of the unjust acts 
of the belligerents. 

The American minister was informed, shortly after"" 
the proclamation of the French decree of December 17, 
that all American vessels brought into French ports 
would be sequestered until a decision could be made 
according to the disposition which the Government of 
the United States should entertain toward Great 
Britain.^^ The note of the French Foreign Minister 
containing this statement, w^hen communicated to the 
American Government, aroused much feeling. It was 
regarded as presenting to the United States the alter- 
native of acceding to France in her designs against 
Great Britain, or incurring the confiscation of all Amer- 

«6 Madison to Armstrong, Feb. 8, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 249-250. 

^^ Champagny to Armstrong, Jan. 15, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 248-249. 



I06 NEUTRAL TRADE 

ican property carried into French Prize Courts. Such 
a proposition, it was maintained, implied that the 
United States was susceptible to suggestions which no 
independent and honorable nation ought to entertain. 
Armstrong was instructed to place the contents of 
Minister Champagny's note before the French Gov- 
ernment, and while letting it be clearly understood that 
the American Government regarded the tone of the note 
as most offensive, he was to leave the way open for 
friendly and respectful explanation. Information re- 
garding the action of Congress in giving power to the 
President to suspend the embargo act, in whole or in 
part, was furnished to the American minister, and he 
was instructed to use his best endeavors to induce 
France to repeal her decrees. If Great Britain, it was 
stated, should revoke her orders and thereby prepare 
the way for the removal of the embargo as it applied to 
her, France could not persist in her decrees unless she 
intended to force a conflict with the United States. On 
the other hand, if France should be the first to set an 
example of repeal, " Great Britain would be obliged, 
either by following it to restore to France the full 
benefit of neutral trade, which she needs, or, by per- 
severing in her obnoxious orders after the pretext for 
them had ceased, to render collisions with the United 
States inevitable. "^^ Any action that might be taken 

^s Madison to Armstrong, May 2, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 252-253. 



NEUTRAL TRADE lO/ 

by France was to be at once reported to Minister 
Pinkney in London and to the State Department at 
Washington, since each Government had pledged itself 
to follow the example of the other. 

Armstrong acted in accordance with these instruc- 
tions, but secured no satisfaction from the French 
Government. In fact, by the issuance of the Bayonne 
decree by Napoleon, April 22, 1808, the American 
grounds of complaint against France were greatly in- 
creased. This decree authorized the seizure and con- 
fiscation of all American vessels then in France or 
which might arrive there. This was in return for the 
embargo act which the French minister said made it 
imlawful for any American vessel to be abroad after 
the date of its passage. This decree w^as aimed at 
those American vessels that were trading under British 
licenses and forged documents. ( Secretary IMadison 
said that if the decree was aimed at all American 
vessels on the high seas demands for reparation would 
be extended; and that, if war with the United States 
w^as to be deprecated, France ought to revoke her de- 
crees, in so far at least as they violated the rights of the 
seas and furnished a pretext to Great Britain to con- 
tinue her retaliatory measures.*^^ ]\Iinister Armstrong 
found that the embargo act upon which the American 

•59 Madison to Armstrong, July 22, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 254-255. 



v^' 



V 



I08 NEUTRAL TRADE 

Government had counted to coerce Great Britain and 
France into repealing their obnoxious measures had 
no effect in securing such a result. Armstrong favored 
the removal of the embargo. He advised putting in 
its place a system of armed commerce. Pinkney, on 
the other hand, after an unsuccessful attempt to per- 
suade Great Britain to repeal her orders, expressed 
himself strongly in favor of a continuance of the 
embargo. In a letter to Madison he said : " The spirit 
of monopoly has seized the people and Government of 
this country. We shall not, under any circumstances, 
be tolerated as rivals in navigation and trade,"^*^ 

In January, 1809, the British Government sent in- 
structions to their minister at Washington authorizing 
him to state to the American Government that the 
orders in council of January and November, 1807, 
would be raised with respect to the United States upon 
three conditions. These were that the United States 
should remove all its restrictive acts against Great 
Britain, leaving them in force against France ; that the 
United States should agree to renounce all claims to the 
colonial trade and acquiesce in the rule of 1756; that 
Great Britain should be at liberty to capture all Ameri- 
can vessels which might attempt to trade with the ports 

'^o Armstrong to Madison, Aug. 30, 1808; American State 
Papers, For. Rel, III., 256. Pinkney to Madison, Sept. 21, 
1808; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 228-230. 



NEUTRAL TRADE IO9 

of France or other countries acting under the French 
decrees.''^ 

The British minister, conceiving that the all-im- 
portant thing for his Government was the restoration 
of free intercourse with the United States, disregarded 
the specific conditions under which he had been in- 
structed, and proposed the repeal of the orders in coun- 
cil of January and November, 1807, with respect to 
the United States, provided the President would issue a 
proclamation for the renewal of intercourse with Great 
Britain." The Secretary of State on the same day re- 
plied, giving assurance that, should the British Govern- 
ment remove the orders in council which were men- 
tioned, the President of the United States would issue 
a proclamation repealing the non-intercourse act in 
accordance with the power given him by Congress/^ 
Minister Erskine, the following day, informed the Sec- 
retary of State that the orders in council would be 
withdrawn with respect to the United States on the 
loth of June next.^* Thereupon, the Secretary of 
State announced that the President would accordingly 

71 Canning to Erskine, Jan. 23, 1809; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 300-301. " Correspondence Relative to 
America," 9. 

72 Erskine to Smith, April 18, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 296. 

73 Smith to Erskine, April 18, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 296. 

7* Erskine to Smith, April 19, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 296. 



I I O NEUTRAL TRADE 

repeal the non-intercourse act and renew trade between 
Great Britain and the United States upon the same 
date as the removal of the orders in council/^ The 
President on the same day issued a proclamation de- 
claring the renewal of the accustomed intercourse be- 
tween the United States and Great Britain^® 

The British Government later disavowed the 
arrangement which Erskine had made, on the ground 
that their minister had exceeded his instructions ; and 
the President's proclamation, accordingly, was with- 
drawn, August 9. ;' Erskine was censured for departing 
from the letter and, more especially, the spirit of his 
previous instructions. With regard to some of the 
points of criticism made by Canning it is difficult to see 
wherein these were covered by instructions given to 
Erskine, and the objections appear hypercritical, 
prompted by a determination to make the rejection of 
the agreement as plausible as possible. Great Britain 
was apparently more desirous of seeing America at 
war with France than she was to see her at peace with 
England. 
»^ March, 1809, Congress raised the embargo as to all 
other nations except Great Britain, France, and their 
dependencies, and substituted a system of non-inter- 
course and non-importation against them. This act 

^5 Smith to Erskine, April 19, 1809; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 296. 

''^ Proclamation of the President of the United States, April 
19, 1809; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 297. 



NEUTRAL TRADE III 

prohibited all voyages to the British or French posses- 
sions and all trade in articles of British or French 
product or manufacture/^ 

May I, 1810, a law was passed which provided for 
non-intercourse alone; and declared that if Great 
Britain or France should so revoke or modify its edicts 
before March 3, 181 1, as that these should cease to 
violate the neutral commerce of the United States, and 
if the other nation should not within three months 
thereafter in like manner revoke or modify its edicts, 
the provisions of the non-intercourse and non-importa- 
tion law should be revived against the nation refusing 
so to act.'^^ 

This act was communicated to the American min- 
isters at London and Paris, with the instructions that 
they present the same to the respective Governments 
to which they were accredited. The American minister 
at Paris, upon transmitting the act to the French Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, received a communication 
from the French minister in which he declared that, if 
England would revoke her orders in council, France 
would revoke her decrees. With peculiar logic he 
placed the responsibility for securing these results upon 
the United States.^'' The French Government later 

■^7 Annals of Congress, loth Cong., 2d sess., 1824-1830. 
78 Annals of Congress, nth Cong., 2d sess., 2582-2583. 
^9 Champagny to Armstrong, Aug. 22, 1809 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 325-326. 



112 NEUTRAL TRADE 

explained that the revocation of their decrees would 
follow the previous revocation of the orders in council 
in chronological sequence.^" Pinkney in London, being 
informed by Armstrong of the conditions attached to 
the repeal of the French decrees, endeavored to per- 
suade the British Government at least to repeal so 
much of their orders as affected the blockade of French 
ports prior to the Berlin decree, in order that that 
decree might in consequence be revoked by France. 
The American Government considered itself justified 
in insisting that the British orders anterior to the Berlin 
decree be first repealed, inasmuch as the British Gov- 
ernment had all along contended that the Berlin decree 
was the original aggressor upon the neutral commerce 
of the United States.^^ Upon the failure of the 
American minister to induce the British Government to 
repeal its earlier orders upon the assurance that France 
would withdraw the Berlin decree, instructions were 
given to Pinkney to urge upon the British Government 
the consideration of the act of Congress of May i.^^ 

While this fruitless negotiation was going on in Lon- 
don, the French Government was planning a cunning 
scheme to deceive the United States and force her into 

80 Armstrong to Smith, Jan. 28, 1810; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 326. 

81 Smith to Pinkney, July 2, 1810; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., 360-361. 

82 Smith to Pinkney, July 5, 1810; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 362. 



NEUTRAL TRADE I 1 3 

hostile opposition to Great Britain. On August 6, 
1810, Armstrong received a note from the Duke of 
Cadore, Minister of Foreign Affairs, announcing that 
the decrees of Berlin and Milan had been revoked and 
that they would cease to have effect after November i 
of that year.^^ Armstrong transmitted this informa- 
tion to Pinkney, who immediately communicated it to 
the British Government with the statement that he 
should expect that the British orders in council would 
at once be repealed. The British Ministry refused to 
believe that the French decrees had in fact been re- 
pealed. They gave assurance that " whenever the re- 
peal of the French decrees shall have actually taken 
effect, and the commerce of neutral nations shall have 
been restored to the condition in which it stood previ- 
ously to the promulgation of those decrees, His 
Majesty will feel the highest satisfaction in relinquish- 
ing a system which the conduct of the enemy com- 
pelled him to adopt."*V 

President Madison, relying upon the note of the 
Duke of Cadore that the French decrees had been 
revoked, issued, November 2, a proclamation in accord- 
ance with the act of May i, declaring that all restric- 
tions upon the commerce of France and her depend- 

83 Cadore to Armstrong, Aug. 5, 1810; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 386-387. 

s*Wellesley to Pinkney, Aug. 31, 1810; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 366. 



114 NEUTRAL TRADE 

encies should cease from the date of the proclamation.^^ 
Pinkney was unsuccessful in his efforts to secure the 
repeal of the orders in council. ^ In a letter to the 
Secretary of State, December 14, 1810, he expressed 
his belief that the British Government intended to do 
nothing. He, therefore, advised that "a very firm 
tone " be assumed by the United States Government.*^^ 
The British Government held that the words in the 
Duke of Cadore's note, announcing the revocation of 
the Berlin and Milan decrees, implied as a condition to 
the actual repeal that Great Britain should in conse- 
quence of that declaration revoke the British orders 
in council and renounce their principles of blockade. 
The words of the French minister following the 
declaration of the repeal of the decrees had been 
these : " it being understood that in consequence of this 
declaration the English shall revoke their orders in 
council, and renounce the new principles of blockade 
which they have attempted to establish. "s'^ Another 
condition, which the British held was implied in the 
French note, was that the decrees would be actually 
repealed provided that the United States would resent 
any refusal of the British Government to renounce the 

85 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
481-482. 

8" Pinkney to Smith, Dec. 14, 1810; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 375- 

s^Wellesley to Pinkney, Dec. 29, 1810; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 408-409. 



NEUTRAL TRADE I I 5 

new principles of blockade and to revoke the orders in 
council. The American Government insisted that no 
conditions had been made, but that the decrees had 
actually been repealed. 

In February, 1811, Lord Wellesley again announced 
that Great Britain would repeal her orders in council 
whenever France should actually have revoked the 
decrees of Berlin and Milan, and should have restored 
the trade of neutral nations to the condition which 
prevailed before the promulgation of those decrees. 
He maintained that the relinquishment of them with 
respect to the United States alone was not sufficient. 
The refusal of Great Britain to comply with the re- 
quest of the United States was especially assigned to 
the alleged demand by France that the British prin- 
ciples of blockade be renounced.^^ Pinkney now de- 
cided to return home, for two reasons ; first, his mis- 
sion had apparently failed, and second, he deemed it 
expedient to place the diplomatic representation of the 
United States in London upon the same basis as that 
maintained by Great Britain in Washington. This 
was a most unfortunate move, making it impossible 
now for the differences between the United States and 
Great Britain to be settled otherwise than by war. 
Before Pinkney left London the British Government 
announced the appointment of a minister plenipoten- 

^8 Wellesley to Pinkney, Feb. 11, 181 1; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 412. 



Il6 NEUTRAL TRADE 

tiary to the United States in the person of A. J. Foster, 
former charge d'afifaires in Sweden. Pinkney then 
hesitated about withdrawing, but upon receiving from 
Lord Wellesley an absolute refusal to repeal the orders 
in council he thought it useless to remain longer. 

The second of February, being three months after 
the President's proclamation had been issued announ- 
cing the repeal of the French decrees, Great Britain 
still refusing to repeal the orders in council, the non- 
intercourse and non-importation law was revived 
against her. Congress, March 2, 181 1, confirmed the 
action of the President, and authorized him to suspend 
the non-intercourse and non-importation act with Great 
Britain whenever that country would revoke her orders 
in council. 

The last negotiations between the United States and 
Great Britain seeking a peaceful settlement of this dif- 
ference were carried on in Washington by Secretary 
Monroe and the British minister, Foster, from July, 
181 1, to June, 1812. In these discussions Foster justi- 
fied the British orders on the ground of their necessity as 
retaliatory measures to counteract Napoleon's attempt 
to crush British trade. He argued that France was 
the aggressor in the issuance of retaliatory edicts. He 
objected to the position of France with reference to 
blockades, and stated that neither the practice of Great 
Britain nor the law of nations sanctioned the rule that 



NEUTRAL TRADE I I / 

no place, excepting fortresses in a complete state of 
resistance, could be lawfully blockaded by sea. The 
blockade of May, 1806, he asserted, " was intended to 
be maintained, and was actually maintained, by an ade- 
quate force ... to enforce the blockade."*^ The 
strongest argument offered by the British minister in 
support of the refusal of his Government to repeal the 
orders in council was the fact that proof was lacking 
to show ithat France had really revoked her decrees, 
that, in fact, there was evidence to the contrary. He 
showed that an American vessel, the New Orleans 
Packet, had been seized since the decrees were supposed 
to have been revoked, and further, that the Emperor in 
a speech to the deputies of the free cities of Hamburg, 
Bremen, and Lubeck had declared that the Berlin and 
Milan decrees should be the public code of France as 
long as England maintained her orders in council of 
1806 and 1807. 

Secretary Monroe maintained that the British argu- 
ment of retaliation was unjustifiable, for the retalia- 
tory acts were far in excess of the acts which called 
them forth, and that besides they fell with the greater 
eflfect not upon the commerce of the enemy, but upon 
that of neutrals ; that Great Britain ought, in keeping 
with her own promise to proceed pari passu with the 
Government of France in the revocation of her edicts, 

^^ Foster to Monroe, July 3, 181 1; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 435-437- 



I I 8 NEUTRAL TRADE 

immediately to repeal her orders. Monroe held that 
France had revoked her edicts as far as they violated 
neutral rights, and upon that ground the United States 
had a right to expect a similar revocation on the part 
of Great Britain. He explained ihe seizure of the 
New Orleans Packet on the ground that it had been 
merely detained and not condemned ; and said that the 
speech of the Emperor contained nothing incompatible 
with the revocation of the decrees in respect to the 
United States, but that it merely enunciated the French 
policy to cease the French blockade in favor of those 
nations in whose favor Great Britain should revoke 
hers or those who should support their rights against 
her pretension, as France considered the United States 
would do by enforcing the non-intercourse and non- 
importation act.®" 

Monroe's position was difficult to maintain, for he 
knew perfectly well that the French decrees had not 
ceased to affect neutral vessels, and that American 
ships were being seized almost daily. " The reports 
of Minister Serrurier to the French foreign office, of 
his interviews with Monroe, as revealed by the re- 
searches of Mr. A'dams in the French archives, are 
perfect evidence that the administration felt keenly the 
hypocritical position which it was obliged to assume."^^ 

S'O Monroe to Foster, July 22,, 181 1; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 439-442. 

91 Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality, 44. 



NEUTRAL TRADE I 1 9 

When the Emperor was informed of the action of 
the President in reviving the non-intercourse and 
non-importation act against Great Britain, he pro- 
ceeded to admit American cargoes which had been 
provisionally placed in deposit on their arrival in 
France. Such cargoes were required, however, to be 
exchanged for French goods of which two thirds must 
be silks.^- All the American vessels that had been 
sequestered in the ports of France after November 2, 
1810, were ordered to be released, and at the same time 
American vessels carrying only American products and 
manufacture were admitted. The United States was 
not satisfied with the response of the French Govern- 
ment, and at once sent a minister plenipotentiary, Joel 
Barlow, to Paris, July, 181 1, to secure more liberal 
commercial arrangements and especially to present 
American claims for losses resulting from the enforce- 
ment of the French decrees. On May 10, 1S12, the 
American Government was officially informed that the 
French Emperor, under date of April 28, 181 1, had 
issued a decree definitely repealing the Berlin and 
Milan decrees and that to the first of the preceding 
November they were considered as not existing in re- 
gard to American vessels. A copy of this decree was 
communicated to the British Government, May 21. 

President Madison called the twelfth Congress in an 

^2 Bassano to Russell, May 4, 181 1; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 505-506. 



I20 NEUTRAL TRADE 

extra session, November 4, 181 1, and on the following 
day presented his third annual message. This message 
recommended that provision be made to place the 
United States upon a war footing.''^ Congress pro- 
ceeded to pass certain measures preparatory to war. 
Among these were a bill to increase the regular army 
from ten thousand to twenty-five thousand, and a bill 
to provide for a volunteer force of fifty thousand men. 
On April i, 1812, Congress again passed an embargo 
act for ninety days. This was a forerunner of the 
actual war measure which was adopted June 18, 1812. 

While Congress was debating the question of war, 
the British minister and Monroe continued negotiations 
with respect to the rehnquishment of impressment and 
the repeal of the British orders in council. As late as 
June 14, the British minister stated again that, if a full 
and unconditional repeal of the French decrees could 
be shown, the orders in council would be revoked. 
This the American Government of course was unable 
to produce, and so, while the United States had real 
grievance against France which would have justified 
going to war with that country as well as with Great 
Britain, her suffering at the hands of Great Britain 
was so much greater that she was warranted in declar- 
ing war upon that country alone. 

The United States had a complaint against Great 

^3 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
491-496. 



NEUTRAL TRADE 121 

Britain in relation to the question of blockade apart 
from the general orders in council. This was made 
one of the causes of the war in Madison's war message 
of June I, 1812, and repeated in the report of the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations two days later. 

As early as 1800 Marshall, then Secretary of State, \ 
protested against the English blockade of Dutch ports, 
on the ground that they were " not effectually blockaded 
by a force capable of completely investing them." The 
British in this instance held that if the blockade was 
generally maintained it was sufficient, and that an oc- 
casional absence of a fleet from a blockaded port did 
not impair it. Marshall conceded that if such absence 
were occasioned by storm or accident that claim might 
hold, but not when a fleet was applied only a part of 
the time to maintain a blockade.^* A similar protest 
was made by the United States in 1801, in connection 
with the attempted blockade of Gibraltar by Spain. 
Again, in 1803, the American Government protested 
against the British order of June 17 of that year which 
declared the islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe in a 
state of blockade ; the question in this case being a lack 
of previous notification and the fact that the islands 
themselves, instead of specific ports, were declared 
blockaded. In a note to the British representative at 
Washington, Secretary Madison wrote that the United 

^* Marshall to King, Sept. 20, 1800 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 370-371. 



"Ny 



122 NEUTRAL TRADE 

States held such a blockade illegal ; that she accepted 
as a proper definition of a blockade that which Great 
Britain herself had agreed to in a treaty with Russia in 
1801, namely : " That in order to determine what char- 
acterizes a blockaded port, that denomination is given 
only to a port where there is, by the dispositions of the 
Power which attacks it with ships stationary or suffi- 
ciently near, an evident danger of entering."^^' This 
was the definition which the American Government in- 
sisted upon in all the various negotiations carried on 
with the British Government. All blockades which 
were not confined to specific ports or places and which 
were not backed up by a force sufficient to endanger an 
attempt to enter were regarded as illegal and denomi- 
nated mere fictitious or paper blockades. The United 
States also claimed that a notification should be an- 
nounced in advance, and that individual ships sailing 
in ignorance of the blockade should be warned before 
attempting to enter the blockaded port. 

The draft of the treaty which, in 1804, Monroe was 
instructed to present to the British Government con- 
tained articles upon blockade which declared that the 
term "blockaded port" should be appHed "only to a 
port where there is, by the disposition of the Power 
which attacks it with ships stationary or sufficiently 
near, an evident danger in entering. ... It is agreed 

8^ Madison to Thornton, Oct. 27, 1803 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 361-362. 



NEUTRAL TRADE I 23 

that no vessel sailing from the ports of either [party] 
shall, although cleared or bound to a blockaded port, be 
considered as violating in any manner the blockade, 
unless on her approach towards such port she shall have 
been previously warned against entering the same.^^ 
In the instructions given to Monroe and Pinkney May 
17, 1806, Madison urged the importance of securing 
from the British Government an agreement upon the 
question of blockade. He dwelt especially upon the 
point of notification. In the proposed treaty which was 
signed by Monroe and Pinkney with Lord Holland 
and Lord Auckland, provision was made with refer- 
ence to notification of vessels, similar to that contained 
in the Jay treaty of 1794; but no statement relative to 
the definition of blockade was given. This was one of 
the objections made by President Jefiferson^^ to the 
proposed treaty. After its rejection by the President, 
the American ministers attempted to secure an article 
upon blockade exactly like the one included in the draft 
of the treaty proposed in 1804.^^ ; Inasmuch as the 
Monroe- Pinkney negotiations upon all subjects failed, 
no advance was made on the subject of blockade. 
In connection with the British order in council of 

^8 Convention between the United States and Great Britain; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 82-83. 

^^ Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 20, 1807; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 166-173. 

^^ Monroe and Pinkney to Canning, July 24, 1807 ; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 194-196. 



124 NEUTRAL TRADE 

May 1 6, 1806, the United States held that Great Britain 
attempted to establish a blockade contrary to the usages 
of nations, and this became a subject of discussion in 
all the subsequent negotiations over the orders in 
council. Great Britain insisted that it was a legitimate 
blockade which she was able to maintain with an ade- 
quate force. 



CHAPTER III 
Declaration of War and Peace Proposals 

The negotiations of three administrations failing to 
remove the causes of grievance of the United States 
against Great Britain, the war cloud which had long 
been upon the horizon now drifted nearer. If the 
United States, prior to the declaration of war, had 
been represented at the court of St. James by a minister 
plenipotentiary of the ability of Albert Gallatin, instead 
of by a mere charge d'affaires in the person of 
Jonathan Russell, it is possible that the war might have 
been averted ; but, under the circumstances, there was 
much justification for the position of the ruling party 
at Washington, that the honor and independence of the 
United States were involved and that nothing short of 
war would now avail. Though there were undoubtedly 
sufficient reasons for war, not only with Great Britain, 
but also with France, they all would have disappeared 
upon the restoration of peace between those two 
countries. 

The question of war with Great Britain was not 
settled wholly upon the grounds of justice or expedi- 
ency. It became, fundamentally, a party issue. The 
Democratic party, constitutionally averse to Great 

125 



I 26 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

Britain, and seeing in the sentimental causes of the war 
an opportunity to appeal to the popular imagination, 
became pronounced for war ; while the Federalist party, 
being friendly to England, and located largely in the 
commercial States, which would suffer most from the 
operation of the war, vigorously opposed it. The war 
passion of the Democrats was especially aroused by 
the presentation to Congress by the President of a 
message, on March 9, 18 12, in which he brought 
charges against Great Britain of attempting to sever 
the New England States from the Union and to 
annex them to her own possessions.^ Transmitted 
with the message were letters containing the cor- 
respondence of John Henry, who, in a spirit of spite 
for having been insufficiently rewarded, had made 
known a mission, which he had undertaken to New 
England in 1809 at the instigation of the Governor- 
in-Chief of Canada, to investigate the state of affairs 
and political feeling in the East. The British Govern- 
ment denied having had any connection with the Henry 
mission. No evidence was adduced from the papers 
or from Henry's testimony before the Committee of 
Foreign Affairs to prove that any plan of secession had 
been contemplated by the New England States. The 
Federalists claimed that the entire affair had been 
trumped up by Madison to augment the war feeling, 

1 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
498. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 127 

and evidence was produced to show that the President 
had paid $50,000 for the papers. - 

On April 4, Congress passed its last hostile act short 
of war. This was another embargo act, which, as its 
supporters openly declared, was preparatory to war. 
This measure, as in the case of the previous retaliatory 
measures, affected American interests much more dis- 
astrously than it did French or English. 

All other efforts proving without avail, and urged 
on by the young but popular leaders of his party, most 
prominent of whom were the South Carolina repre- 
sentatives, Calhoun, Cheves, and Lowndes, Madison, 
at last, on June i, 181 2, sent a message to Congress in 
which in vigorous language he discussed the various 
grounds for war against Great Britain. He gave as 
justifiable reasons for a declaration of war, impress- 
ment, violation of the rights and peace of the American 
coasts by British cruisers, illegal blockade, and the 
British orders in council.^ 

The House of Representatives referred the message 
to the Committee on Foreign Relations ; and, on June 
3, the report of the committee was presented to the 
House, convened in secret session, by John C. Calhoun, 
in the absence of Porter, the chairman of the com- 
mittee. Historians generally have attributed the 

2 Baltimore Federal Republican, March 19, 1812. 

3 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
499 et seq. American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 405-407. 



128 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

authorship of this paper to Calhoun, but the discovery 
and pubhcation of the Cralle papers by Gaillard Hunt 
has at least thrown doubt upon the commonly accepted 
view. 

These papers, published by Mr. Hunt in the American 
Historical Review for January, 1908, contain letters 
from Gales, the editor and proprietor of the National 
Intelligencer from 1810 to i860, to Richard K. Cralle, 
the friend and literary executor of John C. Calhoun. 
According to these letters, Monroe, Secretary of State, 
was the author of the war manifesto, and not Calhoun. 
Gales stated in evidence of this that the report was in 
the handwriting of Monroe's private secretary and con- 
fidential clerk; that the select committee had the sub- 
ject referred to them at the close of the day's sitting 
June I, and reported at the opening of the session 
June 3 and, therefore, had not time in the interval to 
have prepared such an exhaustive report ; and that the 
report was similar in style to the President's message, 
which showed that the sources of the two documents 
were closely allied. Gales attributed the more vigorous 
attitude taken by President Madison in his message of 
November 5, 1811, to the influence of Monroe, who, a 
few months before, had been added to the Cabinet. 
Gales believed that the Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions, being composed of many young and inexperi- 
enced men, consulted Monroe upon foreign affairs and 
that, when the President's message was referred to 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 29 

them, they prevailed upon the Secretary of State, as 
being more fully possessed of the facts and merits of 
the questions, to prepare the report. It was an elabo- 
rate manifesto filling ten or twelve ordinary pages, 
and contained language which Gales said no one who 
had ever heard Monroe discourse upon the subject 
could doubt was his.* 

The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
reviewed the history of the British acts of aggression 
and of the unsuccessful negotiations to adjust the dif- 
ferences between the two countries. In addition to 
impressment and violation of neutral commerce as 
reasons for war, there were added the attempt to dis- 
member the Union, and the inciting of the Indians to 
arms against the United States. The report concluded 
with the following appeal to the sentiment of the nation : 
" Your committee believing that the free born sons of 
America are worthy to enjoy the liberty which their 
fathers purchased at the price of so much blood and 
treasure, and seeing in the measures adopted by Great 
Britain a course commenced and persisted in which 
must lead to a loss of national character and independ- 
ence, feel no hesitation in advising resistance by 
force, in which the Americans of the present day will 
prove to the enemy and to the world, that we have not 
only inherited that liberty which our fathers gave us, 

* Gaillard Hunt, "Joseph Gales on the War Manifesto of 
1812," in American Historical Review, Jan., 1908. 

10 



1 30 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

but also the will and power to maintain it. Relying on 
the patriotism of the nation, and confidently trusting 
that the Lord of Hosts will go with us to battle in a 
righteous cause, and crown our efforts with success, 
your committee recommend an immediate appeal to 
arms."^ 

A bill declaring war, drawn by William Pinkney, 
Attorney-General, was introduced into the House of 
Representatives by Calhoun. After a lengthy debate in 
the Committee of the Whole the following day, the 
bill passed the House by a vote of seventy-nine to 
forty-nine.® 

In the Senate the measure was discussed in secret 
session for several days, and was finally passed with 
slight amendment on June 17.'^ The vote stood nine- 
teen for and thirteen against the bill. The vote in 
both houses represented almost precisely the party 
division. This division was sectional as well as poli- 
tical, the agricultural States of the West and South 
favoring the war, the commercial States of the North, 
and particularly the East, voting against it. The South 
favored war because the British orders affected the 
cotton trade most seriously. The bill passed the House 

^ Calhoun's report for the Committee on Foreign Relations 
to the House of Representatives, June 3, 1812; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 567-570. 

^ Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., ist sess., 1637. 

■^ Ibid., 297. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 3 I 

as amended by the Senate, and, on the i8th, was sent 
to the President, who signed the act the same day. 
The following day he issued the war proclamation.^ 

The Federalist party, having opposed the Govern- 
ment in all its previous acts designed to secure redress 
without war, and having said that the Government 
could not be " kicked into war," now opposed the act of 
war itself. They asserted that the Administration took 
this action merely to continue itself in power.^ It 
was claimed that the war was directed by the South 
and West against the commercial section of the 
country.^" The House of Representatives of Massa- 
chusetts published an address to their constituents 
■which was distributed widely. New England assumed 
an attitude of passive resistance to the war, furnishing 
neither men nor money to any considerable extent. 
This was the policy advocated by the leaders of the 
Federalist party." 

The Governors of Massachusetts and Connecticut 
denied that the Federal Government had the power to 
make a draft upon the state militia for carrying on a 
war which had in view no one of the three constitu- 
tional objects, namely, "to execute the laws," "to sup- 

^ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 

512-513- 

9 N. Y. Evening Post, June 15, July i, 1812. 

10 Boston Weekly Messenger, June 26, 1812; Jan. 14, 1813. 

11 Ibid., July 3, 1812. 



132 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

press insurrection," and "to repel invasion." The 
President feared to press the matter to its logical con- 
clusion, and the difficulty was partially removed by 
allowing the militia to remain under state officers. The 
opposition of the Federalists hampered the Administra- 
tion throughout the war.^- In Massachusetts, where 
the Federalists were the strongest, petitions and re- 
monstrances, from town after town, were sent to Con- 
gress ; and the state legislature passed a " memorial " 
denouncing the Administration and declaring the war 
" improper," " impolitic," and " unjust." This re- 
monstrance was presented to Congress June 14, 1813.^^ 
Memorials objecting to the war poured into Congress 
from nearly every town in New England and from 
many outside of that section. A large mass-meeting 
held in Fanueil Hall, Boston, July 15, 1812, adopted 
a series of resolutions maintaining the right of public 
discussion of and individual expression on the war 
policy. The clergy of all denominations generally pro- 
nounced against the war, declaring it cruel and unpro- 
voked. To such length was the opposition carried that 
in Massachusetts, when the public funeral of Captain 
Lawrence of the Chesapeake occurred, the state officers 
and other leading Federalists refused to attend. The 
victories of the war were either belittled or entirely 

12 Boston Weekly Messenger, June 4, 1813; May 21, 1813; 
Jan. 7, 1814. Salem Gazette, Jan. 11, 14, 18, 25, 1814. N. Y. 
Spectator, April 22, 1814. 

13 Boston Weekly Messenger, June 18, 1813. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 33 

passed over by the Federalist press. This was the 
attitude taken by the Senate of Massachusetts in 1813, 
when it passed the following resolution: "Resolved, 
as the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts, that, 
in a war like the present, waged without justifiable 
cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates 
that conquest and ambition are its real motives, it is 
not becoming a moral and religious people to express 
any approbation of military or NAVAL exploits, 
which are not immediately connected with the defense 
of our sea-coast and soil."^* 

A fair example of the tone and spirit of the Federal- 
ist party throughout the war is given in the following 
extract from the Boston Weekly Messenger, one of its 
leading papers : " Will you lowly bow the suppliant 
knee to an administration which is, in every particular 
sense your enemy; whose profligate profusion is in- 
volving you and your posterity in a redeemless debt of 
countless millions ; who has already disgraced, and are 
rapidly proceeding to ruin your country ? "^^ This 
paper, even as late as September, 1814, kept up its 
bitter attack, and declared that the causes of the war 
sprang from the following sources : "First — To gratify 
ancient hatred against G. Britain, and to assist the 
French in subduing the English. Secondly — To give 
that tone and strength to the Madisonian government, 

^* National Intelligencer, June 26, 1813. 
^^ Boston Weekly Messenger, April i, 1814. 



I 34 DECLARATIOlsr OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

which might naturally be expected to arise out of a 
state of war. Thirdly — To silence those men who had 
opposed the Jeffersonian and Madisonian course of 
policy, and to command their wealth for the purpose of 
keeping them still. Fourthly — To take the chances of 
the events which might arise out of this new state of 
things, and from the noise, excitement and acclamation 
of successful war, probably to estabish, by the help of 
arms, a government not unlike that of Bonaparte. 
Fifthly — To satisfy the people as to all the expenses 
and sacrifices which might arise, by conquering the 
Canadas, and making a great outcry as to our gains and 
glory."^** The Boston Gazette, one of the most violent 
of the Federalist papers, employed these words : " Is 
there a Federalist, a patriot, in America, who conceives 
it his duty to shed his blood for Bonaparte, for Madi- 
son or Jefferson, and that Host of Ruffians in Congress 
who have set their faces against the United States for 
years, and have spirited up the brutal part of the popu- 
lace to destroy us ? Not one ; shall we then any longer 
be held in slavery and driven to desperate poverty by 
such a graceless faction ! Heaven forbid ! " The 
Democratic papers in equally extravagant and partisan 
language strove to add fuel to the war flame, and to 
overwhelm their adversaries with invective.^'^ 

1^ Boston Weekly Messenger, Sept. i6, 1814. 
1'^ National Intelligencer. July 28, 1812. Philadelphia Au- 
rora, June 8, 16, Aug. 19, 1812. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 3$ 

The declaration of war caused a great sensation in 
Great Britain. It brought forth bitter denunciations 
from Government and press. It was claimed that the 
United States had seized the opportunity of attacking ^ 
Great Britain at the precise moment when all her 
energies were taxed to the utmost in the struggle with 
Napoleon. Holding, as the British did, that the policy 
against which the United States protested was essential 
to the maintenance of British naval supremacy, it 
was natural that they should consider the action of the 
United States unwarrantable. Not all, however, took 
this position. The Liverpool Advertiser considered 
Madison's message "one of the ablest state papers 
which ever issued from the American Government," 
and said that it made out a strong case against Great 
Britain " on the received principles of public law and 
international justice. "^^ The Edinburgh Review, one 
of the most influential periodicals of the time, criticized 
severely the policy of Great Britain toward the United 
States, and characterized the orders in council not 
only as odious and unfriendly to the United States, 
but as constituting an " everlasting stain on the char- 
acter and policy of our country."^'' This periodical, 
in common with the more liberal British sentiment, 
regarded Great Britain's right to impress as undeniable, 
but her practice of that right as immoderate and unjust. 

^8 Liverpool Advertiser, Augst 8, 1812. 
19 Edinburgh Review, Nov., 1812. 



I 36 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

The people in general throughout Great Britain had 
little knowledge of the real conditions in the United 
States, and their friendship for Americans was slight. 
The Edinburgh Review said that the Americans were 
" less popular and less esteemed among us than the 
base and bigotted Portugueze, or the ferocious and 
ignorant Russians."-** There was, however, one ele- 
ment in the British population that sincerely regretted 
the war. This was the British manufacturers. Their 
influence in the direction of peace later became 
potent.^^ 

The American Government, in declaring war, enter- 
tained the hope that Great Britain would remove the 
causes of grievance sooner than take up arms against 
the United States. In order to provide such an oppor- 
tunity the Secretary of State, soon after the declara- 
tion of war was proclaimed, empowered Jonathan 
Russell, charge d'affaires at London, to arrange an 
armistice between the two states, on condition that the 
orders in council were repealed and orders given for 
the discontinuance of the practice of impressment of 
seamen from American vessels together with the 
restoration of those already impressed.^- The pur- 
pose of the armistice was to secure a cessation of 
hostilities, pending negotiations for treaty arrangements 

20 Edinburgh Review, Nov., 1812. 

21 Ibid. 

22 Monroe to Russell, June 26, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel.. III., 585-586. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 37 

upon the subjects in dispute. Russell was instructed 
to assure the British Government that, in return for a 
discontinuance of the practice of impressment, a law 
would be passed by Congress prohibiting the employ- 
ment of British seamen in the public or commercial 
vessels of the United States. Such a law, however, 
was to be reciprocal as well on the part of Great 
Britain. Acting under these instructions on August 
24, Russell proposed to the English Government an 
armistice-^ subject to the terms specified by Secretary 
Monroe. Lord Castlereagh replied that the terms were 
inadmissible, and declined to enter into discussion with 
Russell, claiming that Russell had no adequate power 
to negotiate. He rejected utterly the proposal that 
Great Britain relinquish the practice of impressment 
on the assurance that a law would be passed by Con- 
gress to prohibit the employment of British seamen on 
the public and merchant vessels of the United States. 
Great Britain was willing, said Lord Castlereagh, " to 
receive from the Government of the United States, and 
amicably to discuss, any proposition which professes to 
have in view either to check abuse in the exercise of 
the practice of impressment, or to accomplish, by 
means less liable to vexation, the object for which im- 
pressment has hitherto been found necessary ; but they 
cannot consent to suspend the exercise of a right upon 

23 Russell to Castlereagh, Aug. 24, 1812; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 589. 



138 DECLARATION OP WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

which the naval strength of the empire mainly depends, 
until they are fully convinced that means can be de- 
vised, and will be adopted, by which the object to be 
obtained by the exercise of that right can be effectually 
secured."2^ 

In the interval between the sending of his note to 
the British Government and the receipt of the reply 
from Castlereagh, Russell had received a second de- 
spatch-^ from his Government. This contained in- 
structions which differed slightly from the previous set. 
They allowed an armistice to be agreed to without a 
formal declaration on the points at issue. A clear and 
distinct understanding upon those subjects was de- 
clared sufficient. Russell, upon the basis of the new 
instructions, made another attempt to arrange an 
armistice, on the terms that the discontinuance of the 
practice of impressment should begin simultaneously 
with the operation in the United States of the law pro- 
hibiting the employment of British seamen;-" but the 
British Government found this proposal no less ob- 
jectionable than the former, and refused-^ to consent to 
an armistice on such terms. The difficulty of coming 

24 Castlereagh to Russell, Aug. 29, 1812; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 589-S90. 

25 Monroe to Russell, July 27, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 586. 

26 Russell to Castlereagh, Sept. 12, 1812; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 591. 

2' Castlereagh to Russell, Sept. 18, 1812; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 592, 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 39 

to a clear understanding upon the subjects of im- 
pressment, the discharge of impressed seamen, and 
blockades, which Russell had proposed, was too great 
to be imposed as a condition of an armistice. The 
negotiations were broken off, and Russell in great dis- 
pleasure left London. Before leaving he had a private 
interview with Castlereagh, in which the latter assured 
him of the utter impossibilit}- of the British Govern- 
ment's agreeing to give up the right of impressment.-^ 
With the departure of Russell from London the only 
representative of the United States left in the capital 
was R. J. Beasley, who acted as the American agent 
for prisoners of war. 

The British orders in council, which formed one of 
the principal causes of the war, as stated in Madison's 
message to Congress on the first of June, were revoked, 
as far as they affected American vessels, on the 23d of 
June. This action was taken before the proclamation 
of war had reached England. The orders in council 
were recalled because of the disastrous effect which 
they had upon English manufactures, not on account 
of a desire to favor the United States. An inquiry, 
voted by the House of Commons, as to the effects of 
the orders in council upon business in England had 
resulted in the passage of a resolution of Parliament 
requesting the Prince Regent to repeal the orders. 

28 Russell to Secretary- of State, Sept. 17, 1812; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 593-595- 



140 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

This revocation was accomplished with the reservation 
" that nothing in this present order contained shall be 
understood to preclude His Royal Highness the Prince 
Regent, if circumstances shall so require, from restor- 
ing, after reasonable notice, the orders of the 7th of 
January, 1807, and the 26th of April, 1809, or any part 
thereof, to their full effect, or from taking such other 
measures of retaliation against the enemy as may ap- 
pear to His Royal Highness to be just and necessary."^^ 
A further condition of the revocation of the orders was 
that the Government of the United States should re- 
move all restrictions upon the public and private vessels 
of Great Britain entering the ports of the United 
States. 

Since the war had been declared before the news of 
the order of the 23d of June reached the United States, 
the British Government felt confident that, upon the 
receipt of the news, the Government of the United 
States would be disposed to recall its declaration of 
war. Accordingly, Admiral Warren, commanding the 
British fleet in American waters, was instructed by his 
Government to propose an armistice to the American 
Government. Warren, therefore, directed a despatch 
to the Secretary of State at Washington, informing him 
of his power to agree to a cessation of hostilities. He 
proposed that the United States " instantly recall their 
letters of marque and reprisal against British ships, 

28 American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 433. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS I4I 

together with all orders and instructions for any acts 
of hostility whatever against the territories of His 
Majesty or the persons or property of his subjects;" 
with the understanding that, as soon as this should be 
done, orders of a like nature would be issued by him 
to all British officers " to desist from corresponding 
measures of war against the ships and property of the 
United States." He wrote that, upon agreement of a 
cessation of hostilities, he was authorized to make 
arrangements for the revocation of the laws which 
interdicted the commerce and ships of war of Great 
Britain from the harbors and waters of the United 
States, and that in default of such revocation, after 
such time as might be agreed upon, in accordance with 
the order of the 23d of June the orders in council of 
January, 1807, and April, 1809, would be revived.^" 

Secretary Monroe replied that the President would 
be very glad to make arrangements to terminate hostili- 
ties ''' on conditions honorable to both nations." Such 
terms, it was stated, were the same as had been already 
offered by Russell at London, and had been refused 
by the British Government. The suspension of the 
practice of impressment by Great Britain pending an 
armistice, on consideration that the United States 
provide by law for the exclusion of British seamen 
from American vessels, was insisted upon as the first 

30 Warren to Monroe, Sept. 30, 1812; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 595-596. 



142 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

condition to a cessation of hostilities. " Experience has 
evinced," said Monroe, " that no peace can be durable 
unless this object is provided for."^^ The Secretary 
added that, if Great Britain was willing to enter into 
negotiations upon the subject of impressment, but un- 
willing to suspend the practice during an armistice, the 
United States stood ready to treat without an armistice. 
Admiral Warren, however, refused to commit his Gov- 
ernment to the relinquishment of the alleged right of 
impressment, and the negotiations with regard to an 
armistice ceased. 

The Administration was criticised by the Federalist 
party for its refusal to accept the British offer of an 
armistice ; but since impressment was now made the 
chief cause of the war, the demand that impressment 
should cease during the period of the armistice was but 
reasonable. 

The next attempt to secure peace came from 
Russia a year later. In a contest with so formidable 
a Power as Great Britain the United States had felt 
the need of the friendship of the other European states. 
To this end it had directed its various representa-. 
tives at foreign courts to use their best efforts to culti- 
vate the friendship of the respective states to which 
they were accredited. Russia and the other Bahic 
Powers, it was believed, would especially sympathize 

31 Monroe to Warren, Oct. 27, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 596-597- 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 43 

with the United States in its struggle for maritime 
rights against the far-reaching claims of Great Britain. 
This confidence was somewhat shaken when Russia 
joined herself as an ally with Great Britain in the 
Napoleonic conflict ; yet the most cordial relations still 
continued to exist between the United States and the 
Empire of the Czar. The United States, fortunately, 
had appointed three years before, to represent it at 
the Court of St. Petersburg, one of its ablest statesmen 
and most learned diplomats, John Quincy Adams. The 
Russian Government, upon learning through the British 
minister of the declaration of war by the United States, 
in order to render a supposed service to her ally, Great 
Britain, and to strengthen the ties of friendship with 
the United States, and, as well, to guard her important 
export trade, at once ofifered informally to the min- 
isters of the United States and Great Britain a proposal 
of mediation on the part of the Russian Emperor.^^ 

Adams, immediately upon the receipt of the de- 
spatch of July I, 1812, from Secretary Monroe, ap- 
prising him of the war and instructing him in his 
diplomatic duties in connection therewith, sought an 
interview with Count Romanzoff. In this interview, 
in accordance with his instructions,^^ Adams assured 
the Russian Chancellor of the desire on the part of the 

32 Adams to Secretary of State, Sept. 30, 1812; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 625. 

33 Monroe to Adams, July i, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel, III., 625. 



144 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

Government of the United States that the war with 
Great Britain should be confined to that Power alone, 
and further, that the Government of the United States 
had no intention of entering into any closer relation 
with France than that which then existed. The Chan- 
cellor expressed his pleasure with the statements of 
Adams, especially that which referred to the relations 
of the United States with France. The next day 
Count Romanzoff sent for Adams and showed him a 
draft of a note which he had drawn up embodying the 
statement of the American minister. This note he pro- 
posed, with Adams's consent, to send to Count Lievin, 
the Russian Ambassador at London, with the instruc- 
tion that he should impart the substance of the same to 
Lord Castlereagh, and " use it for the purpose of 
convincing the British Government of the error in sus- 
pecting that of the United States of any subserviency to 
France." Adams readily gave his consent to the send- 
ing of this despatch, as he believed with Romanzoff 
that the communication might tend to promote a spirit 
of pacification in the British Cabinet. He, however, 
expressly stipulated that in giving his consent he acted 
merely in a personal capacity and not under authority 
of the Government of the United States.^* 

Count Romanzoff assured Adams that the Emperor 

3* Adams to Monroe, Dec. ii, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 626-627. MS., Dept. of State, Bureau of In- 
dexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 102. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 45 

was very desirous that peace should intervene between 
the United States and Great Britain, both for the sake 
of these states themselves and for the interests of his 
own empire. The American minister at this time en- 
deavored to find out whether the British authorities 
had indicated their acceptance or rejection of the 
mediation offered by the Emperor. Romanzoff replied 
"that, without accepting or rejecting it, they had inti- 
mated the belief that it would not be acceptable in 
America.""^ The knowledge of Russia's offer of media- 
tion reached the Department of State, March 7, 1813, 
through letters from Adams dated September 30 and 
October 17, 1812.^^ On the following day, March 8, 
1813, similar information was presented by Count 
Daschkoff, the Russian charge d'affaires at Washing- 
ton, who, in a note to the Secretary of State, com- 
municated officially the offer of the Emperor to act 
as a mediator between the United States and Great 
Britain.^^ 

At the time that the proposal was received, there 
were several circumstances which rendered the offer 

35 Adams to Monroe, Dec. 11, 1812; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 626-627. MS., Bureau of Indexes and Ar- 
chives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 102. 

36 Adams to Monroe, Sept. 30, 1812 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 625. Adams to Monroe, Oct. 17, 1812; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 625-626. 

3^ Daschkoff to Secretary of State, March 8, 1813; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 624. 

II 



146 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

especially attractive to Madison. Napoleon had met 
with serious defeat in his Russian campaign; Great 
Britain had shown a disposition not to relax, but rather 
to increase her war measures against the United States, 
as was shown by a blockade of the Chesapeake and 
the Delaware ; and in her own internal government the 
United States was experiencing the utmost difficulties 
in the war and finance departments, made the more 
serious by the disaffection of the New England States. 
Under these conditions it was not strange that Madison, 
who had never wanted war, should have eagerly 
grasped at anything that looked toward peace. 

Secretary Monroe replied to Daschkoff on March 
II, 1813, announcing the acceptance of the offer of 
mediation.^^ He stated that arrangements would be 
made at once to enable the Emperor to carry out his 
generous purpose. In keeping with the promise made 
to the Russian charge d'affaires, the President pro- 
ceeded without any delay to the appointment of John 
Quincy Adams, United States Minister Plenipotentiary 
at the Court of St. Petersburg, Albert Gallatin, Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, and James Bayard, a prominent 
member of the United States Senate, as Envoys Ex- 
traordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary to meet 
with persons similarly appointed by Great Britain, at 
St. Petersburg under the mediation of the Russian 
Emperor. 

38 Monroe to Daschkoflf, March 11, 1813; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 624-625. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 14/ 

On May 25, the President called the Senate in special 
session to consider the subject of the Russian media- 
tion and the ratification of the persons whom he had 
named.^^ The Senate approved of the action of the 
President and at once confirmed the names of Adams 
and Bayard, but refused so to act in the case of Gal- 
latin. The technical objection to the confirmation of 
Gallatin lay in the fact of his still holding the secre- 
taryship of the Treasury. The Senate requested in- 
formation of the President as to whether in the ap- 
pointment of Gallatin to the mission the office of Sec- 
retary of the Treasury would be made vacant. Madi- 
son, desiring to retain the services of the efficient head 
of the Treasury Department, replied that the office 
would not be vacant, as the Secretary of War, William 
Jones, would perform the duties of the Secretary of 
the Treasury during the temporary absence of Gallatin. 
The Senate, then, upon the recommendation of the 
special committee, to whom the question of Gallatin's 
appointment had been referred, passed the following 
resolution : " Resolved, that in the opinion of the 
Senate, the powers and duties of the Secretary of the 
Department of the Treasury and those of an Envoy 
Extraordinary to a Foreign Power, are so incompatible 
that they ought not to be and remain united in the 

3^ Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents. I.. 
526 et seq. 



^v. 



148 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 



samerperson."*" The Senate further voted that the com- 
mittee to whom was referred the appointment of Gal- 
latin should communicate the foregoing resolution to 
the President and confer with him upon the subject 
thereof.^^ The President refused to receive the com- 
mittee, holding that the Senate had overstepped its 
constitutional limits in making such a proposition. 

The commissioners were not only appointed before 
the convening of the Senate, but had received their 
instructions and were well on their way before that 
body met. The haste with which the President acted 
in the matter of mediation, without knowing whether 
it would be acceptable to Great Britain, and his ap- 
pointment of Gallatin gave opportunity for severe criti- 
cism on the part of the Federalists. Objections were 
made to the expense of so uncertain a mission ; to the 
right of the President to appoint to an office not yet 
created by the legislature; to the commissioners' de- 
parture before being ratified by the Senate; to the 
President's acting practically without the advice and 
consent of the Senate; and to locating in one pefeson>. 
two offices deemed incompatible.*- It was very evi- 
dent, however, from the heated discussions in the 
Senate and the lengthy articles in the press that the 

40 June 10,1813; Madison Papers, MS., XLIX., 78. In MSS. 
Div., Library of Congress. 

41 June 16, 1813; Madison Papers, MS., XLIX., 85. 

42 Boston Weekly Messenger, Dec. 10, 17, 1813. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 49 

real reason for the opposition*^ was the party feehng 
against the Administration, the foremost personahties 
of which were Aladison and Gallatin. Under these 
circumstances Gallatin failed of confirmation by one 
vote.** 

Instructions had been drawn up and given to the 
commissioners, under the date of April 15, 1813. This 
notable document stated tliat as soon as Great Britain 
should give satisfactory assurance that she would 
abandon her claim with respect to impressment of sea- 
men and " illegal blockades," warfare on the part of 
the United States would cease. Nearly three fourths 
of the paper was occupied with a discussion of the 
subject of -impressment, and upon this point it was in- 
sisted that a distinct and definite provision against the 
practice was a sine qua non. Assurance was to be 
given in return for such provision that the Govern- 
ment of the United States would take such measures 
as should secure Great Britain against the loss of 
her seamen in the service of the United States.*^ 

It was also stated, as an essential condition, that a 
precise definition of blockade be given by Great Britain. 
The declaration of Great Britain, in 1803, "that no 
blockade would be legal, which was not supported by 

<3 N. Y. Herald. April 7, 1813. 

4* Madison to Gallatin, Aug. 2, 1813; Madison Papers, MS., 
LIL, 58. 

*5 Monroe to Peace Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 695-700. 



I 50 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 



an adequate force, and that the blockades which it 
might institute should be supported by an adequate 
force," were regarded as constituting a satisfactory 
definition. These words, in substance, had been used 
by the Lords Commissioners in 1803 with reference to 
the British blockade of Martinique and Guadaloupe, 
the legality of which the United States protested. The 
British Government, in a letter to the Secretary of 
State, wrote that they had sent orders to Commodore 
Hood " not to consider any blockade of those islands 
as existing unless in respect of particular ports, which 
might be actually invested, and then not to capture 
vessels, bound to such ports, unless they shall previ- 
ously have been warned not to enter them." A second 
definition suggested as a satisfactory alternative was 
also derived from British sources. Great Britain, in 
a convention with Russia in 1801, had agreed "that, 
in order to determine what characterizes a blockaded 
port, that denomination is given only to a port where 
there is, by the disposition of the Power which attacks 
it, with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident 
danger in entering."**' 

A third main subject for discussion given in the in- 
structions to the commissioners was with reference to 
the trade of the United States with enemy's colonies 
and their parent country. If, however, it was stated, 
an arrangement on the subject of such trade to a 

^8 Monroe to Peace Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813 ; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 695-700. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 5 I 

proper extent could not be secured by treaty provision, 
silence should be maintained respecting it. Other ob- 
jects deemed of importance in the instructions were: 
regulation of search for contraband goods ; restriction 
of articles to be regarded as contraband; guarantee of 
rights of neutral commerce; prohibition of trade with 
the Indians on the part of Great Britain; the non- 
restriction of the United States in augmenting her 
naval power upon the Great Lakes.'*^ 

While provision against the practice of impressment 
was made a sine qua non, the commissioners were 
allowed to agree to a provision limiting the arrange- 
ment merely to the existing war in Europe. This con- 
cession was permitted, since it was believed that Great 
Britain, when the war was over, would not again re- 
vive her claims to impressment. Instructions, how- 
ever, were given the commissioners to make no arrange- 
ment which would impair the right of the United 
States, or sanction the British claim on this point. 
Provision was also to be made for the mutual restora- 
tion of territory.^^ 

In further instructions, given on April 27, Monroe 
suggested the possibility, in the event of the acceptance 
of the mediation by Great Britain, that the subject of 
the Florida claims would come up for discussion. In 

^^^ Monroe to Peace Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 695-700. 

^s Ibid. Monroe Papers, MS., V., 562 et seq. Library of 
Congress. 



152 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

that case the commissioners were to base the claims of 
the United States to West Florida on the ground of 
cession from France, and to East Florida on the 
ground of indemnity for spoliation.^^ 

The men who were appointed to the commission 
were all men who were strongly in favor of peace. 
Adams had from the beginning deplored the war with 
Great Britain.^" Bayard, a Federalist, had openly op- 
posed it in a speech in the Senate when the declara- 
tion of war was voted f^ and Gallatin, bearing the re- 
sponsibility for the national finances, welcomed a pos- 
sible relief to the financial crisis then pending. 
Bayard and Gallatin would have wished for more dis- 
cretion, particularly upon the subject of impressment, 
as they feared that too exact an insistence in that 
matter might lead to a failure in the negotiation. 
Bayard preferred an informal understanding merely, 
if Great Britain should decline to make a formal con- 
cession.^^ Both Bayard and Gallatin disapproved of 
treating of the Florida Claims in the discussions as 
being in their judgment entirely impolitic. 

Secretary Monroe, in further correspondence with 

*^ Monroe to Commissioners, April 27, 1813 ; Writings of 
Albert Gallatin, I., 539. 

^0 Adams to Russell, August 11, 1812; Russell Papers, MS., 
No. 1632. John Hay Library, Providence, R. I. 

^1 Annals of Congress, 12th Cong., ist sess., 287-288. 

S2 Gallatin to Monroe, May 2, 1813; Writings of Gallatin, 
I-, 539-540. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 53 

the commissioners, stated that they were at liberty to 
exercise their entire discretion as to the mode and 
form of the provisions, if only there should be an 
effective relinquishment of the practice of impress- 
ment. Monroe was opposed to leaving the question of 
impressment in silence, "trusting to a mere under- 
standing," which, he said, was " liable to doubts and 
different explanations," for this would fail to guarantee 
that security which the United States had a right to 
expect.^^ In a letter, dated May 6, 1813, he wrote 
that unless a distinct statement could be secured with 
reference to the relinquishment of impressment it 
would be better that no further steps be taken in the 
negotiation.^* Monroe considered the fate of the Ad- 
ministration and the Republican party, as well as the 
honor of the state, to be dependent upon the outcome 
of the negotiations. The political consideration was 
quite as important as the national to the mind of one 
who aspired to be the candidate of the Administra- 
tion party at the next presidential election. 

The Secretary expressed his belief in a successful 
issue of the negotiations ; but should they fail through 
the refusal of Great Britain, he was confident that this 
would have the effect of arousing the energies of the 

53 Monroe to Gallatin, May 5, 1813 ; Writings of Gallatin, 
!•» 540-541. MS., Dept. of State, Bureau of Indexes and 
Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII. 

5* Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813; Writings of Gallatin, 
I., 542-544. 



154 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

nation to a greater degree than had yet been seen and 
that a more honorable termination of the war would 
result, " by the complete expulsion of the British from 
the continent."^^ 

Gallatin and Bayard, after receiving their commis- 
sions from the President and their " full powers " to 
negotiate with Great Britain for treaties of peace and 
commerce, and with Russia for a treaty of commerce, 
made immediate preparations to join Adams at St. 
Petersburg. They sailed on May 9, from Philadel- 
phia, on the merchant ship Neptune, which had been 
engaged by the United States Government to convey 
the commissioners to St. Petersburg. This vessel was 
commanded by Captain Jones, a brother of the Secre- 
tary of the Navy. Accompanying the commissioners 
as secretaries were George M. Dallas, J. Payne Todd, 
James Gallatin, George Millegan. Dallas alone re- 
ceived a salary. The Americans reached their destina- 
tion July 21. 

The first intimation that the American Government 
had that the mediation was not agreeable to Great 
Britain was contained in a despatch from Adams, 
dated June 26, 1813.^^ On the 22d of that month tlie 
Russian Chancellor had informed the American min- 

55 Monroe to Gallatin, May 6, 1813 ; Writings of Gallatin, I., 

542-544. 

56 Adams to Monroe, June 26, 1813; American State Papers, 

For. Rel., III., 627; MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, 
Russian Despatches, II., No. 113. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 55 

ister of despatches from Count Lievin, the Russian 
Ambassador in London, stating that the British Gov- 
ernment had replied that their differences with the 
United States were of such a nature as to render 
mediation inadmissible.^^ 

There were several reasons advanced in England 
why the mediation should be rejected. There was 
first the objection given by the British Government, to 
the effect that the differences between the United 
States and Great Britain involved important principles 
of English internal policy.^® A second objection arose 
from the belief that Russia would be disinclined to 
favor the commercial policies of Great Britain. Her 
position in the Armed Neutrality League of 1780 
made her an object of distrust. Again, the British 
Government saw no need of mediation, with a view 
to a peace on terms of equality, when by continuing 
the war for a few months longer, as they thought, 
either the American Union would be divided, or tlie 
Government would sue for peace upon any terms that 
might be imposed. The English press opposed the 
acceptance of the mediation on the ground that 
America had not yet been sufficiently punished and 
the power and majesty of Great Britain had not yet 
been adequately displayed. Though Great Britain 
had flatly refused the offer of mediation long before 
Romanzoff disclosed the fact, the Russian Minister 

^^ Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (1874 ed.), II., 479. 
"Ibid. 



156 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

Still hoped by renewing the offer to secure an ac- 
ceptance. 

The American commissioners the day after their 
arrival, July 22, met with Adams and discussed the 
procedure of business to be presented to the Russian 
Government. They learned at this time the slight 
hopes upon which their mission rested. On the 24th 
Bayard and Gallatin were presented by the American 
minister to the Russian Chancellor. Gallatin gave to 
Count Romanzoff copies and translations of their 
letters of credence and " full powers."^^ The Count 
stated"^ that it would be necessary to transmit these 
papers to the Emperor, at his headquarters, he being 
at this time with the army in the field. The commis- 
sioners had at once upon their arrival apprised the 
Russian Government of the fact, and on the 30th of 
July had sent an official note*'^ to the Chancellor an- 
nouncing the acceptance of the offer of mediation by 
the United States. They requested information as to 
the measures that had been adopted by the respective 
Governments of Great Britain and Russia to give 
effect to the mediation. 

In the preparation of this first important note the 

59 American Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 17, 1813 ; MS., 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, IV., 
No. I. 

60 Ibid. 

^1 American Plenipotentiaries to Romanzoff, July 30, 1813 ; 
Russell Journals, V., 15-17. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 57 

difficulties of negotiation by a commission presented 
themselves. Adams, extremely annoyed, wrote : " It 
has been the work of a week and might have been 
done by either of us in two hours. ... It is a sufficient 
specimen of the method of negotiating by commis- 
sions. ... In the multitude of councillors there is 
safety, but there is not dispatch. "^^ 

Albert Gallatin, with characteristic energy and fore- 
sight, as soon as he arrived in Europe entered upon 
an extensive correspondence with acquaintances at the 
various European capitals in order to gain all the in- 
formation that might assist in the negotiations. From 
Gothenburg he wrote to the banking firm of Baring 
Brothers, London, to ascertain if possible the intentions 
of the British Government with respect to mediation.^^ 

Alexander Baring, in a friendly letter, July 22, wrote 
that Great Britain had refused the mediation of a third 
Power because the question at issue was purely of 
a domestic nature of which no foreign Government 
could fairly judge; that the war was a sort of family 
quarrel where foreign interference would only do 
harm and irritate.^* He stated that Great Britain's 
refusal of mediation was not to be taken as a proof of 
her unwillingness to make peace. The Government of 

62 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 497. 

63 Gallatin to Baring Brothers and Company, June 22, 1813; 
Writings of Gallatin, I., 545-546. 

64 Baring to Gallatin, July 22, 1813 ; Writings of Gallatin, 
I., 546-552; Russell Journals, V., 93-106. 



158 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

Great Britain, he was convinced, would willingly enter 
into direct negotiations with the United States. To 
this end it would be advisable that London or Gothen- 
burg, Sweden, should be the seat of the negotiations, as 
proximity to the seat of Government of Great Britain 
might help greatly in bringing about mutual under- 
standing between the two states.*'^ Gallatin replied to 
Baring's suggestion of direct negotiations to the effect 
that while the commissioners might be willing to con- 
fer at London or Gothenburg they were limited by 
their instructions to mediation under the agency of 
Russia.*"' He expressed the hope that Baring's Gov- 
ernment might yet consent to mediation. Baring in a 
letter two months later wrote that feeling was favor- 
able to negotiation with the L^nited States, but that 
there was a fixed determination not to enter into 
mediation.*'^ He considered, he said, the reservation 
of the right of search essential, though such recogni- 
tion on the part of the United States would not be 
demanded. The practice, he maintained, could not be 
given up without seriously impairing the naval power 
of the Kingdom, 

Gallatin, upon learning through his friend Baring 

''s Baring to Gallatin, July 22, 1813; Writings of Gallatin, I., 
546-552; Russell Journals, V., 93-106. 

66 Gallatin to Baring, Aug. 27, 1813; Writings of Gallatin, 
I-, 564-567. 

67 Baring to Gallatin, Oct. 12, 1813; Writings of Gallatin, 
I-> 584-587. Russell Journals, V., 1 13-120. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS I 59 

that the mission under Russian mediation was doomed 
to failure, wrote at once to Secretary Monroe asking 
for instructions and renewed powers, in case a change 
in place and method of negotiations should be decided 
upon.^^ 

The subject of impressment, which had been the 
most emotional of the causes which led to the declara- 
tion of war, and for which alone the war was con- 
tinued after the orders in council had been repealed, 
was the main difficulty in any negotiations between 
the two states. Great Britain was determined not to 
yield in the slightest degree in her claims to the alleged 
right of impressment, while the United States held 
that it would be an added disgrace for her to submit, 
after having resisted the claim to the extent of war. 

In this seemingly impossible dilemma in which the 
United States found herself the statesmanship of 
Albert Gallatin was shown. It was he who first 
found the solution of the much debated impressment 
question. Before it was known that mediation was 
impossible, Gallatin in a letter to Emperor Alexander 
had discussed, at great length, the questions involved 
in the war, as these might, naturally, be considered in 
the negotiations. With reference to impressment, he 
stated that he was willing to leave the abstract prin- 
ciple of the subject out of discussion; that the United 
States would agree hereafter not to employ, even on 

68 Gallatin to Monroe, Aug. 28, 1813; MS., Dept. of State, 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 



l6o DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

board merchant vessels, any seamen subject to Great 
Britain; that a suspension of the pretensions of Great 
Britain, without renouncing them, would satisfy the 
United States; but that the United States would not 
under any circumstances acknowledge the right of 
Great Britain to impressment. If agreement could 
not be reached on that subject, Gallatin would favor 
the postponement of discussion of impressment to a 
more favorable time, as " maritime questions seem to 
fall with the war ; and it is above all desirable that the 
whole civilized world may breathe and, without any ex- 
ception, enjoy universal peace."'''^ It was in accord 
with the policy here set forth that the later peace nego- 
tiations were carried on and a treaty of peace was 
finally signed. 

It has been stated that the American commissioners 
upon their arrival at St. Petersburg learned from 
Adams of the probable futility of their mission. It 
was not until two weeks later that they were officially 
informed of the substance of the reply made by Great 
Britain. The Russian Chancellor still hoped that the 
refusal of Great Britain was not absolute, but that 
upon learning of the actual arrival of the American 
ministers she would consent to the mediation. With 
this hope in view the Chancellor stated that he had 
sent another despatch to Count Lieven, the Russian 

69 Gallatin to Emperor Alexander [June 19, 1813] ; Writings 
of Gallatin, I., 629-631.- 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS l6l 

Ambassador in London, instructing him to renew the 
offer of mediation. '^'^ On August 14, an official note, 
covering the American position on the points at issue 
between the United States and Great Britain, which 
the Russian Chancellor had requested, was presented, 
together with a printed copy of the Act of Congress 
of March 3, 1813, with reference to the non-employ- 
ment of British seamen and other regulations to be- 
come effective when the war was over. Five days 
later, Adams, in an interview with the Chancellor, 
urged upon him the importance of positive informa- 
tion as to the acceptance or rejection of the Russian 
proposal by Great Britain in order that Bayard and 
Gallatin might not be unnecessarily detained. The 
Chancellor replied that he could make no positive state- 
ment. A few weeks later, November 2, in an official 
interview he told Harris, the secretary of the mission, 
that the Russian Ambassador had expressed his un- 
willingness to present the second note which had been 
sent him inasmuch as Great Britain had already an- 
nounced her decision to the Russian Emperor." The 
declination of the British Government was also learned 
from Lord Walpole, the British Ambassador at St. 
Petersburg. The commissioners endeavored to secure 
from the Chancellor an official statement of the fact 

'■<' American Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 17, 1813; Writ- 
ings of Gallatin, I., 569-574. 

''I Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 539. 

12 



1 62 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

of Great Britain's refusal. This he declined to make 
on the ground that he had not been officially informed 
by the Emperor.'^- Months passed and no official in- 
formation was received by the mediation envoys. 

The American commissioners were thus placed in a 
most exasperating position. They had powers to treat 
under the mediation, but no one with whom to treat. 
They were conscious that the fruitlessness of the mis- 
sion would add to the factional feeling at home. 
Though annoyed at the evasive methods employed by 
the Russian Government, they still felt obliged to re- 
main at St. Petersburg until officially informed of the 
refusal of Great Britain. There was less objection to 
the delay, however, since they hoped to receive new 
instructions from the President relating to the over- 
tures of Great Britain for direct negotiations.'^^ 
Nevertheless, the commissioners at last grew restive, 
and Bayard decided to remain no longer at St. Peters- 
burg. He addressed a note^* to the Chancellor an- 
nouncing his intention of leaving and asking for his 
passports. He and Gallatin left St. Petersburg on 
January 25, and proceeded to London.^^ 

" Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 539. 

73 Adams to Monroe, Dec. 30, 1813; MS., Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives, Russian Despatches, III., No. 125. 
■^* Bayard to Romanzoff, Jan. 7, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 

137-147- 

75 Adams to Monroe, Jan. 29, 1814; MS., Bureau of In- 
dexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, III., No. 127. 



DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 1 63 

Two weeks passed and no official communication 
came from the Russian Government with reference to 
the British note. Adams, then, believing that the Em- 
peror did not intend to make public Great Britain's 
refusal of mediation, determined to prove the fact. 
He accordingly requested of the Chancellor that he be 
given a copy of the British Ambassador's note to which 
reference had been made.'^" Romanzoff replied that 
he had been informed by Count Lieven that Lord 
Castlereagh had communicated directly with the Gov- 
ernment at Washington suggesting that instructions 
for a direct negotiation be sent to the American com- 
missioners through the medium of Admiral Warren." 
Count Lieven's despatch, containing this information, 
was shown to Adams. The Chancellor was deeply 
chagrined that the official papers received from Lon- 
don had not been sooner communicated to him.'^® He 
considered himself so ill treated in the matter that he 
offered his resignation to the Emperor.'^ It was 
shown later that the final refusal on the part of Great 
Britain to accept mediation had been communicated the 

■^s Adams to Clay, Feb. 2, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 137- 
141. 

''■'■Romanzoff to Adams, Feb. 4, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 
142. 

'8 Adams to Gallatin and Bayard, Feb. 6, 1814; Russell 
Journals, V., 150-154. 

■^^ Adams to Monroe, Feb. 4, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 
147-149. 



164 DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS 

first of September to Count Nesselrode, the Russian 
Acting Minister of Foreign Afifairs, by Lord Cathcart, 
the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg.^" Count 
Nesselrode was with the Emperor at his headquarters 
with the army when the note was received, and he 
failed to send it to the Chancellor, whose influence in 
the Russian Government was waning. The annoying 
circumstances in which the American commissioners 
had been placed was due to Russian politics, the Em- 
peror evidently wishing to force the resignation of 
Count Romanzoff. 

so Cathcart to Nesselrode, Sept. i, 1813 ; American State 
Papers, For. Rel, III., 622. 



CHAPTER IV 

Acceptance of Great Britain's Proposal for 
Direct Negotiations 

While the American commissioners were delayed at 
St. Petersburg in connection with the fruitless mission 
of mediation, the British Government had been arrang- 
ing for a direct negotiation. The Prince Regent, upon 
learning that the commissioners were not averse to a 
negotiation at London or Gothenburg, but that their 
powers were limited to the negotiation under the media- 
tion of Russia, ordered sent to the port nearest the seat 
of Government of the United States a flag of truce, 
with an official note offering direct negotiations. The 
note, addressed by Lord Castlereagh, British Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, to the Secretary of State 
of the United States, said^ that the British Govern- 
ment was "willing to enter into discussion with the 
Government of America for the conciliatory adjust- 
ment of the differences subsisting between the two 
States, with an earnest desire on their part to bring 
them to a favorable issue, upon principles of perfect 
reciprocity, not inconsistent with the established 
maxims of public law, and with the maritime rights of 
the British empire." This communication, brought 

1 Castlereagh to Secretary of State, Nov. 4, 1813; Ameri- 
can State Papers, For. Rel., III., 621. 

16S 



1 66 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

Upon the British schooner Bramble, reached AnnapoHs 
December 30, 181 3. It was received at Washington 
at twelve o'clock the same night.- 

In spite of the fact that the British Government 
placed the " maritime rights of the British Empire " on 
an equal footing with the " established maxims of 
public law," and that the United States knew from past 
experience that in any negotiations British maritime 
rights would be regarded above all other rights, the 
Government at Washington was disposed to meet any 
overture that promised peace. There was, however, 
a general feeling in the United States that Great 
Britain, in making the proposal for direct negotiations, 
acted with a view of interposing a delay. Secretary 
Monroe, in reply to the British note, stated that the 
President, while regretting the delay then interposed 
in the peace negotiations, was willing to accept the 
ofifer of the British Government, in order that he might 
show the sincerity of his desire for peace. ^ 

Though anxious for peace, the Government of the 
United States adhered with dignity to its purpose not 
to compromise its principles for the sake of securing 
peace. Monroe in his note said : " Wherever the 
United States may treat, they will treat with the sincere 

2 Boston Weekly Messenger, Jan. 7, 1814. 

3 Monroe to Castlereagh, Jan. 5, 1814; American State Pa- 
pers, For. Rel., III., 622-623. Russell Journals, V., 373-379- 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 6/ 

desire they have repeatedly manifested of terminating 
the present contest with Great Britain, on conditions of 
reciprocity consistent with the rights of both parties as 
sovereign and independent nations, and calculated not 
only to establish present harmony, but to provide, as far 
as possible, against future collisions which might in- 
terrupt it." We may not be far wrong in assuming 
that this insistence upon the sovereign political inde- 
pendence of the United States, maintained in all the 
diplomatic negotiations of the war of 1812, is the rea- 
son that there have been " no further collisions," at 
least to the extent of war, during the century since. 

The President, having accepted the offer of the 
British Government, at once communicated this in- 
formation in a message to Congress, January 7, 1814.^ 
A week later he nominated, "by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate," John Quincy Adams, 
James Bayard, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell as 
Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary 
of the United States, " with authority to meet a min- 
ister or ministers having like authority from the Gov- 
ernment of Great Britain, and with him or them to 
negotiate and conclude a settlement of subsisting dif- 
ferences, and a lasting peace and friendship between 
the United States and that Power."^ The Senate con- 

* President's Message; American State Papers, For. Rel., 
III., 621. 
5 Russell Journals, V., 165-166. 



1 68 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

firmed the nominations four days later. Christopher 
Hughes, Jr.,6 was appointed secretary to the mission ; 
and WilHam Shaler was attached to it as bearer of 
communications of the special ministers to the Ameri- 
can ministers at the various courts of Europe. 

Albert Gallatin was added to the mission later, 
when it was learned that he was still in Europe. The 
President had supposed that he was on his way home, 
and therefore had not named him when the others 
were appointed.'^ At this time there were no serious 
objections to Gallatin's appointment, inasmuch as he 
no longer held the position of Secretary of the Treas- 
ury. His nomination was sent to the Senate on Feb- 
ruary 8, and on the following day it was confirmed. 
When Gallatin was nominated to the mission at St. 
Petersburg the President had appointed the Secretary 
of the Navy, William Jones, temporarily, to attend to 
the duties of the Secretary of the Treasury, in addition 
to his own duties. This power of temporary appoint- 
ment was derived from an act of Congress passed 
May 8, 1792. This provided that "in case of the 
death, absence from the Seat of Government, or sick- 
ness of the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treas- 
ury, or of the Secretary of the War Department, or of 

^ Russell Journals, V., 172. 

7 Monroe to Adams, Feb. 3, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 69 

any officer of either of the said Departments whose 
appointment is not in the head thereof, whereby they 
cannot perform the duties of their said respective 
offices, it shall be lawful for the President of the 
United States, in case he shall think it necessary, to 
authorize any person or persons, at his discretion, to 
perform the duties of the said respective offices until a 
successor be appointed, or until such absence or inability 
by sickness shall cease."^ By an amendment to this act 
passed February 13, 1795, it was provided that no 
vacancy should be filled in the manner thus prescribed 
for a longer term than six months.^ In accordance 
with this law the portfolio of the Secretary of the 
Treasury had become vacant through Gallatin's ab- 
sence for more than six months. Shortly before sub- 
mitting Gallatin's name a second time as peace minister 
to the Senate for confirmation, Madison had nomi- 
nated as Secretary of the Treasury, George W. Camp- 
bell, and that gentleman received confirmation upon the 
same day that Gallatin's appointment was sanctioned. 
All five members appointed to the new commission 
were men of large experience in national afifairs. Four 
of them achieved an enduring rank among the fore- 
most of American statesmen. John Quincy Adams, 
the chairman of the mission, though at this time only 
in middle life, had had, for an American of that period, 

8 Annals of Congress, 2d Cong., 1st sess., 1385. 
^ Annals of Congress, 3d Cong., 2d sess., 1499. 



I/O ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S 

an unusual diplomatic experience, which had given him 
acquaintances in all the principal capitals of Europe. 
As a boy of eleven, in 1778, he accompanied his 
father to Paris upon a diplomatic mission. At the 
age of fourteen he served as private secretary to 
Francis Dana, who was the accredited envoy of Russia. 
In 1783, Adams was again with his father at Paris 
when the first peace treaty was negotiated. From 
1794 to 1797 he was minister to Holland and from 
1797 to 1801 minister to Prussia. While in Berlin he 
successfully negotiated a commercial treaty with 
Prussia. Upon the defeat of the Federalists in 1801 
Adams was recalled. He then entered into political 
life, first being elected United States Representative 
and then United States Senator. His senatorship ex- 
pired March 3, 18C9, and he was not reelected by the 
Federalist party of which he had been a member, be- 
cause he had voted for the embargo act, and had even 
been a member of the committee which had introduced 
it. Though his severance from the Federalist party 
cost him his seat in the Senate, it brought him a reward, 
so it was claimed, at the hands of President Madison,^" 
in the form of an appointment as minister to the Court 
of St. Petersburg. This position he had held, at the 
time of the peace negotiations, for more than four 
years. 

Adams's talents and education, no less than his re- 

10 Boston Weekly Messenger, Dec. 27, 181 1. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I/I 

markable experience, fitted him admirably for his posi- 
tion upon the peace commission. His thorough knowl- 
edge of constitutional and international law ; his con- 
scientious devotion to high ideals ; his indefatigable in- 
dustry ; and his ability as a writer of forceful English 
rendered him particularly fitted for the work. While 
possessing these excellent characteristics, Adams had 
others which were less commendable. He was easily 
provoked ; rather ungracious in manner ; lacking in 
sympathy with men of different character and training 
from himself; and utterly devoid of a sense of humor. 
These qualities, added to his cold intellectuality, isolated 
him from the fellowship of other men. He possessed 
few friends and these not of the closest. He himself 
deplored the lack of friends and the fact of his incur- 
ring the enmity of nearly all the men with whom he 
had been associated in public service. It was due to 
the characteristics which have been mentioned that 
during the period of the peace negotiations Adams 
rarely appeared upon friendly terms with the other 
commissioners. 

James A. Bayard of Delaware was a prominent 
member of the Federalist party. His political experi- 
ence at the time of his appointment on the peace com- 
mission had been confined to service in Congress, cover- 
ing a period of seventeen years, eight in the House of 
Representatives and nine in the Senate. In 1801, he 
had been offered by President Adams the position of 



1/2 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S 

minister to France, but had declined it. Bayard was 
highly esteemed by his colleagues in the Senate and 
possessed the confidence of both Federalists^^ and Re- 
publicans.^- His legal ability, sound reasoning, and 
good judgment, which made him a leader in Congress, 
rendered him especially useful on the peace mission, 

Henry Clay, the youngest of the commissioners, be- 
ing now thirty-seven, had already for several years 
been one of the leading politicians of the country. He 
had entered the Senate when lacking several months 
of the constitutional age, to fill out an unexpired term. 
At the end of that term, 1811, he was elected to Con- 
gress, and in the first session of his service became 
Speaker of the House. This position he held at the 
time of his appointment to the peace commission. 
Clay represented the newer national life of the country, 
in contrast to the sectionalism of New England, or 
the exclusiveness of the South. He was brilliant, per- 
suasive in speech, and gracious in bearing, though 
strong in his enmities, and impulsive in action. 

Jonathan Russell of Massachusetts, the least known 
member of the mission, had had valuable experience in 
diplomatic negotiations. He had been charge d'affaires 
at Paris in 181 1 ; and had occupied a like position at 
the Court of St. James from November, 18 11, to Sep- 

11 Federal Republican, Sept. 19, 1814. 

12 Clay to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS., 
XIV., 1807. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1/3 

tember i, 1812. While in this capacity, at the out- 
break of the war, it will be recalled, he had been 
intrusted with power to arrange an armistice. His 
negotiations were carried on with patriotism and in- 
tegrity, though it may be with some narrowness of 
spirit. His conduct, however, was quite generally ap- 
proved at home. Russell's intellectual abilities were 
not conspicuous, though he possessed a fair degree of 
literary skill. His enemies were many, due in a large 
degree, it would seem, to his own inordinate conceit. 
This was most apparent in his jealous distrust of men 
of larger caliber than himself, which led him to utter 
reproaches and criticisms of their motives. Though 
he was charged with double dealing and with making 
personal profit out of his public positions, the charges 
appear not to have been substantiated. When be- 
sought^^ by his friends to give them secret information 
of public affairs, from which they might profit com- 
mercially, Russell honorably rejected and repudiated 
such requests.^* His correspondence, dealing with tri- 
fling personalities and empty compliments, shows a man 
of rather ordinary ability.^'' At the same time with 
Russell's nomination to Gothenburg, his nomination as 
minister to Sweden was sent by the President to the 

13 John Smith to Russell, Feb. 9, 1814; Russell Papers, MS. 
1* Russell to Madison, Dec. 21, 1811; Russell Papers, MS., 
No. 2503. 
15 Russell Papers, MS. 



174 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

Senate. His nomination to the second position had 
been made the year before, but the Federalists had at 
that time succeeded in preventing his appointment. 
Now his appointment to both positions was confirmed ; 
to the first by a vote of 22 to 8, and to the second 
by a vote of 16 to 14.^" 

Albert Gallatin, the last member to be added to the 
commission, was, in personal qualities and ability for 
conducting a negotiation, perhaps the best equipped of 
them all. His tact and humor on more than one 
occasion prevented the breaking off of the negotia« 
tions. No less important was his influence in main- 
taining harmony among the members themselves. 
Gallatin, though inexperienced in conducting diplo- 
matic negotiations, had for many years been a promi- 
nent figure in the Administration. Upon him, more 
than upon any other man, had rested the burdens 
and responsibilities of the Government during the pre- 
ceding twelve years. As Secretary of the Treasury, 
he had not only been the author of the various meas- 
ures to meet the fiscal necessities of the Government, 
but he had also maintained a commanding influence 
in the other departments of the Government. The 
Federalists, with much truth, considered him the origi- 
nator of every measure inaugurated during these 

16 J. B. Howell to Russell, Jan. 18, 1814; Russell Papers, 
MS., No. 875. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1/5 

years." Though for years unjustly and unreasonably 
criticised, Gallatin refrained from that bitterness of 
feeling and intemperate language which was so com- 
monly indulged in by public men of his day. 

The only common tie that existed between the mem- 
bers of the commission was that of loyalty to their 
country. In personal characteristics and tempera- 
ment, in training and education, in political and re- 
ligious beliefs, there was wide diversity. Accustomed 
themselves to be leaders in their several spheres, they 
ungraciously yielded to one another. Every member 
of the mission save Bayard was personally disliked by 
one or more of the others. Adams was disliked by 
the other four, especially by Bayard, Clay, and Russell. 

The public, in general, was well pleased with the 
appointees.^^ They were men whose political opin- 
ions were well known, and these, it was believed, were 
in accord with the general feeling of the country. 
There was much confidence that the ministers would 
speedily negotiate a treaty of peace, provided that this 
could be done consistently with the honor of the na- 
tion, and without relinquishing principles deemed es- 
sential to the sovereign character of the state. ^^ 

The commissioners were informed by Secretary 

1^ N. Y. Evening Post, Sept. 25, 1812. Columbian Centinel 
(Boston), Feb. 8, 1812. 
IS Providence Patriot, Jan. 29, 1814. 
19 Ibid., Feb. 19, 1814. 



1/6 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

Monroe that the instructions issued April 15, 1813, 
under the proposed Russian mediation, were to remain 
in force for the negotiation, except for certain modi- 
fications. With regard to impressment, the Secretary 
stated that there had been no change in the sentiment 
of the American Government on that question. It 
maintained with as much force as ever that "this de- 
grading practice must cease ; our flag must protect the 
crew, or the United States cannot consider themselves 
an independent nation." It was again mentioned that 
the American Government was willing to pass a law 
which would remove the pretexts for impressment 
by the British Government by altogether excluding 
British seamen from service in American vessels, and 
even all British subjects, if necessary, except the few 
already naturalized. A further provision of such a 
law would be to stipulate, likewise, the surrender of 
all British seamen deserting in American ports from 
British vessels, public or private. If a treaty should 
be negotiated, the commissioners were to secure, if 
possible, a stipulation that American impressed seamen 
be paid by the British Government the sum that their 
wages would have amounted to in the merchant service 
during the time of their detention.^" 

Upon the subject of blockade the Secretary urged 
the importance of obtaining a precise definition. Stip- 

20 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 701-702. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I// 

ulations were also to be made for indemnity for the 
destruction, contrary to the laws and usages of war, 
of all unfortified towns and other private property. 
The commissioners were instructed to secure the 
restoration to their owners of the slaves taken away 
by the British during the war, or payment for them at 
full value. The charge was made that "a shameful 
traffic has been carried on in the West Indies, by the 
sale of these persons there, by those who professed to 
be their deliverers."-^ It was held that, if these slaves 
were regarded as non-com.batants, they should be re- 
stored ; if as property, they should be paid for. 

Secretary Monroe declared in his instructions to the 
commissioners that the sentiments of the President 
were the same, in every instance, as at the time of the 
former instructions; and that the reasons for main- 
taining these sentiments had "become more evident 
and strong " since the date of the former instructions. 
If the negotiations, it was said, had proceeded under 
the mediation of Russia, the United States would have 
confidently expected the favor of other European 
Powers, in case Great Britain had attempted to dictate 
hard terms. Under the present circumstances a good 
understanding with Russia and the Baltic Powers was 
desirable. 

The original manuscript containing these instruc- 

21 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 701-702. 

13 



178 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

tions includes much that has been omitted in the 
printed form. The portions that were omitted display 
the intense feeling of the Administration at the time 
upon the points at issue. One unprinted passage, re- 
ferring to neutral rights, says: "The objects are the 
same and the reasons for maintaining them have gained 
great additional weight, by the vast amount of blood 
and treasure which has been expended in their sup- 
port."22 

After discussing the two main points, those of im- 
pressment and blockade, the original manuscript con- 
tains a confidential article upon the Canadas, which, in 
view of the charges made by the British in the treaty 
negotiations, is interesting. The paragraph reads as 
follows : " The reasons given in my letter of the 23d of 
June and the ist of the month, in favor of a cession 
of the Canadas to the United States, have also gained 
much additional force from further reflection. Ex- 
perience has shown that the British Government can- 
not participate in the dominion and navigation of the 
Lakes, without incurring the danger of an early re- 
newal of the war. It was by means of the Lakes that 
the British Government interfered with and gained an 
ascendency over the Indians, even within our limits. 
The efifect produced by the massacre of our citizens 
after they were made prisoners, and of defenseless 

-2 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814; 
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc- 
tions, VII. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1/9 

women and children along our frontier need not now 
be described. It will perhaps never be removed while 
Great Britain retains in her hands the government of 
those provinces. This alone will prove a fruitful 
source of controversy, but there are others ; our settle- 
ment had reached before the war from the northern 
boundary with Lower Canada, along the St. Lawrence, 
to the southwestern extremity of Lake Erie, and after 
peace it can not be doubted, that they will soon extend 
by a continued population to Detroit, where there is 
now a strong establishment, and to the banks of the 
Michigan, and even of the other Lakes, spreading 
rapidly over all our vacant territory. With the disposi- 
tion already existing, collisions may be daily expected 
between the inhabitants on each side, which it may not 
be in the power of either Government to prevent. The 
cupidity of the British traders will admit of no control. 
The inevitable consequence of another war, and even 
of the present, if persevered in by the British Govern- 
ment, must be to sever these provinces by force from 
Great Britain. Their inhabitants, themselves, will soon 
feel their strength and assert their independence. All 
these evils had therefore better be anticipated, and 
provided for by timely arrangements between the two 
Governments in the mode prescribed. Should the 
British Government decline cession of territory to an 
extent to remedy the evils complained of, you will not 
fail to attend to the injunction contained in my letter 



l80 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

of the 15th: of April last, as the measures of mitigating 
them as far as may be able."^' 

A third omission in the printed instructions is found 
in connection with the discussion of Great Britain's 
refusal to accept mediation. This explains the reason, 
in Monroe's mind, for the British rejection of the 
Russian offer. The omitted confidential paragraph 
reads : " I shall proceed to notice the conduct of the 
British Government in declining the Russian mediation 
and proposing to treat directly with the United States. 
Its policy in so doing can not be mistaken. Indeed the 
British minister explains it himself, in stating that the 
object was to keep the business unmixed with the 
affairs of the Continent. Whence this desire, suppos- 
ing it to be the real and only object, unless it be 
founded in an opinion, that on the most important 
questions, which we have to treat with the British 
Government, Russia and all the other Powers of the 
Continent have a common interest with the United 
States against Great Britain, and a dread thence aris- 
ing, if any negotiation should be carried on under the 
auspices of the Emperor of Russia, that it might pro- 
duce a concert. To this cause alone, as is presumed, 
is the conduct of Great Britain to be imputed. It is, 
therefore, to the interest of the United States to avoid 
becoming its victim, and to improve the occurrence, to 

23 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814 ; 
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc- 
tions, VII. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS l8l 

their advantage, as far as may be practicable. It is 
believed that there is not a Power in Europe that v^ould 
give the slightest countenance to the British practice of 
impressment. Had that practice been brought into 
discussion under the auspices of Russia, it may reason- 
ably be presumed that it would have been treated by 
the Emperor, so far as he might have expressed an 
opinion on it, as novel, absurd, and inadmissible in 
regard to other nations ; and that the British ministers 
would have been forced to support it against the United 
States by arguments drawn from their former con- 
nection with and dependence on Great Britain. Had 
the British Government supported the practice on the 
ground of maritime right, applicable to all nations, it 
would have offended, and might have excited, all 
against Great Britain. Had it supported it as a right 
applicable to the United States only, thereby degrad- 
ing them below the condition of other nations, it was 
easy to anticipate the effect here. The objection of the 
British Government to a negotiation which formed an 
appeal, on any question of neutral right, to the im- 
partial judgment of Russia, or any other power, though 
not as an umpire, would be still stronger, for all Europe 
has long known and suffered under British violation of 
neutral rights. It must have been on this view of the 
subject, that the British Government declined a nego- 
tiation, which could not fail to show in their naked 



1 82 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

deformity the injustice of the British claims and 
usurpation." 

Two further paragraphs found in the original manu- 
script, which were omitted in publication, deal with the 
policy of the United States with reference to the Euro- 
pean Powers. They are, it will be observed, in accord 
with the early traditional policy of the American 
Government. " By meeting this overture in the man- 
ner in which it has been done, these Powers will 
see the manifestation of a desire, to keep open the door 
of communication with them ; and to this communica- 
tion great facility will be afforded, by Mr. Adams and 
Mr. Russell, who, while joined in the commission to 
treat with England, may preserve a direct correspond- 
ence with the Governments to which they are respec- 
tively appointed. In availing yourselves of the good 
offices of Russia and Sweden, as far as it may be prac- 
ticable, on any of the points in question, in the pro- 
posed negotiations, you will always recollect that the 
object is to secure to the United States by means there- 
of, a safe and honorable peace, and not to combine 
ivith any Power, in any object of ambition, or in claim- 
ing other conditions more favorable than that proposed 
which may tend to prolong the war."-* 

Further instructions were addressed to the peace 
ministers January 30, February 10, February 14, and 

2* Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 28, 1814; MS., 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instructions, 
VII. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 83 

March 22. Those of January 30 called attention to the 
fact that American vessels and cargoes in the ports of 
Great Britain, at the time of the declaration of war, 
had been seized and condemned by the British Gov- 
ernment without previous warning, while the United 
States had given British vessels six months in which to 
withdraw, in some instances even longer time. It was 
suggested that a general provision be made for the 
compensation for losses incurred by the subjects of 
each nation at the hands of the other, without time 
being given to remove their property to their own 
country.-^ 

In a very brief note of February 10, Secretary 
Monroe suggested that, if the commissioners found 
themselves unable to conclude a treaty which would 
provide definite arrangement on the subject of neutral 
rights, they might agree to a provision that would place 
the United States in the same position relative to such 
rights as might be most favorably accorded by Great 
Britain to any other state.^*' 

In the despatch of February 14, Great Britain was 
charged, in her refusal of mediation, with acting to pre- 
vent a good understanding between the United States, 
Russia, and Sweden on the subject of neutral rights. 

25 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Jan. 30, 1814; 
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc- 
tions, VII. 

26 Monroe to American Commissioners, Feb. 10, 1814; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 703. 



184 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

This plan, it was stated, would be foiled in the 
arrangement for the new negotiations. " In accepting 
the overture to treat in Sweden this attempt of the 
British Government has been defeated, as the oppor- 
tunity is afforded to communicate with the Russian 
and Swedish Governments almost with equal advan- 
tage as if we had treated at St. Petersburg under the 
Russian mediation. By accepting the British overture 
to treat at Gothenburg, and not at London, as well as 
by the manner, the utmost respect is shown to the 
Emperor and likewise to the Government of Sweden. 
You will not fail, as already instructed, to explain this 
transaction and the motives that have governed the 
President in it."" 

In the matter of impressment Monroe went back 
to the article in the previous instructions, which au- 
thorized an agreement with reference to impressment 
merely during " the present war in Europe,"^^ if no 
stipulation could be secured from Great Britain that she 
would forbear the practice of impressment for a defi- 
nite term of years. The importance of such a stipula- 
tion was dwelt upon in a paragraph which has been left 
out of the published document. It reads as follows: 

27 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Feb. 14, 1814; 
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc- 
tions, VII. 

28 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, April 15, 1813; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 695-700. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 85 

" To withdraw from the war without it, would be to 
subject the United States to all the expense in blood 
and treasure which has been and may be incurred, 
without obtaining the security for which we have con- 
tended, and leaving us under the necessity for con- 
tending for it again at a like expense, whenever 
another war shall break out in Europe, which will 
probably not be distant, and may be very soon. In 
every view of the subject it must be desirable to Great 
Britain to remove the ground of controversy, if she 
means to preserve peace, for it is essential to the right 
and the honor of the United States. "^^ 

In the brief additional instructions of March 22, the 
peace commissioners were told under no pretext to 
allow British claims to territory south of the northern 
boundary of the United States, or on the Pacific coast 
about the Columbia River.^" 

The members of the peace commission were at the 
time of their appointment widely separated, two in 
America and three in different parts of Europe. It 
was nearly six months after their appointment before 
they were all assembled in the place finally agreed 
upon for the negotiation. Clay and Russell sailed 
from New York, February 25, in the United States 

29 Monroe to American Plenipotentiaries, Feb. 14, 1814; 
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instruc- 
tions, VII. 

^'^ Russell Papers (copy). No. 837. 



1 86 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

corvette John Adams, and reached Gothenburg April 
13.^^ They were 'the bearers of one copy of the 
commissions. The day after their arrival they des- 
patched a note to Adams informing him of the mis- 
sion and of his own appointment. He was requested 
to join them as soon as possible at Gothenburg.^^ A 
note was also sent to Bayard and Gallatin notifying 
them of their appointment. These gentlemen had also 
been given official notification by Monroe.^^ Bayard 
and Gallatin had left St. Petersburg January 25,^* and 
after spending some time at Amsterdam, where they 
received news of the acceptance by the United States 
of the offer of direct negotiation, they had proceeded 
to London.^^ They arrived in that city April 9, at a 
time, as they wrote the new commissioners,^^ not 
favorable for securing a hearing for American in- 
terests. The allies had just taken Paris, and on the 

31 Clay and Russell to Bayard and Gallatin, April 14, 1814; 
Russell Journals, V., 174. 

32 Clay to Russell and Adams, Apr. 14, 1814; Russell Jour- 
nals, v., 175-1/6. 

33 Monroe to Plenipotentiaries; MS., Bureau of Indexes and 
Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII. 

34 Adams to Monroe, Jan. 29, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives, Russian Despatches, III., No. 127. 

3= Bayard to Clay and Russell, April 20, 1814; Russell 
Journals, V., 183-184. 

3« Bayard to Clay and Russell, April 20, 1814; Russell Jour- 
nals, v., 184. Gallatin to Clay, April 22, 1814 ; Russell Papers, 
MS., No. 829. Writings of Gallatin, I., 606-608. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 8/ 

19th news arrived of Bonaparte's formal abdication 
of the thrones of France and Italy. London was in- 
toxicated with joy, and proud of her successes. The 
Americans found little to encourage their hopes of 
restoration of peace between their country and Great 
Britain. On the contrary, they believed that with the 
release of large numbers of soldiers from the Euro- 
pean struggle the war in America would be prosecuted 
with much greater vigor than heretofore. They found 
public feeling strongly against the United States and in 
favor of the continuance of hostilities.^'^ 

Undismayed by the obstacles presented, Gallatin con- 
tinued his peace efforts. He found his friend Baring 
a favorable medium for learning the purposes of the 
British Government.^^ Through him he was informed 
that no commissioners had yet been appointed by 
Great Britain; that the Government had waited until 
officially notified of the appointment of the commis- 
sioners by the United States and the arrival of the 
same at the place of meeting. Baring^'' also gave the 
information that, owing to the political changes in 
Europe, Gothenburg was no longer considered a suit- 

^^ Bayard and Gallatin to Monroe, May 6, 1814; Writings 
of Gallatin, I., 611-613; Russell Journals, V., 231-234. 

28 Gallatin to Baring, April i, 1814; MS., British Foreign 
Office, 5, 103. 

39 Baring to Gallatin, April 22, 1814; MS. (copy), British 
Foreign Office, 5, 103. 



1 88 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

able place for the negotiation, and that a change to 
London or to some place in the Netherlands would be 
much more acceptable to Great Britain. 

Bayard and Gallatin addressed letters respecting the 
proposed change of place to Clay and Russell at 
Gothenburg, and requested their opinion as to whether 
the question of change was within the discretion of the 
mission, and whether they deemed such a change ex- 
pedient. They expressed their own conviction that 
the change was desirable. Colonel Millegan, private 
secretary of Bayard, was despatched with this com- 
munication to Russell and Clay, with instructions to 
return as soon as possible with the reply of those 
gentlemen and with the official papers confirming the 
commission in order that these, together with the noti- 
fication of the arrival of the American commissioners 
at Gothenburg, might be communicated to the British 
Government.^" 

Russell, upon arriving in Europe, had at once pro- 
ceeded to Stockholm to present his credentials to the 
Court of Sweden, in accordance with instructions from 
the Department of State.^^ In the absence of Russell, 
Clay was obliged to take the responsibility of replying 

40 Bayard to Clay and Russell, April 20, 1814; Russell Jour- 
nals, v., 186-187. Gallatin to Clay, April 22, 1814; Russell 
Journals, V., 187-189. 

41 Monroe to Russell, Feb. 5, 1814; MS.; Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 89 

to Bayard and Gallatin. In his reply^- he held to the 
opinion that the instructions, being unrestricted, did 
not prevent negotiations from being conducted at some 
place other than Gothenburg, and said that he would 
favor a change to some place in the Netherlands, but 
not to London, provided the British Government pro- 
posed the change. The only objection that he saw to a 
change of place was the possibility of offense which 
Sweden might take, after having been notified that 
negotiations were to take place within her territory. 
Any such feeling, he thought, might be prevented by 
diplomatic tact, especially if it could be made to ap- 
pear that the United States did not take the initiative 
in the proposed change, but only acquiesced, in the 
interests of peace, in a proposal made by Great Britain 
to this effect.*^ With these reservations Clay gave his 
consent to a change of place, subject to the approval 
of the other members of the mission. He ordered a 
messenger to bear to Russell and Adams at Stock- 
holm the letters received from Gallatin and Bayard, 
together with a copy of the reply which he had made 
to these. He informed them that he had ordered 
Captain Angus, with the John Adams, to be in readi- 
ness at Gothenburg to convey them to the port nearest 

*2 Clay to Bayard and Gallatin, May 2, 1814 ; Russell Jour- 
nals, v., 197-205. Writings of Gallatin, I., 608-611. 

^^Clay to Russell, May i, 1814; Russell Papers, MS., No. 
1660. 



190 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN'S 

Ghent.^* Gallatin and Bayard, upon the receipt of the 
letter of reply and other papers from Clay, on the 13th 
of May communicated to Lord Castlereagh, Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, the fact of the appoint- 
ment of the American ministers, and enclosed copies 
of their powers.*^ On the i6th a reply was made to 
this note by Lord Bathurst, stating that commissioners 
would be forthwith appointed.^*' 

The American commissioners in London then sent 
a note to Bathurst in which they expressed*^ their 
willingness to agree upon any other neutral place, 
which might be more eligible and convenient, for the 
seat of the negotiations. They expressed their willing- 
ness to proceed to Ghent, which had been suggested 
as a place of meeting. 

The other three commissioners were notified of the 
change and requested to proceed to Ghent as soon as 
convenient. Adams had left St. Petersburg April 28, 
and had reached Stockholm May 25, where he found 

4* Clay to Russell and Adams, May 31, 1814; Russell Jour- 
nals, v., 222-224. 

45 Bayard and Gallatin to Castlereagh, May 13, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 103. 

46 Bathurst to Bayard and Gallatin, May 16, 1814; MS. 
(copy), British Foreign Office, 5, 103. Lord Bathurst was 
Secretary for War and Colonies in the Cabinet of Lord Liver- 
pool (1812-27). 

47 Bayard and Gallatin to Bathurst, May 17, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 103. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I9I 

Russell.*- Russell had notified Count d'Engestrom, 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Swedish 
Government, of the change in the place of the negotia- 
tion, and that Government had shown no ill feeling 
on this account.'^ Russell and Adams left Stockholm 
June 7, and reached Ghent on the 24th, GaUatin and 
Bayard had remained in London awaiting the appoint- 
ment of the British commissioners, but the British 
Government acted with the utmost slowness, failing to 
make the appointment tmtil May 17.^ Full powers of 
the commissioners were issued two days later.^^ After 
the appointment of commissioners there was a similar 
policy of delay on the part of the British Government 
in sending their representatives to the place appointed 
for the negotiations. This gave a just cause for criti- 
cism, and for the belief expressed by the American 
commissioners that these delays were made designedl)'^^ 
by the British in order that they might have the prestige 
of militar}- success in America, of which they were 
confident, before entering upon the peace negotiation. 

-- Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 634. Adams to Monroe^ 
May 28, 1814: MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Russian 

Despatches, III., 134. 

-sRussel to d'Engestrom, May 5, 1814; Russell Pacers, 
MS. (copy). 

^Beasley to Russell, May 17, 1814; Russell Papers. MS., 
Xo. 16-14. 

"^ MS., British Foreign Omce, j, 102. 

^-J. Q. Adams to John Adams, Oct 27, 1814; Madison 
Papers, MS., LIIL, 76. 



192 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S 

On June 11, Gallatin addressed a note to Lord 
Castlereagh informing him that Clay, Adams, and 
Russell were on their way to Ghent and that he and 
Bayard were ready to proceed at a moment's notice. 
He requested information as to the time when the 
British commissioners might be expected to arrive. 
This note was answered by Hamilton, British Under- 
Secretary of State^^ for Foreign Affairs, to the effect 
that the British commissioners would leave Sweden for 
Ghent about the first of July.^* Clay reached Ghent 
June 25, one day after the arrival of Adams and 
Russell. Bayard arrived tlie 27th, while Gallatin did 
not reach there until July 6. 

The city of Ghent, the old capital of Flanders, with 
its interesting history and picturesque buildings, was 
well chosen as the place for the peace negotiations. 
Situated thirty-five miles east of Ostend, the seaport of 
the country, and about an equal distance from the cities 
of Brussels and Antwerp, it had good means of com- 
munication with all the leading capitals of Europe. 
The neutrality of the Flemish provinces had been pro- 
claimed by the treaty of London, May, 1814, which 
united them in national government with Holland. 
The people of Ghent were most cordial to the Govern- 

S3 Gallatin to Castlereagh, June 11, 1814; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

s* Hamilton to Irving, June 15, 1814; MS. (copy), British 
Foreign Office, 5, 102. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I93 

ments of both Great Britain and the United States. 
This cordiality was shown in the generous hospitahty 
which was extended to the ministers of the two coun- 
tries.^^ The American ministers were elected hono- 
rary members of the various learned societies: Adams, 
Gallatin, and Bayard of the Society of Beaux Arts; 
Clay, Russell, and Hughes of the Society of Agriculture 
and Botany. After the treaty was signed Adams, Gal- 
latin, and Bayard were also elected members of the 
latter society. Adams had the additional honor of 
an invitation to inscribe his name in the Livre d'Or, a 
book containing the names of illustrious persons con- 
nected with the history of Ghent.^^ 

The American commissioners stopped first at the 
Hotel des Pays-Bas, but shortly removed to quarters 
on the Rue des Champs, corner of Rue des Foulons. 
Their first meeting was held in Adams's room on the 
30th of June. The next meeting took place on July 
9, after the arrival of Gallatin. At this conference 
it was decided that meetings of the commissioners 
should be held daily, and that a journal should 
be kept by each commissioner in which should be 
copied all papers of which there was but one copy.^''' 

^^ Papers on Treaty of Ghent, sent by Thomas Wilson, 
Consul at Ghent, April 28, 1822, to Secretary of State; MS., 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Consular Reports, 1882. 

56 Ibid. 

57 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, II., 656 et seq. 

14 



194 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S 

The members themselves were required to provide 
for the work of 'transcribing for their own uses, as the 
Government had furnished only one secretary for the 
entire mission. Adams, in anticipation of the meeting 
of the commission, had represented to Secretary Mon- 
roe that it would be unwise for the Government not 
to provide an adequate secretarial force. In the ab- 
sence of such provision, he averred, either ministers 
themselves must be burdened with a vast amount of 
writing or they must employ unofficial secretaries to 
do the work, who would be under no obligation to 
observe secrecy upon the matters coming under their 
observation.^^ 

The British Government either possessed an extra- 
ordinary degree of confidence in the superiority of 
their position in any negotiation with the United States, 
or else they failed utterly to appreciate the character of 
the statesmen whom the American Government had 
sent to treat with the British negotiators. It is diffi- 
cult to understand the reason for the appointment of 
men of such mediocre ability as Lord Gambier, Henry 
Goulburn, and William Adams, the British commis- 
sioners. The British Ministry may have intended to 
choose men whom it could easily control ; or, what is 
more likely, the Congress of Vienna bulked so large in 

^s Adams to Monroe, April 25, 1814; MS., Bureau of In- 
dexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, III., No. 133. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS I95 

the public view that the meetings at Ghent appeared 
to be of little importance. At any rate, it is generally 
conceded by American and English historians alike 
that while the United States appointed to the mission 
its very best men, Great Britain chose only second- 
rate men. The foremost writer upon this period has 
said: "Probably the whole British public service, in- 
cluding Lords and Commons, could not at that day 
have produced four men competent to meet Gallatin, J. 
Q. Adams, Bayard, and Clay on the ground of Ameri- 
can interests; and when Castlereagh opposed to them 
Gambier, Goulburn, and Dr. Adams, he sacrificed what- 
ever advantage diplomacy offered ; for in diplomacy as 
in generalship, the individual commanded success. "^^ 

Lord Gambier, the head of the mission, had attained 
some distinction in His Majesty's navy. He had been 
granted a peerage in 1807 as a reward for his services 
in the bombardment of Copenhagen on September 2, 
1807.®° His knowledge was not profound even in 
those subjects in which he had most experience, and 
in dealing with diplomatic matters he had little skill. 
Henry Goulburn, the second named in the British 
commission, was a member of Parliament and Under- 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. He had 
previously been Under-Secretary for Home Affairs. 

59 Henry Adams, History of the United States (1813-1817), 
IX., 14. 

6" Dictionary of National Biography, XX., 393-394- 



196 ACCEPTANCE OF GREAT BRITAIN S 

He was a graduate of Trinity College, Oxford. He 
was the ablest of the three members of the commis- 
sion and enjoyed most the confidence of the British 
Ministry. That he possessed considerable ability is 
shown in the fact that in 1821 he was made a member 
of the Privy Council and Chief Secretary to Wellesley, 
Lord Lieutenant of Ireland ; that in 1828, in the Duke 
of Wellington's administration, he was appointed 
Chancellor of the Exchequer; that in Peel's first 
cabinet he was Home Secretary; and in the second, 
again Chancellor of the Exchequer.^^ William Adams, 
LL.D., was also a graduate of Trinity College, Ox- 
ford, and a scholar of considerable repute. As a 
lawyer he had gained some reputation for the mastery 
of legal details. He served on a commission appointed 
in 181 2 to regulate the procedure of vice-admiralty 
courts abroad. Later, from 1815-24, he served on a 
similar commission appointed to investigate the courts 
of justice and ecclesiastical courts of England. In the 
Ghent commission Adams was given the sole prepara- 
tion of the despatches which related to maritime war.^^ 
In addition to the paper containing their instruc- 
tions, the British commissioners were provided by their 
Government with the following papers: full powers, 
treaty of Paris (1783) ; treaty of commerce, London 

61 Dictionary of National Biography, XXII., 283-284. 

62 Ibid., I., 108. 



PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS 1 9/ 

(1794) ; explanatory article, Philadelphia (1796) ; ex- 
planatory article, London (1798) ; convention, London 
(1802); convention (not ratified), London (1803); 
correspondence and proposed treaty (1806-1808) ; 
declaration of war (1812) ; proclamation, London 
(1814).^^ 
63 MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 



CHAPTER V 
The Opening of Peace Negotiations at Ghent 

The British ministers reached Ghent Saturday even- 
ing, August 6, 1 814. All of the American ministers had 
been waiting there a full month, and some of them much 
longer. On the next day after their arrival, Anthony 
St. John Baker, secretary of the British mission, called 
upon Bayard and informed him of the arrival of the 
British ministers and of their desire to exchange " full 
powers." It was proposed that the meeting for this 
purpose should take place at the rooms of the British 
ministers at the Hotel Lion d'Or the next day at one 
o'clock. Bayard promised Baker that this communica- 
tion should be laid before the other commissioners and 
an answer returned during the evening.^ 

When the Americans learned of the proposal of the 
British to meet at their hotel they were much disturbed, 
for they regarded it as a pretension of superiority on 
the part of the British commissioners for them to set 
the place for the first meeting. Adams cited inter- 
national law authority to show that the course taken 
by the British was the usage of ambassadors to min- 

1 Russell Journals, V., 236-237. 

198 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 1 99 

isters of an inferior rank. Bayard also brought for- 
ward a case of a similar character when commissioners 
of Spain and England met at Boulogne in 1600. On 
that occasion the Spanish commissioners made, and 
the English resisted, a proposal much like the one that 
was now made by the British commissioners.^ Bayard 
and Gallatin, however, were disposed to take no notice 
of the matter, as they were averse to obstructing the 
negotiation with any question of "mere ceremony." 
Adams proposed that Hughes should call in the even- 
ing on Baker and inform him that the American com- 
missioners would be glad to confer and exchange " full 
powers " at any time the British commissioners would 
indicate, and at any place other than their lodgings. 
At Gallatm's suggestion, the phrase, "at any place 
other than their own lodgings," was changed to "at 
any place which may be mutually agreed upon." With 
this change Adams's proposition was agreed to, and 
Hughes was authorized further, in case any difficulty 
should arise as to a suitable place, to suggest the Hotel 
des Pays-Bas. Hughes delivered this communication, 
and was promised a reply before one o'clock of the 
next day. About ten o'clock of that same evening 
Baker called and informed the American ministers 
that the Hotel des Pays-Bas, which had been suggested 
by Hughes, had been accepted by the British com- 

2 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 3-4. 



200 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

missioners, and that they would meet the Americans 
there at one o'clock the next day.^ 

On the 8th of August, at the hour agreed upon, the 
commissioners of the two states met at the Hotel des 
Pays-Bas. After introductions had taken place and 
" full powers " been exchanged,* Gambler, the British 
minister first named, addressed the American minis- 
ters, expressing the regret which the British nation felt 
for the existence of the war and the sincere desire of 
the British Government " that the negotiation might 
result in a solid peace honorable to both parties."^ He 
stated, also, that he and his colleagues were personally 
very anxious for this desirable object and hoped that 
they might aid in putting " an end to a state of things 
so contrary to the interests of the two nations, and to 
restore again those amicable relations, which he hoped 
under the blessings of a kind Providence, might ad- 
vance the happiness of both nations."^ The other 
British ministers merely stated that Lord Gambler had 
expressed their own sentiments, 

John Quincy Adams, the first named of the Ameri- 
can commissioners, replied with similar words of as- 
surance as to the strong desire of the American people 
and Government that the negotiation might result in 

'3 Russell Journals, V., 237-238. 
* Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 4-5. 
5 Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 12, 1814; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 705-707. 
"Russell Journals, V., 238. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 20I 

a solid peace. Adams promised for himself and col- 
leagues to bring to the discussion the " disposition to 
meet every sentiment of candor and conciliation with 
the most cordial reciprocity."'^ 

After these preliminary remarks, Henry Goulburn, 
whom the British commissioners had appointed to 
open the conference, expressed the opinion that it 
would be proper for him to mention those points which 
seemed likely to be brought into discussion, and upon 
which the British commissioners had been instructed. 
He added that if any of these which he should men- 
tion should be considered unnecessary by the American 
ministers, or if there were others not mentioned which 
they might consider essential, that fact should be 
stated.^ Goulburn presented three principal subjects 
for discussion in the negotiations. 

I. " The forcible seizure of mariners on board mer- 
chant vessels, and, in connection with it, the claim of 
His Britannic Majesty to the allegiance of all the 
native subjects of Great Britain." 

n. "The Indian allies of Great Britain to be in- 
cluded in the pacification, and a definite boundary to 
be settled for their territory." This point was made 
a sine qua non. 

HI. " A revision of the boundary line between the 
United States and the adjacent British colonies." 

7 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 5. 

8 Russell Journals, V., 239. 



202 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

After having stated these three points, the British 
minister added that the British Government would 
not accord again to the United States the special fish- 
ing privileges within the limits of British jurisdiction, 
granted by the treaty of 1783, without requiring an 
equivalent.^ These points having been stated in ac- 
cordance with their instructions," the British ministers 
inquired whether the American ministers were able 
to entertain a discussion of them. 

John Quincy Adams, in reply, repeated the points 
mentioned by the British in order to learn whether he 
rightly understood them. He questioned them as to 
whether the British Government thought the impress- 
ment of seamen and the incidental claim of allegiance 
a point proper for discussion. Goulburn replied that 
the British Government did not regard it as a neces- 
sary point to be discussed, but had included it as a 
point which might naturally be supposed to arise in the 
course of the negotiation. Bayard questioning the in- 
tention of Great Britain with reference to the boundary 
line, Goulburn stated that Great Britain did not have 
in view the acquisition of any territory, but that the 
revision was intended to remove the causes for dis- 
putes over the uncertainties of the present boundary. 

^ Commissioners to Secretary of State, Aug. 12, 1814; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 705-707. 

1° Castlereagh to Commissioners at Ghent, July 28, 1814; 
Memoirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 6Q-72. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 2O3 

With reference to the Indian territory which had been 
proposed, it was stated that there was no intention of 
making any change in the nature of the sovereignty of 
the Indians over the country set apart for them. 
Adams, after going over each point, said he wished 
to have an opportunity to confer with his colleagues 
as to their instructions before giving a reply and 
before proposing other points which they might con- 
sider proper to bring forward.^^ The British wished 
an immediate answer as to whether the American 
ministers were instructed upon the point which they 
had made a sine qua non ; but upon the refusal of the 
Americans to reply,^^ they assented to the request of 
Adams, and the conference adjourned until eleven 
o'clock the following day. It was agreed that the con- 
ferences should be held alternately at the lodgings of 
each mission and that the British ministers should meet 
at the lodgings of the Americans the next day at the 
hour determined upon. 

Of the four subjects brought forward by the British 
ministers for consideration, impressment was the one 
which they cared least to discuss, while to the Ameri- 
cans it was the most important. By turning the nego- 
tiations to the questions of Indian pacification and 
territory, of boundaries and fisheries, subjects not 
entering into the causes of the war, the British hoped 

11 Russell Journals, V., 241-242. 

12 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 6. 



204 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

that they might score a diplomatic victory. Aside from 
the point of diplomacy, however, these questions had 
been pressed upon the attention of the British Govern- 
ment in a very practical way. With reference to the 
Indian pacification, promises had been made to the 
Indians by the British generals which obligated the 
British Government to see that the Indians were in- 
cluded in the pacification; and the Indian territorial 
question had been presented to the Government as a 
practical means of defending the British possessions in 
North America. There were also commercial reasons 
for the establishment of a permanent Indian territory, 
which were urged by merchants in London who carried 
on trade with the Indians. These merchants in a 
memorial to the Government, under the pretext of 
safeguarding the interests of the Indians, suggested 
four different boundary lines, either one of which 
would have given a large increase of territory to Great 
Britain. They pointed out the commercial importance 
to England of the trade with the Indians, the annual 
export of the fur trade before the war being £250,000, 
and the duties to the Government amounting to from 
i20,ooo to £50,000." 

The subject of boundary, besides being of interest 
to these London merchants, was also of much con- 

^3 Memorial of Committee of Merchants trading with the 
Island of Newfoundland and its Dependencies to Liverpool; 
MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 103. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 20$ 

cern to British subjects in the Provinces. Almost con- 
stant conflict had arisen between British and American 
subjects over boundaries which the treaty of peace 
had inaccurately or indefinitely described. Again, the 
fisheries were of great importance to the British sub- 
jects, and it was with much displeasure that they saw 
American fishermen sharing in these within their own 
territorial waters. When it became known that peace 
negotiations were to be carried on by the two coun- 
tries, memorials and petitions were sent to the British 
Government by the inhabitants of Nova Scotia and 
by London merchants urgently imploring that in the 
new treaty American fishermen be excluded from the 
privileges granted by the treaty of 1783.^* 

The American ministers, after returning to their 
rooms from the first meeting, deliberated upon the 
answer that they should make and the points that 
they should propose at the next conference. Des- 
patches from the Secretary of State, written June 25 
and 2^], were received that same evening. The in- 
structions of June 25 stated that the rights to the 
fisheries " must not be brought into discussion " ; if 
they were insisted upon, negotiations were to cease. 
The commissioners were given authority to propose an 
article postponing impressment to a future negotiation. 
The despatch of June 27 allowed the commissioners, if 

1* Petition of the Committee of the Inhabitants of Nova 
Scotia to Bathurst; MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 103. 



206 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

it should be found necessary, to omit altogether any 
stipulation on the subject of impressment. Adams, 
Gallatin, and Hughes, according to Adams's memoirs, 
worked half the night deciphering these despatches ; 
but as they gave instructions on no new points, merely 
giving greater latitude in regard to those already 
authorized, they did not affect the reply which had 
already been determined upon. The next day the 
American mission met at Bayard's room at ten o'clock, 
and agreed finally upon the answer and the points to be 
presented to the British ministers. 

At the second meeting of the two missions, Adams, 
for the American commissioners, stated that upon the 
first point, that of impressment, which had been sug- 
gested by the British plenipotentiaries, the American 
ministers had instructions ; that upon the second point, 
the Indians, they had received no instructions; but 
that they had reason to believe that commissioners had 
already been appointed to treat of peace with the In- 
dians, and, in any event, the war with them would 
cease upon peace being made with Great Britain ; that 
upon the third point, namely, boundaries, they had in- 
structions ; and that upon the fourth, '' the fisheries," 
they were without instructions. Adams presented two 
additional subjects which the American commissioners 
were instructed to propose for discussion. These 
were: a definition of blockade and, as far as could 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 20/ 

be agreed upon, neutral and belligerent rights; and 
secondly, claims to indemnity for captures both before 
and during the war. The British were informed that 
there were a number of other points which the Ameri- 
can ministers were at liberty to bring into discussion, 
either in the negotiation of the peace, or in that of a 
treaty of commerce, which, in case of a propitious 
termination of the conference, they were also author- 
ized to conclude. The Americans maintained that it 
was not to be expected that they should have been 
instructed upon the second and fourth points pro- 
posed by the British commissioners, since these had 
never formed a subject of dispute between the two 
states, and had not been the causes of the war. 
Adams, however, expressed the willingness of his col- 
leagues to hear what the British had to say upon these 
points. They would then decide whether these, under 
any possible form, could be brought within the scope of 
their discretionary powers, though he admitted that they 
did not deem it likely. The British inquired whether 
these points might not, under the general powers pos- 
sessed by the American commissioners, be made the 
subject of a provisional arrangement. The American 
ministers believed that they could agree to no such 
proposition. They stated that their Government had 
had no thought of such points being brought forward 
by Great Britain ; not only because these did not enter 
into the causes of war, but because in the tenor of 



208 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

Lord Castlereagh's proposition of the negotiation no 
expectation of such points could be found.^^ 

The British ministers repHed that Castlereagh's des- 
patch was not a place for the suggestion of the points 
for discussion, as that could not have contemplated 
ulterior events, and it was not to be expected that they 
would leave out the Indians, their allies, in any peace 
settlement that should be made. Gallatin again assured 
the British that a peace with the Indians would inevi- 
tably follow that with Great Britain, and that a peace 
might have already been made; as to a boundary line 
between the United States and the Indians, inasmuch as 
there had always been one, it was natural to suppose 
there would be one at the close of the war.^® 

The American ministers maintained that the pro- 
posed stipulation of an Indian boundary was without 
precedent in the history of the European states. In 
reply to this, the British held that tlie Indians were to 
be regarded in a certain sense as an independent people, 
and that this position was indicated by the treaties made 
with them by both Great Britain and the United States. 
The Americans explained that there was an important 
difference between treaties made with the Indians living 
within the territory of the United States, and a treaty 
made respecting them with a foreign Power which had 

15 Russell Journals, V., 243-246. 
1^ Ibid., 246-247. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 2O9 

acknowledged the territory on which the Indians re- 
sided to be a part of the United States.^'' 

The British ministers, when asked if they intended 
an acquisition of territory from the Indians, or any 
change in the attributes of sovereignty which the In- 
dians had heretofore enjoyed, replied that they did not. 
Later, in reply to a question of Bayard as to the pur- 
pose of the boundary line, and whether the United 
States was to be restricted from purchasing land of 
the Indians, the British minister, Adams, said that they 
wished the Indian territory set apart as a sort of a 
barrier between the possessions of Great Britain and 
the United States, to prevent friction between the 
peoples of the two countries ; that the Indians were 
to be restricted from selling land both to the United 
States and to Great Britain, but that they might sell to 
others. The British were asked whether it was to be 
understood that the pacification and the settlement of a 
permanent boundary for the Indians were both made a 
sine qua non. They answered that they were.^^ In 
this the British ministers went beyond their instruc- 
tions, for these had merely suggested the proposal to 
the American ministers of an arrangement for the 
mutual guarantee of the Indian possessions without ex- 
pressing it in the objectionable terms proposed by the 

!'■ American Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 12, 1814; 
American State Papers, For, Rel, III., 705-707. 
18 Russell Journals, V., 247-248. 

15 



2IO OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

British ministers.'^^ The American ministers regarded 
the proposition for Indian boundaries, as it had been 
given by the British, as tantamount to a cession of 
rights, both of sovereignty and of soil, and were 
unanimously opposed to granting it.-*' 

After offering a temporary adjournment, to give 
the Americans time for consultation, which was de- 
clined, the British ministers stated that, inasmuch as 
the American ministers were not instructed to discuss 
the points mentioned, including the one which had 
been presented as a sine qua non, and as the Americans 
thought it unlikely that they could agree to any provi- 
sional article, they would be obliged to report to their 
Government and await further instructions. The 
American ministers expressed their regret at the danger 
of breaking off the negotiation at its very commence- 
ment, and said that, although they were unable to urge 
the discussion on the points of greatest difficulty, they 
were confident that a disclosure of the views on both 
sides on that subject would lead to a satisfactory 
understanding. If a reference to the British Govern- 
ment was necessary, it was urged that as short a time 
as possible might intervene.^'- 

It was agreed, in order to prevent misconception on 

1^ Castlereagh to Commissioners at Ghent, July 28, 1814; 
Memoirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 67-72. 

2" Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 12, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 705-707. 

21 Russell Journals, V., 248-249. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 211 

the points which had been proposed by each side, that 
a protocol should be drawn up, and that for this pur- 
pose each commission should prepare a written statement 
of what had passed at the two meetings. The joint 
mission arranged to meet the next day at twelve o'clock 
at the lodgings of the American ministers to compare 
the respective protocols. That evening, at the request 
of the other ministers, Adams worked out a draft of 
a protocol, which, after being subjected to corrections 
by Bayard, Gallatin, and Clay, was given to Secretary 
Hughes to copy.-- The commissioners of the two 
states met on the loth to compare their respective 
protocols. The one drafted by the American ministers 
was more explanatory than that of the British, since 
it stated the reasons why instructions had not been 
given by the American Government upon the sub- 
jects of Indian boundaries and fisheries. This caused 
much discussion, the British ministers contending 
that the protocol should contain merely a statement 
of the points proposed by either side, without intro- 
ducing anything of an explanatory or argumentative 
character. The American ministers admitted that a 
protocol " ought not to contain reasons at large, which 
might be urged during the conference, but that im- 
portant facts ought to enter into it and the reasoning 
merely explanatory of them."^^ It was at last agreed 
that the statements of each commission as made by 

22 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., lo. 

23 Russell Journals, V., 249-250. 



212 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

itself, upon the points which were considered Hkely to 
enter into the negotiations, should constitute the pro- 
tocol.2* 

The proposed protocol of the American commis- 
sioners had included what the members of the British 
commission had said with respect to the Indian terri- 
tory's being made a barrier between the British posses- 
sions and those of the United States and to the pro- 
hibition of the sale of Indian lands within the said 
territory to the United States and Great Britain. The 
British commissioners, while not denying the truth of 
these statements, objected to the insertion of them 
in the protocol. They said that these explanatory re- 
marks had been made by them frankly and gratuitously 
and ought not to enter into the protocol. After a 
vigorous attempt on the part of the American min- 
isters to have these statements retained, they finally 
yielded, on condition that the British ministers would 
consent to a slight modification of their second point. 
This proposition was to read as follows: "That the 
peace be extended to the Indian allies of Great Britain, 
and that the boundary of their territory be definitely 
marked out as a permanent barrier between the do- 
minions of Great Britain and the United States. An 
arrangement on this subject to be a sine qua non of a 
treaty of peace."-^ This modification, the American 

2* Russell Journals, V., 250-251. 

25 Protocol of Conference, Aug. 8, 1814; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 708. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 213 

ministers considered, made the point more definite. 
The Americans were determined, if unable to negotiate 
terms of peace, to have the issues between the two 
states clearly set forth to the world. 

The British ministers objected to the statement in the 
proposed protocol of the Americans that they had 
offered to discuss all the points suggested ; that the 
British had declined so doing unless the American min- 
isters would agree to a provisional article ; and that they 
had proposed to adjourn the conference until they 
should be able to obtain further instructions.^^ The 
British stated that they had acted in a spirit of candor 
and frankness, which could not continue if the Ameri- 
can ministers made such use of their free communica- 
tion. The American ministers, accordingly, agreed to 
strike out everything to which the British made objec- 
tion. It was, however, distinctly understood that in 
reporting to their respective Governments neither party 
was to be limited to the protocol agreed upon ; but it 
might state any of the facts and circumstances in con- 
nection with the conferences during the negotiations.-^ 
The protocol at last was agreed to ; and it was given to 
the secretaries of the two missions to draw up, accord- 
ingly, from the two drafts. The British ministers 
despatched a messenger the same night with a com- 
munication to their Government asking information as 

26 Commissioners to Monroe, Aug. 12, 1814; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 705-707. 

27 Russell Journals, V., 253-254. 



214 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

to whether the negotiations should continue if the 
American ministers adhered to their determination not 
to sign a provisional article; and if so, upon what 
points.-^ 

In the interval of waiting for the British reply, the 
American ministers were busily engaged for a week in 
preparing a despatch to be sent to their Government. 
Adams and Bayard each prepared a draft, but neither 
was wholly acceptable to all the mission. The task 
was then assigned to Gallatin to revise the draft that 
Bayard had presented and to alter and amend it so that 
it might receive the concurrence of all the mission. 
Russell had suggested many amendments and altera- 
tions in the drafts of Bayard and Adams, which the 
latter regarded as trifling and inconsequential. The 
final draft of the despatch drawn up by Gallatin, with 
some amendments, was adopted August 17.-^ 

The American ministers, on the 13th, sent a note 
to the British ministers requesting them to secure from 
the Lords in Admiralty a cartel for the Chauncey, 
Captain Angus commanding. The captain was di- 
rected to be ready to sail for the United States on the 
25th with the despatches.^" Dallas was to be sent as 

28 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Aug. 8, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

29 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 15-16. 

30 American Commissioners to British Commissioners, Aug. 
13, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of 
Ghent." 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 21 5 

the bearer of these. The British ministers forwarded 
the request for a cartel to their Government, and the 
requisite papers were at once returned to them.^^ The 
evening of the 13th the Americans gave a dinner at 
their hotel to the British ministers and distinguished 
citizens of Ghent.^^ 

Lord Castlereagh arrived at Ghent on the i8th on his 
way to the Congress of Vienna. He remained until the 
morning of the 20th. He brought with him new in- 
structions which were more pleasing to the British 
ministers than the original ones had been.^^ Lord 
Castlereagh in his conference with the British ministers 
had objected, however, to the proposition which they 
had made to the American ministers relative to the 
Indian territory, that neither state should acquire by 
purchase or otherwise any of the Indian lands in the 
territory mentioned. Castlereagh said that this would 
prevent the American Government from taking land 
from the Indians by conquest, which might become 
necessary as punitive measures.^* 

On the morning of the 19th, Baker, secretary of the 

31 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Aug. 14, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

32 Amsterdam Courant, Aug. 27, 1814, quoted in Weekly 
Messenger, Oct. 14, 1814. 

33 Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 19, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 188-189. 

34 Ibid. 



2l6 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

British mission, called upon the American ministers 
and invited them to a meeting at the hotel of the British 
ministers that afternoon at three o'clock.^^ At that 
meeting Goulburn presented the substance of the in- 
structions which had just been received. He stated 
that it was with surprise that the British Government 
had learned that the American ministers were not pro- 
vided with instructions with reference to Indian paci- 
fication and boundary; and that the least that they 
could require was that the American ministers should 
consent to a provisional article on that subject. Such 
article would be subject to the approval of the Ameri- 
can Government, and if it failed to be ratified the 
treaty should be null and void.^^ Discussion upon any 
other point was declared useless until the American 
ministers should consent to sign the proposed article. 
A permanent Indian boundary, as well as Indian paci- 
fication, was again stated as a sine qua non, while the 
instructions had insisted only on the Indian pacifica- 
tion. A fuller explanation was made at this time of 
the purpose of the proposed Indian boundary. It was 
declared to be chiefly for defense, to furnish a barrier 
between the territory of the two states. Provision 
against the purchase of Indian lands by the United 
States or by Great Britain was again declared to be 

■35 Russell Journals, V., 259. 

^8 American Ministers to Monroe, Aug. 19, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 708-709. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 21/ 

essential. As a boundary for the Indian territory, the 
British ministers proposed the lines of the treaty of 
Greenville, subject to modifications to be mutually 
agreed upon.^'^ 

The British ministers had three propositions to make 
with respect to the settlement of the boundary between 
the possessions of the United States and Great Britain : 
I. " The United States should hereafter keep no armed 
naval force on the western lakes from Lake Ontario 
to Lake Superior, both inclusive; that they should 
not erect any fortified or military post or estab- 
lishment on the shores of those lakes ; and that they 
should not maintain those which were already exist- 
ing." n, " The boundary Hne west of Lake Superior, 
and thence to the Mississippi, to be revised; and the 
treaty-right of Great Britain to the navigation of the 
Mississippi to be continued." IIL " A direct commu- 
nication from Halifax, and the province of New 
Brunswick, to Quebec to be secured to Great Britain. "^^ 

The first of these propositions was made on the 
ground that since Great Britain was the weaker Power 
in North America her possessions were in danger of 
attack from the United States while that state held 
possession of the Great Lakes. The British ministers 

3^ Russell Journals, V., 25^261. British to American Com- 
missioners, Aug. 19, 1814; American State Papers, For. Rel., 
III., 710. 

38 American Ministers to Monroe, Aug. 19, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 708-709. 



21 8 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

stated, upon being questioned, that it was the intention 
that Great Britain should have all the rights with re- 
spect to the lakes which the United States was to 
relinquish ; but that both states should enjoy the com- 
mercial navigation of the lakes as heretofore. With 
reference to the western boundary line proposed, the 
American ministers asked if it was not the line from 
the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi that was 
intended. The British replied that it was " the line 
from Lake Superior to the Mississippi." When ques- 
tioned how the third subject was to be accomplished, 
the British ministers stated that a cession should be 
made to Great Britain of that portion of territory 
intervening between New Brunswick and Quebec which 
cut off direct communication between the British 
provinces.^^ 

After mentioning these points, the British ministers 
added that if the conference should be broken off in 
consequence of the refusal of the American ministers 
to agree to a provisional article, Great Britain would 
not be bound, upon a renewal of negotiations, to abide 
by the terms which she now proposed ; " but would be 
at liberty to vary and regulate her demands according 
to subsequent events, and in such manner as the state 

®9 Russell Journals, V., 261-263, 265. British to American 
Commissioners, Aug. 19, 1814; American State Papers, For. 
Rel., III., 710. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 2I9 

of the war, at the time of renewing the negotiations, 
might warrant."^"' 

The British ministers were questioned as to the in- 
tention of Great Britain relative to Moose Island and 
other islands in Passamaquody Bay which had re- 
cently been taken by the British. They replied that as 
Great Britain had always considered them hers she 
certainly would not give them up or allow them to be 
brought into discussion. Bayard asked whether the 
proposition relative to the lakes was also a sine qua 
non. Doctor Adams replied that one sine qua non had 
been given, and when that had been disposed of it 
would be sufficient time to take up the consideration of 
the other.*^ No reference was made at this time to the 
fisheries, as the instructions to the British ministers 
had been silent on that point. The American ministers 
having left out of their discussions the subject of the 
fisheries, it was thought by the British ministers that 
the Americans were prepared to yield that point. 

The American ministers requested that, before giving 
their reply, the British ministers would reduce their 
propositions to writing. This they consented to do, 
and promised to transmit the note to the American 

*o American Ministers to Monroe, Aug. 19, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel, III., 708-709. Memoirs of J. Q. 
Adams, III., 18. 

41 Russell Journals, V., 263-264. American Commissioners 
to Monroe, Aug. 19, 1814; American State Papers, For. Rel., 
III., 708-709. 



220 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

mission at an early hour.^^ The official note from the 
British ministers was received the following day. A 
copy of this, together with an account of the proceed- 
ings of the conference of the 19th, drafted by Gallatin, 
was sent at once to America by the John Adams .^^ 

Hopes of a successful termination of the negotia- 
tion were no longer entertained by the American min- 
isters.^* They expected now merely to exchange the 
usual formalities for closing the negotiation. Clay 
alone thought it barely possible that the negotiations 
might be continued through the lowering of the British 
demands ; but how faint the hope that even he enter- 
tained is shown in a letter which he wrote at this time 
to Secretary Monroe. "The hope of their retracting 
their demands is," said he, " too remote to warrant the 
smallest calculation upon it; the reliance will be much 
better placed on the firmness and energy of the Ameri- 
can people to conquer again their independence."*^ It 
was the unanimous opinion of the American ministers 
that Great Britain's policy was to consume as much 

*2Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 21, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 188-189. 

^3 Russell Journals, V., 265. 

44 Russell to George Blake, Aug. 19, 1814; Russell Papers, 
MS., No. 1726. Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 21. 

4^ Gallatin to Monroe, Aug. 20, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS. 
Writings of Gallatin, I., 637-640. Clay to Monroe, Aug. 18, 
1814; Russell Papers, MS., copy of Clay's Journals, 1781. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 221 

time as possible before the termination of the negotia- 
tion, in order that some decisive victory might be gained 
in the war which would make it easier for her to insist 
upon her demands. This, it was deemed, was the 
object of the sine qua non, that time might elapse while 
the American ministers were waiting for new instruc- 
tions upon the Indian question, which would be neces- 
sary if that point should be insisted upon. Clay 
thought that if the American ministers refused to refer 
the question the British would not break off negotia- 
tion on this point.*^ 

For four days the American ministers labored over 
the note which was to be their answer to the one pre- 
sented by the British ministers on the 19th. It was in 
these conferences among themselves, in decisions of 
procedure, and in the preparation of notes and des- 
patches, that the greatest difficulties were encountered, 
owing to the size of the mission and the temperamental 
differences and personal antipathies of its members. 
Adams, as the head of the mission and a diplomat 
of wider experience than the others, expected to be 
deferred to in the preparation of state papers. He was 
soon shaken out of this illusion, as has been seen in the 
previous discussions over the despatches to the Secre- 
tary of State. 

The preparation of the note to the British ministers 

^6 Clay to Monroe, Aug. 18, 1814; Russell Papers, MS., copy 
of Clay's Journals, 1781. 



222 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

illustrates the 'hard, conscientious work that the com- 
missioners performed. Adams spent an entire day 
making a draft of the answer; Gallatin and Clay both 
prepared notes, and these were read and discussed on 
the2ist. With reference to his own draft Adams says: 
" I found, as usual, that the draft was not satisfactory 
to my colleagues. On the general view of the subject we 
are unanimous, but in my exposition of it, one objects 
to the form and another to the substance of almost 
every paragraph. Mr. Gallatin is for striking out every 
expression that may be offensive to the feelings of the 
adverse party. Mr. Clay is displeased with figurative 
language, which he thinks improper for a state paper. 
Mr. Russell, agreeing in the objections of the two other 
gentlemen, will be further for amending the construc- 
tion of every sentence; and Mr. Bayard, even when 
agreeing to say precisely the same thing, chooses to say 
it only in his own language."*^ Adams's note was given 
to Gallatin to revise, and on the 23d this note, with cor- 
rections and amendments, together with the paragraph 
prepared by Clay and an entire new draft made by 
Bayard, were all read and discussed. The secretary 
of the mission was directed from all of these to make a 
new draft. Adams says that about one half of his 
note was stricken out and nearly one half the remainder 
was left for consideration.^^ On the 24th the mission 

*7 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 21. 
48 Ibid., 22. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 223 

had a short meeting in the morning and one after 
dinner which lasted until eleven o'clock at night. 
Adams records that they erased, patched, and amended 
until all were wearied, though none of them were 
" satiated with amendment." He states that not more 
than one fifth of his original draft was retained in the 
final draft, with " scraps from Gallatin, scraps from 
Bayard, and scraps from Clay, all of whom are dis- 
satisfied with the paper as finally constructed." On the 
25th the note was finally adopted and presented to the 
British ministers. 

Ten days passed with no word from the British com- 
missioners. On the 23d the Americans had dined with 
the British at the Intendant's. At this dinner the con- 
versation of the Americans made it evident that they 
did not expect the negotiations to continue. Clay in- 
formed Goulburn that they intended to refer to their 
Government for instructions, and that they considered 
the British proposition equivalent to a demand for the 
cession of territory. Bayard also told Goulburn that 
peace could not result. He intimated to him that such 
proposals as the British had made not only destroyed all 
prospects of peace, but sacrificed the Federal party, 
to which he belonged, to its political adversaries. He 
maintained that a conciliatory spirit would have 
strengthened that party, which, he intimated, it was to 
the advantage of the British interest to support, and to 
make peace was the only method of efifectually accom- 



224 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

pushing that result. He assured him that Great Britain 
had nothing to fear on the part of Canada, upon what- 
ever terms peace was made. He also gave him to 
understand that there would be no trouble about alle- 
giance and impressment ; but the British demands were 
such as the United States never could grant.*^ On the 
27th the British ministers gave a return dinner to the 
American ministers, but no assurance was expressed of 
any more conciliatory terms on the part of the British 
Government. 

The note from the American ministers to the British 
ministers bearing the date of August 24 called attention 
to the fact that Castlereagh in his despatch of Novem- 
ber 4, 181 3, to the American Secretary of State had 
written that Great Britain was willing to negotiate with 
the United States " for the conciliatory adjustment of 
the differences subsisting between the two States," with 
the purpose of securing a successful termination " upon 
principles of perfect reciprocity, not inconsistent with 
the established maxims of public law, and with the 
maritime rights of the British empire." Since this was 
the avowed purpose of the negotiation, the American 
commissioners said it was not to be expected that the 
United States would go beyond the terms stated by 
Lord Castlereagh, and furnish them with powers re- 
specting the Indians. That the British Government 

^^Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 23, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 189-190. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 22 5 

had not changed their purpose, the note declared, was 
to be inferred from the statement made by the British 
ministers at the first conference to the effect " that no 
events subsequent to the first proposals for this nego- 
tiation had, in any manner, varied either the disposition 
of the British Government, that it might terminate in 
a peace honorable to both parties, or the terms upon 
which they would be willing to conclude it."°° 

It was well known, the Americans said, that the 
differences between the two states were wholly of a 
maritime nature, and that the boundary of the Indian 
territory never had been a subject of dispute between 
Great Britain and the United States. " Neither the 
principles of reciprocity, the maxims of public law, nor 
the maritime rights of the British empire could require 
the permanent establishment of such boundary." Again, 
the proposition to demand a permanent territory for 
the Indians was " contrary to the acknowledged princi- 
ples of public law, and to the practice of all civilized 
nations." It was not founded on " perfect reciprocity," 
and it was wholly unnecessary. It was further de- 
clared that the universal practice of European Powers 
possessing territories in America had been to allow the 
interference of no foreign state in matters arising 
between the acknowledged sovereign of the territory 
and the Indians dwelling therein. The Indians could 

^"American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713. 
16 



226 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

not be considered an independent Power, especially by 
Great Britain, which, by the treaty of 1783, solemnly 
acknowledged them to be within the dominions of the 
United States, and, further, the Indians themselves 
had acknowledged the ultimate sovereignty of the 
United States in the treaty of Greenville, 1795 ; for in 
that treaty and subsequent Indian treaties the relation- 
ship with the United States was thus defined : " that the 
Indian tribes shall quietly enjoy their lands, hunting, 
planting, and dwelling thereon so long as they please, 
without any molestation from the United States; but 
that when those tribes, or any of them, shall be dis- 
posed to sell their lands, they are to be sold only to the 
United States ; that, until such sale, the United States 
will protect all the said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoy- 
ment of their lands against all citizens of the United 
States, and against all other white persons who intrude 
on the same; and that the said Indian tribes again 
acknowledge themselves to be under the protection 
of the said United States, and of no other Power what- 
ever," It was maintained that the proposed stipula- 
tion was not reciprocal, for while professing to place 
both nations on an equality as to the prohibition im- 
posed respecting the purchase of Indian lands, it, in 
reality, affected only the United States, which alone 
had enjoyed that privilege heretofore. Further, the 
measure proposed was unnecessary, for the United 
States had always adopted a liberal policy toward the 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 22/ 

Indians. There was no desire to continue the war with 
the Indians; and peace with them would inevitably 
follow peace with Great Britain.^^ 

The note stated that the American ministers would 
assent to a provisional article "engaging that each 
party will treat for the Indians within its territories, 
include them in the peace, and use its best endeavors 
to prevent them from committing hostilities against the 
citizens or subjects of the other party"; alid that 
another provisional article might also be'^^sented to 
" which should preclude the subjects or citizens of each 
nation respectively from trading with the Indians re- 
siding in the territory of the other. But to sur- 
render both the rights of sovereignty and of soil over 
nearly one-third of the territorial dominions of the 
United States to a number of Indians, not probably 
exceeding twenty thousand," was beyond their powers, 
and they assured the British plenipotentiaries that any 
arrangement for that purpose would be at once rejected 
by their government.^^ 

It was further declared with reference to the military 
occupation of the lakes by Great Britain that that was 
equally inadmissible, and it was impossible to discover 
by what rule of " perfect reciprocity " the United States 
could be called upon " to renounce their equal right of 
maintaining a naval force upon those lakes, and of for- 

^1 American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713. 
52 Ibid. 



228 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

tifying their own shores, while Great Britain reserves 
exclusively the corresponding rights to herself."^' 

It was denied that Great Britain could, in point of 
fact, as far as military preparation went, be regarded 
as the weaker Power in North America in comparison 
with the United States; it was held that, upon the 
argument of " weaker Power," the United States might 
with more consistency make the demand which Great 
Britain was making of the United States. It was 
asked whether Great Britain would be willing, " in rela- 
tion to another frontier, where she has the acknowl- 
edged superiority of strength," to consent to reduce her 
equipment to a condition of equality with the United 
States.^* 

With reference to granting land for communication 
between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and the 
change in the western boundary proposed by the 
British ministers, the note stated that the American 
ministers had "no authority to cede any part of the 
territory of the United States, and to no stipulation to 
that effect will they subscribe." The objections to the 
propositions of the British ministers, colored by the 
personal feeling of the Americans, is summed up in the 
following words of their note: "The conditions pro- 
posed by Great Britain have no relation to the subsist- 
ing differences between the two countries ; they are in- 

^3 American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713. 
54 Ibid. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 229 

consistent with acknowledged principles of public law ; 
they are founded neither on reciprocity, nor on any of 
the usual bases of negotiation, neither on that of titi 
possidetis nor of status ante bellum. They would inflict 
the most vital injury on the United States, by dismem- 
bering their territory, by arresting their natural growth 
and increase of population, and by leaving their north- 
ern and western frontier equally exposed to British 
invasion and to Indian aggression ; they are, above all, 
dishonorable to the United States, in demanding from 
them to abandon territory and a portion of their citi- 
zens ; to admit a foreign interference in their domestic 
concerns, and to cease to exercise their natural rights 
on their own shores and in their own waters." A 
treaty founded on such terms, it was maintained, could 
not be permanent. Instead of settling the differences 
it would give rise to new ones, " sow the seeds of a 
permanent hatred, and lay the foundation of hostilities 
for an indefinite period." The United States desired 
peace on " terms of reciprocity honorable to both coun- 
tries," and only upon such terms would peace be 
permanent. In concluding the note the American min- 
isters offered to agree to a treaty which should be 
based upon the principle of status ante bellum, and 
which should reserve to both parties " all their rights, 
in relation to their respective seamen."^^ This conces- 
sion, in willingness to agree upon a treaty which should 

^^ American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713. 



230 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

be silent upon the subject of impressment, had been 
proposed by Secretary Monroe in his latest instruc- 
tions to them, June 27.^" 

This retrogression in the policy of the American 
Government was due to the following circumstances: 
The European conflict had ended, and the actual prac- 
tice of impressment for the time being had ceased ; the 
American Government was experiencing extreme diffi- 
culty in obtaining men and money for the war; and 
information had been received from Bayard and Gal- 
latin of the determined attitude of Great Britain upon 
impressment. In view of these facts, President Madi- 
son had called a meeting of his Cabinet and had sub- 
mitted the question whether a treaty of peace, silent 
upon the subject of impressment, should be author- 
ized.^^ All the Cabinet members present were unani- 
mous in favor of such authorization, and the American 
ministers were instructed accordingly. 

The American note of August 24 went to the length 
of offering to discuss all points involved in the difiFer- 
ences which had interrupted and might again tend to 
interrupt the harmony of the two countries, without 
making the conclusion of peace depend upon agree- 
ment upon these. The American ministers with spirit 
refused to consider the propositions contained in the 

56 Monroe to American Commissioners, June 27, 1814; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 704-705. 
"Writings of Madison (1865 ed.), III., 408. 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 23 1 

British note of August 19, and declared that these 
would only be a fit subject of deliberation when it 
became necessary to decide upon the expediency of an 
absolute surrender of national independence.^^ 

The American ministers expected an immediate re- 
ply which would terminate the negotiations ; but not 
until September 4 did they receive an answer. Mean- 
time despatches had been sent by George M. Dallas to 
America announcing the failure of the negotiations. 

On the day before the American note was received, 
the British ministers had written to their Government 
asking whether, in case the American ministers re- 
fused to accept the basis of uti possidetis, even for a 
provisional article, they should break off negotiations.^'' 
The note of the American ministers was sent to Cas- 
tlereagh, then in Paris, for information as to the nature 
of the reply that should be made.''" He answered that 
no written reply should be given to the American note 
save under instructions of the British Cabinet ; but that 
a verbal communication should be made to the Amen- 
ds American to British Ministers, Aug. 24, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 711-713. 

59 Goulburn to Bathurst, Aug. 24, 1814 ; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 190-191. 

•'o Goulburn to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; Wellington's 
Suppplementary Despatches, IX., 193-194. British Commis- 
sioners to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; MS., British Foreign 
Office, 5, 102. 



232 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

can ministers apprising them of the fact that their note 
had been referred to the British Government."^ 

Castlereagh at once sent the despatches and letters 
from the British ministers to the Prime Minister, Lord 
Liverpool. In a personal letter he stated that in his 
discussions with the British ministers at Ghent he had 
proposed that the proposition on Indian limits should 
be given less peremptorily, especially the phrase " it is 
equally necessary " ; but that the British ministers had 
opposed any change for fear of appearing to weaken. 
Upon the words " purchase or otherwise " he had also 
cautioned them from committing themselves without 
further authority. He considered the whole territorial 
question one of expediency, not to be insisted on if 
it would result in a rupture of the negotiations. For 
the war to be continued on the part of Great Britain for 
territorial aggression, as it would be represented, would 
make the war popular in America. Castlereagh made 
the suggestion of proposing to the American ministers 
a provisional article for them to sign on the subject of 
Indian pacification, separate from the question of terri- 
torial limits."- 

Before the papers from Castlereagh reached Lon- 
don, the Cabine't had had under advisement despatches 

^^Castlereagh to Goulburn, Aug. 28, 1814; Wellington's 
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 196. 

82 Castlereagh to Earl Liverpool, Aug. 28, 1814; Welling- 
ton's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 192-193, 



OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 233 

and notes which had been sent direct from Ghent, and 
the general outhne of the answer proposed by the 
British ministers was approved ; but the peace ministers 
were criticized in so presenting the British poHcy in 
their notes as to have made a rupture possible on the 
territorial question alone. The members of the Cabi- 
net expressed the fear that a break on that basis 
would unite all the parties in America in favor of the 
continuance of the war. It was declared important to 
place the responsibility of the rupture, if it was to take 
place, clearly upon the American ministers.^^ The re- 
cent military successes in Canada, however, mitigated 
against the Cabinet's consenting to lower appreciably 
the British demands. 

When sending the American note to their Govern- 
ment the British ministers had enclosed a projected 
reply.*^* In the letter of the same date they expressed 
embarrassment over the words "perfect reciprocity," 
which the Americans had insisted were used in Castle- 
reagh's note of November 4, 1813, but which were not 
found in the copy which had been given them of the 

63 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 2,1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 214. Liverpool to Wellington, 
Sept. 2, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 
211-213. 

«4 Goulburn to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 193-194. Memoirs and Corre- 
spondence of Castlereagh, X., 99-100. British Commissioners 
to Castlereagh, Aug. 26, 1814; MS., British Foreign Office, 
5, 102. 



234 OPENING OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AT GHENT 

document in the Foreign Office relating to the same 
matter of the date of Octoiber 30, 181 3. The ministers 
requested a copy of the letter of November 4, 181 3. 
The American version was shown to be correct, When 
the British note was later published. 

In view of the British insistence upon the establish- 
ment of an independent Indian territory as a sine qua 
non, the American commissioners gave up all hope of 
agreement upon a treaty. They decided to give up 
their house at the end of the month, though later they 
concluded to keep it until the middle of September, and 
Adams discussed with his colleagues the advisability of 
his return to St. Petersburg. The two missions gave 
the usual formal dinners in anticipation of the closing 
of a negotiation. 



CHAPTER VI 
The Indian Question and the Canadian Boundary 

The American ministers, after sending their note of 
August 24, were kept waiting a week before any word 
was returned from the British ministers, and then there 
came only the announcement that the American note 
had been referred to the British Government. The 
Americans had attributed the delay to the desire of the 
British ministers " to give a greater appearance of 
deliberation and solemnity to the rupture." As a 
matter of fact, it only illustrated what was shown 
throughout the negotiations : that the British commis- 
sioners were mere puppets in the hands of the British 
Cabinet. 

On the first of September, Adams had an extended 
conversation with Goulburn about the British propo- 
sals. This interview was by no means reassuring to 
Adams, and in his report of it to Secretary Monroe he 
wrote : " In the whole tenor of his discourse I perceived 
not only an inflexible adherence to the terms which we 
had rejected, but, under the cover of a personal deport- 
ment sufficiently courteous, a rancorous animosity 
against America which disclosed that there was nothing 

235 



236 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

like peace in his heart."^ In their conversation Goul- 
burn explained Great Britain's necessity of insistence 
upon the Indian boundary as being not, primarily, for 
the sake of the Indians, but for the protection of Can- 
ada. He stated that disarmament on the lakes by 
the United States was likewise essential to the safety 
of Canada. 2 To this Adams replied, that Canada was 
in no danger from the United States; that the American 
Government had no intention of conquering and annex- 
ing that province, and that the invasion of Canada had 
been a war measure, and nothing more. Goulburn re- 
ferred to the proclamation of General Hull as showing 
the intention of the American Government with refer- 
ence to Canada. To this Adams answered that the 
American Government was no more responsible for 
Hull's proclamation than the British Government was 
responsible for Admiral Cochrane's proclamation. 
Adams presented here the charge against British 
officers of taking away negroes and selling them in the 
West Indies. The mention of this fact had been au- 
thorized by the Government instructions of January 
28. Adams wrote that " the whole of this conversa- 
tion was on both sides perfectly cool and temper- 
ate in the manner, though sometimes very earnest on 

ij. Q. Adams to Monroe, Sept. 5, 1814; MS., Bureau of 
Indexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 139 
2 Ibid. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 23/ 

mine, and sometimes with a hurry of reply and an em- 
barrassment of expression on his, indicating an effort 
to control the disclosure of feelings under strong ex- 
citement."^ In reporting the conversation to the Sec- 
retary of State, Adams said that, while the avowed pur- 
pose of the Indian boundary was changed from the 
Indians to the security of Canada, the real one, though 
not acknowledged, was discernible, namely, " no other 
than a profound and rankling jealousy at the rapid in- 
crease of population and settlement in the United 
States, and an impotent longing to thwart their prog- 
ress and to stunt their growth. . . . With this temper 
prevailing in the British commission it is not in the 
hour of their success that we can expect to obtain 
peace upon terms of equal justice and reciprocity." 

On September 2 the British ministers received from 
their Government a draft* of the reply to be presented 
to the American ministers. Permission was granted to 
make such alterations in the style, and in the facts, if 
they were incorrectly stated, as might seem proper to 
the British ministers.^ Two days later, the British 
note, with a few slight changes, was sent to the Ameri- 
can ministers. It w^as received by Gallatin and given 

3 Adams to Monroe, Sept. 5, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 139. 

* Bathurst to Goulburn, Sept. i, 1814; Wellington's Supple- 
mentary Despatches, IX., 245-249. 

s Goulburn to Castlereagh, Sept. 5, 1814; MS., British For- 
eign Office, 5, 102. 



238 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

to Adams. The following day it was read at a meet- 
ing of all the American ministers. Adams records in 
his diary the sentiment with which it was received: 
" Mr. Bayard pronounced it a very stupid production. 
Mr. Clay was in favor of answering it by a note of 
half a page. I neither thought it stupid nor proper to 
be answered in half a page."*' Gallatin proposed to an- 
alyze its contents and to make a minute of the reply 
that should be made. Clay was so thoroughly dis- 
gusted that the following day he sent a note to the 
British commissioners asking for a passport to return 
home.'^ 

The British note was no more conciliatory than the 

last one of the American ministers. It stated that, 

while the war was ostensibly declared by the United 

States on account of the maritime claims of Great 

Britain, it had not been carried on for these purposes 

only; that the United States had on the contrary, by 

declaration and act, shown a disposition to wage war 

for the annexation of Canada; that it was on this 

account that the boundary question had assumed so 

much importance ; that, inasmuch as the United States 

had aimed at acquisition and aggrandizement, it was 

no more than right that Great Britain should retain 

territory which British valor had placed in her power ; 

« Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 31. 

^Goulburn to Bathurst, Sept. 5, 1814; Wellington's Supple- 
mentary Despatches, IX., 221-222. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 239 

that the United States had manifested such a spirit of 
aggrandizement by " their progressive occupation of the 
Indian territories, by the acquisition of Louisiana, by 
the more recent attempt to wrest by force of arms from 
a nation in amity the two Floridas, and, lastly, by the 
avowed intention of permanently annexing the Canadas 
to the United States," that it became necessary for the 
British Government to endeavor to secure its domin- 
ions in North America against the attempts at con- 
quest on the part of the United States.^ 

The note again presented the argument of the 
" weaker Power," in accordance with which it claimed 
that Great Britain's command of the lakes was essen- 
tial to the defense of Canada. With respect to the 
boundary of the district of Maine and of the Northwest, 
the British ministers maintained that the objection 
made by the American ministers to the effect that they 
had no authority to cede any part of the territory of 
the United States was inconsistent with their previous 
declaration " that they were instructed to treat for the 
revision of their boundary lines." The boundary of the 
district of Maine, it was stated, had not been definitely 
determined, and the one claimed by the United States 
was not the one which was contemplated in the treaty 
of 1783. With reference to the northwestern frontier, 
a proposal for settling the boundary, which had been 
mutually acknowledged to be a necessity, could not 

s British to American Ministers, Sept. 4, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 713-715. 



240 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

be regarded as a demand for a cession of territory 
" unless," as the note sarcastically added, " the United 
States are prepared to assert that there is no Hmit 
to their territories in that direction, and, that avail- 
ing themselves of the geographical error upon which 
that part of the treaty of 1783 was formed, they 
will acknowledge no boundary whatever; then, un- 
questionably, any proposition to fix one, be it what it 
may, must be considered as demanding a large cession 
of territory from the United States."^ The note 
stated that, with respect to the boundary west from 
the Lake of the Woods, the line which was agreed to 
in the unratified treaty of 1803 would be acceptable 
to the British Government ; or their ministers were pre- 
pared to discuss any other proposed boundary line.^° 

The Indian boundary was insisted upon as essential 
to the permanent tranquility and security of the Indian 
tribes. The renewal of the stipulations contained in 
the treaty of 1795 between the United States and the 
Indians, respecting the boundaries of the Indian terri- 
tory, would be regarded as sufficient on that subject. 
The note disclaimed that the proposition respecting 
the Indian boundaries had been arbitrarily demanded 
without off"ering an opportunity for discussion and 
mutual agreement upon the boundaries to be fixed. If, 
as the American note affirmed, an agreement to the 

9 British to American Ministers, Sept. 4, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 7i3-7i5- 

10 Ibid. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 24 1 

proposal would cede one third of the territory of the 
United States, then "the American Government itself 
must have conveyed it away by the Greenville treaty 
of 1795." That treaty, it was asserted, hy its provi- 
sions placed the Indians on the plane of independent 
nations. For the American Government to declare 
that all the Indian nations within its boundary lines 
were subjects of the United States, " living there upon 
sufferance on lands which it also claims the exclusive 
right of acquiring," was to threaten the extinction of 
the Indian nations. Great Britain would be willing to 
enter into the same engagement with respect to the 
Indians within her own territory as she had proposed 
to the United States, and, therefore, the proposition 
could not be regarded as not being reciprocal. Neither 
could it, with any truth, be considered " as contrary to 
the acknowledged principles of public law, as deroga- 
tory to the honor, or inconsistent with the rights of the 
American Government."^^ 

The British ministers, as they had been instructed, 
sought to throw the responsibility for the rupture upon 
the American ministers. They closed their note with 
these words : " It will be for the American pleni- 
potentiaries to determine whether they are ready now 
to continue the negotiations, whether they are disposed 
to refer to their Government for further instructions, 

I'- British to American Ministers, Sept. 4, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 713-715. 

17 



242 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

or, lastly, whether they will take upon themselves the 

responsibility of breaking off the negotiation alto- 
gether."i2 

This arrogant language was used at a time when the 
British Cabinet confidently expected that the war 
would speedily be brought to a close with the aid of 
the additional forces that had been despatched to 
America, and that the United States, in utter defeat, 
would sue for peace upon any terms. Lord Castle- 
reagh, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the leading 
figure in the Cabinet, had successfully dictated terms 
at the treaty of Paris. He saw no reason why, in 
what he considered to be a minor affair, he should not 
be as peremptory. 

The British ministers reported to their Government 
a draft of the note which they had presented to the 
Americans. They stated that no change was likely to 
be proposed by the American ministers, who, they de- 
clared, had no real intention of making peace. The 
negotiation, they said, had been entered into "-with the 
sole view " of gaining some advantage which would 
draw the people of the United States together in con- 
ducting the war, and the question of Indian boundary 
had been taken by them for this object. This point, it 
was asserted, was shown by a letter written by Craw- 

12 British to American Ministers, Sept. 4, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 713-715. British Commissioners 
to Castlereagh, Sept. 5, 1814; MS., British Foreign Office, 
5, 102. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 243 

ford, American minister at Paris, to Count Hoogendorf 
of Holland, a copy of which, sent to the British min- 
isters by Lord Clancarty, British minister to Holland, 
was now enclosed for the information of the British 
Government. The letter of Crawford had attempted 
to show how Great Britain had violated the rights of 
neutrals in her method of warfare, and especially in 
her system of blockade, while the United States had 
conscientiously respected the rights of neutral states.^^ 
September 6 the American mission met, and the 
analysis of the British note, together with a minute 
of points made by Gallatin, was discussed. It was 
voted to authorize Gallatin to draft an answer to be 
presented at the next meeting. Bayard was the only 
one of the mission that was inclined to make any con- 
cession. He proposed to offer for the Indians the 
status quo ante bellum, or a declaration that the 
treaty of Greenville should not be considered as abro- 
gated by the war. Clay and Adams were for no 
stipulation respecting the Indians in a treaty with 
Great Britain. Gallatin proposed that they should 
offer to refer to their Government a stipulation for 
mutual disarmament on the lakes, while Adams op- 
posed this as being outside of their instructions. He 
maintained that Great Britain had a sufficient guar- 

^3 Copy of a letter of W. H. Crawford to Count Hoogen- 
dorf enclosed in a letter of Goulburn, Sept. 5; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, 102. 



244 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

antee for the security of Canada in her ability to attack 
the commerce of the United States.^* 

On the 7th, the discussion upon the British note was 
renewed. Gallatin's draft was presented and referred 
to the other members individually for amendments 
and additions. Adams having insisted upon introduc- 
ing paragraphs complaining of the employment of the 
Indians by Great Britain as contrary to the laws of 
civilized warfare, it was voted that he should prepare 
a paragraph on that subject. Upon the question rela- 
tive to the Indian boundary Adams also made a draft 
of several paragraphs. On the 8th, a final draft was 
made from the sketches of all. Adams's paragraph re- 
specting Indian rights was adopted. The one concern- 
ing the employment of savages was adopted in substance 
with amendments. On the 9th, the concluding para- 
graph and a few others, which had been previously un- 
settled, were adopted. The note was copied by Hughes 
and taken to the British ministers the same af ternoon.^^ 

The American note of the 9th indignantly dis- 
claimed any unjust action on the part of the United 
States in the acquisition of Louisiana, or in the treat- 
ment of Spain in the question of the Florida bound- 
aries. It also denied the charge that the annexation of 
Canada had been the declared object of the United 
States Government. The note asserted that the United 
States had from. the commencement of the war been 

1* Memoirs of J. G. Adams, III., 31-32. 
15 Ibid., 32-33- 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 245 

willing to make peace without obtaining any cession 
of territory, on the sole condition of the satisfactory 
settlement of maritime rights ; that the United States 
could not consent to leave its own frontier unpro- 
tected in order to protect the frontier of Canada; that 
an invasion of Canada on the part of the United 
States was impracticable, for it could not occur with- 
out leaving the Atlantic shores exposed to more de- 
structive attacks by the British fleet ; that Great Britain 
was, at the commencement of the negotiation, in pos- 
session of only two ports on the lakes, and that this di'd 
not give her a claim to any large cession of territory 
founded on the right of conquest should the United 
States be willing to treat on such a basis, which it was 
not, for the principle of status quo ante bellum was 
the only basis to which it would consent.^^ 

The justice of including allies in the treaty of peace 
and of providing for their security was not questioned ; 
but the right of Great Britain, "according to those 
principles and to her own practice, to interfere in any 
manner with Indian tribes residing within the terri- 
tories of the United States, as acknowledged by her- 
self, to consider such tribes as her allies, or to treat 
for them with the United States, "^'^ was denied. In 
reply to the statement of the British ministers that the 
American claim to sovereignty over the Indians and 

19 American to British Ministers, Sept. 9, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 715-717. 
" Ibid. 



246 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

their lands within the American borders was unheard 
of and invahd, the American note proceeded to show 
that it was not inconsistent with the acknowledged prin- 
ciples and practices of other countries, and notably 
of Great Britain herself. This could be seen in all the 
colonial charters from that of Virginia to that of 
Georgia. The treaty of Utrecht, which described the 
Indians of the five nations as subject to the dominion 
of Great Britain, and the treaty of the Cherokees, by 
which the members of that tribe were granted the 
privilege of living where they pleased, were evidence 
that Great Britain regarded itself as sovereign over 
Indian lands. The British proclamation of 1763, which 
declared " all purchases of lands from the Indians null 
and void, unless made by treaties held under the sanc- 
tion of His Majesty's Government," had no meaning 
"if the Indians had the right to sell their lands to 
whom they pleased." The various boundary lines 
were settled in former treaties without consulting the 
Indians, and those now proposed showed that the 
Indians were not considered as independent nations. 

Again, it was shown that the relationship claimed by 
the United States toward the Indians did not originate 
with the treaty of Greenville; that that treaty neither 
took from the Indians the right, " which they had not, 
of selling lands within the jurisdiction of the United 
States to foreign Governments or subjects, nor ceded 
to them the right of exercising exclusive jurisdiction 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 24/ 

within the boundary Hne assigned." It was merely de- 
claratory of the public law in relation to the parties, 
founded on principles previously and universally recog- 
nized. The note declared that there was nothing in 
the treaty of Greenville to warrant the proposition 
which the British ministers had made, and showed 
that the reciprocity proposed in the last British note 
respecting Indian territories, by which each state 
should agree to purchase no lands from the Indians 
within its own territory, was merely nominal, being, in 
actual fact, unequal. It was held to be of no concern 
what policy Great Britain adopted in her territory ; but 
the United States could not consent to any interfer- 
ence in its own policy respecting the Indians living 
within its borders. The acceptance of a permanent 
Indian boundary line, beyond which settlement should 
never be made, would arrest the natural growth of 
the country, and leave the frontier forever exposed 
to savage incursions.^^ 

It was repeated that there was no objection to the 
question of peace with the Indians ; but that no pro- 
vision in the treaty was necessary to secure that result. 
Following upon a peace with Great Britain, it was 
said, a peace would at once be made with the Indians, 
restoring them to the same position in which they were 
before the commencement of the war, provided the 
Indians themselves would consent to a peace. The 

^8 American to British Ministers, Sept. 9, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 715-717. 



248 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

note spoke with abhorrence of the atrocities committed 
by the Indian allies of Great Britain, and suggested, 
as being of more benefit to the Indians than a boundary 
provision, an article by which Great Britain and the 
United States should reciprocally stipulate, in the 
future, if at war with each other, to refrain from 
employing Indians.^^ 

In regard to cession of territory for a way of com- 
munication between New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, 
the American ministers maintained in their note that 
there was a very great distinction between their agree- 
ment to discuss revision of boundary lines and the 
question of the cession of any portion of territory ; 
that their declaration " did not imply that they were 
instructed to make any cession of territory in any 
quarter, or to agree to a revision of the line, or to any 
exchange of territory, where no uncertainty or dis- 
pute existed." They denied that there was any uncer- 
tainty in the treaty of 1783 with respect to the bound- 
ary of the district of Maine ; and said that it never had 
been known "that the British plenipotentiaries who 
signed that treaty had contemplated a boundary dif- 
ferent from that fixed by the treaty," and that nothing 
more was required to ascertain definitely the boundary 
than that it be surveyed in accordance with the provi- 
sions of the treaty. It was insisted that upon this 
point the instructions of the American ministers did 

19 American to British Ministers, Sept. 9, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 715-717. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 249 

not enable them to treat, particularly as the territories 
in question were a part of the State of Massachusetts.-'' 

The American ministers offered no objection to a 
discussion of the northwestern boundary after the 
question of the Indian boundary should be settled. 
They concluded their note by reiterating their definite 
rejection of both the proposition to establish a perma- 
nent Indian boundary and that to secure "the exclu- 
sive military possession of the lakes to Great Britain." 
They considered it useless to refer these subjects to 
their Government. With this understanding, they 
offered to continue the negotiation, and " to discuss all 
the points of difference, or which might hereafter tend 
in any degree to interrupt the harmony of the two 
countries. "^^ 

The American ministers when sending their note of 
the 9th had almost no hope of peace resulting from 
the negotiations. They gave the British ministers to 
understand that unless their demands were lowered a 
rupture would ensue. At a dinner on the 15th, Gam- 
bier having asked Adams if he would return imme- 
diately to St. Petersburg, the American minister's reply 
was: "Yes; that is, if you send us away."— 

The British ministers, upon the receipt of the Ameri- 
can note of the 9th, referred it to their Government, 

20 American to British Ministers, Sept. 9, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 715-717. 

21 Ibid. 

22 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 36. 



250 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

adding these words : " As the American ministers have 
stated that they consider both propositions contained in 
our note of the 19th of August, and the 4th of Septem- 
ber, inadmissible, and that they deem it useless to refer 
to their Government any arrangement containing either 
of these propositions, we request to be favored with 
instructions as to the line of conduct which it may be 
proper to adopt with respect to the continuance of the 
negotiation."-^ The British Cabinet viewed with dis- 
appointment the apparent certainty of failure of the 
negotiations. They felt that their commissioners had 
pressed their demands too far, and that more concilia- 
tory means must be adopted. While the British Gov- 
ernment were not eager for peace with the United 
States until British arms should have gained some 
brilliant victories in America, yet they wished to avoid a 
rupture in the peace negotiations over terms which 
were sure, when known, to react against them, and 
to be the means of uniting the people in the United 
States in the prosecution of the war. A draft of a 
note of reply to the American ministers was drawn up 
and forwarded to the British ministers the i6th of 
September.-* 

23 British Ministers to Castlereagh, Sept. 9, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

2* Draft of note from Foreign Office to British Ministers, 
Sept. 16, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 
263-265. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 2$ I 

The British ministers received the despatch from 
their Government September 19.-^ After making a 
few sHght changes in the wording, they presented the 
note to the Americans the same day. The note, re- 
verting again to the question of the boundary Hne of 
the district of Maine contended that the American 
ministers, by assuming the right to decide what bound- 
ary was, or was not, a subject of dispute, had rendered 
their powers useless, or exceedingly partial in their 
operation. It stated that the refusal of the American 
ministers to allow any boundary line between their 
territory and that of the Indians, because it would 
arrest the natural growth of the United States, was 
sufficient proof of a spirit of aggrandizement on the 
part of the United States. The declaration was re- 
peated concerning the avowed purpose of the United 
States to annex Canada. This was asserted on the basis 
of the proclamation made by General Hull, July 12, 
1812, and that by General Smyth, November 17, 1812. 
Copies of these proclamations were transmitted along 
with the British note.-® General Hull's proclamation" 
had urged upon the inhabitants of Canada non-resist- 
ance to the American invasion, promising to all such, 

25 British Ministers to Castlereagh, Sept. 19, 1814; MS,, 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

26 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718. 

27 Hull's proclamation, July 12, 1812; Russell Journals, V., 
439-441. 



252 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

protection under the Government of the United States, 
while General Smyth's proclamation to his soldiers 
contained a definite avowal of the purpose of con- 
quest and annexation.-^ 

The charge, which had been made in the American 
note, that Great Britain had been instrumental in in- 
ducing the Indians to withdraw from the protection of 
the United States and to wage war against it, was 
strongly disavowed. To prove this fact, it was pointed 
out that the Indians had been at war with the United 
States before that Power had declared war against 
Great Britain. As a result of the war between the 
Indians and the United States all treaty rights had 
been abrogated, and in consequence the Indians were 
no longer under the protection of the United States. 
It could only be on the supposition that the Indians 
were subjects of the United States that the American 
ministers could be authorized to deny the right of 
Great Britain to treat for the Indians in the peace 
negotiations; but such claim, it was repeated, was in 
opposition to the treaties which had been concluded, 
and particularly that of Greenville, which recognized 
the sovereignty of the Indians.^^ 

The note assumed that the American ministers had 
received no new instructions since the general pacifica- 

28 Smyth's proclamation, Nov. 17, 1812; Russell Journals, 
v., 442-445- 

29 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 253 

tion of Europe, which had materially changed the 
aspect of the negotiation from what it was when the 
original instructions had been given. The failure of 
the American Government to furnish new instructions, 
it was stated, was a proof of no sincere desire to 
make peace.^° 

After reaffirming the fixed purpose of Great Britain 
not to abandon the Indians, her allies, in any peace 
arrangement, the statement was made that the British 
Government was willing to sign a treaty of peace with 
the United States on terms honorable to both parties. 
" It has not offered," the note said, " any terms which 
the United States can justly represent as derogatory 
to their honor, nor can it be induced to accede to any 
which are injurious to its own"^^ 

The note then proceeded to restate the sine qua 
non. This no longer included an arrangement of a 
permanent Indian boundary and prohibition of the 
purchase of Indian lands by the United States, to 
which unalterable objection had been made by the 
American ministers; but the sine qua non, as now 
given, was limited to securing to the Indians the 
restoration of peace, with " the rights, privileges, and 
territories w^hich they enjoyed in the year 1811, pre- 
vious to the commencement of the war." With refer- 
ence to the purchase of Indian lands, while the British 

30 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-/18. 

31 Ibid. 



254 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

ministers had been instructed not to include it in a 
sine qua non, they were instructed to propose for dis- 
cussion an article on the subject by which the two 
states should reciprocally bind themselves to purchase 
no lands of the Indians within the boundaries which 
should be agreed upon. By making this arrangement 
subject to revision at the expiration of a certain period, 
it was hoped that the objection on the part of the 
American ministers to a permanently fixed boundary, 
beyond which the settlement of the United States 
should not extend, might be removed. ^^ 

The British ministry, alarmed at the way the nego- 
tiations were tending, in their draft^^ of the note re- 
quired the British ministers to deny that they had ever 
intended that the exclusive military possession of the 
lakes by Great Britain was to be considered a sine 
qua non. The note presented to the American min- 
isters, accordingly, contained this statement. It was 
followed by the further statement that, whenever the 
question relative to the pacification of the Indians — 
which, subject to the explanations already given, was a 
sine qua non — should be adjusted, the undersigned 
would be authorized to make a final proposition on the 
subject of Canadian boundaries, "so entirely founded 

32 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718. 

33 Draft of note from Foreign Office to British Ministers, 
Sept. 16, 1814; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 
263-265. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 255 

on principles of moderation and justice, that they feel 
confident it can not be rejected." This proposition, it 
was stated, would be made as soon as the American 
ministers should have consented to " include the Indian 
nations in the treaty, in the manner above described," 
and should have declared that they were authorized 
to treat upon the proposed subject,^* 

The British ministers had, in several instances, 
changed the wording of the note in a manner which 
rendered it less conciliatory than the British Cabinet 
had intended. They were severely criticized by the 
Ministry when the nature of the changes became 
known, although it was by no means certain that the 
commissioners were not acting with the knowledge of 
the Ministry in most cases. In the draft of a note, 
September 19, from the Foreign Office the following 
words had been employed : " It will not insist on any 
terms which the United States can justly represent as 
derogatory to their honor," instead of the words, "it 
has not offered any terms derogatory to their honor." 
Again, in the statement of the sine qua non in the orig- 
inal draft, the British ministers had added after the 
words, " whenever the question which relates to the 
pacification of the Indian nations,"^^ the words, 

34 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718. 

35 Draft of note from Foreign Office to British Ministers, 
Sept. 16, [1814]; Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 
263-265. 



256 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

"which, subject to the explanations already given, is 

a sine qua non,"^® and further in the same paragraph 

for the original words, "consented to include the 

Indian nations in the treaty," were substituted the 

words, " consenting to include the Indian nations in the 

treaty, in the manner above described." 

The last note, as well as those which preceded it, was 

in harmony with the character of English diplomacy 

at the beginning of the 19th century. A distinguished 

American writer has said: "At this time English 

diplomacy cultivated very few of the arts and none at 

all of the graces ; there is hardly an important state 

paper in the whole correspondence between England 

and America from 1806 to 1815, which, if addressed 

to the United States government today, would not lead 
to blows."37 

The American mission considered the note " over- 
bearing and insulting in its tone." Though a part of 
the sine qua non was abandoned, the rest was so 
rigidly clung to that the American ministers were de- 
jected in spirit, believing that peace was utterly im- 
possible. Gallatin was sure that the sine qua non, as 
given by the British ministers, would be rejected by 
the American Government; yet he considered it a 
bad point to break off upon. He thought that they 

^•5 British to American Ministers, Sept. 19, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 717-718. 
37 Adams, Life of Albert Gallatin, 500. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 25/ 

might be obliged to admit the principle at last. Bayard 
shared the opinion of Gallatin and wished to break 
off on some point that would unite the people in sup- 
port of the war. All agreed to this sentiment. 
Adams thought it possible that Great Britain might yet 
abandon her sine qua non, and, if not, that it would 
be no worse to break off on that point than on any 
other.^^ 

The American ministers again intrusted to Gallatin 
the work of making an analysis of the British note and 
a minute of the proposed answer. These he presented 
to the mission on the 21st. Gallatin was further in- 
structed to prepare a complete draft of a reply. This 
was presented to the mission two days later. Adams 
also prepared a reply, and from these two the final note 
was drawn up. Adams records that the arguments 
with reference to the boundary line of the district of 
Maine and to the condition of the Indians were largely 
Gallatin's work, while the reply to the accusatory 
matter of the British note and the proposed article of 
amnesty to include the Indians were his own. After 
new drafts had been made, corrected, and amended 
from day to day, a final draft was agreed upon Sep- 
tember 25. This was copied by the secretary, and on 
the next day was signed by all. Hughes delivered it 
at once to the British ministers.^^ 

38 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., yj- 

39 Ibid., 38-42. 
18 



258 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

On the 29th, despatches from Washington reached 
the mission. Papers were also received containing the 
account of the treaty of Greenville, July 16, with the 
Indians. It was proposed by Clay to send at once to 
the British ministers these extracts from the papers, 
but the others objected.*'' That evening the American 
ministers entertained guests to the number of one hun- 
dred and fifty. The British ministers, though invited, 
were not present, having designedly left the city that 
day to visit Brussels. 

The note sent by the American ministers to the 
British on the 26th contained a strong argument in 
reply to each of the points of the last British note. It 
was denied that the American ministers assumed to 
decide what was or was not a subject of uncertainty 
and dispute with regard to the boundary of the district 
of Maine; but it was claimed that, until the British 
[ministers should show that the boundary was a sub- 
ject of dispute, it was their duty to assume that it 
was not. The treaty of 1783 was cited to show what 
were the boundary lines, as agreed upon, and the points 
upon which questions had arisen. By that treaty the 
boundary was described to be " a line to be drawn 
along the middle of the river St. Croix, from its mouth, 
in the bay of Fundy, to its source, and from its source 
directly north to the Highlands, which divide the rivers 
that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which 

^'^ Memoirs of J. Q, Adams, III., 43. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 259 

fall into the river St. Lawrence ; and thence, along the 
said Highlands, to the northwesternmost head of Con- 
necticut river." Doubts having arisen as to what river 
was the St. Croix designated in the treaty of 1783, 
provision was made in the treaty of 1794 to settle that 
question. As this was the only point provided for 
with reference to the northeastern boundary in that 
treaty, it was natural to infer that there existed no 
other subject of controversy over the boundary from 
the source of that river. The note proposed that, 
since the river and its sources had been determined, 
a joint commission should now be appointed by the 
two Governments "to extend the line to the High- 
lands, conformable to the treaty of 1783." Objection 
to the British proposition was made because, instead of 
seeking to ascertain what the boundary was, it required 
an alteration in the mutually recognized line ; this 
could not be effected without the cession of territory 
that was unquestionably included within the limits 
fixed by the treaty of 1783. It was in view of this 
point that the American ministers had declined to 
treat. They were, on the other hand, willing to dis- 
cuss any actual boundary that was uncertain or in 
dispute.^^ 

The statement of the British note " that the United 
States will admit of no line of boundary between their 

41 American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721. 



26o INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

territory and that of the Indian nations, because the 
natural growth and population of the United States 
would be thereby arrested," was declared untrue. On 
the contrary, the United States had always secured to 
the Indians definite boundaries for the land which they 
inhabited, mutually agreed upon in the treaties between 
the Indians and the United States. What they did 
refuse to do was " to assign, in a treaty of peace with 
Great Britain, a definite and permanent boundary to 
Indians living within the limits of the United States." 
The United States never intended to acquire lands 
from the Indians other than by peaceful means and 
with their consent, but in this way they did propose 
to purchase Indian land as the needs of the popula- 
tion required.*^ 

With reference to the proclamations of General 
Hull and General Smyth, copies of which had accom- 
panied the note of the British ministers to the Ameri- 
can ministers, the American commissioners stated that 
these were not to be considered as acts of the American 
Government any more than the proclamation of Ad- 
miral Cochrane was to be taken as an act of the British 
Government. A copy of Admiral Cochrane's procla- 
mation was enclosed with the note. This proclama- 
tion had offered to receive on board British vessels, or 
at British military posts, any persons wishing to leave 
the United States, and to give to such persons a choice 

*2 American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 26 1 

either of joining His Majesty's sea or land forces, or 
of being sent as free settlers to the British possessions 
in North America, or to the West Indies. Though the 
negroes were not specifically mentioned in the procla- 
mation, it was well understood that it was they who 
were intended.*^ 

It was again asserted that peace with the Indians 
would follow that with Great Britain, and that they 
would be restored to the same condition as before the 
war. The Americans were, however, unwilling to 
treat concerning the Indians as allies of Great Britain, 
for in so doing they would practically admit the In- 
dians to be independent nations, a condition which 
they refused to accept. To acknowledge the Indians 
would be to transfer to them all rights of soil and 
sovereignty over the territory which they inhabited. 
Further, to do this at the demand of Great Britain 
would be to transfer the protection of the Indians to 
that state. The right of protection over the Indians 
was acquired by the United States, not by treaties with 
the Indians, as the British ministers had argued, but in 
consequence of the sovereignty and independence of 
the United States. Before the treaty of 1783 these 
Indians, Hving within the same territory, were regarded 
as being under the protection of His Britannic Majesty, 
and had been so treated. When a similar proposition 
had been made to consider the Indian tribes as inde- 

^3 American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721. 



262 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

pendent nations, to serve as a barrier between French 
and English territories in North America, England had 
immediately rejected it, " on the express ground that 
the King would not renounce his right of protection 
over the Indians within his dominions." Great Britain, 
having recognized the sovereignty of the United States 
and agreed to its boundaries, ought not to regard any 
persons or communities within such territory as being 
independent of the United States.^ 

The American ministers, it was stated, did not re- 
quire that the British plenipotentiaries should depart 
from the regular practice of the British nation of 
insisting upon the inclusion of their allies in terms of 
peace, for the Indians, not being independent nations, 
could not be in the true sense allies. Furthermore, the 
British Government had no authority from the Indians 
to treat for them, and no power to bind them to agree 
to accept the peace or to secure the continuance of it. 
The proposition made by the British ministers looked 
to the Indians as subjects rather than as allies. It was 
agreed that Great Britain in her treaties with France 
in 1763, and with the United States in 1783, had made 
no provision for the Indians, though in each of these 
instances the Indians had taken part in the war which 
preceded the treaty ; that the United States was, there- 
fore, pursuing a course consistent with the former 
practice of Great Britain. The Americans held that 

4* American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 263 

the only basis for considering the Indians in a treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain would be 
the principles by which amnesties are stipulated in 
favor of persons who in time of war have aided the 
enemy of the state to which they belong. On this basis 
the American ministers promised to do all they could 
in securing peace to the Indians, and they offered a 
stipulation, " that no person or persons, whether sub- 
jects, citizens, or Indians, residing within the dominions 
of either party, shall be molested or annoyed, either in 
their persons or their property, for any part they may 
have taken in the war between the United States and 
Great Britain ; but shall retain all the rights, privileges, 
and possessions which they respectively had at the com- 
mencement of the war; they, on their part, demean- 
ing themselves peaceably and conformably to their 
duties to the respective Governments." The Ameri- 
can ministers stated in closing their note that they 
should be glad to discuss the proposition concerning 
the Canadian boundary which the British ministers 
said that they would offer when the Indian question 
was settled.^^ 

This note was forwarded by the British ministers to 
their Government the same day on which it was re- 
ceived.*^ It was highly objectionable to the British 

45 American to British Ministers, Sept. 26, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 719-721. 

4^ British Ministers to Castlereagh, Sept. 26, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 



264 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

ministers, who considered that to assent to the Ameri- 
can proposition would be to abandon the whole prin- 
ciple upon which their argument with reference to the 
Indians had been based. In submitting the note to 
their Government, the British ministers suggested that 
in the reply there should be, first of all, a specific 
article with respect to Indian pacification which would 
be satisfactory to Great Britain. They were opposed 
to the proposal for the appointment of commissioners 
to determine the boundary dispute. They thought it 
would be best to refer as little as possible to the treaty 
of 1783 as to territorial boundaries, "considering it as 
founded throughout, in this respect, on very erroneous 
principles."^^ 

Before this note was received by the British Govern- 
ment, news of British successes in America had reached 
London. The negotiations had been purposely pro- 
longed by the British Cabinet, that an opportunity 
might be given to hear the results of the new cam- 
paign in America.*^ The favorable news made the 
English people even more desirous of continuing the 
war, that the United States might be thoroughly 
punished for what they considered its unwarranted 
attack upon Great Britain. The London Times, in an 
editorial of September 16, represented the feeling 

^■^ Goulburn to Bathurst, Sept. 26, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 287-288. 

48 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 2, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 214. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 265 

which was at this time entertained by the larger part 
of the Enghsh people: "We owe it not only to our- 
selves but to posterity, in the war provoked by 
America, and engaged in for the most unjust purposes, 
to make such an impression upon their fears as shall 
curb the desire of aggression and conquest for many 
years to come. America ought in this contest to be 
fully and explicitly taught that a false neutrality, the 
sacrifice of character to interest, and a subservience 
to an ignorant but violent populace are crimes in a 
government which, though they may promise immedi- 
ate advantage, must, nevertheless, be followed by 
merited chastisement, and the loss of those just inter- 
ests, which they might have permanently secured, had 
they not in the spirit of rapine grasped at that which jus- 
tice had closed as the right and property of another."^^ 
The British Ministry, however, though they had 
taken more vigorous measures for prosecuting the war 
than during the first year of its continuance, and 
though important successes attended the British arms, 
were still earnestly desirous of peace. The Govern- 
ment were even more disposed to make peace amid 
successes than they would have been had events been 
the reverse.^" The financial problems of the country 
also made a speedy peace desirable. 

^9 London Times, September 16, 1814. 

so Liverpool to Wellington and Castlereagh, Sept. 27, 1814; 
Wellington's Supplementary Despatches, IX., 290. 



266 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

The news of British victories in America was re- 
ported to the British ministers at Ghent by the British 
Cabinet, and they were instructed to communicate this 
news to the American ministers. They were at the 
same time to inform the American ministers that the 
success of British arms would not afifect in any way 
the purpose of the Enghsh Government to secure a 
termination to the war which should be honorable to 
both parties ; nor would the terms which had been 
offered with regard to the Canadian frontier be 
changed by reason of British successes in those parts. 
The ministers were authorized, in case the American 
ministers asserted that they had no instructions either 
to include the Indians in the treaty of peace or to enter 
into any negotiations with respect to the boundary of 
Canada and that they were unable to sign even a 
provisional article on the Indians, to consent that the 
negotiation should be suspended until the American 
ministers should receive further instructions from 
their Government. ^^ It was thought that under the 
circumstances the American Government would now 
be willing to yield. 

The note of the American ministers of September 26 
was received at London the 28th. Instructions were 
not returned to the British ministers with reference to 
the reply which they were to make until October 5. 

°i Bathurst to Commissioners, Sept. 27, 1814; Memoirs and 
Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 138-139; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, loi. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY id"] 

These instructions were received at Ghent three days 
later, October 8, and constituted the note which the 
British dehvered to the American ministers on that 
same day. 

The American ministers during the interval of wait- 
ing, in connection with a note which they addressed to 
the British ministers requesting a passport for the 
return to the United States of the schooner Transit 
with a bearer of despatches to their Government, had 
enclosed extracts from papers relative to a treaty which 
commissioners of the United States had signed with 
the Indians the i6th of July of that year.^" A long 
debate occurred over the question of sending the 
papers relative to the Indians. Clay thought they 
should be sent, and also a copy of Admiral Cochrane's 
refusal to grant a passport to a cartel ship when re- 
quested by the Secretary of State. Gallatin and 
Adams believed that the sending of these papers was 
improper, especially the newspaper articles, which had 
no authority in public law.'' 

Expecting that they would be obliged to break ofif 
the negotiations, and wishing to justify themselves 
before the other Powers, the American ministers, while 
awaiting the reply from the British Government, pre- 
pared papers to the Russian and French Governments. 

52 American to British Ministers, Sept. 30, 1814; Russell 
Journals, V., 460-461. 

53 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 44. 



268 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

They had received instructions to this effect from Sec- 
retary Monroe.^* Adams prepared the paper to be 
sent to the Russian Government, and Clay the one to 
the French Government. The latter was to be pre- 
sented through Crawford, the American minister at 
Paris. 

Lord Bathurst in his letter to the British ministers, 
the 5th of October, enclosed a project of an article 
respecting Indian pacification. This the ministers 
were authorized to alter, " without changing the sub- 
stance or spirit of the article," with respect to any 
word or phrase which they might think would render 
it more acceptable to the American ministers. They 
were instructed to confine themselves wholly to the 
question of Indian pacification, not even admitting an 
article on amnesty for disaffected subjects, until the 
Indian article should be agreed upon. In case the 
ministers of the United States would agree to sign the 
article only sub spe rati, that is, subject to the sanction 
of their Government, the British ministers were still 
authorized to accept it. If the American ministers 
should propose to suspend the negotiation in order to 
await further instructions, His Majesty's ministers 
were authorized to assent. If neither of these proposi- 
tions were made by the American ministers, the British 
representatives were to make them, " in order to have 

^4 Monroe to American Commissioners, July 9, 1814; MS., 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instructions, 
VII. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 269 

on record that no expedient was omitted in order to 
prevent the breaking off of the negotiation." In case 
the American ministers could be induced neither to 
accept the article nor to suspend the negotiation, for 
the purpose of referring to their home Government for 
instructions, the British ministers were instructed to 
announce that the negotiation was closed and that they 
would return home.^^ 

The note which the British ministers addressed to 
the American ministers the 8th of October, while 
designed primarily to present the project of Indian 
pacification, did not refrain from discussing other 
topics that had been subjects of controversy in the 
previous notes between the two commissions. 

The first paragraph attempted to show the illegality 
of the purchase of Louisiana and the spirit of terri- 
torial aggrandizement on the part of the United States 
which that act manifested. The charges of avarice 
and oppression were reiterated against the United 
States also in her acquisition of the Florida territory. 
The British ministers in their last note had complained 
that the American ministers were acting under instruc- 
tions which had been given before the pacification of 
Europe, May 30, 1814, an event which had materially 
changed the practical consequence of the maritime 

^5 Bathurst to Commissioners, October 5, 1814; Memoirs 
and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 148-149; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, loi. 



2/0 IXDIAX QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

questions, with reference to which the American in- 
structions had been mainly given. The American 
ministers in their note of September 26 had asserted 
that they had received instructions since the pacifica- 
tion of Europe, and that under these instructions they 
were acting; and further, that they had informed the 
British ministers of their later instructions of the 25th 
and 27th of June. In this note the British denied 
any recollection of the American ministers having made 
such communication to them, and held that the note 
of September 9 distinctly stated that they were acting 
under instructions of January, 1814. Complaint was 
made that the American ministers should act under 
those instructions, if they had any of a later date 
which were drawn up under changed conditions.^^ 

The note declared that, with reference to cession of 
territor}- in the district of Maine, all that the British 
Government required was merely what was requi- 
site to afford communication between Halifax and 
Quebec. It refused to assign any significance, as far 
as the present negotiation was concerned, to the procla- 
mation of Vice-Admiral Cochrane, a copy of which 
proclamation had been enclosed in the last American 
note ; and at the same time it denied that the statement 
of the American ministers that the proclamations of 
Generals Hull and Smyth were not authorized by the 
American Government was conclusive evidence that 

58 British to American Ministers, Oct. 8, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel, III., ^2l-^2Z■ 



IXDIAX QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 271 

annexation had not been intended. The failure to 
declare a public disapprobation of the acts of these 
officers, it was maintained, indicated the real attitude 
of the United States.^" 

The American Government was called upon to give 
the proof of any attempt by the British Government to 
incite the Indian nations against the United States 
before the declaration of war was made. The claim 
was put forth that instead of inducing the Indian 
nations to begin the war, as charged in the notes of 
August 24 and September 9, the British Government 
had endeavored to dissuade them from commencing it. 
The note again repeated the argimient that the United 
States in its treaties with the Indians had practically 
acknowledged their independence. If the United 
States, as in effect it admitted, maintained that the 
Indian nations were independent in their relations with 
the United States, but that they might not form any 
alliance witli a foreign Power which should " entitle 
that Power to negotiate for them in a treat}- of peace,'' 
tlie British held that such claim was without sanction. 
Such an assumption, claimed by Germany in con- 
nection with cities which had cooperated with France, 
was rejected in the treaty of iNIiinster. The note re- 
fused to accept tlie American claim with reference to 
the absolute rights of the United States to the territorv" 

^" British to American Ministers, Oc:. S. 1S14: American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 721-723. 



2/2 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

of the Indians. The fact that Great Britain in former 
treaties had not thought it necessary to provide for 
the pacification of the Indian nations did not preclude 
her from now negotiating for them. The American 
contention that the Indians, while not citizens, were 
not aliens, but were subjects of the United States was 
assailed.^^ 

It was stated that the American ministers had mis- 
understood the negotiation between France and Great 
Britain, to which they had referred as showing an 
example of a refusal of a proposition such as Great 
Britain was now making ; that this proposal of Indian 
territory between the dominions of Great Britain, made 
by the French Government, formed no part of an ulti- 
matum. The English Premier, at the time, had not 
objected to the proposition. It was rather to the pro- 
posed line of boundary between the two parties that 
objection had been made.^^ 

The article submitted on Indian pacification, it was 
held, would remove the two objections made by the 
American ministers : that the proposal for Indian paci- 
fication was not reciprocal, and that, "as the United 
States could have no security that the Indian nations 
would conclude a peace on the terms proposed, the 
objection would be, in effect, unilateral."^^ 

The proposed article was as follows : " The United 

^8 British to American Ministers, Oct. 8, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 721-723. 
69 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 2/3 

States of America engage to put an end, immediately 
after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostihties 
with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom 
they may be at war at the time of such ratification, 
and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations re- 
spectively, all the possessions, rights, and privileges, 
which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to, in 
1811, previous to such hostilities. Provided, always, 
That such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from 
all hostilities against the United States of America, 
their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the 
present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, 
and shall so desist accordingly.""^ The article was 
made reciprocal as well for Great Britain in regard to 
the Indians who had been at war with her.®^ 

The last paragraph of the British note, stating that the 
proposed article was their ultimatum, was expressed in 
rather stronger language than that of the draft which 
had been sent by the British Cabinet to their ministers. 
The concluding words were : " Whatever may be the re- 
sult of the proposition thus offered, the undersigned de- 
liver it as their ultimatum, and now await with anxiety 
the answer of the American plenipotentiaries, on which 
their continuance in this place will depend. "'^^ 

"1 British to American Ministers, Oct. 8, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 721-723. 

62 Ibid. Goulburn to Bathurst, Oct. 10, 1814; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, 103. 

19 



2/4 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

The note was principally the work of Lord Bathurst, 
with some slight modifications by Lord Liverpool. 
These both were agreed that the negotiation should be 
brought to a point. Liverpool had wished to make 
the charges against the United States respecting the 
Floridas so strong that it would frighten the American 
ministers into submission.*^^ He stated that there was 
but one sentiment throughout Europe, which was to 
the effect that, considering the transaction itself, and 
the occasion when and circumstances under which it 
took place, it was to be regarded as " one of the most 
immoral acts recorded in the history of any country."^* 
This declaration was softened somewhat in the note 
presented. The British note reached the American 
ministers on the evening of October 8. A reply was 
framed on the 13th, and presented the day following,^^ 

As in the case of each of the other notes, the Ameri- 
can mission spent many hours in discussion of the 
projects for the reply. They all considered it ob- 
jectionable to be obliged to admit a preliminary article 
without knowing what the substance of the whole 
treaty was to be; but none of them were ready to 
break off on that point. Bayard, who was very anxious 
for peace, advised the acceptance of the article ; Clay 

<'•'* Liverpool to Bathurst, Oct. i, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 298-299. 

64 Ibid. 

65 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 52. 



INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 2/5 

was in favor of rejecting any proposition for disarma- 
ment on the lakes. If this article was to be admitted, 
Clay and Gallatin favored a short reply; Adams 
thought it should be long, at least as long as the note 
presented by the British ministers. Adams favored 
the use of stronger language than the Americans had 
hitherto used in their notes. He complained because 
he could not prevail on his colleagues " to insert any- 
thing in the style of retort " to the British notes, whose 
tone, he declared, was "arrogant, overbearing, and 
offensive."*'" 

After four days of discussion, the American minis- 
ters decided to accept the article now offered as an 
ultimatum. There was, however, a difference of opin- 
ion as to the manner of its acceptance, whether, as 
Gallatin suggested, it should be adopted as perfectly 
conformable to the views of the American ministers 
themselves, or whether, as Adams urged, it should be 
made to appear as a great concession, and made for the 
sake of securing peace. Adams wished also to avow, 
as the sentiments of the American Government, that the 
cession of Canada would be for the interest of Great 
Britain as well as the United States. A paragraph 
which had been drawn up to this effect was rejected 
by his colleagues. Adams, Gallatin, and Clay all pre- 
ss Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III, 51. 



2/6 INDIAN QUESTION AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY 

sented drafts of an answer. The one offered by Clay, 
with some modifications, was finally adopted.®'^ 

After two months of negotiations the settlement of 
the Indian question had now been reached, and with 
this obstacle removed, the first prospect of a treaty of 
peace began faintly to appear. 

67 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 51-52. 



CHAPTER VII 
Modification of British Demands 

At the time that the American ministers were 
struggling with the question of the acceptance of the 
article on Indian pacification and the reply to be made 
to the British note, public opinion in America, which 
was to aid materially the work of the peace ministers, 
was rapidly forming. The capture of Washington 
on August 24 and the burning of the public build- 
ings by the British called forth general indignation, 
and the reception of the despatches from Ghent, con- 
taining the proposition of the British ministers, aroused 
the people even more.^ The war sentiment at once 
became more pronounced, and even the Federalists 
acknowledged that peace was impossible under the 
terms proposed by the British Government. 

The despatches brought by George M. Dallas on 
the John Adams reached New York at ten o'clock the 
evening of October 5. Early the next morning Dallas 
started for Washington to present the despatches to 
the Secretary of State.^ These, accompanied by an 

1 R. M. Patterson to Russell, Nov. 6, 1814; Russell Papers, 
MS., No. 1708. 

2 New York Spectator, Oct. 6, 1814. 

277 



278 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

address, were transmitted by Madison to Congress 
October 10.^ Congress had been called in secret 
session to consider the despatches, and to act with 
reference to new instructions, which were submitted by 
the President on the 13th.* The House of Representa- 
tives ordered ten thousand copies of the despatches to 
be printed and distributed widely. 

The public communication of the despatches of the 
negotiation, before it was known definitely whether or 
not negotiations were broken off, caused the severest 
criticism in England. Madison had thus acted in order 
to unite all parties in a more vigorous support of the 
Administration in the prosecution of the war, and his 
plan was, in a large measure, successful. All agreed 
that the proposals of Great Britain were inadmissible, 
being inconsistent with the sovereign rights of the 
United States. Many regarded the terms as absolutely 
dishonorable and arrogant.^ The legislature of New 
York passed a resolution " That the House of As- 
sembly of the State of New York view, with mingled 
emotions of surprise and indignation, the extravagant 
and disgraceful terms proposed by the British commis- 
sioners at Ghent — that however ardently they may 
desire the restoration of peace to their country, they 

3 New York Herald, Oct. 13, 1814. 

* Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
551- 

5 Providence Patriot, Oct. 24, 1814. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 2/9 

can never consent to receive it at the sacrifice of 
national honor and dignity — that they therefore 
strongly recommend to the National Legislature, the 
adoption of the most vigorous and efficacious measures 
in the prosecution of the war, as the best means of 
bringing this contest to an honorable termination, and 
of transmitting unimpaired to their posterity, their 
rights, liberty, and independence."^ 

The popular objections to the terms were well stated 
in the Philadelphia Aurora of October 24 : " It is im- 
possible our commissioners can listen to such terms 
without indignation, and we feel warranted in saying, 
that to restrain the United States from treating with 
the Indians ; that to despoil them through Massa- 
chusetts, Michigan, Ohio, and the Lakes of their 
natural frontier and soil; to admit Great Britain into 
an exclusive right to arm the Lakes and to a military 
occupation of both shores ; to erect an independent 
savage power on our confines and within our domain ; 
and to curtail our fisheries, sacred by the treaty of 
1782, are demands, attempts, or pretensions which the 
United States will never submit to, but with the loss of 
her freedom."^ 

The territorial demands of Great Britain aroused the 
greatest indignation in the United States. The land 
that was exacted by Great Britain, either in the form 

« New York Spectator, Oct. 29, 1814. Federal Republican, 
Oct. 21, 1814. 
^ Philadelphia Aurora, Oct. 24, 1814. 



280 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

of a permanent Indian territory or for communication 
between Halifax and Quebec, it was pointed out, meant 
the cession by the United States of some 233,000,000 
acres, an extent of country larger than England, 
Wales, Ireland, and Scotland. This territory, it was 
estimated, was worth, at the government price of land, 
nearly $500,000,000.^ 

The Federalist papers, while laying the blame of the 
ill success of the mission upon Madison, opposed the 
British pretensions as vigorously as the Republicans. 
The United States Gazette in an editorial of October 
19, 1814, said: "England now turns upon us in the 
fullness of her wrath and power. No alternative is 
left us but to resist with energy or submit with dis- 
grace. As the latter is not possible to Americans, we 
must prepare our minds for an extremely long, ardu- 
ous, and sanguinary war."^ The Federal Republican, 
also, in its issue of October 21, said: "We all agree in 
opinion that the terms proposed by Great Britain are 
inadmissible, and that her pretensions as stated by her 
Commissioners at Ghent ought to be resisted to the 
last. To be restrained from ever hereafter obtaining 
land from the Indians by fair and voluntary treaty 
would be to surrender an essential right of sovereignty 
and to submit to a degradation which nothing short of 
conquest ought to impose upon us."^" Another 

8 Providence Patriot, Nov. 12, 1814. 
» United States Gazette, Oct. 24, 1814. 
^"Federal Republican, Oct. 21, 1814. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 28 1 

Federalist paper, the Norfolk Ledger, had the follow- 
ing editorial : " Comment is unnecessary ; every Ameri- 
can head and heart will make the same comment. 
There is nothing from which some good may not be ex- 
tracted ; our surprise is over ; now we know what we 
have to depend on, and we trust in God, the manly 
and patriotic spirit of the nation will teach an insolent 
foe, that a people who in their infancy could break his 
chains, will in their sturdy youth meet his arrogant 
demands with firmness, that will prove that they are 
sons worthy of their illustrious sires. ... To meet the 
crisis, requires the united wisdom, talents, and integrity 
of the nation ; and to bring these into operation, party 
distinctions must cease. The people (as their fathers 
did in the days of trial) must select men of talents 
and virtue."^^ 

The objections to the British proposals were em- 
phasized differently in different sections of the 
country. New England took most exception to the 
question of the fisheries; the Middle and Southern 
States to the Indian territory and boundary question.^^ 

The American commissioners at Ghent had realized 
that the discord at home was a serious obstacle in the 
way of securing favorable terms of peace, and they 
wrote frequent letters to their friends urging them to 

" Quoted in the National Intelligencer, Oct. 22, 1814, from 
the Norfolk Ledger. 

12 New York Herald, Oct. 13, 1814. 



282 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

use all effort to bring about unity in prosecuting the 
war. Russell in a letter to Henry Wheaton wrote as 
follows : " Cannot you arouse the country to more gen- 
erous and united effort? I will not forgive the man 
who indulges the prejudice of party in times like these. 
All must rally now in defense of their country. Hope 
for nothing but what you can command by spirit and 
energy."^^ 

On October 19, Monroe addressed a letter to the 
ministers approving their action in rejecting the terms 
proposed by the British ministers. He sent them also 
copies of the despatches and instructions which had 
been printed, to be used as they saw fit in Europe. It 
was thought that the negotiations might have been 
already closed before the papers reached Ghent, but 
in case they were not, the American ministers were 
instructed, provided the British ministers were disposed 
to agree to the status ante helium, to make that the 
basis of a treaty.^* Gallatin in a letter to Monroe, 
June 13, had urged this as a basis, inasmuch as no 
better terms appeared obtainable.^^ 

The publication of the British demands upon the 

13 Russell to Wheaton, Oct. 26, 1814; Russell Papers, MS. 

14 Monroe to Commissioners, Oct. 19, 1814; MS., Bureau of 
Indexes and Archives, Unclassified Instructions, VII. Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., TZ^. 

1' Gallatin to Monroe, June 13, 1814; Writings of Gallatin, 
I., 627-629. Correspondence of the Commissioners of the 
Treaty of Ghent; MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Un- 
classified Instructions, VII. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 283 

American commissioners was a most politic stroke on 
the part of Madison, and resulted, not only in uniting 
America in stubborn resistance, but also in rendering 
public sentiment in Great Britain more favorable to 
the United States. 

The ultimatum which was given by the British 
ministers on October 8 was answered by the American 
ministers five days later. The American ministers 
had decided that it would not be wise to break off 
negotiations upon the Indian article as now proposed ; 
and in their note of the 13th they expressed their will- 
ingness to accept the substance of the article which 
the British ministers had offered, since this proposi- 
tion left the United States " free to effect its object in 
the mode consonant with the relations which they have 
constantly maintained with those tribes . . . and ac- 
cords with the views uniformly professed by the un- 
dersigned of placing those tribes precisely, and in every 
respect in the same situation as that in which they 
stood before the commencement of hostihties."^*' The 
article, it was to be understood, was agreed to sub- 
ject "to the approbation or rejection of the Govern- 
ment of the United States," inasmuch as no definite 
instructions had been given them upon the subject. 
Should peace not ensue, this article was to be of no 
effect, and was not to be brought forward by way of 
argument or precedent in any subsequent negotiation. 

16 American to British Ministers, Oct. 13, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., ^21-72^. 



284 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

While endeavoring to make the reply brief, the 
American ministers could not refrain from discussing 
some other topics adverted to by the British in their 
note. The British ministers had made the charge that 
the acquisition of Louisiana by the United States was 
illegal, Spain having offered a remonstrance against its 
cession and the right of France to make it. To this 
the American note replied that, although the Spanish 
minister at Washington had made such remonstrance, 
at that very time orders were given by Spain for the 
deHvery of Louisiana to France. So France was in 
actual possession of the territory when she disposed of 
it to the United States." 

The American ministers maintained that the argu- 
ment employed by the British in their last note in 
denying the existence of an ultimatum respecting an 
Indian barrier on the part of France to Great Britain 
in 1 76 1 tended rather to confirm the American state- 
ment of September 26. The quotation from a letter 
of Pitt, that " the fixation of the new limits to Canada, 
as proposed by France, is intended to shorten the ex- 
tent of Canada, which was to be ceded to England, and 
to lengthen the boundaries of Louisiana, which France 
was to keep," was interpreted as establishing the 
American position. The purpose of this boundary 
arrangement, it was held, was to establish what was 
not to be admitted, that all which was not Canada was 

1'' American to British Ministers, Oct. 13, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 723-724. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 285 

Louisiana, whereby all the intermediate nations and 
countries, the true barrier of each province, would be 
given up to France. This, the Americans asserted, 
was the exact principle supported by them, that is, 
that the recognition of a boundary gives up to the 
nation in whose behalf it is made all the Indian tribes 
and countries within the boundary. In accordance 
with this principle the United States relied upon the 
treaty of 1783, which without reservation fixed the 
boundaries for Indian tribes. The American note 
further refused to admit what the British had cited in 
argument, that the German states formed an analogy 
to the status of the Indians. ^^ 

In offering to accept the article upon Indian pacifica- 
tion, which had been proposed as an essential pre- 
liminary, the American ministers requested the British 
to present to them a projet of a treaty which should 
embrace all the points considered essential by Great 
Britain ; and the American ministers agreed on their 
part to present a contre-projet." 

Upon receipt of the American note, the British min- 
isters transmitted it to their Government, asking for 
further instructions now that the American ministers 
had accepted their ultimatum.^" 

18 American to British Ministers, Oct. 13, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 723-724- 

19 Ibid. 

20 British Ministers to Castlereagh, Oct. 14, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 



286 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

Two qualifications made by the American ministers 
in the article were noted in the letter of Goulburn to 
Bathurst, namely, the stipulation not to consider their 
acceptance as an argument or precedent in future nego- 
tiations ; and the statement of their willingness to ac- 
cept the substance of the article. It was suggested by 
the British ministers that objection be made to the first 
qualification, and that the understanding of the article 
be limited "to its not being obligatory upon either party 
in a future negotiation. "^^ The second qualification it 
was thought best to leave unnoticed. Uncertainty was 
expressed as to whether they should accede to the 
demands of the American ministers for a complete 
projet or require the Americans to present one first. 
Information was requested on that point. 

The British Government sent instructions, on Oc- 
tober i8, to their peace commissioners. This despatch 
was received at Ghent the 20th, accompanied by letters 
and papers which communicated unfavorable news of 
British operations in America.-^ The news disheart- 
ened the British ministers, who had counted on British 
successes to enable them to secure the acceptance of 
their peace terms by the American ministers. They 
had attributed the acceptance of the article respecting 
the Indians to the British victories which had been 

21 Goulburn to Bathurst, Oct. 14, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 344-345. 

22 Goulburn to Bathurst, Oct. 21, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 366. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 287 

previously reported, particularly the taking of Wash- 
ington.^^ 

By the despatch of October i8 the British ministers 
were instructed to reply to the American plenipoten- 
tiaries that there were three material points remaining 
for consideration. There was, first, the subject of the 
right of naturalization and the question of impress- 
ment, and other topics relating to maritime laws. 
These questions, it was stated, might be altogether 
omitted if the United States so desired; but, if they 
were to be inserted in the treaty, Great Britain would 
insist that these points should be definitely stated, and 
she would not recede from the position which she had 
repeatedly declared to be based on the established law 
on these points.^* 

The second subject was that of the fisheries, with 
regard to which the British ministers were instructed 
to say that Great Britain admitted the right of the 
United States "to fish on the high seas without the 
maritime jurisdiction of the territorial possessions of 
Great Britain in North America ; that the extent of the 
maritime jurisdiction of the two contracting parties 
must be reciprocal ; that Great Britain is ready to enter 
into an arrangement on that point ; and that, until any 

23 Goulburn to Bathurst, Oct. 21, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 366. 

2* Bathurst to Commissioners, Oct. 18, 1814; Memoirs and 
Correspondence of Castlereagh.X., 168-170; MS., British For- 
eign Office, 5, loi. 



288 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

arrangement shall be made to the contrary, the usual 
maritime jurisdiction of one league shall be common to 
both the contracting parties."^^ They were again in- 
structed to declare that Great Britain could not renew 
the privilege, granted in the treaty of 1783, of drying 
and curing fish on the unsettled shores. This privilege, 
it was maintained, had been annulled by the war, and 
Great Britain was under no obligation to renew it. 

The third point to be considered was that of bound- 
aries. The northwest boundaries, it was stated, might 
be regarded as settled " by the admission of the Ameri- 
can Plenipotentiaries that the British Government is 
willing to treat on the basis of uti possidetis, subject 
to the modifications for mutual accommodation." The 
British commissioners were instructed, in case the 
American commissioners admitted this principle, to 
proceed to state the " mutual accomodation " which 
might be entered into conformable to these points : 
the United States to agree to restore the two forts 
of Fort Erie and Fort Amherstberg ; Great Britain to 
restore Forts Custine and Mahias, retaining Fort Ni- 
agara and Fort Michilimakinac, " leaving the boundary, 
on the side of the Province of Main (sic), running 
thus : From the river St. Croix, including Moose Island, 
which was always a part of New Brunswick, along the 
line established by the Commissioners in 1798, running 

25 Bathurst to Commissioners, Oct. 18, 1814; Memoirs and 
Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 168-170; MS., British For- 
eign Office, 5, loi. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 289 

astronomically north, until it is intersected by the 
river Ristook, up to its source ; and then along the high 
ridge of mountains, and running a westerly course, 
until they abut upon the heights which formed the 
present boundary." The British commissioners were 
instructed to refrain from referring to the topics 
which had in the previous note been discussed without 
accomplishing anything further than to promote irrita- 
tion on each side.^*' 

On the 20th, another despatch was sent from the 
British Foreign Office to the British commissioners. 
This despatch countermanded that part of the instruc- 
tions of the despatch of the i8th requiring the British 
ministers " not to detail the modifications " which they 
were authorized by their government to propose on 
the principle of uti possidetis until the American 
ministers should have admitted that principle as the 
basis of the treaty. The instructions now permitted 
such explanation with reference to the boundary ques- 
tions, provided that the American ministers should 
make a " qualified or provisional admission of that 
principle." It was further suggested that it might be 
expedient not to make the other proposition at the 
outset. A change in the boundary was proposed, that 
instead of the river St. Croix the river Passamaquoddy 

26 Bathurst to Commissioners, Oct. 18, 1814; Memoirs and 
Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 168-170; MS., British For- 
eign Office, 5, loi. 

20 



290 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

should be taken as the boundary as far as latitude 46 
degrees, and this latitude should be continued as the 
boundary until it reached the boundary of lower 
Canada. It was to be demanded, in consideration of 
the superior value of the country restored by Great 
Britain, that the United States should make a cession 
of the island of Carleton, near Lake Ontario ; and in 
connection with Michilimakinac the island as well as 
the fort was to be understood; further a cession of 
territory, at least five miles wide, around Fort Niagara 
should be required.^^ 

On the 2ist, after receiving the instructions of the 
i8th, the British ministers sent their note to thei 
American ministers. They did not present a complete 
projet, as the American ministers had requested, but 
referred to the statement made at the first conference 
as containing the points which, in the judgment of the 
British Government, remained to be adjusted.^^ 

With regard to the maritime questions it was pro- 
posed in this note to waive all stipulations, inasmuch 
as the maritime pacification of Europe had rendered 
these questions no longer pertinent. For the view of 
Great Britain with respect to the fisheries the state- 

27Bathurst to Commissioners, Oct. 20, 1814; Memoirs and 
Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 172; MS., British Foreign 
Office, 5, loi. " The island of Carleton, near Lake Ontario," 
is one of the islands in the mouth of the St. Lawrence. 

28 British to American Ministers, Oct. 21, 1814; MS., Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., IIL, 724-725- 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 2gi 

ment made in the first correspondence was referred to. 
The matter of the marine league which had been men- 
tioned in the instructions of the i8th was not covered 
by that statement at the first conference ; but the min- 
isters thought it would be better to leave the mention of 
this until the fisheries should again be brought into dis- 
cussion. They thought that repetition or detail of the 
subject of the fisheries might seem to imply a doubt 
as to the right of Great Britain to act upon her views 
of the subject.-^ The note stated in regard to the third 
point, that of boundaries, that it was expected, from the 
previous discussion, that the northwestern boundary, 
from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi, would 
be admitted without objection by the United States ; that 
as to the other boundaries, the British Government were 
willing to accept the basis of uti possidetis, inasmuch 
as the American ministers had objected to the former 
boundary proposition because it was not based on that 
principle. The acceptance of the principle of uti possi- 
detis was to be " subject to such modifications as 
mutual convenience may be found to require."^" 

On October 24, the American ministers replied to 
the British note of the 21st. The note, written by 
Gallatin, with some suggestions from Bayard and Clay, 

29 British Ministers to Castlereagh, Oct. 24, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

'30 British to American Ministers, Oct. 21, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 724-725. MS., Bureau of In- 
dexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 



292 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

rejected the imputation made by the British ministers 
that the American ministers on August 24 had sug- 
gested the principle of uti possidetis as the basis for 
negotiations, when they had merely remarked that the 
propositions of the British commissioners " were 
founded neither on the basis of uti possidetis nor on 
that of status ante helium." It was held that they 
had specifically stated that they were instructed to treat 
on the principle of both parties making restoration of 
whatever territory they might have taken during the 
war; that it had been previously declared that the 
American ministers had " no authority to cede any 
part of the territory of the United States ; and that to 
no stipulation to that effect would they subscribe." 
The American note explicitly refused to treat upon the 
basis of uti possidetis, or upon any other principle in- 
volving a cession of any part of the territory of the 
United States. It declared again that the American 
ministers had power to treat only " upon the principle 
of a mutual restoration of whatever territory may have 
been taken by either party." The request was repeated 
that the British ministers should present a projet 
" embracing all the other specific propositions which 
Great Britain intended to offer." The American min- 
isters expressed their willingness, if it was so desired, 
to offer simultaneously a projet on their part.^^ 

31 American to British Ministers, Oct. 24, 1814; MS., Bureau 
of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 725- 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 293 

This note, when referred to the British Government,^- 
caused a general feehng of disappointment in London. 
Lord Liverpool was vexed that the American ministers 
would not accept the principle of uti possidetis.^^ In 
order to gain time the Government decided to require 
the American ministers to make a full pro jet of all the 
conditions upon which they were ready to make peace. ^* 
It was evidently expected that the American ministers 
would advance such extreme claims that Great Britain 
would feel justified, in the eyes of the world, in break- 
ing off the negotiations. 

At Ghent the two missions were dispirited. The 
British were annoyed that the Americans would make 
no concessions ; the Americans were provoked that the 
British sought means to prolong the negotiations to 
gain time.^^ It was believed to be Great Britain's pur- 
pose to continue the negotiation until the Congress at 
Vienna was over, and then to prosecute the war with 
renewed vigor.^^ Social functions continued, but little 

32 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Oct. 24, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

33 Liverpool to Wellington, Oct. 28, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 384. 

34 Ibid. 

35 J. Q. Adams to John Adams, Oct. 25, 1814; Madison 
Papers, MS., LIIL, 7(}. Adams to Monroe; MS., Bureau of 
Indexes and Archives, British Despatches, III., No. 142. Mon- 
roe to Adams, Nov. 20, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes and 
Archives, British Despatches, III., No. 143. 

36 Russell to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS., 
XIV., No. 1804. 



294 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

cordiality existed between the American and the British 
ministers. A dinner given by the British to the Amer- 
icans on the 26th is described by Adams as " dull."^^ 

On the 31st, the British ministers returned their 
answer to the American note of the 24th.^^ The 
American victories at Plattsburg and BaUimore, and 
the growing opposition of the British people to the war 
led the Ministry to soften their policy in their new 
note. In this note the British ministers took the 
ground that their note of October 21 had been in 
reality a projet of the points which remained to be 
treated of in the negotiation. They insisted that the 
American ministers should present a contre-projet con- 
taining all the objections which they had to offer to the 
points submitted by the British ministers. They desired 
also a statement of " such further points as the 
Government of the United States consider to be 
material." The British ministers stated that they had 
no further demands to make and no other stipulations 
upon which they were required to insist than those 
previously given. They requested the American min- 
isters to present specific propositions upon which they 
were instructed to sign a treaty.^^ 

That there were many and difficult problems in- 

37 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 58. 

28 British to American Ministers, Oct. 31, 1814; MS., Bureau 
of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 726. 

39 Ibid. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 295 

volved in the negotiations may be seen from the series 
of questions which was directed to the Secretary of 
State by Gallatin at this period of the negotiation. 
These questions were as follows : — 

I. Would it be proper to break on the point of the 
privilege of trading with the Indians granted to the 
British in the treaty of 1794? 

II. Should the right of preserving an unlimited naval 
force on the lakes be insisted upon? 

III. Should they insist upon the renewal of the 
rights to the fisheries as defined by the treaty of 1783, 
or should they rest the rights upon the American con- 
struction of the treaty which said that it had not been 
abrogated by the war? 

IV. Was an agreement upon the northern bound- 
ary of the territory of Louisiana necessary, or should 
a proviso be inserted that the article on the north- 
western boundary, from the Lake of the Woods to 
the Mississippi, should not afTect the boundary of 
Louisiana ? 

V. Might the boundaries of Louisiana be assumed 
without referring to them ? 

VI. If a boundary was to be fixed for Louisiana, 
what should it be? 

VII. If Great Britain, agreeing in general to mutual 
restoration of territory, should except the settlement 
on the Columbia River, what should be done? 

VIII. What should be the claim respecting the 



296 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

country between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific 
Ocean? 

IX. Should consent be given to an arrangement 
for the appointment of commissioners to decide upon 
the question of territorial possession of the islands in 
Passamaquoddy Bay? If so, how should the commis- 
sion be constituted, and should insistence be made on 
the restitution of the islands until the question was 
settled? 

X. With reference to territorial desires by Great 
Britain in the northern part of the district of Maine, 
the boundary line to which, the British claimed, was 
uncertain, should consent be given to the appointment 
of commissioners to settle such boundary? 

XL If an exchange of territory were proposed, how 
far could that be agreed to, in view of the claim of 
Massachusetts to the possession of said territory? 

XI I. If a maritime war should be renewed in 
Europe, what steps were to be taken relative to the 
subject of impressment?*" 

Not only were the American ministers occupied with 
such questions as these, but they were also engaged in 
writing letters and drawing up papers to place before 
the representatives of the various European countries ; 
and Gallatin, at least, concerned himself with questions 
of the internal as well as foreign policies of the United 

^'^ Gallatin to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS., 
XIV., 1806. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 29/ 

States. In the same letter in which he propounded so 
many diplomatic questions he expressed his views on 
the financial and military situation in the United States. 
Gallatin thought that the war was likely to continue 
some time and that, as the United States could make 
no loans in Europe, a deficiency would occur. To 
meet this he made the following suggestions : — 

I. To extend indirect international taxes as far as 
practicable. 

II. To limit nominal loans and to borrow on stock 
at a rate not to exceed eight per cent. 

III. To apply exclusively the moneys arising from 
these two sources to loans and revenues, to the pay- 
ment of the civil list, interest on the public debt, and 
the support of the regular army and navy and of the 
militia employed on offensive operations. 

IV. Not to increase the Treasury notes receivable 
in payment of taxes and payable one year after date; 
but, to meet deficiencies, to issue long term notes not 
legal tender, bearing interest at six to eight per cent. 
These to be funded if the war should continue. 

V. With reference to the military situation, Gallatin 
advised that the States should be authorized to raise 
state troops for self-defense, and that these, as well as 
the militia called for defensive purposes, should be paid 
and supported by the States respectively, the United 
States ultimately reimbursing the expense, after the 



298 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

war. Unless such suggestions should be adopted to 
relieve the financial situation, Gallatin apprehended an 
overissue of paper money. Another means suggested 
was the creation of a national bank and the making of 
loans on the Government lands.*^ 

These suggestions of Gallatin were called out by the 
urgency of the financial and military situation in the 
United States. The Government began the war with 
inadequate financial measures, and the policy of short 
term loans and issue of paper money had brought the 
country to a financial crisis. The raising of soldiers 
was also difficult. The uncertain value of the pay, the 
ill success that had generally followed the land forces 
in the war, and above all the absence of great patriotic 
zeal contributed to the smallness of the enlistments. 
All sorts of propositions were made in Congress for 
the raising of soldiers. That patriotic motives were 
largely wanting is shown by the attempts to present at- 
tractive financial ones. One of these propositions was 
that every ten men should provide a substitute for a 
year at a time, paying fifty dollars each, while the 
United States Government would give a bounty of one 
hundred and twenty-four dollars, and eight dollars a 
month. At the end of a year's service one hundred 
and sixty acres of government land were also to be 
granted to each soldier thus serving. 

*i Gallatin to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS., 
XIV., 1806. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 299 

The American ministers, after sending their note of 
October 24, had prepared a joint letter to Secretary 
Monroe and several private letters. These communi- 
cations, with copies of all the notes that had passed 
between the two missions since the John Adams sailed, 
were, on October 26, given to Connell to bear to 
America. Connell left Ghent the same day for Os- 
tend. Here, according to instructions, he detained the 
Chauncey until the British reply to the American note 
of the 24th could be delivered to him. The British 
note being presented on the 31st, Payne Todd, one of 
the secretaries of the legation, took the despatches to 
Ostend, and the Chauncey sailed the next day, No- 
vember i.^^ 

The letter which the American ministers sent to 
Monroe declared that there was no hope that peace 
was likely to result from the negotiations. In spite 
of the fact that the sine qua non upon the Indian 
question had been reduced to a mere pacification of 
the Indians and an article embracing this point had 
been agreed upon, the American ministers considered 
the terms of the uti possidetis brought forward in the 
British note, October 21, as inadmissible and wholly 
incompatible with the previous declaration of the 
British ministers.*^ 

42 New York Spectator, Nov. 30, 1814. 

*3 American Commissioners to Monroe, Oct. 25, 1814; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 710-71 1; MS., Bureau 
of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 



300 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

The British note of October 31, by omitting the 
principle of uti possidetis, made the peace prospects 
somewhat brighter. Clay, with shrewd foresight, had 
predicted that the British would abandon the uti 
possidetis and hold fast to the islands of Passama- 
quoddy Bay and to the way from Halifax to Quebec, 
if successful on the Mobile or at New Orleans. Just 
as they had abandoned the Indian sine qua non piece- 
meal, so, he thought, they would abandon the terri- 
torial question.^* 

From October 30 to November 10 the American 
mission met each day to work out a projet of a treaty 
to be offered to the British. Every member of the 
mission took an active part in the discussions and in 
the formation of the various articles. Gallatin and 
Adams, as heretofore, performed the largest construc- 
tive work. Both of them prepared complete drafts 
for consideration by the commissioners. There was 
unanimity on scarcely one of the articles proposed, but 
those dealing with the fisheries and the navigation of 
the Mississippi were most hotly debated. Gallatin's 
draft of the projet suggested the renewal of the two 
privileges, one as a compensation for the other. Clay 
was bitterly opposed to allowing Great Britain the 
privilege of the navigation of the Mississippi. He 
contended that this was of far greater value than the 

4* Clay to Monroe, Oct. 26, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS., 
XIV., 1807. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3OI 

fisheries. Adams was in favor either of adopting 
Gallatin's article or of taking " the ground that the 
whole right to the fisheries was recognized as a part 
of our national independence, that it could not be 
abrogated by the war, and needed no stipulation for 
its renewal." Gallatin's article was at first adopted, 
with a minority consisting of Clay and Russell dis- 
senting. Clay's stubborn opposition and the declara- 
tion of his refusal to sign the treaty containing the 
artic!^ mentioned caused a reversal of the previous 
vote and the adoption of a substitute paragraph pro- 
posed by Clay himself, which left the fisheries out of 
the discussion.*^ Clay drafted the article upon im- 
pressment, which was adopted by the mission by a vote 
of three to two, Clay, Adams, and Russell favoring, 
Bayard and Gallatin opposing. The article upon in- 
demnities was the work of Adams, and so also was 
the article offering to conclude a treaty of peace on the 
basis of the state existing before the war, applied to all 
the points in dispute between the two countries, leaving 
their adjustment to future negotiation. The article 
upon ratification was drawn jointly by Gallatin and 
Adams. The remainder of the projet was, in general, 
the work of Gallatin. The draft of the treaty, finally 
adopted and signed by all on November lo, was taken 

45 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 60-64. 



302 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

the same afternoon by Hughes to the hotel of the 
British ministers.*^ 

The British Cabinet were in the meantime troubled 
at the way matters were progressing both at Ghent 
and at Vienna. The slowness of the negotiations at 
Vienna especially gave concern. Added to the diffi- 
culties of foreign diplomacy were those of a financial 
nature at home. British loans were at a discount. 
The property tax, which had been the main source of 
revenue to meet the extraordinary expenses of the 
Government, was to expire within a few months, and 
its reenactment was almost impossible, as the measure 
had been most unpopular. ^^ The American war had 
^^cost far more than had been contemplated, and there 
appeared no favorable sign that the necessary expendi- 
tures in that direction would cease for some time. 
The cost for the next year was estimated at i 10,000,- 
000. The British debt had reached the largest figure 
in the history of the nation. The interest alone upon 
it amounted to £30,000,000 a year. 

In view of these circumstances, and apprehending 
that the negotiations at Ghent might suddenly termi- 
nate, when the necessity of laying the papers before 
Parliament to call a vote upon them would arise, 

<o Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 64-69. 
47 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 2, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 401-402. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 303 

Liverpool had summoned a full meeting of the Cabinet 
to consider the American question.*^ 

The Cabinet considered the situation so serious that 
they requested Wellington to take charge of the war 
in America. It had been thought that his prestige 
would restore confidence in the army, and bring about 
a condition more favorable to Great Britain with refer- 
ence to peace. In case Great Britain should be obliged 
"to give up something of her just pretensions," it was 
said that this could be done more creditably through 
Wellington than through any one else.*^ An addi- 
tional motive for sending Wellington to America was 
to remove him from Paris, where he had been British 
Ambassador since the overthrow of Napoleon's Gov- 
ernment. His life was considered to be in danger 
there, and the Cabinet wished to remove him without 
umbrage to the French Government.^" 

In communicating to Wellington the desire of his 
Government, Liverpool presented to him two plans of 
leaving Paris without causing offense to the French 
Government. One was for him to proceed to Vienna 
to assist Castlereagh in the negotiations there, the 
other, to go to America to take charge of the war, 
" with full powers to make peace, or to continue the war, 

*8 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 2, 1814; Wellington's 
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 401-402. 

49 Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 4, 1814; Wellington's 
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 404-405. 

50 Ibid. 



304 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

if peace should be found impracticable, with renewed 
vigor." Wellington was to act at his own pleasure in 
the matter. It was stated that the American war 
entailed much inconvenience, and the possibility of a 
speedy conclusion of it appeared most likely by uniting 
double power in WelHngton.^^ 

Lord Bathurst also wrote Wellington, urging him 
to make his decision between the two plans not as a 
soldier but as a statesman, — whether, as a statesman, 
" under the present circumstances, not as a statesman 
of Paris exclusively, but of Europe, it is better for the 
Duke of Wellington to go to Vienna, or to America." 
Bathurst considered that it was important that Wel- 
lington should assume the " double character of nego- 
tiator and Commander-in-Chief " before the existing 
peace negotiations were broken off.^- 

Wellington believed that he was in no particular 
danger in Paris, and thought it would be unwise to 
send him to America, for if war should reopen in 
Europe he would be needed there. He expressed no 
objection to going to America, though he did not see 
great promise of British success. He thought there 
were sufficient troops there already. That which was 
wanting in America, he considered, was a naval superi- 

51 Liverpool to Wellington, Nov. 4, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 405-407. 

52 Bathurst to Wellington, Nov. 4, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 416-417. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 305 

ority on the lakes ; and until such a superiority 
could be acquired it would be impossible to keep the 
enemy out of the whole frontier. He admitted that 
the confidence which he enjoyed as a result of the Euro- 
pean struggle would reconcile the army and the people 
in England to terms of which they were unwilling then 
to approve. With regard to the negotiations, he stated 
that he thought they had no right from the existing 
state of the war to demand any cession of territory 
from America; that their possession of territory be- 
tween the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Bay must 
be regarded as merely temporary. The military opera- 
tions, he said, though creditable, did not entitle the 
British to a cession of territory. He was therefore 
opposed to Great Britain's insisting upon the uti pos- 
sidetis. If the British should secure New Orleans, 
which they hoped for, then it might be better to insist 
upon the cession of that province as a separate article, 
than upon the uti possidetis as a principle of negotia- 
tion. He considered that his withdrawal from France 
would be regarded either as a sign of defeat or as a sign 
that the two countries were not on the best of terms. 
He thought it extremely inadvisable to leave Paris just 
at that time. He was ready to go to America, he 
stated, and would go whenever ordered, but send- 
ing him at that juncture would publish to Europe that 
affairs there were in a serious state. This reply of 

21 



306 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

Wellington had the effect of causing the British Gov- 
ernment to relinquish utterly their demand for terri- 
torial cession in America.^* 

In the note of November lo the American ministers 
stated again that they did not consider the note of the 
British ministers of October 21, which merely referred 
to the points proposed in the first conference by offer- 
ing to assume the basis of uti possidetis, already re- 
fused, as constituting a projet of a treaty as requested 
by them. They wrote that they had suggested, in the 
note of October 24, " that the exchange of the two 
pro jets should be made at the same time " ; but that 
waiving the advantage of receiving the first draft, or 
any question of etiquette, they offered herewith a 
projet of a treaty to the British ministers.^* They held 
the position that in view of the statement of the British 
ministers that they had no other propositions to offer 
than those contained in the note of October 21, there 
remained for consideration only three subjects, which 
had been presented by the British ministers. These 
were the fisheries, the northwest boundary, and the 
question of adoption of the basis of uti possidetis with 
respect to the other boundaries. In regard to the 
fisheries it was stated that they were " not authorized 

53 Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 9, 18, 1814; Wellington's 
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 424-426, 435-437- 

s* American to British Ministers, Nov. 10, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 733-734', MS., Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 307 

to bring into discussion any of the rights or liberties 
which the United States have heretofore enjoyed in 
relation thereto." It was held that the treaty of 1783 
from its peculiar character was not abrogated by the 
war, and no stipulation was necessary to entitle the 
United States to the full enjoyment of all the rights 
under that treaty .^^ 

The American note refused to assent to the British 
proposal to fix the northwest boundary by the line 
from the Lake of the Woods to the Mississippi unless 
the boundaries of Louisiana should also be provided 
for in the settlement. An article on that subject sim- 
ilar to the one agreed to between the British and 
American commissioners in 1807 was submitted. 
With reference to the other boundaries between the 
British and American territories it was proposed to 
refer the whole subject to commissioners; and for 
this purpose five articles were drawn on the same prin- 
ciple as was adopted by the two Powers in the Jay 
treaty for settling the disputed question of the river 
St. Croix.^^ 

The basis of uti possidetis was again rejected, and 
the principle of the status quo ante bellum was offered, 
which would place the two countries, " in respect to all 

^5 American to British Ministers, Nov. 10, 1814; MS., Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent " ; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 'JZZ-'JZA' 

56 Ibid. 



308 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

the subjects of difference between them, in the same 
state they were in at the commencement of the present 
war ; reserving to each party all its rights, and leaving 
whatever may remain of controversy between them for 
future and pacific negotiation." An article upon this 
basis with reference to restoration of territory was 
presented in the projet.^" 

The projet included an article on Indian pacification 
which had already been agreed upon. Another article 
was offered intended "to restrain the hostilities, and 
to prevent the employment of the savages in war," 
and one " reciprocally granting a general amnesty." 
The article with reference to impressment, which Clay 
had drafted, prohibited the practice for a given term 
of years, both states mutually agreeing to exclude from 
its marine service all persons belonging to the other 
state. A formal agreement upon what should con- 
stitute a legal blockade was made the substance of one 
article. The statement on this subject was that which 
had been given by Monroe in the instructions of April 
15, 1813. An article was presented relating to in- 
demnities. This consisted of two parts ; one part pro- 
viding for irregular seizures, captures, and condem- 
nations of American property, contrary to the estab- 
lished laws and usages of nations, previous to the com- 

57 American to British Ministers, Nov. 10, 1814; MS., Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 733-734- 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3O9 

mencement of the war; and the other, for similar 
irregularities committed during the war and contrary 
to the known and established usages of war between 
civilized nations. The note asserted that the first part 
applied to the United States alone, which was justly- 
entitled to indemnification for losses experienced in 
consequence of the effect of the orders in council of 
November, 1807, and April, 1809; the second part ap- 
plied equally to both belligerent parties. The projet 
also included an article fixing a varying time limit 
when captures of vessels at sea should cease.^® In 
presenting their projet the American ministers re- 
quested the British ministers, in their turn, to make 
explicit answer respecting all the articles included in 
it; and to present a projet reduced to specific proposi- 
tions embracing all the objects that they intended to 
bring forward.^^ 

The next day after receiving the American note and 
projet the British ministers, as usual, referred the 
papers to their Government, and asked for instructions 
upon certain points in the projet concerning which 
they were in ignorance as to the views and sentiments 

^^ Projet of Treaty; MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, 
"Treaty of Ghent"; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 
735-740. 

S9 American to British Ministers, Nov. 10, 1814; MS., Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 733-734- 



3IO MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

of the British Ministry.*"' The part upon which they 
particularly wished information was that relating to 
the boundary of Louisiana. They were unwilling to 
consent to a discussion of this boundary, for their 
doing so might be taken as a recognition of the right 
of the United States to the occupation of the territory. 
The British ministers stated that " to accede to it, with 
the reservation proposed as to the country beyond the 
Stony Mountains, would be to abandon to their en- 
croachment the northwest coast of America, on which 
they had already made some settlements."^^ The 
British commissioners considered the projet so ex- 
travagant that it should be wholly rejected; but being 
in doubt whether or not they should reply to each 
article, giving the reasons for the specific objections, 
they requested to be instructed by their Government.®- 
They also wished instructions as to whether they 
should present a projet of a treaty in accordance with 
the request of the American ministers. They sent with 
their letter a draft of the points which they considered 
such a projet should contain, if one were to be pre- 
sented. 

The British ministers became convinced that the 
Americans were determined to agree to no terms of 

«<> British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Nov. ii, 1814; 
MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

«i Ibid. 

"2 Goulburn to Bathurst, Nov. 10, 1814; WelHngton's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 427. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3 II 

peace except on the principle of status quo ante bellum. 
They wrote to their Government that to secure peace 
it would be necessary to accede to the American 
proposition, " placing things upon the same footing in 
the point of privileges as well as rights, as they stood 
when war was declared." They believed that insistence 
either upon the retention of territory or upon the 
fisheries would cause the negotiations to be broken off. 
The question in their minds was upon which of the 
two it would be more advantageous to break. They 
believed that the fisheries would be the more favorable 
point of dispute, for it was of great interest to British 
subjects, while only a small part of the American 
people were interested in it. The British ministers 
thought that the articles respecting the appointment of 
commissioners to settle the boundary disputes should 
be rejected in toto. The objection, it was stated, should 
not be made " on the real ground, which is, that Ameri- 
cans always cheat us " ; but on the ground that " the 
plenipotentiaries on both sides are more competent to 
decide such points." They would reject the article 
relative to islands in the Passamaquoddy Bay on the 
ground that it was inadmissible because it raised a 
doubt as to the title of Great Britain to those islands. 
The article with reference to indemnities as far as it 
affected indemnifications for losses previous to the war 
was also regarded as inadmissible.*'^ 

«3 Goulburn to Bathurst, Nov. 14, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 432-433. 



312 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

The British Cabinet considered the American projet 
for some time before giving instructions to their min- 
isters as to the nature of their reply. They finally 
decided to withdraw the principle of uti possidetis 
which had been advanced in the note of October 21. 
They were led to this decision, as has been indicated 
before, by the unsatisfactory condition of the nego- 
tiations at Vienna, and by reason of the financial dif- 
ficulties in Great Britain.^* The property tax upon 
which the main reliance had been placed for raising 
revenue to meet the extraordinary expense of the Gov- 
ernment was extremely unpopular, and it would be 
quite impossible to secure consent to its continuance 
after the expiration of the present law. 

Further, in view of the general depression of rents, 
which appeared inevitable, it seemed to the British 
Cabinet desirable to bring the war in America to a 
close.^^ The debate in Parliament had shown that to 
continue the war on the question of territorial claims 
only would meet with bitter opposition. The Duke of 
Wellington, too, had influenced the Cabinet very 
greatly by his assertion that no material military ad- 
vantage could be expected as the war went on, and that 
he would be reluctant to accept the command unless a 

6* Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 18, 1814; Wellington's 
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 438-439. 
66 Ibid. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3 1 3 

serious effort to obtain peace should be made without 
insisting upon keeping any part of the conquest.*''' 

One of the strongest influences in bringing about a 
change in the demands of the British Cabinet was the 
constant fear of a renewal of the war in Europe. 
There was a strong presentiment of the occurrence of 
the event which took place the following March. With 
this fear in mind, Wellington had been stationed as 
ambassador at Paris. In the event of the renewal of 
the war in Europe, Great Britain needed all her mili- 
tary strength. Again, in the Congress of Vienna, 
Castlereagh had been forced to be less aggressive in 
British demands owing to the existence of the war with 
America. Later, the British press gave reports from 
Vienna in which it was stated that the conclusion of 
peace between Great Britain and the United States 
had produced a more vigorous tone in the notes of 
Lord Castlereagh.*'^ 

While the Cabinet were considering the reply that 
should be made to the American note and projet, the 
news reached Great Britain of the publication in the 
United States of the first part of the negotiations. 
The American Government was severely criticized for 
publishing diplomatic papers before the negotiations 
were completed. November 19, both Houses of Par- 
se Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 18, 1814; Wellington's 
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 438-439. 

67 London Morning Post, Jan. 23, 1815 (quoted in Inger- 
soll's Historical Sketch of the Second War, p. 313). 



314 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

Hament took up the discussion of the correspondence 
that had passed between the representatives of the 
two states, with the result that the Cabinet was severely 
censured for instructing the British commissioners to 
make such excessive demands. Alexander Baring, a 
friend of peace and of America, said in the House of 
Commons that he thought no man in the country- 
could have expected that America would ever have 
yielded to such pretensions at a time when Great Britain 
had gained no advantage over her in the war. On 
November 21, in the House of Lords, the Marquis of 
Lansdowne, after inquiring of Earl Liverpool whether 
the Ghent correspondence as published in America was 
authentic, and receiving an affirmative answer, declared 
that the pretensions set up by Great Britain called 
loudly for the interference of Parliament. He said that 
he was willing to support the dictum of perpetual 
British allegiance and impressment, but not a war for 
conquest or territory, for the lakes or the Indians,^^ 

All of these influences combined forced the Cabinet 
to lower the demands, and the British commissioners 
accordingly were instructed in this view. Despatches 
bearing dates of November 21 and 22 were sent from 
the Foreign Office to the British ministers communi- 
cating the change in the Ministry's demands. These 
were received at Ghent November 25. The British 
commissioners discussed the points to be made in their 

^^ Ingersoll's Historical Sketch of the Second War, 300. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3 I 5 

reply to the Americans. Goiilbiirn believed that if, 
after receiving a declaration of what the American 
ministers maintained as their right to the fisheries, 
no answer were made upon that point, it would be 
practically an admission of the United States to the 
fisheries as enjoyed by them before the war, and that 
they could not be excluded from them. Doctor Adams 
and Lord Gambier held a contrary view. All three 
were opposed to the admission of any article that would 
favor America's fisheries.^^ The British commis- 
sioners made a few changes in the wording of the 
pro jet in addition to the points noted for change by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs,^" but only in the article 
upon amnesty was there any important alteration. 

In the note accompanying the amended projet re- 
turned by the British commissioners comment was 
made upon several of the articles, and numerous verbal 
changes were suggested. The article relating to the 
Indians, which provided that both Powers should 
pledge themselves not to employ the Indians in any 
subsequent war, was declared inadmissible on the 
ground that it was impossible for the British ministers 
to bind their Government in regard to its conduct in 
any future war. The articles which the American 

^9 Goulburn to Bathurst, Nov. 25, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 452-454. 

'■** Letter from the British Foreign Office to British Com- 
missioners, Nov. 21, is missing from the despatches in the Pub- 
lic Record Office. 



3l6 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

commissioners had proposed with respect to impress- 
ment and blockade, the British commissioners main- 
tained, were unnecessary, since the British Government 
were wilhng to conclude the treaty without any stipula- 
tion upon the subjects included in those articles, and 
the American ministers had stated that the conclusion 
of the peace would not depend upon those points. 
The British commissioners objected to the article upon 
indemnities, stating that the indemnifications proposed 
were unprecedented and were so objectionable that if 
insisted upon, all hope of bringing the negotiations to a 
favorable issue must prove in vain. The declaration 
was made that, as the British Government made no 
claim for losses sustained by British subjects in con- 
sequence of the war, neither could they consent to make 
compensation for losses sustained by the citizens of 
the United States in the war.'^^ 

The British note suggested that a stipulation be 
made by which the courts of justice in each state 
should be open to all the claimants of the other state, 
and that " no obstruction be thrown in the way of their 
recovery of the rights, claims, or debts of any kind, 
respectively due or belonging to them." The article 
with reference to amnesty was declared to be wholly 
unnecessary. The British ministers stated with refer- 

^1 British to American Ministers, Nov. 26, 1814; MS., Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 740-741. 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 317 

ence to particular alterations in the various articles, 
that they were prepared to make such explanations 
as might be required with a view to reconciling the 
pretensions of the two Governments. In the conclud- 
ing paragraph of the British note the former demand 
of the principle of uti possidetis was reluctantly with- 
drawn in these words : " The undersigned have fore- 
borne to insist upon the basis of uti possidetis, to the 
advantage of which they consider their country fully 
entitled. But should this negotiation terminate in a 
way contrary to their hopes and just expectations, they 
must protest against any claim or demand being urged 
by the American Government in any future negotia- 
tion, in consequence of the facilities which His 
Majesty's Government have now shown themselves 
willing to afford to the speedy restoration of peace."^- 
The amended projet returned by the British com- 
missioners provided that the notification for the cessa- 
tion of the war be issued after ratifications of the 
treaty should have been exchanged rather than at the 
time of the signature. This was designed, it was 
supposed, to give time for the completion of the British 
plans against New Orleans, the successful outcome 
of which was never doubted. The date from which a 
limitation would be placed upon the capture of prize 

^■2 British to American Ministers, Nov. 26, 1814; MS., Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 740-741. 



3l8 MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 

vessels was changed from the signing of the treaty to 
the exchange of ratifications. In the article provid- 
ing for boundary commissioners the British substituted 
two for three commissioners, and provided that, in case 
of a failure of the two commissioners to agree, refer- 
ence should be made to a friendly Power whose deci- 
sion should be accepted as final. It was expected that 
two partisan commissioners would not agree upon 
all, if any, of the points in dispute, and that in conse- 
quence the settlement of the questions would be sub- 
mitted to the arbitration of a European Power with 
whom the influence of Great Britain would naturally 
be greater than that of the United States. 

The article concerning the northwest boundary was 
changed from the wording, " a line drawn due north or 
south (as the case may be) from the most north- 
western point of the Lake of the Woods, until it shall 
intersect the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude, and 
from the point of such intersection due west along and 
with the said parallel, shall be the dividing line between 
His Majesty's territories and those of the United 
States to the westward of the said lake, so far as the 
said respective territories extend in that quarter," to 
the following : " a line drawn due west from the Lake 
of the Woods, along the forty-ninth parallel of north 
latitude, shall be the line of demarcation between His 
Britannic Majesty's territories and those of the United 
States to the westward of the said lake, so far as the 



MODIFICATION OF BRITISH DEMANDS 3 I9 

territories of the United States extend in that quarter." 
The British added to this article a guarantee to British 
subjects of the privilege of the navigation of the Mis- 
sissippi RiverJ^ 

An additional article relating to the prisoners of war 
was proposed by the British commissioners. Instead 
of a mere statement that '* all prisoners on both sides 
shall be set at liberty," the British offered the follow- 
ing : " All prisoners of war, taken on either side as well 
by land as by sea, shall be restored as soon as prac- 
ticable after the ratifications of this treaty shall have 
been exchanged, on their paying the debts which they 
have contracted during their captivity. The two con- 
tracting parties respectively engage to discharge in 
specie the advances which may have been made by the 
other for the sustenance and maintenance of such 
prisoners. "^^ 

By abandoning the principle of uti possidetis, as 
well as the Indian boundary and the exclusive military 
control of the lakes, the British Government cleared 
away what had proved to be the chief obstacles in the 
way of peace. 

■^3 Copy of projet of treaty of peace; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., III., 735-740. 
74 Ibid. 



CHAPTER VIII 

Conclusion of the Peace Negotiation 

The British note presenting the amended projet of 
the treaty and giving up the principle of uti pos- 
sidetis was received November 27. For three days 
thereafter the American ministers were engaged in 
discussing the alterations made in the projet and for- 
mulating their reply. The principal discussion was over 
the article with regard to the northwest boundary, par- 
ticularly that part added by the British note grant- 
ing to Great Britain the navigation of the Mississippi. 
This provision was vehemently opposed by Clay, the 
champion of the West. Gallatin, out of regard for 
the feeling in New England, was in favor of granting 
the navigation of the Mississippi in exchange for the 
fishing privilege. Clay with much fervor argued 
against this plan, asserting that the fishing privileges 
were of much less value than the navigation of the 
Mississippi ; Adams, on the other hand, considered that 
the privilege of navigating the Mississippi was of 
small importance.^ Clay maintained that to require a 
stipulation on the fisheries was inconsistent with the 
claim already advanced that the rights respecting these 

1 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 71. 

320 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 32 1 

were guaranteed by the treaty of 1783 and needed no 
renewal. Bayard held that there was a distinction 
between the American rights to the fisheries secured by 
the treaty of peace of 1783 and those which Great 
Britain possessed in the privilege granted to her of 
navigating the Mississippi ; Gallatin proposed to offer 
an article making the navigation of the Mississippi an 
equivalent for the fisheries.- This proposal was agreed 
to by a vote of 3 to 2, Clay and Russell voting against 
the proposition. 

In the preparation of the note to be presented to the 
British ministers Gallatin, Adams, and Clay drew up 
drafts of the proposed note, and these were read before 
the mission. The draft as finally adopted was more 
largely the work of Gallatin than of any other member 
of the mission. It was Gallatin's suggestion that they 
should waive the claims of indemnities for losses sub- 
sequent to the war incurred by vessels in British ports 
which were not given the customary six months' notice ; 
that these claims should instead be taken up for dis- 
cussion with the British ministers. Adams proposed 
sending a copy of the deposition respecting the carry- 
ing away and sale of negroes by British officers. To 
this all the others objected. The American note was 
adopted and signed on the 30th. It was immediately 
taken by Hughes to the British ministers.^ 

2 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 7I-7S- 

3 Ibid., 76-78. 
22 



322 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

This note consented to the substitution of the day of 
exchange of ratifications for that of the signature of 
the treaty as the time for the cessation of hostihties 
and for regulating the periods when prizes at sea 
should be restored, "it being understood," the note 
stated, " that measures shall be adopted for a speedy 
exchange of ratifications, and that the periods in the 
second article shall be fixed in a manner correspond- 
ing with this alteration."* 

The new article respecting prisoners, and the change 
in the composition and procedure of the boundary com- 
missions, which had been proposed by the British com- 
missioners, were accepted. An additional suggestion 
was made that a time limit be fixed within which the 
commissioners must make their decision and report. 
The note consented to drop entirely the articles relat- 
ing to the non-employment of Indians in any future 
hostilities ; the definition of blockade and general 
amnesty; and also that part of the article concerning 
indemnities for losses and damages received after the 
commencement of the war. The American commis- 
sioners expressed their desire to " discuss the cases 
of vessels and property in port when war was de- 
clared or known " ; and in that connection submitted " a 
copy of the provision made in that respect by the 

4 American to British Ministers, Nov. 30, 1814; MS., Bureau 
of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent "; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 741. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 323 

United States." They consented to the withdrawal of 
the article upon impressment with the understanding 
" that the rights of both Powers on the subject of sea- 
men, and the claims of the citizens and subjects of the 
two contracting parties to indemnities for losses and 
damages sustained prior to the commencement of the 
war, shall not be affected or impaired by the omission 
in the treaty of any specific provision with respect to 
those two subjects."' 

To most of the verbal alterations made by the 
British in the articles the American commissioners as- 
sented, but from some they dissented. These and 
other changes they expressed their desire to discuss ; 
and to this end they requested a conference, at such 
time and place as might be convenient for the British 
plenipotentiaries, in order to consider these points, and 
to agree upon the " places and time left in blank in 
several of the articles."® 

The British ministers replied to this note the same 
day, and named the Chartreux, their hotel, for the 
meeting place the next day at twelve o'clock.'^ This 
was the first meeting of the two missions since August. 
All the negotiations since that time had been carried 
on by the interchange of notes. In this conference 

s American to British Commissioners, Nov. 30, 1814; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel, III., 741. 

«Ibid. 

■'^ British to American Ministers, Nov. 30, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 742. 



324 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

the chairman of each mission opened his respective 
side; Gambier for the British, and Adams for the 
American.^ 

The American ministers objected to the changes in 
the first article, where the words " belonging to either 
party " and " taken by the other " were substituted for 
*' taken by either party from the other." They ob- 
jected to the insertion because it would make the 
restoration of territory to depend not upon right, but 
upon possession at the commencement of the war.^ 
They maintained tljat the " retention of possessions 
obtained by force was so far setting up a title for 
conquest " ; that possession was prima facie evidence 
of right ; that if either party had a right, or both parties 
had an equal right, the possessor could not be ousted 
by the other claimant. The British ministers main- 
tained that temporary possession until the right could 
be ascertained was of little consequence, and proposed 
that "both parties should retain possession of any 
territory the right to which was in dispute."^** The 
Americans objected on the ground that it would place 
it in the power of the party in possession of any terri- 
tory to claim that such territory was in dispute. They 
insisted that the words which they had originally pro- 

8 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 79. 

9 Ibid., 80. 

10 Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes, 
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 325 

posed, which stipulated for the restitution of all posses- 
sions, should be adopted,^^ and that any other arrange- 
ment would be inconsistent with the principle of status 
quo ante bellum, upon which alone they had stated they 
were authorized to treat. The British plenipotentiaries 
refused to strike out the alteration, but agreed to refer 
the question to their Government.^^ 

The significance of this discussion was that the 
British Government were determined to retain the pos- 
session of certain islands in the Bay of Passamaquoddy 
which had been taken by the British during the war. 
The British claimed that these, though in the pos- 
session of the United States at the commencement of 
the war, originally belonged to Nova Scotia and, 
therefore, should rightfully be retained by Great 
Britain. The Americans on the contrary maintained 
that these islands belonged to the United States, being 
a part of the State of Massachusetts; and they claimed 
that the territory should be given up on the principle of 
mutual restitution, as was done in other similar cases. 

The American commissioners proposed for time to 
be allowed for cessation of hostile operations after the 
ratifications of the treaty had been exchanged, " fifteen 
days in the Channel, in the North seas, in all parts of 

11 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. I, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office 5, 102. 

12 Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes, 
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 742. 



326 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

the Atlantic Ocean to the equinoctial line or the 
equator, and in all parts of the Mediterranean. Two 
months in the Atlantic ocean to the latitude of the 
Cape of Good Hope, and three months in all other 
parts of the world." The British ministers proposed 
four different territorial areas within which the time 
allowed was to be twelve, thirty, forty, and one hundred 
and fifty days respectively. The American plenipo- 
tentiaries reserved the British proposal for considera- 
tion.^^ 

The American ministers proposed the following 
change in the wording of the article redrafted by the 
British, relating to the settlement of the disputed 
ownership of the islands in the Bay of Fundy : In place 
of the wrords, " whereas claims have been made by the 
Government of the United States to certain islands 
in the bay of Fundy," substitute the words, " whereas 
the several islands in the bay of Passamaquoddy, 
which is a part of the bay of Fundy, and the island of 
Grand Menan in the said bay of Fundy, are claimed by 
the United States as being comprehended within their 
aforesaid boundaries."^* The American ministers be- 
lieved that the v^^ording of the article as stated by the 

^^ Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes, 
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., III., 742. 

1* Ibid. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 327 

British had been intended to exclude Moose Island 
in Passamaquoddy Bay from coming within the dis- 
puted boundary. This change and the article in which 
it belonged were agreed upon.^^ 

The change proposed by the American ministers in 
the articles upon boundaries, limiting the time within 
which the commissioners were required to act, was ob- 
jected to by the British. The blanks in the boundary 
articles for the insertion of the place where the re- 
spective commissioners should meet were filled in at 
this conference. St. Andrews, in the Province of New 
Brunswick, was agreed upon for the commissions ap- 
pointed for the settlement of the question of disputed 
islands in the Bay of Fundy and the northeastern 
boundary. Albany was to be the meeting place of the 
commission for the settlement of the northern bound- 
ary.^^ The article containing the provision with re- 
spect to British navigation of the Mississippi caused 
the sharpest discussion. With regard to this subject 
the American ministers maintained that Great Britain 
had made a new demand without offering an equiva- 
lent; that, if the demand was based on the treaty of 
1783, the fishing liberty ought in Hke manner to be 
revised ; if the demand did not rest upon that treaty, 
then, no equivalent being offered for the privilege, it 

15 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 84. 

16 Ibid. 



328 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

was " without reciprocity."^^ Gambier, for the 
British, held that the arrangement regarding the north- 
west boundary, contained in the first part of the article, 
to which the British ministers had given their con- 
sent, furnished an equivalent.^® The Americans re- 
fused to concur in that opinion and proposed, as an 
alternative, to expunge the whole article.^^ The 
British ministers stated that they would refer it to 
their Government. As another alternative the Ameri- 
can ministers proposed that British subjects might 
have access to the Mississippi River at a single ap- 
pointed place upon payment of regular custom dues.^*^ 
In connection with the question of the navigation of 
the Mississippi, the American ministers again argued 
the claim of the United States to the fisheries. They 
maintained that the treaty of 1783 differed from ordi- 
nary treaties in that it did not confer, but only recog- 
nized, advantages enjoyed under both by Great Britain 
and the United States and, therefore, no stipulation 
was necessary to secure the full enjoyment of the 
fisheries to the United States as stipulated in the treaty 
of 1783. If, however, any stipulation were to be made, 
they said that they would propose one which would 

1'^ Official Statement of the Conference by Secretary Hughes, 
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526. 

18 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. I, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

19 Ibid. 

20 Protocol of Conference by Secretary Hughes, Dec. i, 1814; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., HI., 742. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 329 

make the two privileges offset each other. A memo- 
randum, containing an article to this effect, was left 
with the British by the American ministers at the close 
of this discussion. This article was as follows : " The 
inhabitants of the United States shall continue to 
enjoy the liberty to take, dry, and cure fish in places 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Great Britain, as 
secured by the former treaty of peace; and the navi- 
gation of the river Mississippi within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States shall remain free 
and open to the subjects of Great Britain, in the 
manner secured by the said treaty."^^ This article, 
also, was refused by the British plenipotentiaries. 

There was an ardent discussion over the article 
with regard to indemnity for vessels and effects seized 
in British ports w^ien the war was first declared or 
known. The American ministers demanded the resti- 
tution of the value of such seizures. They enforced 
their demand on the ground of the " law of nations " 
to abstain from the capture of private property at the 
breaking out of a war. This general law, they con- 
tended, was shown by the frequent clauses in treaties 
stipulating for a timely notice of hostilities."^ 

21 Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes, 
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526. Protocol of Con- 
ference of Dec. I, 1814; American State Papers, For. Rel., 
III., 742. 

-2 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. i, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 



330 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

This claim was further pressed inasmuch as the 
United States at the time of the declaration of war had 
given sixty days' notice for British vessels to leave 
American ports. The British commissioners main- 
tained that it was the practice of civilized nations to 
capture and condemn all private property taken afloat, 
or the proceeds of it, whenever a state of war actually 
existed, without any reference to the time when it 
began. They maintained that periods fixed in order to 
apprise persons of hostilities were matters of conveni- 
ence only, and did not affirm any general law or usage 
on the subject. Further, that the principle of demand, 
more than the value of the property, was of im- 
portance : " that restitution of value could not take 
place without the implication that such ships and goods 
had been improperly or irregularly seized ; . . . that it 
was wholly unprecedented for any nation that had de- 
clared war against Great Britain even to ask and much 
less to receive indemnity, for the direct and necessary 
consequences of their own act."-^ They asserted that 
the United States, being the party which declared the 
war, had no right to indulgence on this point, and that 
the act of Congress, which had been communicated to 
them, merely authorized the President to grant pass- 
ports, but did not make it obligatory for him to do so. 
The British commissioners informed the Americans 

23 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. i, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 33 1 

that their Government would reject such demands and 
that it would be useless to submit them.-'* 

On the day of the conference, the British commis- 
sioners transmitted a copy of the American note of 
November 30 to their Government. In a note to 
Castlereagh they expressed satisfaction that the Ameri- 
can ministers had agreed to abandon all the articles 
that had been declared to be inadmissible, with one 
modification. They mentioned the two objections on 
which alone the American ministers " evinced a dis- 
position to insist." With reference to the first ob- 
jection, which was to the alteration made by the British 
ministers in the first article of the projet, that one aimed 
at "limiting the restitution of territory to the pos- 
sessions belonging to either party which had been taken 
by the other during the war," the British ministers 
stated that they saw the design of the American min- 
isters " to obtain occupation of the islands in Passama- 
quoddy Bay during the time between the ratification 
of the treaty and the decisions upon the claims of the 
United States, together with the fair advantage which 
might result from the fact of possession."-^ The 
British commissioners reported the second main ob- 
jection of the American ministers, that of the free 

-* Official Statement of Conference by Secretary Hughes, 
Dec. I, 1814; Russell Journals, V., 524-526. 

25 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. i, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102 



332 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

navigation of the Mississippi by British subjects, 
together with the arguments which the American min- 
isters had used in connection with that matter, and also 
the American claim to the fisheries. 

The British ministers considered that, in drawing 
from the American ministers an offer of an equivalent 
for the fisheries, they had secured an advantage, since 
this was a departure from the American argument that 
the fishing privileges were not abrogated by the war.^" 
In their note of December i they asked for specific 
instructions from their Government upon the follow- 
ing points : — 

First. As to their adherence to the words of the 
first article, "belonging to either party and taken by 
the other." 

Second. As to the retention of any part of article 
eight, which dealt with the northwestern boundary. 

Third. As to insisting upon the latter part of that 
article relative to the Mississippi. 

Fourth. As to accepting the navigation of the Mis- 
sissippi with the very limited access offered in the 
American proposal as an equivalent for the privileges 
of the fisheries.^'' 

With reference to the first of these points the British 
thought that the American ministers would yield. They 

26 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. i, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

27 Ibid. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 333 

themselves were inclined to give up the free naviga- 
tion of the Mississippi, since they considered they had 
secured a tacit admission from the American ministers 
that the navigation and fishing privileges rested on the 
footing of a stipulation in the treaty of 1783. There- 
fore, they reasoned, giving up this privilege would 
place them in a position to exclude the United States 
from the fishing privileges.^^ They urged that as 
little delay as possible should be allowed in the reply, 
as it was important that the negotiations should be 
completed speedily, for the United States Senate would 
adjourn March 2, and the concurrence of this body was 
necessary to the ratification of the treaty.-^ 

On the second of December the British Government 
sent a despatch to the peace ministers instructing them 
to demand of the American ministers the proofs that 
the British naval officers had taken slaves from the 
coast of America and sold them in the West Indies.^" 
The British ministers, accordingly, made this demand. 
They stated in their note that they were instructed to 
assure the American plenipotentiaries that, upon re- 
ceiving the proofs in question, the British Government 
would adopt every means in their power to bring to 

28 Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. i, 1814; Wellington's Supple- 
mentary Despatches, IX., 460-461. 

29 Ibid. 

3** Bathurst to Commissioners at Ghent, Dec. 2, 1814; Mem- 
oirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 213; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, loi. 



334 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

justice any British subjects guilty of the offense charged 
against them by the Secretary of State.^^ The Ameri- 
can ministers, conscious that the proofs which they had 
were meager, and unwilHng to provoke irritation, de- 
ferred their answer to the British note. 

In view of the favorable prospects for peace, the 
American commissioners thought that every precaution 
ought to be taken to prevent discord in the future 
negotiations. To this end, the mission, at Russell's 
suggestion, decided to divulge nothing of the discus- 
sions which took place either at their own meetings or 
at the conference of the two missions, and agreed that 
the papers should be communicated to no one except 
the Secretary, Christopher Hughes, Jr.^^ It was in 
consequence of this policy that William Shaler, who 
was attached to the mission, became offended and left 
Ghent.^^ He proceeded to Paris, carrying with him 
despatches from the Department of State for Minister 
Crawford. He was also the bearer of a letter from the 
mission to Crawford containing the information that, in 
view of the present state of the negotiations, the 
American ministers wished to revoke their former 
opinion with respect to the employment of French 

31 British to American Commissioners, Dec. 7, 1814; MS., 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 

32 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 90. 
^3 Ibid., 91. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 335 

aid.^'* Crawford previously had suggested to them the 
advisability of employing French officers and soldiers, 
who, he wrote, could easily be obtained.^^ The Ameri- 
can ministers had in an earlier letter given an opinion 
favorable to such a plan.^*' 

On the 6th of December the British Government sent 
the requested instructions to their commissioners. 
Upon the two special points of dispute the British 
ministers were instructed to insist on the retention of 
the words " belonging to either party and taken by the 
other" in the first article and to impress upon the 
American commissioners that the alteration in no way 
was inconsistent with the principle of status quo ante 
bellum upon which they had agreed to treat, as there 
was a "manifest difference between the restitution of 
territory which unquestionably belonged to either 
party, previous to the war, and the restitution of that 
of which either party may have had temporary posses- 
sion immediately preceding the war."^^ In order to 
avoid the inconveniences that might arise in the restora- 
tion of territory situated in dififerent places, which the 

3* American Commissioners to Crawford, Dec. 2, 1814; 
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 

25 Crawford to American Commissioners, Oct. 14, 1814; 
Russell Journals, V., 483-485. 

3*^ American Commissioners to Crawford, Oct. 19, 1814; 
Russell Journals, V., 483-486. 

s^Bathurst to Commissioners at Ghent, Dec. 6, 1814; Mem- 
oirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 214-217; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, loi. 



336 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

party in possession might claim the right to retain, the 
British ministers were authorized to consent to Hmit 
" the application of the Article to such possessions only 
as are by the tenour of the Treaty itself, liable to dis- 
pute ; " more especially, to hmit its application to such 
possessions as were to be decided upon by the commis- 
sioners on the disputed boundaries. Every facility in 
wording the limitations was to be allowed, if only 
"the object for which the alteration was proposed be 
obtained," namely, the retention of the islands in 
Passamaquoddy Bay during the time of reference to 
the commissioners.^^ 

The Cabinet approved of the conduct of their com- 
missioners in admitting that the free access to the navi- 
gation of the Mississippi was no- longer a right belong- 
ing to Great Britain under the treaty of 1783, but was 
to be considered as granted by the American Govern- 
ment in return for the favorable arrangement of the 
northwestern boundary to which Great Britain had 
given consent. The British commissioners were to 
object to the proposal to make the fishing privileges 
and the navigation of the Mississippi offset each other. 
It was stated that, if they were to be considered equiva- 
lent, the manner in which they had been proposed by 
the American ministers was very unequal ; for the 
American commissioners had proposed a " limited and 

3^ Bathurst to Commissioners at Ghent, Dec. 6, 1814; Mem- 
oirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 214-217; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 101. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 33/ 

restricted renewal " of the one privilege, in return 
for an " unlimited and unrestricted renewal " of the 
other.39 

With the instructions were enclosed two articles for 
the commissioners to propose. By the first, the north- 
western boundary was defined as had already been 
agreed upon; by the second, the conditions on which 
Great Britain would renew the fishing liberty hereto- 
fore enjoyed by the United States and the privilege 
enjoyed by Great Britain with reference to the naviga- 
tion of the Mississippi were to be left to future nego- 
tiation.*'' The commissioners were authorized not to 
sign the treaty with the omission of the amended pro jet 
of article eight with reference to the relinquish- 
ment of the fishing privileges; nor with the omission 
of the latter part of the article concerning the naviga- 
tion of the Mississippi. Instructions were further 
given them that, in case they were unable to secure the 
accession of the American ministers to the proposition 
as ofifered by the British Government or to some other 
written document which should acknowledge that the 
fishing liberty was no longer in force, they should refer 
home for further instructions.*^ 

39 Bathurst to Commissioners at Ghent, Dec. 6, 1814; Mem- 
oirs and Correspondence of Castlereagh, X., 214-217; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, loi. 

^o Ibid. 

" Ibid. 

23 



33^ CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

The British ministers upon receiving these instruc- 
tions from their Government sent their secretary to 
the American mission requesting a conference at such 
time and place as might be convenient for the Ameri- 
can ministers. The American commissioners named 
the next day, December lo, as the time and their own 
rooms as the place for the meeting.*^ 

At the conference on the loth, after the protocol of 
the conference of the first of December had been agreed 
upon, the British ministers stated that they were in- 
structed not to consent to allow the words in the first 
article, " belonging to either party and taken by the 
other " to be changed unless some modification should 
be made, either by excepting from mutual restitution 
all those territories which were made by any article of 
the treaty the subject of reference to commissioners, 
or by excepting alone the islands in Passamaquoddy 
Bay.*^ This was suggested to remove the objection 
made by the American commissioners that under the 
former British proposal each party would be given the 
right to judge in the first instance of what did, or did 
not, belong to the other. The American commission- 
ers took this statement under consideration.** The 

42 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III, 93. 

43 Protocol of conference of Dec. 10, 1814; MS., Bureau 
of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., IIT., 743. 

** Ibid. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 339 

British commissioners said with reference to article 
eight that their Government offered in Heu of the 
American proposals to retain the amended article as 
to the boundary from the Lake of the Woods to the 
Stony Mountains, and to insert the following stipula- 
tion : "His Britannic Majesty agrees to enter into 
negotiation with the United States of America, re- 
specting the terms, conditions, and regulations under 
which the inhabitants of the said United States shall 
have the liberty of taking fish on certain parts of the 
coast of Newfoundland, and other of His Britannic 
Majesty's dominions in North America, and of drying 
and curing fish, in the unsettled bays, harbors, and 
creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen islands, and Lab- 
rador; as stipulated in the latter part of the third article 
of the treaty of 1783, in consideration of a fair equiva- 
lent to be agreed upon between His Majesty and the 
said United States, and granted by the said United 
States, for such liberty as aforesaid. 

" The United States of America agree to enter into 
negotiation with His Britannic Majesty respecting the 
terms, conditions, and regulations under which the 
navigation of the river Mississippi from its source to 
the ocean, as stipulated in the eighth article of the 
treaty of 1783, shall remain free and open to the sub- 
jects of Great Britain, in consideration 01 a fair 
equivalent, to be agreed upon between His Majesty and 



340 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

the United States, and granted by His Majesty."*" 
These propositions to reserve for future negotiations 
the subjects both of the fisheries and the navigation of 
the Mississippi were received by the American min- 
isters for consideration. 

An article relative to the slave trade was proposed 
by the British ministers, namely, " Whereas the traffic 
in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of human- 
ity and justice, and whereas both His Majesty and the 
United States are desirous of continuing their efforts 
to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed, that 
both the contracting parties shall exert every means 
in their power to accomplish so desirable an object."*^ 
This was received by the American ministers for con- 
sideration. 

The British ministers also offered a provision with 
reference to suits by the subjects of one nation in the 
courts of the other, namely, " That the citizens or sub- 
jects of each of the contracting parties may recipro- 
cally sue in the courts of the other, and shall meet with 
no impediment to the recovery of all such estates, 
rights, properties or securities as may be due to them 

45 Report of conference of Dec. lO, 1814; British Commis- 
sioners to Lord Castlereagh, Dec. 10, 1814; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, 102. Protocol of conference, Dec. 10, 1814; 
MS., Bureau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 743. 

46 Ibid. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 34 1 

by the laws of the country in whose courts they shall 
sue." This also was received for consideration.*^ 

The American ministers suggested that doubts might 
arise as to the accuracy of the words in article eight 
which read, " a line drawn due west from the Lake of 
the Woods along the forty-ninth parallel of north lati- 
tude," and it was agreed that an alteration should be 
made to guard against any possible misunderstanding. 
The American commissioners also proposed some 
minor alterations in the article with respect to the 
various periods for the cessation of hostilities.*^ 

The British ministers after this conference reported 
to their Government that they were confident that the 
American plenipotentiaries would accept all their 
propositions with the exception of that part which 
placed the right to the fisheries on the treaty of 1783. 
They thought that the suggestion made in conversation 
after the formal conference indicated that the Ameri- 
can ministers expected the treaty to be signed, for 
Adams had suggested the signing of the treaty in 
triplicate to provide against possible accidents.'*^ The 
British ministers considered it hopeless to expect a 
renunciation of the fisheries in return for the renuncia- 
tion of the Mississippi. They believed that the Ameri- 

*'^ Protocol of conference, Dec. 10, 1814; MS., Bureau of 
Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 

*s Ibid. 

^'^ Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. 10, 1814; WelHngton's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 471-472. 



342 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

can ministers would not make such an offer ; and they 
thought it unwise for them to offer it as it would imply 
a 'doubt of the right of Great Britain to exclude the 
United States from the fisheries without such a re- 
nunciation. In their judgment the record of the pro- 
tocol of the last conference, December i, in which 
the American ministers proposed to give the free navi- 
gation of the Mississippi as an equivalent for the 
fisheries, would be sufficient evidence that the American 
ministers doubted their right to enjoy the fi-sheries 
without a stipulation. If now the American ministers 
should reject the British proposition, it might be used 
as an argument in favor of the claim of the United 
States.^^'^ 

On the nth, the American commissioners sent 
Hughes to request of the British commissioners a con- 
ference at their house the following day. At this con- 
ference the American ministers stated that they could 
not accede to the alterations in the first article relative 
to the words " belonging to either party and taken by 
the other," or to either of the modifications which 
had been proposed by the British ministers. They said 
that they considered the Passamaquoddy islands as part 
of the State of Massachusetts, and that any agreement 
which would give to Great Britain the possession of 
them would be equivalent to a temporary cession of 

so Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. lo, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 471-472. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 343 

territory, which, as had been previously intimated, was 
entirely beyond their power to make except with the 
consent of the State of which it formed a part.^^ The 
American ministers indicated, however, that they 
would be " willing to admit such a modification as 
should secure the right of Great Britain from being 
affected or impaired by yielding possession of the 
islands to the United States." The value of the 
islands, it was said, was comparatively insignificant, 
but the principle upon which Great Britain required 
the possession of them was the point which they felt 
called upon to resist.^- 

To this the British ministers replied that the Ameri- 
can ministers had assumed that a clause whose con- 
sequential effect would produce to Great Britain a 
continuance of the possession she now held implied 
cession of territory for America, and they had assumed 
this for the sole purpose of entangling this question 
with the suggested difficulty of ceding without the con- 
sent of the United States any part of its territory; 
that such a clause could not justly be so interpreted, as 
the United States would not be required to do any act 
which could prejudice her ultimate right. The British 
ministers declared that in fact no act whatever would 
be required of the United States, while Great Britain 

51 Report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by the Brit- 
ish Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 13, 1814; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

52 Ibid. 



344 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

would be obliged to yield a possession the right to which 
was known under other title than that of war. They 
were willing, if need be, to accede to a clause which 
would especially guard the ultimate right against the 
prejudice which the American ministers feared might 
arise from the continued possession by Great Britain. 
The British ministers also admitted the comparatively 
small value of the territory in question, but claimed 
that yielding possession of the islands involved a point 
of honor on the part of Great Britain, and, if insisted 
upon, might make the conclusion of peace impossible.^'' 
The British commissioners maintained that in accord- 
ance with the principle of the objection made by the 
American ministers Great Britain could not be assured 
of the fulfillment of any award which might be made 
by commissioners with respect to the islands adversely 
to the claims of the United States. To this the Ameri- 
cans replied that the award, if made in favor of Great 
Britain, could not be defeated on the principle which 
they had stated, but it would determine that those 
islands had not been a part of the State of Massa- 
chusetts, and, therefore, no cession would occur. On 
the other hand, if the United States gave consent to 
Great Britain to have possession of the islands and it 
should turn out that they belonged to the State of 
Massachusetts, then, without its consent, a temporary 

^3 Report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by the Brit- 
ish Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 13, 1814; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, 102. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 345 

cession would have been made of a possession the right 
to hold which belonged to that State. The American 
ministers also repeated their objection to the altera- 
tion on the ground that it was not in accordance with 
the principle of status quo ante bellum.^* 

The American ministers declared that they were not 
authorized to admit the substitution proposed in the 
latter part of the eighth article, that the fisheries and 
the navigation of the Mississippi by British subjects for 
fair equivalents be left for future negotiation. They 
considered it unnecessary as it merely stipulated a 
future negotiation which might take place just as well 
without it. The only effect of such stipulation, they 
considered, was to abandon the ground upon which 
they claimed the right to the fisheries. Further, they 
objected strongly to the words of that article which 
sought to make the right appear dependent solely on a 
provision of the treaty of 1783; and said that the pro- 
position had been annulled by the war. Those prin- 
ciples they had opposed and still would emphatically 
oppose. Gallatin stated again the American argument 
of the special character of the treaty of 1783 which 
prevented it from being abrogated, like ordinary 
treaties, by war ; he said that the treaty constituted one 
great whole, and that all its parts partook of its general 
character and could not be separated from it or made 
the subject of different and distinct construction. As a 

5* Russell Journals, V., 531-532. 



34^ CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

substitute for the paragraph in the eighth article of- 
fered by the British ministers the American plenipo- 
tentiaries proposed a general article to treat from time 
to time on all unsettled questions. ^^ To this proposi- 
tion the British objected. 

The American ministers said that they would not 
object to the omission of the last clause of the eighth 
article and the substitution of another "if it were pos- 
sible so to word one as to make the fisheries and the 
Mississippi the subject of future negotiation without 
prejudice to either party as to the manner in which its 
rights were derived. "^^ 

The British ministers replied that, if Great Britain 
were allowed to retain the possession of the Passama- 
quoddy islands, they would be willing to consider any 
proposition relative to the fisheries and the Mississippi 
in accordance with the view suggested by the Ameri- 
can ministers ; " provided such an article were worded 
so as to merely refer those subjects to future negotia- 
tions without tending to preclude either party from 
acting hereafter on his own view of those subjects." 
The British assured the American ministers that in this 
they went to the limit of their instructions.^^ 

With reference to the new articles which had been 

55 Russell Journals, V., S31-532. 

56 Report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by the Brit- 
ish Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 13, 1814; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

5^^ Ibid. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 347 

proposed by the British, the American ministers ex- 
pressed their wilHngness to adopt, at least in substance, 
the one with regard to the slave trade; but they ob- 
jected to the one relative to the courts as unnecessary.^^ 
The conference ended with an intimation on the part 
of the American ministers that they would present in 
writing their ultimate decision on the two subjects 
presented by the British commissioners at the last con- 
ference.^^ 

Upon returning to their rooms the American com- 
missioners took up at once the discussion of the reply 
to be made. Gallatin and Clay thought a single page 
note would be sufficient, while Adams as usual pre- 
ferred making a long reply.*"* The discussion con- 
tinued in meetings of the American ministers during 
the next two days. A great diversity of opinion pre- 
vailed among the commissioners. Adams proposed a 
draft of a reply which insisted upon the rejection of 
both demands of the British Government. If, how- 
ever, the islands were made an ultimatum by the 
British, that point might be conceded, but not the 
fisheries. Bayard was in favor of explicitly granting 
the point with regard to the islands, but insisting to 
the last upon the fisheries ; Clay was in favor of reject- 
's Russell Journals, V., 531-532. 

'^Report of conference of Dec. 12, 1814, given by the British 
Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 13, 1814; MS., British 
Foreign Office, 5, 102. 
60 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 112. 



348 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

ing both demands but eventually, if necessary, yield- 
ing both. He thought that by insistence upon both, one 
would be likely to be obtained. The draft presented by 
Gallatin indicated that the question of the islands 
would be yielded, and that the fisheries possibly would 
be.^^ Russell was for insistence upon the fisheries, but 
would yield them rather than have the war continue.^^ 
While Adams, Gallatin, and Clay all ofifered drafts, it 
was reserved for Gallatin again to prepare the final 
one. This with corrections and amendments was 
adopted on the 14th. It was copied and despatched to 
the British ministers that afternoon. The British sec- 
retary replied the same evening that the note had been 
referred to the British Government.^^ 

The American note consented to the proposal of the 
British commissioners to omit the words which were 
oiginally proposed by them. It stated, with reference 
to the ofifer of the British commissioners tO' omit the 
words originally proposed by them in the first article 
on condition that the American commissioners would 
except the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay from the 
principle of mutual restoration, that the American min- 
isters were willing to agree to the proposed exception, 
provided that the claim of the United States should 
not thereby in any way be affected. To insure this 

«^ Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 114-115. 
«2Ibid., 117. 
^3 Ibid., 119. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 349 

result, and to prevent a temporary possession from 
being converted into a permanent possession, the 
American ministers proposed a clause providing that 
the title to the islands, if not settled witliin a given 
period, should revert to the party in whose possession 
they were at the commencement of the war ; and, 
further, that " No disposition made by this treaty of 
the intermediate possession of the islands and terri- 
tories claimed by both parties, shall, in any manner what- 
ever, be construed to aflfect the right of either.""* 

The American ministers refused to accede to the 
substitute offered in the last of article eight concern- 
ing the fisheries and the navigation of the Mississippi. 
With regard to their former proposition, they stated 
that for " the purpose of meeting what they believed to 
be the wishes of the British Government, they pro- 
posed the insertion of an article which should recog- 
nize the right of Great Britain to the navigation of 
that river, and that of the United States to a liberty in 
certain fisheries, which the British Government con- 
sidered as abrogated by the war." They viewed this 
article as merely declaratory and would accede in this 
manner; but wanted no new article on either of those 
subjects. They referred to their previous offer to be 
silent with regard to both questions ; but stated that 

^'^ American to British Ministers, Dec. 14, 1814; MS., Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent " ; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 743-744. 



350 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

to the stipulation now proposed, or to any other aban- 
doning, or implying the abandonment of, any right in 
the fisheries claimed by the United States they could 
not subscribe. The stipulation that the parties here- 
after would negotiate concerning those subjects was 
declared to be unnecessary. They would, however, be 
willing to consent "to an engagement, couched in gen- 
eral terms, so as to embrace all the subjects of differ- 
ence not yet adjusted, or so expressed as to imply in no 
manner whatever an abandonment of any right claimed 
by the United States." They agreed to accede to the 
substance of the article on the abolition of the slave 
trade, but refused to admit the necessity of the article 
upon the courts. They maintained that the courts of 
the United States without such an article would be 
equally open to the claim of British subjects, and they 
depended upon the British courts for the same liberty 
for the citizens of the United States.®^ 

The British commissioners upon receipt of the 
American note transmitted it at once to their Govern- 
ment.^^ In a letter to Bathurst, Goulburn expressed 
the belief that the proposition made by the American 
ministers regarding the Passamaquoddy islands would 
be satisfactory, provided the stipulation for the 

"5 American to British Ministers, Dec. 14, 1814; MS., Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, "Treaty of Ghent"; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 743-744. 

6^ British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 14, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 35 1 

restoration of those islands to America in case a de- 
cision respecting them was not made within a certain 
Hmited time should be withdrawn ; but said that the 
proposal should be rejected unless this change was 
made.^^ With respect to the fisheries he thought that 
an article like the one mentioned in the last despatch 
was the best arrangement that they could make, un- 
less it should be deemed better to omit altogether any 
stipulation respecting the fisheries and the Mississippi 
and to make a statement distinctly of British rights. 

Bathurst replied to the British commissioners that 
with respect to the alteration which was proposed in 
the first article, whereby Great Britain might remain in 
temporary occupation of the islands in Passamaquoddy 
Bay, there was no objection except the provision for 
the surrender of the islands to the United States in 
case no decision should be reached within a given num- 
ber of years. This, it was stated, might occasion the 
postponement of any decision on the subject. There 
was no objection if a stipulation as to the rights of the 
islands should be a point of reference first to be de- 
cided by the commissioners. 

Since the article on the fisheries appeared now the 
only point of great difficulty, the British ministers were 
instructed to accept the proposition made by the com- 

^■^ Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. 14, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 479. 



352 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

missioners of the United States in the protocol of De- 
cember I, which was to omit the article altogether. 
Instructions were also given not to insist on the article 
which guaranteed to the subjects of each country the 
right to prosecute suits in the courts of the other 
country. 

On December 22, the British ministers sent a note 
in reply to the American note of the 14th. In this 
they expressed their willingness to agree to that part 
of the article of the American ministers which made it 
imperative upon the boundary commissioners to decide 
the question of the ownership of the islands within a 
fixed time. They expressed the hope that the Ameri- 
can ministers would be satisfied with the declaration 
" that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government 
to do all that belongs to them to obtain a decision with- 
out loss of time." They agreed to withdraw the pro- 
posed article on the fisheries, and offered to adopt the 
proposal of the American ministers, made at the con- 
ference the first of December, and repeated in their 
last note, namely, to omit altogether the article dealing 
with navigation of the Mississippi and the fisheries.*'^ 

The American ministers now saw peace in sight, 
although some of them, notably Clay, were not satis- 
fied with the terms upon which it was to be concluded. 

68 British to American Ministers, Dec. 22, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., 744-745- 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 353 

Orders were sent to Captain Boyd to have the 
Transit in readiness to start for the United States at 
a moment's notice."^ 

At a meeting of the American ministers on the even- 
ing of the 22d it was decided to ask for another con- 
ference with the British commissioners, although Clay 
was opposed to it. The request was made, and the 
next day the British ministers sent a note stating that 
they would meet at the house of the Americans at 
twelve o'clock that day, December 23. At this confer- 
ence the American ministers agreed to the proposals 
made in the note of the British ministers of the 22d, 
and certain verbal alterations in the various articles 
were accepted.'^'' 

That portion of the first article of the treaty which 
had caused so much controversy as finally agreed upon 
read as follows : " Such of the islands in the bay of 
Passamaquoddy as are claimed by both parties shall 
remain in the possession of the party in whose occupa- 
tion they may be at the time of the exchange of the 
ratifications of this treaty, until the decision respecting 
the title to the said islands, shall have been made in 
conformity with the 4th article of this treaty. 

" No disposition made by this treaty as to such pos- 
session of the islands and territories claimed by both 

69 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 120. 
■^0 Ibid., 122-124. 
24 



354 CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 

parties shall, in any manner whatever, be construed to 
affect the right of either."^^ 

The American ministers made strong objection to 
that part of the article which stipulated for the 
payment in specie of the advances made by each Gov- 
ernment for the maintenance of prisoners of war, on 
the ground of its imposing on the United States an 
unnecessary burden and of its requiring a mode of 
payment different from that in which by far the 
largei part of the advances had been made. The 
British, however, insisted, and it was allowed. The 
American commissioners saw in this a design on the 
part of the British to secure a profit of from fifteen to 
twenty per cent, upon the advances which they had 
made for American prisoners, these originally having 
been made in paper money." 

The British plenipotentiaries urged the article with 
reference to the prosecution of suits of law by the citi- 
zens or subjects of one nation in the courts of justice 
of the other. The Americans refused to consent to 
this article on the ground that their courts were open 
to all nations, and the acquiescence in such an article as 
this might imply that the subjects of Great Britain 
were not able to prosecute suits in the courts of the 

■^1 British to American Ministers, Dec. 22, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel, III.. 744-745. 

72 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 24, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102; Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 
124. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 355 

United States without such provisions. The British 
at last gave way on this point." The conference was 
adjourned until the next day for the signing of the 
treaty. 

The British Ministry had hoped that their last com- 
munication would enable the commissioners to close 
the negotiations with a treaty of peace. They were, 
however, suspicious of President Madison, and feared 
he might not sign the treaty. For this reason it was 
stipulated that the war should not cease until after 
the exchange of ratifications at Washington. They 
counted upon having a strong English fleet in the 
Chesapeake and the Delaware at the time that Baker, 
the bearer of the British copy of the treaty, would 
reach Washington ; and they also counted upon the dis- 
position of the Eastern States to secede from the Union 
as likely to " frighten Madison." It was suggested 
that if Madison should refuse to ratify the treaty, the 
British Government should immediately propose to 
make a separate treaty with the New England States, 
which it was believed could be accomplished.'^* 

The evening of the 24th the ministers of the two 
states met at the house of the British ministers for the 
purpose of attaching their names to the treaty. As 
previously agreed, it was signed in triplicate, the 

■^3 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 124-125. 
■^■* Liverpool to Castlereagh, Dec. 23, 1814; Wellington's 
Supplementary Despatches, IX., 495. 



356 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 



British mission furnishing three copies and the Ameri- 
can commissioners furnishing three. These were 
signed and exchanged, Lord Gambier delivering the 
three British copies to Adams, and Adams in turn 
delivering the three American copies to Lord Gambier. 
Lord Gambier expressed the hope that the treaty would 
be permanent, and Adams replied that he " hoped it 
would be the last treaty of peace between Great Britain 
and the United States."^^ Upon the ratification of 
either copy by the two Governments hostilities were to 
cease. 

The British ministers at the conference the day be- 
fore had consented to date the cessation of hostilities 
from the ratification by the two states, instead of the 
exchange of ratifications, which before they had de- 
manded. However, they had insisted that such rati- 
fications should be without alteration by either of the 
contracting parties.''^ They were criticized by their own 
Government for inserting this clause. 

It was agreed by the two commissions that the 
fact of the signing of the treaty should not be made 
known until noon of the following day, when Baker 
should be able to make the announcement at London. 
A carriage was in readiness to convey him, immediately 

75 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 126. 

■^6 Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. 30, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., S16-517. 



CONCLUSION OF PEACE NEGOTIATION 35/ 

upon the signing of the treaty, to Ostend, where a 
vessel was waiting to take him to England. '^^ 

This eventful day prompted Adams to make the 
following entry in his diary : " I cannot close the 
record of this day without an humble offering of grati- 
tude to God for the conclusion to which it has pleased 
him to bring the negotiations for peace at this place, 
and a fervent prayer that its result may be propitious 
to the welfare, the best interests, and the union of my 
country. "^^ 

77 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 126. 

78 Ibid., 127. 



CHAPTER IX 
Ratification and Reception of the Treaty 

At once upon the signing of the treaty Anthony 
St. John Baker set out for London, carrying with him 
a copy of the treaty and despatches from the British 
commissioners to their Government. One of these 
despatches informed the British Foreign Office that 
Christopher Hughes, Jr., secretary of the American 
mission, had been furnished with a certificate of his 
being the bearer to the United States of one copy of 
the treaty of peace.^ It was recommended that Henry 
Carroll, the bearer of a duplicate copy of the treaty, be 
permitted to proceed to the United States on the same 
ship which might be assigned to carry to America His 
Majesty's ratification. 

The next day, December 25, the American min- 
isters communicated to their Government the substance 
of the negotiations since the last despatches were sent 
on the Chauncey and announced the final result. The 
joint letter, in giving the account of the proceedings 
with reference to the fisheries and the Mississippi, stated 

1 British Commissioners to Castlereagh, Dec. 24, 1814; MS., 
British Foreign Office, 5, 102. 

358 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 359 

that the offer to exchange the one privilege for the 
Other was that of the majority of the mission.- This 
wording was inserted at the request of Russell, upon 
the suggestion of Clay. 

On the 28th, the American ministers sent a note to 
the British in reply to the request made by the latter 
in a note of December 7, which had asked for proofs 
of the charges made by the American Government with 
reference to the carrying away and sale of negroes by 
British officers. The American ministers stated that, 
not having been instructed to communicate proofs to 
the British Government for the purpose which the 
British Government had in contemplation, they would 
transmit the British note to the American Government 
to decide upon the propriety of its co-operation in 
that object which the British now had in view.^ 

Before leaving Ghent the American ministers gave 
a public dinner to the British ministers at which the 
Intendant of Ghent and numerous other officials were 
present. At the dinner Lord Gambier arose to give 
the first toast : " The United States of North America," 
but Adams courteously anticipated him in offering the 
toast: "His Majesty the King of England." At the 
same moment the band struck up " God save the King." 

2 American Ministers to Monroe, Dec. 25, 1814; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., III., ^2>^-^^^•, Russell Papers, MS., 
No. HID. 

3 American to British Commissioners, Dec. 28, 1814; MS., 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 



360 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

When Lord Gambler afterwards arose to give his toast 
the band played the American patriotic air, "Hail, 
Columbia." The citizens of Ghent also gave a grand 
fete to the ministers of the two missions in celebration 
of the signing of the treaty. This was given in the 
beautiful Hotel de Ville of that city.* 

Carroll, whom the American ministers had com- 
missioned to be the bearer of a copy of the treaty to 
the United States, left Ghent for London, December 
26. He sailed from London, January 2, in the British 
ship of war Favorite in company with Baker, who had 
been authorized to be the bearer of the British copy 
of the treaty to America, and to act in the name and 
behalf of His Britannic Majesty for the exchange of 
ratifications of the treaty.^ The copy of the treaty 
which he carried had been ratified by the Prince Re- 
gent in council at Carleton House,^ December 27. 
This ratification was, however, merely nominal, be- 
cause full powers had been granted to the British com- 
missioners, unlike those of the American commission- 
ers, to bind the Government to " accept, ratify, and con- 

* Adams gave as a toast at this banquet : " Ghent, the city 
of peace; May the gates of the temple of Janus, here closed, 
not be opened again for a century!" (Memoirs of J. Q. 
Adams, III., 131, 139.) 

^ Castlereagh to Baker, Dec. 23, 1814; Memoirs and Corre- 
spondence of Castlereagh, X., 230-231. 

^ London Globe, Dec. 27, 1814. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 36 1 

firm " whatever'^ the commissioners should sign. Baker 
was empowered, upon the exchange of ratified copies 
of the treaty, to adopt measures for forwarding naval 
and military despatches, with which he was supplied, 
commanding the cessation of hostilities.^ He was in- 
structed to proceed to Washington with all possible 
speed and, upon his arrival there, to present to the 
American Secretary of State his letters of credence. 
He was to proceed to an exchange of ratifications pro- 
vided no alteration or addition to the treaty was made 
by the American Government. Should the President 
refuse to ratify the treaty, Baker was ordered to con- 
tinue to Halifax and there make known throughout the 
American States in every possible way the terms of the 
treaty.^ If peace should ensue, he was to remain at 
Washington as charge d'affaires until the restoration 
of diplomatic relations between the two countries.^" 

The Favorite arrived at New York, Saturday even- 
ing, February 11, but Baker did not reach Washing- 
ton until the 17th. Christopher Hughes, bearing the 
unratified copy of the treaty, arrived at Washington by 
way of Annapolis, February 14. On the evening of 
that date the treaty was considered by the Cabinet, 

^ Full Powers of the British Commissioners ; MS., British 
Foreign OflSce, 5, 102. 

8 Bathurst to Baker, Dec. 31, 1814; Memoirs and Corre- 
spondence of Castlereagh, X., 231-233; MS., British Foreign 
Office, 5, IDS. 

9 Ibid. 

10 Ibid. 



362 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

and on the following day the President communicated 
it to the Senate for its advice and approval.^^ The 
Senate requested the President to transmit all the papers 
connected with the negotiations which had not previ- 
ously been communicated. The next day, February 
16/- the President submitted all the papers received 
since December i, the date of the last transmission. 
The Senate, thereupon, voted unanimously to ratify the 
treaty,^^ so that when Baker, the bearer of the British 
copy of the treaty, arrived at the State Department at 
eleven o'clock on the evening of February 17, every- 
thing was in readiness for the exchange of ratifications, 
which at once took place between Baker and Secretary 
Monroe.^* The next day the treaty was proclaimed and 
published.^^ In the exchange of ratifications it was 
agreed that the boundary commissioners to be ap- 
pointed in accordance with the provisions of the treaty 
should act upon the same principles as were observed 
in the treaty of 1794.^*^ The Favorite, returning to 
Great Britain, reached London March 13, and the ratl- 
in Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
552. 

12 American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 730. 
^3 Boston Weekly Messenger, Feb. 17, 1815. 
1* Baker to Castlereagh, Feb. 19, 1815; MS., British Foreign 
Office, 5, 106. 

15 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
560. 

IS Baker to Castlereagh, Feb. 19, 1815 ; MS., British Foreign 
Office, 5, 106. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 363 

fied treaty was delivered to Lord Castlereagh.^^ 
Knowledge of this event was immediately communi- 
cated to the Lord Mayor.^^ 

The celerity with which approval was given to the 
treaty indicates clearly the attitude of the United States 
Government witli reference to it. The Republicans, 
undoubtedly, were glad to bring to an end a war which 
had brought the Government into extreme difficulties, 
political and financial ; while the Federalists, who had 
consistently opposed the war, naturally welcomed peace, 
especially as they hoped that it would restore again the 
commercial prosperity of New England. The Federal- 
ist press, it is true, which before had criticized the Gov- 
ernment for not making peace, now criticized the terms 
of the treaty. It claimed that nothing had been secured 
save the cessation of hostilities, but even this, it ad- 
mitted, was worth rejoicing over.^^ The Republican 
papers considered the treaty most acceptable, and eulo- 
gized the American commissioners in highest terms. 
Even the Federalist papers had nothing but commenda- 
tion for the American representatives. The Philadel- 
phia Gazette, before the treaty was signed, paid this 
high compliment to the American commissioners : 

17 Adams to Monroe, March 22, 1815; MS., Bureau of In- 
dexes and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 147. 

18 Bathurst to Baker, March 21, 1815; MS., British Foreign 
Office, 5, 105. St. James Chronicle, March 14, 1815. 

19 Boston Gazette, Feb. 16, 20, 27, 1815. New England Pal- 
ladium, Feb. 24, 1815. Federal Republican (Georgetown), 
Feb. 20, 24, 1815. 



364 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

" After a most careful and dispassionate survey of the 
correspondence which has taken place between the 
American and British commissioners at Ghent, every 
American with feelings of just pride and exultation, 
must confess that their Representatives on this occa- 
sion have manifested a power of reasoning, added to 
forcibleness of demonstration, chastity and compre- 
hensiveness of language, which entitle them to a supe- 
rior rank as able and intelligent diplomatists. The 
manner in which they have handled the subjects pre- 
sented for their consideration; the promptitude and 
facility with which they have met and overcome every 
impediment in the course of their discussions, are evi- 
dence not only of a deep study and research, but of 
minds intrinsically devoted to the true interests of 
their country. In all the correspondence that has ap- 
peared, the American ministers evidently maintain a 
vast superiority, as much in the matter as in the style 
of the communications."^" 

High praise was universally accorded the American 
commissioners for the able way in which they had con- 
ducted the negotiations. Not only had they appeared 
to be superior to the British commissioners in diplo- 
matic tact, but also in the character of their notes.^^ 

20 Philadelphia Gazette, quoted in the National Intelligencer, 
Dec. 15, 1814. 

21 Madison to Adams, Dec. 17, 1814; Madison Papers, MS., 
VII., 81. G. W. Hay to Monroe, Jan. 6, 1815; Monroe Papers, 
MS., XIV., 1862. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 365 

The favorable reception of the treaty was reflected 
not only in the action of the Government and the 
language of the press, but in the spontaneous rejoicing 
of the people in city and town throughout the United 
States. As soon as the news of peace reached America 
it was quickly communicated to the cities and towns of 
the country by means of express riders who were paid 
large sums for their services. 

In New York, where the news was first received, 
there was at once a great demonstration. A large pro- 
cession was formed, and brilliant illuminations were 
seen throughout the city. Guns were fired, the public 
buildings were decorated, and every possible mani- 
festation of joy was shown. The news of the treaty 
came eight days after Jackson's brilliant victory at 
New Orleans, and the two events were celebrated 
together ; a transparency on the City Hall suggestive of 
the two showed the American eagle bearing in one 
talon the thunderbolts of war and in the other the 
olive branch of peace.^- 

The news of peace reached Philadelphia on Sunday, 
February 12, as the people were returning from church. 
There was general rejoicing, strangers greeting one 
another with good wishes, mutual congratulations, and 
hand shaking.'^ Here, too, a public celebration took 

22 New York Spectator, Feb. 13, 1815. 

23 Patterson to Russell, Feb. 20, 1815; Russell Papers, MS., 
No. 1067. 



366 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

place commemorating both the peace and the victory 
at New Orleans. In Boston, where the news arrived 
on the 13th, the schools were dismissed, business was 
suspended, a procession immediately formed of the 
military organizations of the city, and a general cele- 
bration was voted by the legislature.-* Similar demon- 
strations also occurred in the smaller places of the 
country. 

At Washington the ratification of the treaty came in 
time to enable the restoration of peace to be celebrated 
on Washington's birthday. A large procession, in 
which all the trades were represented, took place. The 
proclamation of the ratification of the treaty was read 
and speeches were delivered. A banquet in the evening 
closed the day's celebration.^^ March 4, the President 
issued another proclamation appointing the second 
Thursday in April as a day of national thanksgiving 
for the establishment of peace. ^^ 

The treaty was the more acceptable to the public 
because by the victory of New Orleans the war closed 
with great credit to the American forces. This feel- 
ing was shown in a letter to one of the commission- 
ers in which satisfaction was expressed "because in 

2* Patterson to Russell, Feb. 20, 1815; Russell Papers, MS., 
No. 1067. Otis Ammidon to Russell, Feb. 20, 1815; Russell 
Papers, MS., No. 1362. Boston Gazette, Feb. 16, 1815. 

25 Boston Weekly Messenger, Feb. 24, 1815. 

26 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
560-561. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 36/ 

the fulness of our glory we grant peace to a worsted 
enemy. -^ 

The American commissioners themselves, though 
disappointed in not being able to secure any promise 
on the part of the British of a discontinuance of the 
practice of impressment or of fictitious blockades, and 
though they failed to secure in the treaty any renewal 
of the fishing privileges in British territory, were, never- 
theless, satisfied that the treaty was, on the whole, 
honorable and fairly favorable to the United States. 
Adams in a letter to Monroe on the day of the signing 
of the treaty wrote as follows : " If the treaty is not 
precisely such as we could have wished, I firmly be- 
lieve it is all which under the circumstances of the 
times, it was possible to obtain. . . . On our part we 
have yielded only that without which Peace would have 
been impracticable."-^ Gallatin in a letter to Monroe, 
December 25, said : " The treaty of peace we signed 
yesterday with the British ministers is, in my opinion, 
as favorable as could be expected under existing cir- 
cumstances, as far as they were known to us."^^ 
Clay wrote: "The terms of this instrument are un- 
doubtedly not such as the country expected at the 

2'' John L. Smith to Russell, April 2, 1815; Russell Papers, 
MS., No. 585. 

28 Adams to Monroe, Dec. 24, 1814; MS., Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives, Russian Despatches, II., No. 144. 

29 Gallatin to Monroe, Dec. 25, 1814; Writings of Gallatin, 
I., 645-647. 



368 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

commencement of the war. Judged of, however, by 
the actual condition of things, as far as is known to 
us, they cannot be pronounced very unfavorable; . . . 
judged from the pretensions of the enemy at the open- 
ing of the negotiation the conditions of the peace re- 
flect no dishonor on us."^" Russell, writing to Craw- 
ford, said : " I believe we have done the best, or nearly 
the best, which was practicable in existing circum- 
stances."^^ 

Public opinion in the United States, in general, was 
most favorable to the treaty.^^ The failure to secure 
any statement relative to impressment and paper 
blockades was not regarded as so important since these 
practices on the part of the British Government had 
ceased with the overthrow of Napoleon, and it was the 
general opinion that they would not be carried on 
again.^^ A few here and there whose financial in- 
terests were affected by the fall in prices which ac- 
companied the news of peace were not pleased with 
the treaty. In New York brown sugar fell from $26 
per cwt. to $12.50; tea from $2.25 to $1 per pound. 
Specie dropped from 22 per cent, advance to 2 per cent. 

30 Clay to Monroe, Dec. 25, 1814; Monroe Papers, MS., 
XIV., No. 1822. 

31 Russell to Crawford, Dec. 23, 1814; Crawford Tran- 
scripts, MSS. Div., Library of Congress. 

32 J. Smith to Russell, May 6, 1815; Russell Papers, MS., 
No. 2041. National Intelligencer, Feb. 16, 23, 1815. Madison 
to Benj. Austin, March 7,1815; Madison Papers, MS., VII., 84. 

33 Ibid. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 369 

Tin fell from $30 a box to $25. Public stocks rose 19 
per cent. Treasury notes appreciated 13 per cent.^* 
A sudden depression in the price of gunpowder and all 
kinds of military and naval stores was noted. 

The British Government, as has been shown, were 
glad to conclude peace even though they had been 
obliged to surrender practically every demand that they 
had made. The English press for the most part con- 
sidered the treaty derogatory to Great Britain. The 
London Globe, the next day after the news was re- 
ceived from Ghent, said, after enumerating the condi- 
tions of the treaty: " In this description of the treaty, 
we read the humiliation of ministers in every line. It 
forms indeed a deplorable contrast with the high sound- 
ing threats and boasts of that part of the public press 
devoted to their service. The waiving of some rights, 
and the mere retention of others, is a miserable finale 
to a war that we were told must not cease until after 
the Americans had been ' confoundedly well flogged ' ; 
which, it was boasted, must dismember the union, over- 
throw the Government and sweep the American navy 
from the ocean, not leaving a single bit of bunting or a 
rag or stitch behind. But after the state to which 
ministers had brought the country by their extrava- 
gance, and the war by their incapacity, if they had been 
able to terminate it upon any terms not absolutely dis- 
honorable and ruinous, if they had effected a lasting 

34 National Intelligencer, Feb. 23, 1815. 
25 



3/0 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

peace, although not an advantageous one, and not 
merely purchased a short and precarious respite, with 
a certainty of the renewal of war with increased force 
and violence at a time when America shall have, both 
internally and in her relation with the European 
Powers, many advantages which she does not now pos- 
sess, we would not be disposed to complain."^^ 

The London Times, also of the opposition press, was 
bitterly opposed to the ratification of the treaty.^® In 
its issue of December 27 it announced what it called 
" the terms of the deadly instrument."^'' In an edi- 
torial of December 31^® it professed to believe that the 
ratification of the treaty by Madison depended upon 
the outcome of the campaign against New Orleans. It 
denied that general satisfaction had been produced by 
the signing of the treaty, which could be shown from 
the fact that the funds had remained at a " dead level " 
instead of rising as might have been expected if general 
satisfaction and confidence prevailed. 

To accept peace in the midst of reverses was 
humiliating to the English people. Peace would have 
been more palatable, it was said, had it come earlier 
when the British arms were successful.^^ The bril- 
ls London Globe, Dec. 2"], 1814. 

36 London Times, Dec. 30, 1814. 

37 Ibid., Dec. 27, 1814. 

38 Ibid., Dec. 31, 1814. 

39Beasley to Russell, Oct. 20, 1814; Russell Papers, MS., 
No. 1847. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 37 1 

Hant success won by the small American navy, which 
had been an object of derision at the beginning of the 
war, wounded the pride of the British, which centered 
in their navy, then, as now, the first in the world. The 
Naval Chronicle of that date had as a motto : " The 
winds and waves are Britain's wide domain and not a 
sail but by permission spreads."*" It was declared 
that the law of nations had always been the law of the 
strongest; that England was, therefore, de jure the 
dictator of the maritime law of the civilized world.*'- 
After the first victories of the American navy, the Eng- 
lish papers stated that the United States navy must 
be crushed to atoms ; that peace must not be enter- 
tained until that object shoiild have been achieved.*^ 
The press with few exceptions had been very severe 
in its denunciations of the United States and, par- 
ticularly, of Madison, who was supposed to have been 
the cause of the war.*^ The papers had throughout 
the peace negotiations insisted that peace should not 
be made until America should have been " beaten into 
submission."** Peace made at New York or Wash- 
ington,*^ and " at the point of the bayonet,"*^ was pref- 

^^ National Intelligencer, Nov. i, 1814. 
^1 London Evening Star, quoted in the National Intelligencer, 
April 3, 1813. 
*- London Times, July 2, 1814. 
43 Ibid., May 17, 1814. 
** London Sun, July 22, 1814. 
*^ London Times, July 2, 1S14. 
*^ London Sun, Aug. 23, 1814. 



3/2 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

arable to negotiations at Ghent. After the British 
victories of August and September it had been de- 
clared that the fancied conquerors of Canada would 
"be mighty glad to come on their knees and cry 
' Paenitet. Miserere nostrum.' "*''' The separation of 
the New England States from the Union and the 
alliance of these with Great Britain was declared as 
likely to follow.^^ 

The popular British demands, which the British 
commissioners had presented at Ghent, as we have 
seen, had included the recognition by the United 
States of the maritime claims of Great Britain ; the 
restitution of Louisiana ; the rearrangement of the 
boundary in accordance with the wishes of Canada; 
the establishment of a permanent Indian territory ; and 
the exclusion of the United States from all participa- 
tion in the fisheries of British North America.*^ 

In view of all these claims it was difficult to become 
reconciled to a treaty which secured scarcely one of the 
things expected and which concluded a war which had 
been far from creditable to British arms. In this war, 
according to one of their own papers, with a navy on 
the American coast exceeding that of the enemy in 
the proportion of ten to one. Great Britain had lost 

^■^ London Times, Oct. 15, 1814. 

*8 London Star, Sept. 29, 1814; London Times, April 15, 

1814. 

49 National Intelligencer, April 28, 1814; Boston Weekly 
Messenger, Aug. 5, 1814. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 373 

two out of every three fights and had lost three times 
as many men. She also had had seventeen hundred 
merchant vessels captured.^" To make peace with this 
record, made vastly worse by the closing campaign of 
the war, was thought to invite the scorn of other 
nations. The London Times said :^^ " They will reflect 
that we have attempted to force our principles on 
America, and have failed. Nay, that we have retired 
from the combat with the stripes yet bleeding on our 
backs — with the recent defeats at Plattsburg, and on 
Lake Champlain, unavenged. To make peace at such 
a moment, they will think, betrays a deadness to the 
feelings of honor, and shows a timidity of disposition, 
inviting further insult. If we could have pointed to 
America overthrown, we would surely have stood on 
a much higher ground at Vienna, and everywhere else 
than we possibly can do now. Even yet, however, if 
we could but close the war with some great naval 
triumph, the reputation of our maritime greatness 
might be partially restored : but to say that it has not 
hitherto suffered in the estimation of all Europe, and 
what is worse, of America itself, is to belie common 
sense and universal experience. ' Two or three of our 
ships have struck to a force vastly superiot" ! ' — No, not 
two or three, but many, on the Ocean, and whole 
squadrons on the Lakes ; and the numbers are to be 
viewed with relation to the comparative magnitude of 

s° Edinburgh Review, Nov., 1814. 
51 London Times, Dec. 30, 1814. 



374 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

the two navies. Scarcely is there one American ship 
of war which has not the boast of a victory over the 
British flag, scarcely one British ship in thirty or forty 
that has beaten an American, Our seamen, it is urged, 
have on all occasions fought bravely. Who denies it? 
Our complaint is, that with the bravest seamen, and 
most powerful navy in the world, we retire from the 
contest when the balance of defeat is so heavily against 
us. Be it accident, or be it misconduct, we enquire not 
now into the cause; the certain, the inevitable con- 
sequences are what we look to, and they may be 
summed up in a few words — the speedy growth of the 
American navy — and the recurrence of a new and 
much more formidable American war. . . . We are well 
convinced, that every ship, and every sailor, employed 
in maintaining the vital contest for our maritime as- 
cendency, far from diminishing, will add a propor- 
tional weight to our influence at Vienna ; but in truth, 
Vienna and its fetes, and all its negotiations, are in- 
finitely insignificant to us now, compared with the 
growth of the American navy and the probable loss of 
our transatlantic provinces. With respect to the latter 
point, it is certain that the present treaty will produce 
the most serious discontent among the Canadians, when 
they find that the great object of their wishes, a secure 
frontier communication, is referred to the decision of 
commissioners."^^ 

22 London Times, Dec. 30, 1814. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 375 

The prediction of this paper that the treaty would 
not be satisfactory to Canada proved true. The people 
of British North America had been clamorous for a 
change in the boundary between those provinces and 
the United States which should give them absolute 
control of the navigable rivers and lakes lying between 
the two, with the adjacent territory, which would pre- 
vent invasions from the United States by water.^^ 
They were also no less insistent upon excluding the 
Americans from the former fishing privileges. A me- 
morial from Newfoundland, a few months before the 
peace negotiation began, pointed out the advantages 
that had accrued to Canadian fishermen with the elimi- 
nation of American competition during the war. 
It strongly urged the permanent exclusion of for- 
eign fishermen from the Newfoundland fisheries, giv- 
ing as an additional reason for such action that the 
increased numbers of native fishermen afforded larger 
facility for national defense. 

The anti-ministerial papers, the London Morning 
Chronicle and the London Courier, were favorable to 
the treaty, and considered the terms as most honorable 
for the country inasmuch as Great Britain had yielded 
nothing in the treaty with reference to the maritime 

^3 Quebec Gazette, quoted in New York Spectator, July 2, 
1814; Quebec Mercury, Nov. 8, quoted in New York Herald, 
Dec. 2, 1814. 



3/6 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

questions.^* Party feeling so strongly actuated the 
press that it affords no sure index of the public senti- 
ment. That the people, however, rejoiced in the 
restoration of peace was seen in the demonstrations 
with which they greeted the first news.^^ At Birming- 
ham a large crowd witnessed the arrival of the mail 
which brought the news of the treaty. They imme- 
diately took the horses out and drew the coach to the 
post-office with loud acclamations.^^ The manufactur- 
ing and mercantile classes were especially glad to see 
peace, for it gave promise of renewed prosperity. 

The British commissioners were not the recipients 
of such universal commendation as that bestowed upon 
the representatives of the United States. When the 
treaty was discussed in the House of Commons, April 
II, 1815, in connection with a motion which had been 
made proposing an address of thanks to the Prince 
Regent for the treaty of peace, the British commis- 
sioners were severely censured for having acted with 
" gross mismanagement " in the negotiations. The 
basis of the criticism was that " in this treaty no one 
subject of dispute between the two countries that 
existed before its signature does not still exist and all 
the pretensions advanced by His Majesty's ministers 

^* London Morning Chronicle, Dec. 27, 1814; London Cou- 
rier, Dec. 27, 1814. 

^5 Boston Weekly Messenger, Feb. 17, 1815. 

s*' Adams, History of the United States, IX., 54-55. Lon- 
don Courier, Dec. 30, 1814. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 3// 

in the course of the negotiations were, one by one, 
abandoned by them." Alexander Baring and others 
spoke in a similar condemnatory way. Goulburn 
spoke in defence of himself and his colleagues. The 
motion was carried by a vote of 128 to 37.°^ In the 
House of Lords two days later the ministers were 
censured when discussion arose over a motion made 
by the Marquis of Wellesley for an address to the 
Prince Regent requesting him to place before the House 
copies of the correspondence between His Britannic 
Majesty's plenipotentiaries and those of the United 
States. Earl Bathurst, Secretary for War and the 
Colonies, had great difficulty in defending the minis- 
ters and in preventing the passage of the motion.^^ 

One feature that marred the negotiations at Ghent 
that is indissolubly connected with the treaty and with 
its negotiation is the unpleasant feelings that were 
aroused and that continued to be manifested in later 
years by certain members of the commission in their re- 
lations to each other. The smouldering personal ill 
feeling which flashed up during many of the discus- 
sions of the commissioners broke into a flame in the 
last conferences. The most violent controversies arose 
over the fisheries and the Mississippi question, but 
even such a small matter as the final disposal of the 
papers and documents caused a bitter quarrel in the 
mission. Gallatin thought that the papers should be 

"Annual Register, 1815, 15-17. 
58 Ibid., 17-18. 



3/8 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

sent to Beasley, the charge d'affaires at London, for 
the use of the commissioners engaged in negotiating a 
commercial treaty. Clay, on the other hand, thought 
that all the papers should be sent by the Neptune to 
Washington. ^^ At a meeting on December 30, 
Bayard, Clay, and Russell, Adams being absent, voted 
that Adams should transmit all papers, maps, and other 
articles of the mission to Washington, and a letter was 
addressed to him to that effect. Adams replied to this 
communication on January 2.^^ He maintained that it 
was in accordance with general usage in such cases 
for the head of the mission to retain all papers unless 
directed by his Government to make some special 
disposition of them. He claimed responsibility for the 
papers, and expressed his unwillingness to deliver them 
except to some one authorized to receive them. He 
refused to consider the paper signed by Bayard, Clay, 
and Russell as the act of the majority of the mission 
since it had been signed without consultation of the 
whole mission. In consequence of the retention of 
these papers beyond the time of the sailing of the 
vessel which carried the treaty, the papers connected 
with the final negotiations were not presented to Con- 
gress at the time of the ratification of the treaty. 
It was not until the spring of 1822 that these last 

59 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, III., 129-130. 

60 Adams to Bayard, Clay, and Russell, Jan. 2, 1815 ; Russell 
Journals, V., 559-56o. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 379 

papers were given to the public. At this time John 
Quincy Adams was a candidate for the Repubhcan 
nomination for the Presidency. Jonathan Russell, then 
a member of Congress, and chairman of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations,*'^ was bitterly opposed to the 
candidacy of Adams, favoring instead that of Clay.^^ 
Russell thought that he might prejudice the West 
against Adams by making it appear that in the nego- 
tiations at Ghent Adams had been willing to sacrifice 
the western interests for those of the East in offer- 
ing to grant to the British the right of navigating the 
Mississippi in exchange for the fishing privileges. 
Russell succeeded in getting one of his colleagues in 
Congress to propose a resolution requesting the Presi- 
dent to have laid before Congress all the correspond- 
ence in connection with the treaty of Ghent which had 
not been made public. The resolution was laid on the 
table until the next day, January 17, when it was 
passed.^^ 

On February 21, the President communicated to 
Congress the papers.*^* These failed to give the op- 
ponents of Adams the material for criticism which they 
had expected. Later, April 19, the letter of Russell 
written to Monroe February 11, 1815, giving the 
reasons why he had differed from the majority on the 

81 Clay to Russell, Jan. 2, 1822 ; Russell Papers, MS., No. 419. 
62 Russell Papers, MS., No. 1724. 
^3 Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., ist sess., 733-734' 
^*Ibid., 1147. 



380 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

exchange of the Mississippi privileges for the fisheries, 
was called for by Congress. The Secretary of State 
reported to the President that the letter called for was 
not to be found in the archives of the State Depart- 
ment, but that Jonathan Russell had left at the State 
Department what purported to be a copy of that letter,^^ 
However, before this was given to Congress the 
original was found by Adams among the private 
papers of President Monroe. The original letter had 
been marked private by Russell and so had not been 
filed witti the public documents. Monroe communi- 
cated to Congress, May 4,^*^ the knowledge of the two 
letters, but considered it unwise to submit the letters 
themselves and the remarks which Adams had added 
unless the House should specially call for them. Con- 
gress then made a second call, which Russell claimed 
was at the instigation of Adams. The President then 
sent the letters in a message of May 7.^'' 

Russell was greatly censured for attempting to con- 
vert a private letter into a public document.^^ Adams 
and he carried on a most undignified controversy in 
the public press.*^^ The purported copy which Russell 

6^ Annals of Congress, 17th Cong., ist sess., 1791. 

66 Ibid. 

67 Ibid., 2170. 

68 Niles' Register, XXII., 220. 

69Niles' Register (Russell's reply), XXII., 296-304. Niles' 
Register (Adams's rejoinder), XXII., 327-336. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 38 1 

left with the Secretary of State unfortunately con- 
tained many variations from the original. Adams pub- 
lished in a pamphlet these letters in parallel columns.'^'* 
Of 172 variations pointed out by Adams, only two or 
three were of any real consequence, most of them being 
the underlining of a word, the order of the words, or 
shght change in phrasing. The most important change 
in the copy was found where Russell enlarged upon the 
reasons which actuated the minority in opposing the 
exchange of the two privileges. Here he placed the 
emphasis, as he had not in the original letter, upon the 
fact of its being contrary to the instructions of April 
15, 1813. Russell's explanations were never wholly 
satisfactory even to his friends. He claimed that the 
difference was immaterial and that he had purposed to 
present to the State Department an exact copy in- 
dicating the variations, but that before he saw Adams 
and had an opportunity to present such a copy, which 
he had prepared and had in his pocket, the original 
had been found.'^^ When Clay'^^ expressed regret at 
the divergence in Russell's letters and refused to side 
with him in his controversy with Adams, Russell bit- 

''o Duplicate letters of J. Q. Adams; British and Foreign 
State Papers, IX., 563-565. 

''I Russell to Pay, August 7, 1822; Russell Papers, MS., 
No. 817. 

72 Clay to Russell, Sept. 4, 1822; Russell Papers, MS., No. 
421. 



382 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

terly denounced him/^ although he had been hereto- 
fore a great admirer of the brilliant young Kentuckian. 
At the close of the negotiations Russell, in a letter to 
Crawford, American minister at Paris, gave expression 
to his feeling toward his colleagues, and more espe- 
cially toward Adams, in these words f^ " In noticing 
the diversity of opinion which may occasionally occur, 
on particular points, between the members of the mis- 
sion to which I belong and which undoubtedly arises 
from a difference of the impression which the same cir- 
cumstances make on different men however sincerely 
united in the pursuit of the same ultimate object, I by 
no means set up for infallibility, nor am I confident 
that the course of which I may be the advocate, is the 
best. I am still farther from intending tO' insinuate 
any reproach against the patriotism, or integrity or in- 
telligence of my colleagues because I happen to be so 
unfortunate as not to accord with them in my views 
of all the subjects, which, in the course of this negotia- 
tion, are presented for discussion. My only object in 
communicating to you these things is to make you 
better acquainted with the character of our proceed- 
ings, to show you that both sides of a question have 
been examined, and to profit by your information and 
advice, if it is possible to be obtained in season to in- 

^3 Russell to Crawford, Dec. 23, 1814; Crawford Tran- 
scripts, Library of Congress. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 383 

fluence the final decision, (i) There are so many 
agents informing the opinions and producing the con- 
victions of a man, besides his reason, that his argument, 
however sincere and plausible, may hold only a sub- 
ordinate rank, and be but the instrument of constitu- 
tional infirmity, prepossession or prejudice. (2) The 
texture of the nerves is a great thing even with great 
men, the fear or the firmness that results from it may 
have more concern in giving direction to the policy of 
an able statesman than his understanding. (3) Great 
irritability of fibre is still more dangerous. It sports 
with the judgment and sometimes the character of its 
victim. It betrays him into inconsistency and ex- 
travagance and, after raising him into flights of eccen- 
tricity, and perhaps of eloquence, leaves him a prey to 
error and absurdity. If this unfortunate man should, 
at the same time, be tainted with family pride or in- 
fected with the conceit of literary acquirement or of 
local importance, his reasoning faculties and his 
patriotism are necessarily circumscribed within very 
narrow limits and he is liable to mistake the tasteless 
ostentation of pedantry for science and his little per- 
sonal pretensions and the motives of his vicinage for 
the great interests of his country. 

" The influence of habit and of education is also 
unsafe, and the wisest and best of men may in vain 
believe themselves free from the prejudices it neces- 
sarily engenders. A long cooperation with a party or 



384 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

a sect imbues the very soul with their colour and what- 
ever purity we may affect, or sincerely endeavor to 
attain, we still give the same tinge to everything which 
we touch. A professional education is, likewise, apt to 
impose fetters on the mind and to give a mechanical 
and artificial character even to our reasoning. The 
tanner believed that leather was the best material for 
fortification and the common lawyer will cite, authori- 
tatively, a black letter maxim as a clincher on a point 
of public right.^* 

"Aware of these and other frailties of human na- 
ture, if I am disposed perhaps to distrust too much the 
opinions of others, I am taught a salutary diffidence in 
my own. When, however, I encounter a man in whose 
heart all the noble passions have found their home, 
and whose head is unobscured by the fogs of a false 
education, whose great object is the welfare of his 
country and who pursues this object with an instinctive 
good sense that never deceives, I listen to him with un- 
suspecting confidence, and promptly accord to in- 
genuousness that implicit faith which I am apt to deny 
to mere ingenuity."'^^ 

Five days after the treaty of peace was signed the 
American commissioners sent a note to the British 
commissioners with reference to a commercial conven- 
tion which they stated they had power "to treat or 

'^^ Russell to Crawford, Dec. 23, 1814; Crawford Transcripts. 
75 Ibid. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 385 

negotiate for, and, in the name of the United States, 
with a minister or ministers of His Britannic Majesty, 
furnished with the like power, concerning the general 
commerce between the United States and Great Britain 
and its dominions and dependencies and concerning all 
matters and subjects connected therewith which may 
be interesting to the two nations, to conclude and sign 
a treaty or convention touching the same premises."^" 
The British commissioners replied the following day 
that their powers had expired and, therefore, they 
could make no answer to the American note, but that 
they would transmit it to their Government for con- 
sideration.'^'' 

As soon as the ratification of the treaty of peace be- 
came known Gallatin and Clay went to London in order 
to learn the disposition of the British Government 
toward a commercial treaty.''^ Soon after their arrival 
they were invited by Lord Castlereagh to an interview 
in which he expressed his desire that the commis- 
sioners who had negotiated the treaty of Ghent, to- 
gether with Sir Frederick John Robinson, should, 
unofficially, talk over the subjects of the proposed 

■^6 American to British Ministers, Dec. 29, 1814; MS., Bu- 
reau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 

■^"British to American Commissioners, Dec. 30, 1814; MS., 
Bureau of Indexes and Archives, " Treaty of Ghent." 

■^sciay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10. 

26 



386 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

commercial treaty to find out whether it was likely that 
any general principle could be agreed upon as a 
basis.'^'' It was recommended that the American com- 
missioners should consult together upon this and other 
subjects suggested by Lord Castlereagh. The follow- 
ing day Gallatin and Clay reported to Goulburn their 
willingness to meet the British commissioners for an 
unofficial conference. They heard no more from the 
British Government for nearly three weeks. Gallatin 
and Clay then intimated their intention of leaving.^'' 
A few days after they were invited by Robinson to 
call at his office.'' This they did and found there 
Goulburn and Dr. Adams. Upon the British commis- 
sioners requesting to hear the propositions which 
the American commissioners had to offer, it was re- 
marked by the American commissioners that there 
were, commonly, in a treaty of commerce two classes 
of subjects: commercial regulations applicable to a 
state of peace as well as of war, and regulations refer- 
ring to the rights and duties of the two parties when 
one was at war and the other at peace. The American 
commissioners stated that they had been instructed 
on both these subjects by their Government. They 
presented as subjects to be included in a commercial 

79 Conversation between Castlereagh and Clay and Gallatin, 
April i6, 1815; American State Papers, For Rel., IV., 11. 

80 Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10. 

81 Ibid. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 38/ 

treaty the following :^^ That the two states with respect 
to each other should be placed on the footing of the 
nation most favored ; that all discriminating duties on 
tonnage or merchandise, whether of imports or ex- 
ports, should be abolished ; that the trade between 
America and the British West Indies should be regu- 
lated and placed on a more permanent basis ; that the 
nature and kind of intercourse between America and 
the adjoining British provinces should be defined and 
provided for ; and that trade with the Indian posses- 
sions of Great Britain should be open to America 
without being restricted to direct intercourse in the 
outward and return voyage. They expressed their de- 
sire to provide for the question of impressment, and 
stated that the American Government was willing to 
prohibit merchant vessels of the United States from em- 
ploying British seamen. The recent act of Congress 
on this subject, it was declared, would largely remove 
the difficulties, and, therefore, Great Britain should be 
willing to abandon the practice.®^ An arrangement on 
the trade between the United States and the colonies 
of a state at war with Great Britain was proposed, 
and also a definition of blockade was suggested as 
desirable. 

The British commissioners were unwilling to discuss 

82 Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10. 

83 Ibid. 



388 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

the points under the subject applying to a belHgerent 
state of one of the parties. They wished to consider 
commercial relations in time of peace only. They ob- 
jected to the discussion of impressment; but stated 
that their Government would receive favorably any 
proposition for the abolition of discriminating duties. 
Trade with the East Indies might be conceded; but 
upon that with the West Indies it was not practicable to 
enter into any stipulation. The British commissioners 
announced that they would refer the substance of the 
conversation to the Cabinet.^* 

Five days later, April i6, again upon the invitation 
of Robinson, the American commissioners called at the 
office of the former and met there the British com- 
missioners. These had received instructions from the 
Cabinet to reply to the topics before mentioned by the 
American commissioners. They stated that of com- 
mercial intercourse between the two states the British 
Government were willing to treat on the footing of 
the most favored nation, and were willing to agree 
upon arrangements for the abolition of discriminating 
duties; they were also willing to admit the United 
States to the East India trade without restrictions of 
direct trade on outward voyage ; but should be obliged 
to insist on that with respect to the return voyage, as 
was contended in the treaty of 1794. The British com- 
missioners claimed that if the United States were to 

84 Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 389 

offer no equivalent for the privilege, it should, at 
least, show a spirit of accommodation in the other 
parts of the commercial arrangement, in the fur trade 
for instance. They maintained that the West India 
trade policy was so fixed that it could not well be 
changed, but that trade with the North American pos- 
sessions would be willingly discussed and arranged to 
the satisfaction of both states. Any proposition that 
the American commissioners might have to offer relat- 
ing to conditions where one state was at war would be 
considered. Definition of blockades was declared to be 
unnecessary, as any question arising in connection with 
them must relate to fact rather than to principle. It 
was held that difficulties existed in connection with any 
arrangement of colonial trade inasmuch as it was not 
known what policy France had adopted. Impressment 
was also declared to be impracticable for discussion.^^ 
The American commissioners asserted, with refer- 
ence to the suggested fur trade, that they were posi- 
tively forbidden to consent to any renewal of trade 
between British subjects and the Indians. They main- 
tained that the reasons for this were political, not com- 
mercial. The commissioners offered to enter upon 
the negotiation, reserving the right to withdraw if cir- 
cumstances should make it eligible to do so, and to 
leave Adams, who was daily expected, to conclude it.®^ 

^5 Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10. 
86 Ibid. 



390 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

The British commissioners, thereupon, agreed to pro- 
vide themselves with the necessary powers for the 
negotiation.^'^ Adams had in the meanwhile reached 
London. He arrived there May 25 from Paris, where 
he had been since the signing of the treaty of Ghent, 
waiting for his commission as Ambassador to Great 
Britain. On June 5, the British commissioners sent 
an invitation for a meeting on the 7th, At the confer- 
ence which was held on that date their powers were 
exchanged. The American commissioners delivered a 
projet of a commercial convention consisting of six 
articles. In this projet they gave up all reference to 
seamen and maritime rights, as it appeared impossible 
to secure any arrangement on that subject. Adams 
had previously interviewed Lord Castlereagh, and had 
become convinced that nothing could be arranged on 
the subject of impressment.^® The proposed treaty 
was confined strictly to commercial subjects. In draw- 
ing up the projet, the treaties of 1794 and 1806, the 
instructions given the commissioners in 1807, and re- 
cent legislation of Congress were used.®^ 

The articles of this projet provided for the follow- 
ing objects : freedom of intercourse between the 

^^ Clay and Gallatin to Secretary of State, May 18, 1815; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 8-10. 

88 Adams to Monroe, June 22, 1815; MS., Bureau of In- 
dexes and Archives, British notes, 19, No. i. 

89 Gallatin to Monroe, Nov. 25, 1815; Writings of Gallatin, 
I., 662-665. 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 39 1 

United States and the British possessions in Europe; 
the aboHtion of all discriminating duties in trade be- 
tween the United States and the British possessions in 
Europe ; liberty to the United States of trade with the 
British East Indies ; trade without discriminating 
duties between the subjects of the United States and 
the British North American possessions, including 
freedom of navigation on all waters entering those 
possessions ; the mutual recognition of consular rights ; 
each state with respect to the other to be placed on 
the basis of the " most favored nation." 

The British ministers presented a contre-projet 
which consented to the article with respect to the aboli- 
tion of discriminating duties ; to that concerning free- 
dom of intercourse between the United States and 
British European possessions with certain omissions ; 
and to the article respecting consular arrangements. In 
the article with respect to liberty of trade with the 
British East Indies restrictions were made to certain 
ports and to direct trade on the return voyage between 
such ports and the United States. The article with 
reference to the East India trade was made a separate 
article outside of the treaty, as the duration of it was 
to be for two years only. The " most favored nation " 
arrangement was to be confined to the United States 
and the British European possessions.'-'*' The provision 

80 Gallatin to Monroe, Nov. 25, 1815 ; Writings of Gallatin, 
I., 662-665. 



392 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

for trade with the British North American possessions 
and that for freedom of navigation were limited. 

The American plenipotentiaries in reply to the 
contre-projet of the British proposed to reinstate the 
clauses which the British plenipotentiaries had omitted, 
notably that which provided that neither the inter- 
course between the United States and His Britannic 
Majesty's possessions in the West Indies nor that by 
sea between the United States and His Britannic 
Majesty's possessions in North America should be 
affected by any article in the treaty.°^ 

Conferences between the two missions occurred the 
nth and the 21st. The American commissioners de- 
clined to accept the arrangement limiting the trade 
privilege with the East Indies to two years, and instead 
proposed the inclusion of that privilege in the treaty 
itself and the duration of the treaty for four years. 
The commissioners being unable to agree upon terms 
of trade between the United States and Canada, the 
article upon that subject was dropped at the proposal 
of the American commissioners, as was also the " most 
favored nation " article. The arrangement for the 
abolition of discriminating duties, in conformity with 
the recent act of Congress, was proposed by the Ameri- 
can commissioners and accepted by the British. On 
the 29th the British announced their readfiness to 

91 American to British Plenipotentiaries, June 17, 1815 ; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., IS- 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 393 

agree to a convention for four years which should con- 
tain the whole of the article with reference to the aboli- 
tion of discriminating duties and also the separate 
article with reference to the East Indies as proposed 
by Great Britain ; the latter article was to be in force 
for four years. ^- 

On June 30, the American commissioners agreed 
to the treaty as finally arranged, but reserved the right 
for either state, at the expiration of four years, to re- 
fuse to renew, or to modify, any of the stipulations of 
the treaty.^^ The treaty was signed July 3. The signa- 
tures followed the reciprocal arrangement which Sec- 
retary Monroe had urged in his letter to Adams,''* 
March 13, 1815. In the projet offered by the Ameri- 
can commissioners the name of the United States was 
placed first in the preamble and ratifying clause. In 
the contre-projet presented by the British commis- 
sioners His Britannic Majesty appeared first. The 
American commissioners insisted on the use of the 
alternative principle. The British commissioners ob- 
jected on the ground that with these variations the 
two copies could not be the exact counterparts of 
each other. They claimed to be ignorant of any gen- 
eral usage of such a principle. The American com- 

92 British to American Plenipotentiaries, June 29, 1815; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 17-18. 

^2 American to British Plenipotentiaries, June 30, 1815; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 18. 

94 Monroe to Adams, March 13, 1815; Writings of Monroe, 
v., Z1i-zn. 



394 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

missioners referred them to their own Foreign Office 
to prove that usage. The British at last consented to 
yield the point. In the copy of the treaty which was 
carried by Gallatin to America, therefore, the United 
States was named first in the preamble, ratifying 
article, and other articles where the two states were 
mentioned together, and the signature of the Ameri- 
can plenipotentiaries appeared first, while in the copy 
of the treaty delivered to His Britannic Majesty the 
reverse order obtained. 

The treaty, as at last arranged, contained five articles. 
The first provided for freedom of intercourse between 
the United States and Great Britain's European pos- 
sessions. Article two contained an agreement upon 
the abolition of all discriminating duties and the in- 
clusion of the "most favored nation" arrangement as 
to trade between the United States and the dominions 
of Great Britain in Europe. Intercourse between His 
Britannic Majesty's possessions in the West Indies and 
on the continent of North America was declared to be 
unaflfected by any of the articles of the treaty. By the 
third article American vessels were admitted to the 
principal settlements of the British dominions in the 
East Indies, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, and Prince of 
Wales Island, and trade was allowed to American 
citizens at these places in all except prohibited articles, 
except that in time of war between Great Britain and 
any state special permission of the British Govern- 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 395 

ment should be necessary for trade in military and 
naval stores and in rice. No discriminating duties 
were to be placed on American vessels, and the United 
States was to be granted the same privilege in the 
East India trade as the most favored European nation. 
United States vessels were excluded from the coasting 
trade of these territories, though they might proceed 
from one principal station to another in direct trade. 
They were also allowed to touch at British ports for 
refreshment in their passage to and fro. Article 
four provided for consular arrangements in the terri- 
tories of the two states. The last article contained 
provisions for ratification and the duration of the 
treaty, which was to be four years from the date of 
signing.®^ 

The ratification of the treaty by the British Govern- 
ment was delayed^® owing to the strength of the opposi- 
tion party. The provisions of the treaty were severely 
criticized. It was claimed to be disadvantageous to 
Great Britain and in every respect favorable to the 
United States.^^ The British charge d'affaires at last 
notifying the Department of State that he was ready to 
exchange ratifications,''® President Madison, as soon as 

95 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 624-627. 

96 Bathurst to Baker, Sept. 6, 1815; MS., British Foreign 
Office, 5, 106. 

9^ J. Q. Adams to Monroe; MS., Bureau of Indexes and 
Archives, British notes, 19, No. 17. 

98 Baker to Monroe, Nov. 24, 1815 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 18. 



39^ RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

the Senate convened, laid before that body the treaty 

accompanied by letters connected with it.^^ The treaty 

was at once ratified. It was proclaimed by the 

President in a message to Congress December ii.^°° 

Though the British North American and West Indian 

trade was not provided for and impressment was 

omitted from the treaty, still upon the whole the treaty 

was regarded as favorable to the United States.^"^ 

With the signing of the commercial treaty the duties 

of the American commissioners as a mission were 

ended. As has been shown, only three of the five 

commissioners negotiated for the commercial treaty. 

Bayard was ill at this time and had returned to the 

United States. He died at his home in Wilmington, 

Delaware, shortly after reaching there. Jonathan 

Russell, after the completion of the negotiations at 

Ghent, had returned to Stockholm after visiting Paris 

on the way. The reason which he assigned for not 

going to London with his colleagues was his disbelief 

in the possibility of securing a commercial treaty at 

that time.^*^^ It was quite likely that his animosity 

towards Adams had much to do with his unwillingness 

to serve further on the mission. 

3* American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 7-8. 
1"* Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 
569-570. 

101 Madison to Gallatin, Sept. 11, 1815; Writings of Gallatin, 
I., 652-653. 

102 Russell to Monroe, May 30, 1815; Russell Journals, VI., 
56 (copy). 



RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 39/ 

Clay and Gallatin left England^"^ on July 23, and re- 
turned to the United States. They were upon their 
arrival the recipients of many social honors and dis- 
tinctions."* Clay resumed his old position in Con- 
gress, to which he had been re-elected while absent. 
Gallatin was offered his former position as Secretary 
of the Treasury. He declined this position, and was 
soon after appointed minister to France, where he re- 
mained for seven years. He was the third member of 
the mission to continue in diplomatic service through 
appointment to a foreign court. It was Madison's 
purpose to appoint Bayard minister to the Court of 
St. Petersburg, but Bayard's health prevented the 
execution of this plan. 

In neither the treaty of peace nor_,the commercial 
convention is there any mention of the subjects over 
which the two nations professedly went to war. Great 
Britain did not relinquish by the terms of these docu- 
ments her maritime claims of right of search and im- 
pressment, of the rule of 1756, of fictitious blockades, 
and of the principles in her orders in council. These, 
though not mentioned in the treaties, were never sub- 
sequently enforced. It has been declared, therefore, 
that the maritime rights for which the United States 
contended were practically gained. The results of the 

103 Russell to Harris, Aug. 12, 1815; Russell Papers, MS. 
(copy), No. 1955- 

104 Hughes to Russell, Nov. 20, 1815; Russell Papers, MS., 
No. 1329. 



398 RATIFICATION AND RECEPTION OF TREATY 

war were manifest in a greater consolidation of the 
Union and a national spirit which was thereafter 
divided on questions not of foreign but of domestic 
policy, such as a national bank, the tariff, and internal 
improvements.^"^ 

105 N. M. Butler, The Effect of the War of 1812 upon the 
Consolidation of the Union; Johns Hopkins University Stud- 
ies in Historical and Political Science, Series V., No. 7. 
Histoire des Etats Unis, 278. Scheffer (Paris, 1825). 



CHAPTER X 

The Execution of the Treaty of Ghent 

The carrying out of the various provisions contained 
in the treaty of Ghent covered a period of many years 
and became the subject of numerous commissions and 
treaty arrangements. The usual forms found in a 
treaty of peace were speedily executed, but one pro- 
vision contained in the article designed to establish 
the status quo ante bellum occasioned much dispute. 
This was the provision requiring the restoration of 
slaves. The United States maintained that by the 
terms of the treaty Great Britain was required to make 
restitution of or compensation for the slaves who, at 
the time of the ratification of the treaty, were in the 
possession of the British forces and within the limits 
of the United States.^ The British Government held 
that the provisions of the treaty related only to the 
restoration of slaves and private property which were 
at the date of the ratification within places directed 
by the treaty to be restored ; and that the restoration 
of slaves from the public vessels of Great Britain was 

1 Monroe to Baker, April i, 1815; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 106-107. 

399 



400 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

not required.^ Under this interpretation of the treaty 
the British Government refused to order their naval 
commanders to deliver up the slaves which had prior 
to the ratification of the treaty been received upon 
British war vessels. 

Neither the United States nor Great Britain being 
willing to recede from its respective position, the 
President instructed the American minister in London 
to propose to the British Government that a reference 
of the disputed question be made to a friendly Power.^ 
September 17, 1816, Minister Adams made such an 
oflfer in connection with a proposal to enter upon a 
negotiation for a treaty of commerce.* Several of the 
members of the British Cabinet being absent from 
London, Lord Castlereagh promised that the British 
Government would give consideration to the proposal 
at a later time.^ 

Richard Rush, when appointed to succeed Adams at 
the Court of St. James in 18 17, had full power to con- 
clude a commercial treaty. A few months later, May 
22, 1818, Gallatin, the American minister to France, 

2 Castlereagh to Adams, April 10, 1816; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 125-126. 

3 Monroe to Adams, May 21, 1816; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 126. 

4 Adams to Castlereagh, Sept. 17, 1816; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 363. 

B Castlereagh to Adams, Sept. 28, 1816; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 364. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 4OI 

was appointed with Rush to negotiate a treaty for the 
extension of the commercial provisions of the treaty 
of 181 5 and for the adjustment of other differences 
between the two states. "^ One of the special subjects 
which they were expected to adjust was the claim of 
the United States for indemnity " to the owners of the 
slaves carried away from the United States by British 
officers, after the ratification of the peace of Ghent, 
and contrary to a stipulation in the first article of that 
treaty."^ 

The British Government accepted the proposal to 
refer the subject to the decision of some friendly 
Power. They proposed, however, that it first be re- 
ferred to two commissioners, appointed in the same 
manner, and with like powers, as those provided for in 
the treaty of Ghent for the settlement of the boundary 
disputes. The American Government objected to the 
British proposition on the ground that the questions of 
indemnification for the slaves carried away and the 
settlement of boundaries were entirely different in 
principles and in character of evidence, and ought not 
to be referred to the same sort of commission.^ The 
American representatives offered to refer the subject 

6 Commission of Rush and Gallatin; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 3/2. 

''Adams to Gallatin, May 22, 1818; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., ZT^-i'72. 

s Adams to Gallatin and Rush, July 28, 1818; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 375-378. 

27 



402 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

to an independent commission to be composed of three 
members, but the British commissioners preferred to 
have reference to some friendly sovereign or state, as 
the United States had at first suggested. The American 
commissioners proposed that such reference be made to 
the Emperor of Russia. To this the British objected ; 
and the article upon the subject of claims for restitu- 
tion of slaves included in the treaty signed October 20, 
1 818, provided that the question as to whether the 
United States was entitled to compensation, in accord- 
ance with the American interpretation of the first 
article of the treaty of Ghent, should be left to the 
decision of " some friendly sovereign or state," and 
that both states should agree to abide by such decision 
as final and conclusive.^ Later the two states agreed 
to refer the matter to the Russian Emperor, who, April 
22, 1822, rendered his decision in favor of the United 
States. He gave as his decision that the United States 
was entitled to a just indemnification from Great 
Britain for all private property, including slaves, that 
had been carried away by the British forces from the 
places and territories the restitution of which was stip- 
ulated in the treaty. The Emperor further expressed 
the opinion that the United States was "entitled to con- 
sider as having been so carried away all such slaves as 
may have been transported from the above mentioned 
territories on board of the British vessels within the 

° Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 633. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 403 

waters of the said territories, and who, for this reason^ 
have not been restored." The Emperor proffered him- 
self as a mediator in the negotiations which would be 
necessary as a result of his decision.^" 

Under the mediation of Russia a convention was 
signed, July 12, 1822, and later ratified by the United 
States and Great Britain, which made provision for 
carrying out the intent of the Emperor's decision. In 
accordance with the arrangements of this instrument 
two commissioners and two arbitrators were ap- 
pointed, one commissioner and one arbitrator by the 
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
and one commissioner and one arbitrator by His Brit- 
annic Majesty. The treaty provided that these four 
commissioners and arbitrators should act as a board 
for examining all claims and should hold their sessions 
at Washington. In case of a disagreement they were 
empowered to draw the name of one of the two arbi- 
trators, who should render a decision. Upon failure 
of the two Governments to agree upon the average 
value of a slave the mixed commission was to decide ; 
and if they failed to agree, recourse was to be had to 
the arbitration of the minister or other agent of the 
mediating power accredited to the United States. The 
treaty was proclaimed by the President,^^ January 16, 

1° Award of Emperor of Russia, April 22, 1822; American 
State Papers, For. Rel, V., 220. 

11 Convention with Great Britain; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., V., 214-217. 



404 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

1823. The two Governments appointed as commis- 
sioners Langdon Cheves and George Jackson respec- 
tively. These men entered upon their labors in August, 
1823, but broke off four months later because of the 
refusal of the British commissioner to act with refer- 
ence to a majority of the claims presented. 

These claims continued to be a source of constant ir- 
ritation between the two Governments until 1826, when 
the disagreement was finally settled by the treaty of 
November 13 of that year/^ signed by Albert Gallatin 
for the United States and William Huskisson and 
Henry Addington for Great Britain. By the terms of 
this treaty Great Britain agreed to pay an indemnity 
of $1,204,960 in satisfaction of all claims. This 
amount was to be paid in two installments. Upon the 
exchange of the ratifications of this convention, the 
joint commission appointed under the convention of 
July 12, 1822, became dissolved. With the payment 
of this indemnity by Great Britain the execution of 
article one of the treaty of Ghent became complete. 

The exchange of prisoners as provided in the third 
article of the treaty also became a subject of contro- 
versy between the two states. The American Govern- 
ment interpreted the words of the article " shall be re- 
stored "^^ as implying the conveyance of prisoners to 
their own country by the state detaining them. Great 

12 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 641-643. 

13 Ibid., 614. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 405 

Britain refused to accede to this interpretation, as the 
expenses sustained by her under such an arrangement 
would be far greater than those of the United States. 
The United States, it was pointed out, would be obliged 
to defray expenses only from the United States to 
Bermuda or Halifax, while Great Britain would be 
bound to pay the cost of conveyance of American 
prisoners from Great Britain to America and of her 
own prisoners from America to Great Britain.^* 

While the exchange of prisoners was being delayed 
on account of the differences in the construction of the 
treaty, a disturbance among the American prisoners at 
Dartmoor prison occurred. The British soldiers in- 
discriminately fired upon them and killed or wounded 
a large number. The British Government immediately 
proposed that an inquiry be made into the affair by 
commissioners, one to be appointed by each Govern- 
ment. This proposal was accepted, and Charles King 
and Francis Larpent were appointed by the United 
States and Great Britain respectively. These men 
proceeded at once to the investigation, and made their 
report April 26, eight days after their appointment. 
Their report, while criticizing the British authorities 
for excessively harsh and severe treatment of unarmed 
prisoners, failed to locate the responsibility for the 

1* Minute of conversation between Castlereagh and Clay 
and Gallatin, April 16, 1815; American State Papers, For. 
Rel., IV., 19. 



406 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

affair or to suggest any means of redress or punish- 
ment.^^ The British Government, attaching a degree 
of blame to their soldiers, ordered the commanding 
officer to be censured for the conduct of his troops. 
Compensation was also offered to the widows and fam- 
ilies of the sufferers.^" The American Government 
felt that the report of the joint commission did not do 
sufficient justice to the American side of the affair, and 
it declined to accept the provision offered by Great 
Britain." A proposal made by the British Govern- 
ment that the prisoners be transported at the joint 
expense of the two states was accepted. Under this 
arrangement the exchange speedily took place. 

The tenth article of the treaty was concerned with 
the slave trade and read as follows: "Whereas the 
traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of 
humanity and justice, and whereas both His Majesty 
and the United States are desirous of continuing their 
efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby 
agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their 
best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object." 
No immediate action was taken by the United States 

15 Report of Larpent and King, April 26, 1815; American 
State Papers, For. Rel, IV., 21-23. 

16 Castlereagh to Clay and Gallatin, May 22, 1815 ; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 23. 

17 Monroe to Baker, Dec. 11, 1815; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 24. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 407 

to give effect to this article. Congress had by law in 
1807 forbidden the importation of African slaves into 
the United States, but to some degree the slave trade 
still continued, in an indirect way, to be carried on. 

On December 3, 1816, President Madison in his 
annual address to Congress recommended some amend- 
ment to the existing law to prevent the violations and 
evasions which were being made by those who, trading 
under foreign flags and with foreign ports, were 
secretly importing slaves into the United States.^^ The 
Committee on Foreign Relations, January 10, 1818, 
also reported the need of the adoption of more re- 
strictive measures to put a stop to the further intro- 
duction of slaves into the United States. It was sug- 
gested by this committee that the law would be more 
effective if provision were to be made granting to the 
informer a part, or the whole, of the forfeited vessel 
or goods, instead of allowing the whole amount to re- 
vert to the United States." 

In 1818 American commissioners were engaged in 
negotiations with Great Britain relative to subjects 
omitted in the treaties of peace and of commerce of 
1814 and 1815, and to the continuance of the commer- 
cial arrangements of the treaty of 181 5, which would 
cease by limitation in 1819. The question of the slave 
trade came up in the course of the negotiation, and the 

18 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 96-98. 

19 Ibid., 132-134. 



408 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

British Government proposed that the United States 
accede to certain regulations which had been included 
in the treaties between Great Britain and the states 
of Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. This pro- 
posal being referred to the Government at Washington, 
the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, in reply 
set forth the principles under which the United States 
acted in its effort to abolish the slave trade. He ob- 
jected to the British proposal upon the grounds of the 
constitutional provisions of the United States Govern- 
ment and the principles of public law. For the en- 
forcement of the regulations the establishment of a 
mixed court would be necessary, whose judges would 
be amenable to impeachment for corruption and who 
would be qualified to decide upon the statutes of the 
United States without appeal. It was questionable, 
Adams said, whether Congress had the power to in- 
stitute such a court, which would carry into execution 
the penal statutes of the United States beyond the 
territories of the country. Again, the proposal that 
officers of ships of war of either party be allowed to 
enter, search, capture, and carry into port for adjudica- 
tion the merchant vessels of the other was repugnant 
to the views held by the United States upon the right 
of search. If the exercise of that power by foreign 
officers in time of war was obnoxious to the feeling of 
the country, much more would that be the case if 
the power were exercised in time of peace. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 4O9 

Another special objection raised by Adams to the 
proposed treaty arrangement upon the slave trade was 
the difficulty of dealing with the slaves which might 
be found on board the vessels condemned by the mixed 
courts. Being freemen, such negroes could not, but by 
their own consent, be employed as servants or laborers ; 
but since the condition of the blacks in the United 
States was regulated by the municipal laws of the 
separate States, the Government of the United States 
could "neither guaranty their liberty in the States 
where they could only be received as slaves, nor con- 
trol them in the States where they would be recognised 
as free."-" The question of the slave trade was dropped 
from the negotiation and was not again renewed until 
1824. 

On May 15, 1820, Congress passed an act which 
declared slave trading to be piracy and to be punish- 
able with death. 2^ This was designed to enable the 
United States to join in the movement then being made 
to place the slave trade upon the same basis as piracy, 
both in its punishment and in its method of repression. 
The movement, however, was unsuccessful on account 
of the opposition to any arrangement that would recog- 
nize the right of the practice of visitation and search 
in time of peace. In 1823 the House of Representa- 

20 Adams to Gallatin and Rush, Nov. 2, 1818; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 399-401. 

21 Revised Statutes, III,, 601. 



41 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

tives adopted a resolution " that the President of the 
United States be requested to enter upon, and to prose- 
cute from time to time, such negotiations with the 
several maritime powers of Europe and America as 
he may deem expedient for the efifectual abolition of 
the African slave trade, and its ultimate denunciation 
as piracy, under the laws of nations, by the consent of 
the civilized world."-- In pursuance of this resolution, 
instructions for carrying it into effect were given to 
the various American ministers in South America and 
Europe. Special instructions upon the subject were 
sent to Minister Rush in London, and full power was 
given him to conclude with the British Government 
a convention for the complete suppression of the slave 
trade. As a preliminary to the conclusion of the pro- 
posed convention, should it meet with the approval of 
Great Britain, would be the enactment of a statute by 
the British Parliament declaring the crime of African 
slave trading to be piracy by British law.^^ The Ameri- 
can minister was instructed to propose to the British 
Government that the two Powers should endeavor to 
get the consent of the other nations to the general 
outlawry of this trafifiic as piracy, and that in the mean- 
time the two states should duly authorize and instruct 
their armed vessels " to capture the slave-trading ves- 

22 Moore, Digest of International Law, II., 922-923. 

23 Adams to Everett, Aug. 8, 1823 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., V., 338. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 4I I 

sels which may assume the flag of cither, and, if not 
of their own nation, to deliver over the captured slave 
trader to the officers or tribunals of his own country 
for trial and adjudication."-* 

The purpose on the part of the United States in 
attempting to make slave trading piracy was to bring it 
definitely within the pale of international law. As 
long as the ofifense was made only a domestic crime it 
was considered that the Constitution of the United 
States did not admit of the submission of the question 
to any foreign tribunal. 

A negotiation upon the slave trade was reopened 
by Minister Rush with the British Government in Jan- 
uary, 1824. Rush first proposed to the British com- 
missioners the plan which Adams had outlined, 
namely, that slave trading be declared piracy and 
punished as such in the courts of each nation. The 
British commissioners preferred rather the plan which 
admitted of a reciprocal right of search. After several 
weeks of negotiation an agreement was reached which 
was a compromise of the American and British 
methods of dealing with the slave trade problem.-^ By 
the convention signed March 13, 1824, slave trading 
was recognized as piracy except that the captain and 
crew of a captured vessel were to be placed on trial 

24 Adams to Everett, Aug. 8, 1823; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., V., 338. 

25 Rush to Adams, Jan. 23, 1824; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., V., 31S-316. 



412 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

only in the courts of their own country. In order to 
carry out the purpose of the convention the cruisers 
of both countries were empowered under certain con- 
ditions and restrictions to visit and search each other's 
vessels " on the coast of Africa, of America, or of the 
West Indies."26 

In order that the concession here made with respect 
to visit and search might not affect the general prin- 
ciple maintained by the United States, the American 
minister secured the inclusion of an article definitely 
limiting its application to the slave trade. This article 
was as follows : " The high contracting parties declare 
that the right which in the foregoing articles they have 
each reciprocally conceded of detaining, visiting, 
capturing, and delivering over for trial the merchant 
vessels of the other engaged in the African slave trade, 
is wholly and exclusively grounded on the considera- 
tion of their having made that traffic piracy by their 
respective laws; and further, that the reciprocal con- 
cession of the said right, as guarded, limited, and 
regulated by this convention, shall not be so construed 
as to authorize the detention or search of the merchant 
vessels of either nation by the officers of the Navy of 
the other, except vessels engaged or suspected of being 
engaged in the African slave-trade, or for any other 

26 A Convention for the Suppression of Piracy, committed 
by the African Slave Trade; American State Papers, For. Rel., 

v., 319-322. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 4I3 

purpose whatever than that of seizing and dehvering 
up the persons and vessels concerned in that traffic for 
trial and adjudication by the tribunals and laws of 
their own country ; nor be taken to affect in any other 
way the existing rights of either of the high contract- 
ing parties. "^^ 

When the convention was submitted to the Senate 
of the United States it was amended by that body so 
as to provide that either party should be free to de- 
nounce it at any time upon giving six months' notice. 
The Senate also amended the article permitting cruisers 
to visit and search vessels of the other party " on the 
coast of Africa, of America, or of the West Indies" 
by striking out the words " of America." It was voted 
to strike out all of article two and that part of article 
seven which provided that vessels or persons of either 
nation engaged in the slave trade, even though not 
under the flag of that nation, should be proceeded 
against in the same manner as any other vessel or 
person might be.-^ 

When the convention, as amended by the Senate, 
was reported to the British Government, it was re- 
fused, the chief objection being made to the striking 

27 A Convention for the Suppression of Piracy, committed 
by the African Slave Trade; American State Papers, For. 
Rel., v., 319-322. 

28 American State Papers, For. Rel., V., 361-362. 



414 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

out of the words " of America."^^ In fact, the British 
charge d'affaires at Washington, Addington, was given 
authority to conclude and sign a treaty verbatim, the 
same as the returned treaty would be with all the 
alterations introduced into it by the Senate, excepting 
only the proposed omission of the words " of Amer- 
ica."^" Addington made this proposal to the Secretary 
of State, who replied that the whole subject was to 
be referred by the President to Congress.^^ 

President Monroe in his annual message to Congress 
December 7, 1824, submitted all the documents relating 
to the negotiations upon the slave trade in order to 
secure the sentiments of Congress upon the subject.^^ 
The committee in the House of Representatives to 
which that portion of the President's message dealing 
with the suppression of the slave trade was referred, 
made to the House an exhaustive report which they 
concluded with the statement that they would not 
consider a negotiation to be dissolved which had ap- 
proached so near a consummation, nor a convention 
as absolutely void which had been executed by one 

20 Rush to Adams, Aug. 9, 1824 ; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., V., 364. 

^0 Canning to Rush, Aug. 27, 1824; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., V., 364-365. 

31 Adams to Addington, Dec. 4, 1824; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., V., 367-368. 

32 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II., 
250. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 415 

party and which the United States, having first ten- 
dered, should be the last to reject.^^ This shows that 
even then the opposition to slavery was much stronger 
in the House than in the Senate. This fact is further 
disclosed by the discussion in the House at this time 
over a bill for the colonizing of free people of color 
of the United States. 

Addington, the British charge, March 2, 1825, ad- 
dressed Secretary Adams requesting that he be in- 
formed as to the intention of the President with respect 
to the proposition which the British Government had 
previously offered. The reply tO' this request was 
not made until after Clay became Secretary of State 
under Adams. April 6, 1825, Secretary Clay ad- 
dressed a long note to the British representative in 
which he stated that, owing to the persistent opposi- 
tion of the Senate to a convention of the character pro- 
posed, it would be inexpedient longer to continue the 
negotiation respecting the slave convention with any 
hope of a satisfactory conclusion.^* 

In 1833 and 1834 the Governments of France and 
Great Britain endeavored to secure the adherence of 
the United States to a convention made between those 
Powers November 30, 1831, and a supplementary 
arrangement of March 22, 1833, for the suppression 

33 American State Papers, For. Rel., V., 629-632. 

34 Addington to Adams, March 2, 1825; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., V., 782. Clay to Addington, April 6, 1825 ; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., V., 783-784. 



41 6 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

of the African slave trade. The American Govern- 
ment held that the convention and supplement were 
open to the same objections as had previously been 
"deemed insuperable," and that the statement of the 
British minister in his note of December 25, 1833, 
"that in the act of accession it would be necessary 
'that the right of search should be extended to the 
coasts of the United States ' " made it more imperative 
for the President to decline the invitation.^^ 

In December, 1841, the representatives of England, 
France, Prussia, Russia, and Austria signed at Lon- 
don a treaty for the suppression of the slave trade. 
The cruisers of each nation were authorized to detain 
and search any vessels of the others that should "on 
reasonable grounds be suspected of being engaged in 
the traffic in slaves." General Cass, then American 
minister in Paris, published a pamphlet in which he 
deplored the treaty on the ground that it tended 
toward the re-establishment of the practice of visita- 
tion and search. In February, 1842, Cass sent a 
communication to M. Guizot, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, protesting against the quintuple treaty. The 
French Government in consequence refused to ratify 
the treaty, but later, in 1845, agreed to support an 

35 Mr. McLane, Secretary of State, to Mr. Vaughan, Brit, 
min., March 24, 1834; MS. Notes to For. Leg., V., 191. Quoted 
in Moore, Digest of International Law, IL, 927. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 41/ 

effective fleet on the African coast as the United States 
had done under the Webster- Ashburton treaty.^^ 

By the eighth article of this treaty, signed August 
9, 1842, Great Britain and the United States agreed 
that each would maintain on the coast of Africa a 
sufficient number of ships " to enforce, separately and 
respectively, the laws, rights, and obligations of each 
of the two countries for the suppression of the slave- 
trade." The two squadrons were to be independent 
of each other, but to act in " concert and cooperation " 
as circumstances might arise. By the ninth article of 
the same treaty the two powers agreed to unite in 
making remonstrances to those states offering a market 
for slaves and to urge upon such states " the propriety 
and duty of closing such markets effectually, at once 
and forever."^^ President Tyler when communicating 
this treaty to the Senate said : " The treaty which I 
now submit to you proposes no alteration, mitigation, 
or modification of the rules of the law of nations. "^^ 
Cass criticized that portion of the treaty which dealt 
with the question of the slave trade, not on the grounds 
of its admission of a right of search, but because the 
abandonment of that claim was not made " a previous 

36 Moore, Digest of International Law, II., 928. 

3" Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 655. 

38 Webster's Works, VI., 353. Quoted in Moore, Digest of 
International Law, II., 931. Richardson, Messages and Pa- 
pers of the Presidents, IV., 168. 

28 



41 8 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

condition to any conventional arrangement upon the 
genera] subject." Webster answered the criticism of 
Cass as follows : " Inasmuch as the treaty gives no 
color or pretext whatever to any right of searching 
our ships, a declaration against such a right would 
have been no more suitable to this treaty than a decla- 
ration against the right of sacking our towns in time 
of peace, or any other outrage."^^ 

When Cass himself became Secretary of State the 
old question of visitation and search arose again. In 
1858 in a note to Lord Napier, British Minister at 
Washington, relative to measures for the suppression 
of the slave trade, Cass referred to a statement made 
by the British minister "to the effect that the use of 
the American flag by a vessel did 'not protect the slaver 
from visit, but exonerates her from search.' " This 
distinction between " ' the right of visitation and the 
right of search, between an entry for the purpose of 
examining into the national character of a vessel and 
an entry for the purpose of examining into the objects 
of her voyage,' could not, said Mr. Cass, 'be justly 
maintained upon any recognized principle of the law^ 
of nations. . . . The United States deny the right 
of the cruisers of any other power whatever, for 
any purpose whatever, to enter their vessels by force 
in time of peace. . . . No change of name can change 

39 Moore, Digest of International Law, II., 931. 



EXECUTION' OF TREATY OF GHENT 4I9 

the illegal character of the assumption. Search, or 
visit, it is equally an assault upon the independence 
of nations.'"^" 

As a result of certain reports concerning orders that 
were alleged to have been given to British and French 
cruisers to visit and search vessels as suspected slavers 
in the Gulf of ^lexico, the United States Senate, June 
16, 1858, adopted a resolution declaring "that Ameri- 
can vessels on the high seas, in time of peace, bearing 
the American flag, remain under the jurisdiction of the 
country to which they belong, and therefore any visita- 
tion, molestation, or detention of such vessels by force, 
or by the exhibition of force, on the part of a foreign 
power, is in derogation of the sovereignty of the 
United States."" When Cass transmitted this resolu- 
tion to the American minister at London he re-empha- 
sized the American position in these rather threatening 
words : " The immunity of their merchant vessels upon 
the high seas will be steadily maintained by the United 
States under all circumstances, as an attribute of their 
sovereignty never to be abandoned, whatever sacrifices 
its protection may require."*- 

^° Cass to Lord Napier, April 10, 1858 ; S. Ex. Doc. 49, 35th 
Cong., 1st sess., 42. 47, 48. Quoted in Moore, Digest of Inter- 
national Law, IL, 942-943. 

*i Foreign Relations, 1874, 963. Quoted in Moore, Digest of 
International Law, II.. 946. 

42 Cass to Dallas, June 17, 185S ; H. Ex. Doc. 7. 36 Cong., 
2d sess., 97. Quoted in Moore, Digest of International Law, 
XL, 946. 



420 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

Notwithstanding the language of the Senate resolu- 
tion, four years later, under the administration of 
Lincoln and Seward, there was concluded a treaty be- 
tween the United States and Great Britain by the 
terms of which the two states agreed to allow their 
naval vessels to visit such merchant vessels of the two 
nations as should, upon reasonable grounds, be sus- 
pected of conducting a traffic in slaves, or of having 
been fitted out for such a purpose. Any vessel of this 
character was to be detained and sent in for trial. It 
is also to be noted that in this treaty the United States 
consented to the establishment of mixed courts, which 
in the earlier negotiations had been considered highly 
objectionable. These mixed courts were, however, 
abolished in 1807, and the courts of the respective na- 
tions took their place. By a supplemental article, con- 
cluded February 17, 1863,*^ the reciprocal right of 
search and detention was permitted within thirty 
leagues of the coast of Cuba, which was practically 
upon the American coast. This was agreed to in spite 
of the vigorous objection to such extension made by 
the United States throughout a long period of years. 

With this treaty, the execution of the article in the 
treaty of Ghent with respect to the slave trade may be 
regarded as complete. The abolition of slavery in the 
United States and the elimination of any possible 
market in America dealt its final blow. Since then 

43 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 674-679, 687-^8. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 42 1 

the United States has been interested in the effort to 
suppress the slave trade in Africa, and to this end it 
became a party to the general act signed at Brussels 
July 2, 1890, which provided comprehensive regula- 
tions for the suppression of the African slave trade. 

The most important arrangements of the treaty of 
Ghent were those in relation to the settlement of the 
boundary disputes. The treaty has frequently been 
called a " treaty of boundaries." Five of the eleven 
articles, covering more than two thirds of the text, 
were concerned with provisions for the establishment 
and operation of boundary commissions. Four joint 
commissions were thus provided: the first to decide 
upon the ownership of the islands in the Bay of 
Passamaquoddy ; the second to arbitrate with respect 
to the Maine highlands and the northwesternmost 
source of the Connecticut River and the location of the 
45th parallel; the third to settle upon the boundary 
through the St. Lawrence and the lakes as far as 
the inlet of Lake Huron and to arrange for the division 
of the islands in the said waters; the fourth to de- 
termine the boundary westward from the inlet of 
Lake Huron to the Lake of the Woods and the owner- 
ship of the islands in the said waters. 

The first of these commissions, to which John 
Holmes, American, and Thomas Barclay, British, were 
appointed, was successful in its efforts. Agents for 
the two states presented the respective claims of each 



422 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

before the commissioners. The claims advanced by 
the United States were that the islands in the Bay of 
Passamaqnoddy were within territory bounded by the 
treaty of 1783 and included in the twenty leagues of 
shore provision ; that all islands within twenty leagues 
of the shores of the United States had been confirmed 
to it; and lastly, that the said islands were not within 
the meaning of any exception made in the treaty of 
1783. It was further claimed by the American agent 
that in following the ship channel all islands would be 
found to be on the American side, with the exception of 
Deer Island. It was held that by the American grants 
and charters it could be shown that the islands in 
question were within the limits of Massachusetts and 
never had been within those of Nova Scotia. The 
arguments of the American agent covered over five 
hundred pages, and the arguments in the rejoinder on 
the part of the British agent were contained in a 
memorial** of four hundred pages. 

The British memorial claimed, first, that the islands 
never were, nor were intended to form, a part of the 
twelve contemplated provinces of New England ; 
second, that they never were nor could be included in 
the territory granted to the Duke of York in 1664, nor 
the territory lying between Sagadehock and Nova 
Scotia mentioned in the charter of the Province of 

^* MS., Dept. of State, Bureau of Rolls and Library, Execu- 
tion of " The Fourth Article of the Treaty of Ghent." 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 423 

Massachusetts Bay, 1691 ; third, that the islands were 
by the express provisions of the charter of 1691 an- 
nexed to that integral part of the Province of Massa- 
chusetts Bay which before had formed the province 
of Nova Scotia under the grant of 1621 ; fourth, that 
these islands thus annexed were precisely the same 
islands that were within the limits designated in the 
grant of 1621 ; fifth, that Nova Scotia, under the 
charter of 1691, was re-ceded to the Crown and be- 
came a separate province and so remained until the 
treaty of peace, 1783 ; sixth, that the islands never 
belonged to Massachusetts except as a part of the 
Province of Nova Scotia; seventh, that the river St. 
Croix designated in the grant of the Province of Nova 
Scotia was the river intended under that name in the 
treaty of 1783 ; and eighth, that all the islands in 
question were excepted by provisions of the treaty of 
1783 from coming within the boundary described by 
the treaty ,^^ 

The commissioners rendered their decision Novem- 
ber 24, 1817. They decided that Moose Island, Dudley 
Island, and Frederick Island in the Bay of Passama- 
quoddy belonged to the United States and that all of 
the other islands, including the Island of Grand Menan, 
belonged to Great Britain.^'^ No steps were taken 

45 MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library, Execution of "The 
Fourth Article of the Treaty of Ghent." 
*^ Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 619. 



424 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

to mark this boundary until 1891. At that time nego- 
tiations were entered upon which resuked in a treaty 
conchided between the United States and Great Britain, 
July 22, 1892, which provided for a joint commission 
of two, " to determine upon a method of more ac- 
curately marking the boundary line between the two 
countries in the waters of Passamaquoddy Bay in 
front of and adjacent to Eastport, in the State of 
Maine, and to place buoys, or fix such other boundary 
marks as they may determine to be necessary," each 
country to defray one half of the cost.^'^ 

Cornelius P. Van Ness for the United States and 
Thomas Barclay for Great Britain were appointed 
commissioners under the provisions of the fifth article 
of the treaty " to determine and mark the boundary 
from the source of the St. Croix to the river St. 
Lawrence, on the 45th parallel." The commissioners 
met at St. Andrews, September 22, 18 16, and after a 
two days' session adjourned, the season being too far 
advanced for the necessary surveying to be done. The 
next meeting was to be held in Boston on the 4th of 
the following June.*® 

The commissioners met at the time and place agreed 
upon, and drew up a set of instructions which they 
presented to the surveyors of the respective govern- 
ments. On June 14 the commissioners adjourned to 

4^ Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 63-64. 
48 Ibid., 7Z. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 425 

meet in New York the 5'th of May the following year, 
unless in the meantime they should agree upon some 
other place and time to come together. The next meet- 
ing was by agreement held May 15, 1818, at Burling- 
ton, Vermont, instead of in New York, since it became 
necessary to be at St. Regis about the first of June 
in order to begin the survey of the line between the 
Iroquois and Connecticut Rivers. The commissioners 
subsequently held meetings also at Montreal and St. 
Regis. On June 12 they adjourned to meet in New 
York the 30th of the following November. Before 
that time arrived it became evident that the surveyors 
and astronomers employed in the survey would not be 
ready to report, and so the conference of the commis- 
sioners was postponed until May 3, 1819, in New 
York. When that day came the surveys were still in- 
complete, and the commissioners moved an adjourn- 
ment to Boston on the first Monday in May, 1820. 
This date was later changed to May 11. Following the 
meeting in Boston the commissioners met next in New 
York, November 23, when it was decided that no more 
surve3^s were necessary, and the agents were ordered 
to attend the next meeting and present their argu- 
ments. The board adjourned to meet in New York 
May 14, 1821, in order to give the agents time to make 
the necessary preparation. On this last date the com- 
missioners came together to hear the arguments.*^ 

^9 Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 74-76. 



426 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

The most difficult question that called for decision 
in connection with the boundary was as to the location 
of the " highlands " mentioned in the treaty of 1783, 
which were said to divide the rivers that emptied into 
the St. Lawrence from those that flowed into the 
Atlantic Ocean. The treaty of 1783 required the 
line to be run upon such "highlands." The British 
Government contended that the boundary line should 
be run upon the highlands to the south of St. Johns; 
but that line of highlands turned no water into the St. 
Lawrence. The United States maintained that the 
line should be run on the highlands to the north of the 
river St. John, since that was the only watershed that 
turned its northern waters into the St. Lawrence and 
its southern waters into the Atlantic Ocean, although 
through the Bay of Fundy. Failure to agree upon 
what should be taken as the " highlands " made it im- 
possible to agree upon the " northwest angle of Nova 
Scotia," for that, by the treaty of 1783, was said to be 
at the point where " a line drawn due north from the 
source of the St. Croix River " strikes the " highlands 
which divide those rivers that empty themselves into 
the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the 
Atlantic Ocean." When all the evidence had been 
presented by the agents of the two states, the commis- 
sioners found themselves unable to agree upon the 
location of the northwesternmost head of the Con- 
necticut and the location of the forty-fifth parallel of 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 42/ 

north latitude, as well as that of the northwest angle 
of Nova Scotia, which were definitive points of bound- 
ary mentioned in the treaty of 1783. The commis- 
sioners, failing to agree, filed their dissenting opinions 
with their respective Governments, and at the same 
time presented lengthy reports upon the work of the 
commission.^" 

Since the joint commission failed to agree upon the 
northeastern boundary question, it became necessary, 
in accordance with the provision in the treaty of Ghent, 
to refer the " reports of the said commissioners to 
some friendly sovereign or state." There was some 
delay in carrying out this provision, during which time 
the district of Maine, with the consent of Massachu- 
setts, was admitted to the Union.^^ 

In 1826 Albert Gallatin, commissioned as Minister 
Plenipotentiary from the United States to Great 
Britain, was empowered to adjust, as far as possible, 
the various differences between the two countries. In 
regard to the northeastern boundary he was instructed, 
if possible, to arrange a direct negotiation upon the 
subject at Washington ; but, should he fail in that, he 
was to agree to submit the matter to arbitration. 
After a long and tiresome negotiation Gallatin, in the 
nineteenth conference which he had with the British 
representatives, secured the acceptance of a convention 

s° Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 78-82. 
51 Ibid., 85. 



428 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

which he had drafted. This convention, signed Sep- 
tember 29, 1827, made it obHgatory on the part of the 
two states to choose some friendly sovereign or state 
as arbiter, and to use their best endeavors to obtain a 
decision, if practicable, within two years after the 
arbiter should have signified his consent to act as such. 
The treaty provided that the decision of the arbiter 
should be taken as final and conclusive and should be 
carried, " without reserve, into immediate effect."^^ 

It was agreed to depart from the procedure pre- 
scribed by the treaty of Ghent, which stipulated that 
the reports of the commissioners, in case of disagree- 
ment, should be presented to the arbitrator, and in- 
stead to substitute for the reports of the commissioners 
new and separate statements by each of the contracting 
parties. This change was considered necessary inas- 
much as the reports of the commissioners and the 
documents connected therewith were " so voluminous 
and complicated as to render it improbable that any 
sovereign or state would be willing or able to under- 
take the office of investigating and arbitrating upon 
them." The time within which the statements of the 
contracting parties should be presented to the arbi- 
trator was limited to two years. The ratifications of 
this convention were exchanged at London, April 2, 
1828, and soon thereafter the King of the Nether- 
lands was chosen to act as arbitrator.^^ 

52 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 646-649. 

53 Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 88-90. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 429 

The statements of the case were duly submitted to 
the arbitrator by the representatives of the two states. 
Albert Gallatin prepared the American statement, a 
most able and exhaustive report, upon which he spent 
two years. The case was treated by both sides under 
the same topics that were the points of difference in 
the joint commission originally appointed. These sub- 
jects, as mentioned before, were: (i) the northwest 
angle of Nova Scotia and the " highlands " ; (2) the 
northwesternmost head of the Connecticut River; (3) 
the boundary line from the Connecticut River along 
the forty-fifth parallel of north latitude to the river 
St. Lawrence. 

The King of the Netherlands gave his award Janu- 
ary 10, 1 83 1. The arbitrator failed to adjudicate the 
differences presented to him, and instead rendered his 
decision in the form of an arbitrary compromise 
boundary. This award gave to the United States 
about eight thousand square miles of the territory in 
dispute and to Great Britain about four thousand 
square miles. Two days after the announcement of 
the award, Prebel, the American minister at The Hague, 
addressed a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
protesting against the award, on the ground that the 
arbitrator had exceeded his powers. The British Gov- 
ernment recognized that the award was recommenda- 
tory in character rather than mandatory, but acquiesced 
in the decision. At the same time the British minister 



430 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

at Washington was authorized to give the United 
States to understand privately that Great Britain would 
not consider a formal acceptance of the award by the 
two Governments as precluding a modification of the 
line by mutual agreement. President Jackson was 
reluctant to accept the decision, and, since it was un- 
satisfactory to both Maine and Massachusetts, he sub- 
mitted the question to the Senate, which by a large 
majority voted that the award was not obligatory and 
recommended a new negotiation with Great Britain.^* 
The United States attempted to secure an agree- 
ment from Maine by which the American Government 
might have a free hand in dealing with the boundary 
question as it afifected the territory of that State. The 
State of Maine refused to accede to such arrangement. 
Negotiations were continued with the British Govern- 
ment over the boundary dispute during the year fol- 
lowing the award of the King of the Netherlands, but 
no agreement was reached. In 1838-39 occurred 
what was known as the Aroostook war, which was a 
conflict between New Brunswick and Maine growing 
out of the unsettled boundary dispute. War became 
imminent, and General Winfield Scott was sent by the 
United States Government to mediate. He persuaded 
the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick to re- 
move their forces from the disputed territory while 
^* Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 1 19-138, 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 43 I 

negotiations should be carried on looking to a settle- 
ment of the boundary.^^ 

Correspondence between the United States and 
Great Britain was renewed, which, after three years, 
resulted in a settlement of the dispute by the signing 
of the Webster-Ashburton treaty, August 9, 1842. 
This agreement was reached wholly by diplomatic 
negotiation in which both parties evinced a willingness 
to compromise rather than to prolong the dispute 
further. The boundary line was, like that in the award 
of the King of the Netherlands, a compromise. In 
fact, by the treaty of 1842 the United States was given 
less of the disputed territory than was assigned by the 
arbitrator's award. By it New Hampshire, Vermont, 
and New York gained certain territory formerly sup- 
posed to belong to them, but which was, actually, above 
the forty-fifth parallel. As a compensation to the 
States of Maine and Massachusetts, which suffered by 
the arrangement, a sum of three hundred thousand 
dollars was paid by the United States Government. 
Maine was also pacified by a provision in the treaty 
which granted to her the privilege of transporting the 
lumber and agricultural products of the State upon the 
waters of the St. John. The boundary, as thus agreed 
upon, was later traced and marked as follows : from the 
source of the St. Croix to the intersection of the St. 
John ; thence to the mouth of the St. Francis ; thence to 

°5 Moore, International Arbitrations, I., 145-146. 



432 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

the outlet of Lake Pohenagamook ; thence to the North- 
west Branch of the St. John; thence to the parallel of 
latitude 46° 25' on the Southwest Branch; thence to 
the source of the Southwest Branch of the St. John; 
thence to the source of Halls Stream; thence to the 
intersection of the line of Valentine and Collins ; thence 
to the St. Lawrence near St. Regis along the line of 
Valentine and Collins.^" 

The third boundary commission provided for by the 
treaty of Ghent was to determine the northern bound- 
ary through the St. Lawrence River and Lakes Ontario, 
Erie, and Huron. The commissioners appointed for 
this undertaking were Peter B. Porter for the United 
States and John Ogilvy for Great Britain. The first 
preliminary meeting of the joint commission was held 
at Albany, New York, November 18, 181 6. Meetings 
were held during the next three years at St. Regis, 
Point Amity, Hamilton, and Ontario. September 28, 
1819, the British commissioner died. His successor 
was Anthony Barclay, son of Thomas Barclay, who 
had been the British commissioner on the northeast- 
ern boundary commission. Barclay did not qualify 
until January 3, 1820. Not until November of the 
following year were maps of the surveys ready. Sev- 
eral meetings were then held in New York City. Sub- 

^^ Report of the joint commission of boundary appointed 
under the treaty of Washington of Aug. 9, 1842; Richardson, 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV., 171. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 433 

sequently the commissioners met in Philadelphia and 
at Utica, New York. At the last place on June i8, 
1822, they reached an agreement. By this agreement 
the boundary was arranged to follow in the main the 
channel throughout the water communications. The 
islands lying in the rivers, lakes, and water communi- 
cations between the boundary line and the adjacent 
shores of Upper Canada were adjudged to belong to 
Great Britain, and all islands between the said boundary 
line and the adjacent shores of the United States were 
declared to belong to the United States.^^ 

The treaty of Ghent stipulated that the portion of 
the northern boundary from Lake Huron to the most 
northwestern point of the Lake of the Woods should 
be referred to the same commissioners who might be 
chosen to act in settlement of the boundary through 
the river St. Lawrence and Lakes Ontario, Erie, and 
Huron. As soon, therefore, as Porter and Barclay 
had completed their work in connection with the 
boundary mentioned, they proceeded upon their second 
task. They issued instructions to the surveyors to 
ascertain the position of Long Lake, or the chain of 
waters referred to by that name in the treaty of 1783, 
and, if those waters did not communicate with Lake 
Superior, to discover what rivers or bodies of water 
divided by a height of land and emptying, one into 

57 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 620-623. 
29 



434 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

Lake Superior and the other into the Lake of the 
Woods, corresponded most nearly to the line described 
in the treaty. Partial surveys were made during the 
summers of 1822 and 1823, and reports were made to 
the joint commission in February, 1824, at a meeting 
at Albany. The following summer the surveys were 
completed, and were reported at a meeting of the com- 
missioners in Montreal in October. Upon the results 
of these surveys and the evidence presented by the 
agents the commissioners endeavored to reach an agree- 
ment, but upon two points they found this impossible. 
The first of these differences was in connection with 
the claims of the respective Governments relative to 
certain islands in St. IMary's River, particularly the 
island of St. George. The second difference was in 
relation to the running of the boundary from a point 
near Isle Royal in Lake Superior to the Chaudiere 
Falls in Lac La Pluie, which is between Lake Superi- 
or and the Lake of the Woods. On the remainder 
of the boundary line from Lac La Pluie to the north- 
westernmost head of the Lake of the Woods the com- 
mission was in agreement.^^ The commissioners 
made separate reports to their respective Governments 
on the points of agreement and disagreement. Pro- 

58 MS., Bureau of Rolls and Library, Journal of Proceed- 
ings of Commissioners appointed to carry into effect the sixth 
and seventh articles of the Treaty of Ghent; Moore, Inter- 
national Arbitrations, I., 171 et seq. 



EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 435 

positions of a compromise nature which each com- 
missioner had presented were also included in the re- 
ports, with a view to a possible arrangement without 
reference to a third party. These reports were made 
in the fall of 1827, and for ten years thereafter no 
action was taken, either to submit the questions to arbi- 
tration, or to renew the negotiation. During this period 
the northeastern boundary question was the impor- 
tant issue. 

When, in 1842, Webster and Ashburton entered 
upon their negotiation to settle the various differences 
existing between the two countries, the boundary from 
Lake Huron to the north westernmost point of the 
Lake of the Woods was included in the questions to 
be settled. An agreement was quickly reached by the 
two negotiators by which they adopted so much of the 
boundary as had been agreed upon by the joint com- 
mission in 1827. With reference to the remainder of 
the line they arranged a compromise, by which the 
difference over the islands in St. Mary's River was 
decided in favor of the United States, while the second 
point of difference, with regard to the route to be fol- 
lowed from a point near Isle Royal in Lake Superior 
to Chaudiere Falls in Lac La Pluie, was settled, in the 
main, in accordance with the British claim. The line 
as agreed upon northward from Isle Royal ran from a 
point north of Isle Royal for one hundred yards to the 
north and east of Isle Chapeau; thence southwesterly 



436 EXECUTION OF TREATY OF GHENT 

to the mouth of the Pigeon River; thence along the 
line of the Grand Portage by land and water to Lac 
La Pluie. The treaty provided that all the water com- 
munications embraced in the boundary line and all the 
various channels in the St. Lawrence and Detroit 
Rivers should be free and open to the citizens of both 
countries.^^ 

The Webster-Ashburton treaty completed the last of 
the boundary arrangements provided in the treaty of 
Ghent, and with this settlement all the provisions of 
that treaty were completely executed, after a lapse of 
nearly thirty years. 

s9 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 652. 



CHAPTER XI 

Settlement of Controverted Questions Omitted 
IN the Treaty of Ghent 

The statement has often been made that the war of 
1812 secured none of the objects for which it was 
fought. This is true if one looks to the treaty of 
peace alone to discover results, for that treaty con- 
tains not a word as to the settlement of the avowed 
causes of the war. The commissioners of peace, in 
order to secure what was most essential, that is, the 
restoration of the blessings of peace, left to the ad- 
justment of time the questions upon which agreement 
then was impossible. Has time justified their action? 
Let us consider the subsequent arrangements upon the 
leading questions in dispute in 1814. 

Impressment, which was the principal cause of the 
war, occupied, as has been seen, comparatively little 
time in the negotiations at Ghent. It was brought for- 
ward in the first conference of the American and 
British commissioners, but the discussions, soon turn- 
ing upon Indian territory, disarmament on the lakes, 
and boundaries, and later upon the fisheries and navi- 
gation of the Mississippi, left the more abstract ques- 

437 



438 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

tions in abeyance. However, in the projet of the 
treaty proposed by the American commissioners there 
was an article providing for the abolition of impress- 
ment, but this was rejected by the British commis- 
sioners. The American commissioners consented to 
waive the article, with the understanding that the omis- 
sion of a specific proposition in the treaty of peace on 
the subject of impressment should not impair the right 
of either Power.^ The treaty, therefore, was signed 
with no provision upon this subject. The American 
commissioners believed that impressment would receive 
a more favorable consideration after the war was over, 
when the two countries came to arrange other ques- 
tions not included in the treaty of peace. 

Eight days after the ratification of the treaty of 
Ghent, President Madison sent a message to Congress 
recommending the passage of a law (to permit the em- 
ployment upon American vessels- of only native 
American citizens and persons already naturalized^J 
The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom this 
message was referred, reported favorably upon the 
recommendation of the President, but advised that the 
question be postponed until the next session of Con- 
gress.^ Such a law was never passed, the general paci- 

^ American to British Commissioners, Nov. 30, 1814; Amer- 
ican State Papers, For. Rel., III., 741. 

2 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I., 555. 

3 Annals of Congress, 13th Cong., 3d sess., 1255. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 439 

fication of Europe obviating the necessity for such 
action. 

When entering upon the negotiations for a commer- 
cial treaty with Great Britain the American commis- 
sioners stated to the British that they were instructed 
by their Government upon two general subjects which 
might properly be discussed: commercial regulations 
applicable to a state of peace as well as of war, and 
the rights and duties of states when one was at war 
and the other at peace. In connection with the second 
subject the American commissioners mentioned im- 
pressment as being the most important question. They 
called the attention of the British commissioners to the 
law that had been passed by Congress* March 3, 181 3, 
which, after the war, excluded the employment of for- 
eign seamen on American vessels. They also men- 
tioned the recommendation of the President in respect 
to the passage of a more rigid law on the subject. It 
was pointed out that such action by the American 
Government, should it result in an absolute exclusion 
of British seamen, would remove all ground for the 
claim of impressment ; and that this method would be 
more satisfactory to Great Britain inasmuch as it 
would operate upon every American vessel, and not 
merely upon those with which a British warship might 
come in contact. The American commissioners con- 
tented themselves with this explanation, and did not 

* United States Statutes at Large, II., 809-810. 



440 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

insist upon the inclusion of an article upon impress- 
ment in the commercial treaty which was signed July 
3, 1 815. All the more disputable questions which en- 
dangered the success of a commercial treaty were 
eliminated and reserved for future negotiation. Jef- 
ferson, in writing to Madison March 23, 1815, had 
advised a convention upon impressment apart from the 
commercial treaty. If included in such a treaty, he 
thought, it might be at the price of injurious conces- 
sions.^ 

After the signing of the commercial treaty, Adams, 
American minister at London, was engaged in a pro- 
tracted correspondence with the British Government 
upon the questions of the restoration of slaves, the 
abolition of the slave trade, and the reciprocal rights 
to the Newfoundland fisheries and to .the navigation of 
the Mississippi. On January 25, 1816, Adams, propos- 
ing to the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs that a 
negotiation be entered upon to secure an additional 
convention, was asked upon what subjects he wished 
to treat. He replied that impressment was the first 
and most important question. When the Am,irican 
minister adverted to the President's policy of confin- 
ing the navigation of American vessels to American 
seamen, and the solicitude of the President that such 
a law might lead to a total discontinuance of the prac- 

5 Jefferson to Madison, March 23, 1815; Writings of Jeffer- 
son, IX, 511-514- 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 44 1 

tice of impressment, the British Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Castlereagh, intimated that if such a law were 
successful there would be no need of any arrangement 
upon impressment. He remarked that as the incon- 
venience did not exist during peace it might be doubt- 
ful whether it was the most seasonable time for a 
discussion of a subject upon which such a different and 
opposite view in the matter of principle was entertained 
by the two Governments. Adams urged the point 
that a time of peace was more favorable for such a 
discussion, but Castlereagh still disagreed. He gave 
Adams to understand that there was still strong feeling 
in Great Britain upon the subject, and that the Gov- 
ernment would not dare to incur the responsibility of 
any concession in connection with it. It was more ex- 
pedient, said he, to wait and see the result of the 
American policy for " encouraging their own native 
seamen," and whether this would remove the need 
for Great Britain to exercise the practice of impress- 
ment to protect herself from the loss of her own 
seamen. As a result of this conference Adams re- 
ported that there appeared to be "no prospect that, 
under the present ministry, any conventional arrange- 
ment for renouncing the practice of impressment will 
be attainable."^ 

A few months later Adams was informed by Castle- 

« Adams to Monroe, Jan. 31, 1816; American State Papers, 
For. Rel, IV., 360. 



442 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

reagh that the British Government were adverse to 
treating with respect ,to any of the conflicting claims 
of neutral and belligerent rights, but would be willing 
to entertain proposals in relation to impressment.'^ 

September 17, 1816, Adams renewed the proposal 
for the negotiation of a treaty of commerce, specifying 
the several objects which the American Government 
considered desirable to be included in a further con- 
vention. Upon the subject of impressment he pro- 
posed that both states should stipulate that they would 
not employ in their naval or merchant service any 
native citizens or subjects of the other state, with the 
exception of those already naturalized. This proposi- 
tion, it was stated, was made, not to secure any ad- 
vantage to the United States, but as a means for Great 
Britain to reserve to herself the services of all her 
own native seamen, and to remove forever the neces- 
sity of resorting to means of force, either by her 
naval officers in taking men from the vessels of the 
United States, or by the United States in resisting the 
renewal of that practice in the event of any future 
maritime war in which it might be neutral.^ Not 
until the following March did Adams receive a reply 
to his proposal, and then Castlereagh expressed a 

7 Adams to Monroe, Aug. 24, 1816; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 361. 

8 Adams to Castlereagh, Sept. 17, 1816; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 363. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 443 

willingness to treat only in a limited way with respect 
to commercial arrangements. 

When Rush was sent to Great Britain to succeed 
Adams in 1817, he was given full power to negotiate 
and sign a commercial treaty which might deal with 
neutral rights as well as commercial privileges. For 
instructions upon the questions embraced in neutral 
rights he was referred to the original instructions given 
to the peace plenipotentiaries.^ 

As the time approached when the commercial treaty 
of 181 5 would expire, no agreement having been 
reached to extend its provisions, the importance of 
practical commercial arrangements again transcended 
the more academic questions of neutral rights. Adams 
in a letter to Rush, May 30, 1818, wrote: " Tt is not 
our desire to embarrass the proposed commercial nego- 
tiation with any of the questions of maritime regula- 
tions adapted to a state of warfare. We do not wish 
that blockade, contraband trade with enemies or 
their colonies, or even impressment, should be drawn 
into the discussion, unless such a wish should be mani- 
fested on the British side."^" 

Before this letter reached him, Rush had already 
made two proposals to the British Government upon 

s Adams to Rush, Nov. 6, 1817; American State Papers, For. 
Rel., IV., 370. 

10 Adams to Rush, May 30, 1818; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 2,72-2,72>- 



444 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

impressment. On April i8 he proposed the reciprocal 
restriction of the naturalization of sailors in return for 
a definite stipulation against the practice of impress- 
ment ; and again, on June 20, he attempted to secure a 
renunciation of the practice by proposing that each 
nation should exclude altogether the seamen of the 
other from its service, the rule to apply to public as 
well as merchant vessels. The British Government at 
first rejected both proposals, but later, August 13, 
Castlereagh intimated to Rush that the second proposi- 
tion might, with two modifications, be accepted, al- 
though, he said, he had not consulted the other mem- 
bers of the Cabinet upon the subject. The modifica- 
tions which he proposed were, first, that either party 
might withdraw from the agreement after three or six 
months' notice; the second, that if a British officer 
should enter an American vessel for the purposes ad- 
mitted to be lawful, and should discover there a sea- 
man whom he suspected to be English, he should be 
allowed to make a record or proces verbal of the fact, 
which might be brought to the attention of the Ameri- 
can Government, though the officer himself would not 
be allowed to take the man.^^ 

This proposition being referred to Washington, 
President Monroe laid it before his Cabinet for their 

11 Moore, Digest of International Law, II., 997. Rush to 
Secretary of State, Aug. 15, 1818; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 379. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 445 

opinions upon the modifications proposed by Lord 
Castlereagh. Two members of the Cabinet, Crawford 
and Wirt, were incHned to accede, while the two 
others, Adams and Calhoun, were opposed to the pro- 
posal. The members of the Cabinet being evenly 
divided upon the subject, President Monroe took a 
midway course. He decided to reject the second 
modification, "because it implied that the boarding 
ofBcer should have the power of mustering the crew 
of an American vessel and passing them individually 
under his inspection " ; and also, " because it implied a 
suspicion that we should not faithfully and sincerely 
carry our own laws into execution." He had less 
objection to the first modification, for he believed that 
if the British Government once agreed not to impress 
seamen from American vessels, even though it should 
be for a short period, they would never be likely to 
resort to the practice again.^- The President, how- 
ever, was willing to consent to the first modification 
only on the condition that a provision be made that 
the notification of the withdrawal of the agreement 
should not take place until after the treaty had been 
in force two years. The President's decision was 
communicated to Minister Rush.^^ 

In the summer of 1818 Albert Gallatin, American 

12 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, IV., 146-149. Moore, Digest of 
International Law, II., 998. 

13 Adams to Rush, Dec. i, 1818; American State Papers, 
For. Rel, IV., 401-402. 



44^ SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

minister in Paris, had been requested by his Govern- 
ment to proceed to London and to join Minister Rush 
in the negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain. 
Gallatin reached London August i6, and on the 22d 
the first informal conference took place between the 
American ministers and the representatives of the 
British Government, who included Lord Castlereagh, 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Goulburn and Robin- 
son, specially appointed plenipotentiaries. 

On August 27, 181 8, the American and British 
plenipotentiaries held their first conference with re- 
spect to treaty arrangements. The British stated that 
they were ready at once to sign a treaty renewing the 
commercial convention of 1815, or if the American 
plenipotentiaries wished to discuss other topics, they 
were willing to delay the signing of the treaty; but 
they declared that their instructions did not allow them 
to consent to any partial or separate consideration of 
such topics " as an appendage to a renewal of the 
existing commercial convention." The American 
ministers expressed their unwillingness to sign the 
treaty renewal immediately.^* 

At the second conference, held August 29, the Ameri- 
can ministers stated that whenever the British min- 
isters were ready to submit their projet on the im- 

^* Protocol of the first conference between the American 
and British plenipotentiaries, Aug. 27, 1818; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 383. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 447 

pressment question they would bring forward their 
propositions respecting the other maritime points.^^ 
On September 17, the British commissioners presented 
a projet of six articles upon impressment. The 
scheme provided for the exclusion by each state of the 
natural-born subjects of the other from service in its 
public or private marine. This restriction was not to 
apply to natural-born subjects of either state natural- 
ized by the other before the signing of the treaty. An 
enumeration of such persons as were thus exempt was 
to be made by each state and the list communicated to 
the other. It should be agreed that during the con- 
tinuance of the treaty neither Power would impress 
or forcibly withdraw any person or persons from the 
vessels of the other upon the high seas. The treaty 
was to run for ten years, but might be abrogated at any 
time upon six months' notice.^** 

The American commissioners offered amendments 
to the British projet. Most of these were merely 
verbal changes ; but two points, upon which insistence 
was made, proved sufficiently serious to break off the 
negotiation relative to impressment. Objections were 
raised to the article which required that the place of 

15 Protocol of the second conference between the American 
and British plenipotentiaries, Aug. 29, 1818; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 383. 

1^ Protocol of the third conference between the American 
and British plenipotentiaries, Sept. 17, 1818; American State 
Papers, For. Rel., IV., 383-388. 



448 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

birth and date of naturalization of all persons ex- 
empt from the exclusion law should be specified. To 
this the Americans objected because it would be im- 
possible in every case to comply with such requirement, 
particularly as there was no national naturalization law 
prior to 1789, and minor children of naturalized 
persons were not required to take out papers to be- 
come American citizens. They proposed as a substi- 
tute that no natural-born subject or citizen of either 
Power whose name should not be included in the list 
should be deemed to fall within the exception unless he 
produced proof of his having been duly naturalized 
prior to the exchange of ratifications of the treaty. 
The second important change proposed by the Ameri- 
can commissioners was that which provided for the 
exemption from the law of persons naturalized by 
their respective laws " previous to the exchange of 
ratifications," instead of " previous to the signature," of 
the treaty, as the British had proposed. The British 
refused to acquiesce in the changes which the Ameri- 
cans offered, and the negotiation failed. Rush ex- 
pressed the belief that, had Lord Castlereagh been 
present in London throughout the negotiations, a suc- 
cessful termination of the subject of impressment 
might have resulted. Impressment failing of settle- 
ment, all other subjects of a maritime nature were 
withdrawn from discussion. Rush found at this time 
that, in spite of the failure to make any arrangement 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 449 

relative to impressment, public opinion, as expressed 
by the ship-owners of London and British naval officers, 
was steadily tending towards a change in British 
policy.^'^ 

In the convention relating to the slave trade which 
was agreed upon by the representatives of the United 
States and Great Britain in 1824, but later rejected by 
the two states, reservation was made that the right 
allowed with respect to the forcible seizure of slave 
vessels should not be construed to sanction the right 
of search and impressment.^^ 

In May, 1826, the House of Representatives passed 
a resolution requesting the President to lay before the 
House " any information in his possession, touching 
the impressment of seamen, from on board American 
vessels on the high seas, or elsewhere, by the com- 
manders of British or other foreign vessels or ships of 
war, since the i8th of February, 1815." The Presi- 
dent, on January 15, 1827, communicated all the 
knowledge upon the subject in his possession, which 
embraced only two specific cases of alleged impress- 
ment, and these, as it subsequently appeared, were 
persons who voluntarily entered the British service and 

1^ Protocol of the fourth conference between the American 
and the British plenipotentiaries, Sept. 25, 1818; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 388-390. Rush, Memoranda of a 
Residence at the Court of London (1833), 445-446. 

18 American State Papers, For. Rel., V., 321. 

30 



450 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

were transferred from an American to a British ship 
without any objections being interposed by the officer 
in charge of the American vessel.^^ 

The United States continued sensitive upon the sub- 
ject of impressment, although no actual cases of the 
practice can be discovered. In connection with cer- 
tain alleged instances of impressment in 1828, Clay, 
Secretary of State, in a letter of January 26, 1829, ad- 
dressed to the American minister to Great Britain 
said: "If these proceedings have had the sanction of 
the British Government, you will inform it that the 
American Government can not tolerate them ; that, if 
persisted in, they will be opposed by the United States ; 
and that the British Government must be answerable 
for all the consequences, whatever they may be, which 
may flow from perseverance in a practice utterly 
irreconcilable with the sovereign rights of the United 
States. If these proceedings have taken place without 
the sanction of the British Government, you will de- 
mand the punishment of the several British naval 
officers at whose instance they occurred, and the im- 
mediate adoption of efficacious measures to guard the 
navigation of the United States against the occurrence 
of similar irregularities."-^ 

1^ Congressional Debates, Vol. II., Part II., 2666. Richard- 
son, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II., 368. 

20 Clay to Barbour, Jan. 26, 1829; MS., Inst. U. S. Ministers, 
XII., 186. Quoted in Moore, Digest of International Law, 
II., 998-999- 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 4$ I 

When Webster and Lord Ashburton entered into 
negotiations to settle various differences between their 
respective states, impressment was one of the subjects 
upon which they exchanged notes. In a note of 
August 8, 1842, addressed by Webster to Lord Ash- 
burton, the American Secretary discussed the history 
of impressment and the general principles upon which 
it was founded. He declared that the Government of 
the United States had reflected on the past; had 
pondered upon the condition of the present; and had 
endeavored to anticipate, as far as was within its 
power, the probable future ; and that the result of such 
deliberation was that the American Government was 
" prepared to say, that the practice of impressing sea- 
men from American vessels cannot be hereafter al- 
lowed to take place. That practice is founded on 
principles which it does not recognise, and is invari- 
ably attended by consequences so unjust, so injurious, 
and of such formidable magnitude as cannot be sub- 
mitted to." He declared that the only rule which could 
be " adopted and observed, consistently with the rights 
and honor of the United States and the security of 
their citizens," was that the nationality of the vessel 
should protect the seamen on board. This was an- 
nounced to be the principle that hereafter would be 
maintained by the American Government. Webster 
also upheld the contention of the United States that the 
right of search by one nation of the vessels of another 



452 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

for the purpose of impressment was contrary to the 
law of nations. He said: " Every merchant vessel on 
the seas is rightfully considered as part of the territory 
of the country to which it belongs. The entry, there- 
fore, into such vessel, being neutral, by a belligerent, is 
an act of force, and is prima facie, a wrong, a trespass, 
which can be justified only when done for some pur- 
pose, allowed to form a sufficient justification by the 
law of nations. But a British cruiser enters an Ameri- 
can merchant vessel in order to take therefrom sup- 
posed British subjects; oflfering no justification there- 
for, under the law of nations, but claiming the right 
under the law of England respecting the king's pre- 
rogative. This cannot be defended. English soil, Eng- 
lish territory, English jurisdiction is the appropriate 
sphere for the operation of English law ; the ocean is 
the sphere and any merchant vessel on the seas is, by 
that law, under the protection of the laws of her own 
nation, and may claim immunity, unless in cases in 
which that law allows her to be entered or visited. "^^ 
Lord Ashburton in reply stated that the object of 
his mission had been to settle existing subjects of 
difference; that no differences on the subject of im- 
pressment had arisen within recent years because the 
practice had, since the war, wholly ceased and could 
not, consistently with existing laws and regulations for 

21 Webster to Ashburton, Aug. 8, 1842 ; Niles' Register, 
LXIIL, 62-63. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 453 

manning her Majesty's navy and under the present cir- 
cumstances, be renewed. He admitted the desirability 
of coming to some agreement in time of peace upon 
the principles underlying impressment in order to re- 
move all apprehension and anxiety as to the future. 
He promised to transmit Webster's note to the British 
Government that it might receive proper attention. ^^ 

When transmitting the Webster-Ashburton treaty to 
the Senate, August ii, 1842, President Tyler also 
sent with it the correspondence between the negotia- 
tors on the subject of impressment. In his message 
accompanying the documents he said : " The impress- 
ment of seamen from merchant vessels of this country 
by British cruisers, although not practiced in time of 
peace, and therefore not at present a productive cause 
of difference and irritation, has, nevertheless, hitherto 
been so prominent a topic of controversy and is so 
likely to bring on renewed contentions at the first 
breaking out of a European war that it has been 
thought the part of wisdom now to take it into serious 
and earnest consideration. The letter from the Secre- 
tary of State to the British minister explains the 
ground which the Government has assumed and the 
principles which it means to uphold. For the defense 
of these grounds and the maintenance of these prin- 
ciples the most perfect reliance is placed on the in- 

22Ashburton to Webster, Aug. 9, 1842; Niles' Register, 
LXIII, 63. 



454 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

telligence of the American people and on their firm- 
ness and patriotism in whatever touches the honor of 
the coimtry or its great and essential interests. "^^ 

The protest made by the British Government against 
the seizure of Mason and Shdell on the British 
steamer Trent in the Civil War has been held to 
denote an abandonment on the part of England of a 
right to take from neutral vessels, on any pretext 
whatever, persons " not within the conceded exception 
of military persons in the actual service of the 
enemy."2* 

The doctrine of inalienable allegiance, upon which 
the alleged right of impressment was founded, was 
abandoned by Great Britain in 1870 when Parliament 
passed a naturalization act which conceded the right 
of voluntary expatriation and recognized the efiicacy 
of the naturalization laws of foreign states to change 
the status of former subjects of Great Britain. This 
law removed what, heretofore, had proved an insuper- 
able obstacle to any agreement between the United 
States and Great Britain upon legislation which should 
mutually protect the interests of both states. 

The United States Navy Regulations (ed. 1896, par. 
410) contain the following provision: "Commanders 
of public vessels of war are not to suffer their vessels 

23 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV., 
169. 

2* Lawrence's Wheaton (1863), 217-218. Quoted in Moore, 
Digest of International Law, II., looi. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 455 

to be searched by any foreign power under any pre- 
text, nor any officers or men to be taken out, so long 
as they have power of resistance. If force be used, 
resistance must be continued as long as possible. If 
overcome, they are to yield their vessel, but not their 
men without the vessel."-^ 

The second important subject included in the causes 
of the war, and upon which the American peace com- 
missioners were instructed to secure a satisfactory 
arrangement, was blockade. They were instructed to 
secure an agreement upon a precise definition of legal 
blockade. Such a definition, it was maintained by the 
American Government, should include previous warn- 
ing to vessels sailing to the blockaded ports and the 
maintenance of the blockade by a force sufficient to 
render hazardous any attempt to enter. The commis- 
sioners, however, found it necessary to abandon mari- 
time questions in the discussion of the peace treaty 
and of the later commercial treaty. Great Britain 
admitted the validity of the contention that a blockade 
to be binding must be maintained by an efi^ective force, 
but she claimed that the blockade established by the 
order in council of May, 1806, was efficiently main- 
tained, and that the later order of November, 1807, was 
a necessary act of retaliation against the enemy. The 
Berlin and Milan decrees were likewise claimed by 

2s Quoted in Davis, Elements of International Law (ed. 
1908), 499-500 (footnote). 



456 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

Napoleon to be retaliatory acts against Great Britain 
to punish her for a violation of the lav^ of nations. 

In 1816 the United States had occasion to restate 
its position concerning blockade. When notified by 
the Spanish minister at Washington of a declaration 
of the blockade of "the ports of the Viceroyalty of 
Santa Fe," the American minister in Madrid was in- 
structed to advise the Government of Spain " that ' a 
blockade, to be acknowledged as valid by the United 
States, must be confined to particular ports, each having 
a force stationed before it sufficient to intercept the 
entry of vessels; and no vessel shall be seized, even 
in attempting to enter a port so blockaded, till she has 
been previously warned away from that port.' " Again 
in 1825 and 1826, in connection with certain blockades 
established by Brazil, the American Government, 
through diplomatic channels, pressed its position upon 
the Brazilian Government, particularly that part which 
called for notifications to be given to each vessel 
attempting to enter the blockaded ports.-° In 1846, 
when the United States established a blockade of the 
west coast of Mexico, Buchanan, Secretary of State, 
wrote Pakenham, the British minister, to assure him 
that there was no intention of setting up a paper 
blockade, since this would be unwarranted by the prin- 
ciples which the United States had maintained in re- 

26 Raguet to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Dec. 13, 
1825; American State Papers, For. Rel., VI., 1023-1025. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 45/ 

gard to blockades ever since it became an independent 
nation. In order to insure consistency in the Ameri- 
can position the commanding officers of the United 
States Navy in the Pacific were informed by Mason, 
Secretary of the Navy, that "a lawful maritime 
blockade requires the actual presence of a sufficient 
force stationed at the entrance of the ports sufficiently 
near to prevent communication. The only exception 
to this rule, which requires the actual presence of an 
adequate force to constitute a lawful blockade, arises 
out of the circumstance of the occasional temporary 
absence of the blockading squadron, produced by 
accident, as in the case of a storm, which does not 
suspend the legal operation of a blockade."^^ 

Paper blockades, against which the United States 
protested, were placed under the ban by the Declara- 
tion of Paris in 1856. Article 4 of that convention 
adopted the proposition that " blockades in order to be 
binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained 
by a force sufficient really to prohibit access to the 
enemy's coast." This was agreed to by seven states, 
namely, Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Rus- 
sia, Sardinia, and Turkey. In the second Hague Peace 
Conference in 1907-^ an attempt was made to secure 
the adhesion of the participating Powers to the prin- 

27 Moore, Digest of International Law, VII., 790-791. 

28 Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899-1907, I., 
721-725. 



458 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

ciple laid clown in the Declaration of Paris and to 
define more strictly the meaning of " effective " 
blockade, proper notification, and circumstances of 
violation. The discussions in the conference disclosed 
the fact that there were two practices in the matter 
of notification of blockade, the Anglo- American and the 
Continental. As it seemed that agreement was impos- 
sible at that time, the subject was dropped; but a pro- 
position was adopted providing for the establishment 
of an International Prize Court which should apply the 
rules of international law. In order to come to an 
agreement upon some of the important rules which 
such a Prize Court would be obliged to apply, the 
London Naval Conference of 1909 was convened. The 
subject of blockade was one of the matters definitely 
included in the Declaration of London, which was the 
result of that conference. By this international agree- 
ment the Declaration of Paris was adopted in relation 
to the definition of blockade, and the question of ef- 
fectiveness of blockade was declared to be a matter 
of fact ; declaration of blockade must include the date 
when it began, the limits included, and the period with- 
in which neutral vessels may come out; notification 
must be given to the Governments of the neutral states 
and to the local authorities by the officer commanding 
the blockading force. 

The subject of disarmament on the Great Lakes, 
which was brought into the discussions at Ghent 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 459 

through the insistence by the British commissioners 
that the United States dismantle its forts and with- 
draw its vessels from the lakes, had a happy sequel 
in the subsequent arrangement for the limitation of the 
naval forces of both countries upon the boundary 
waters. 

Shortly after the treaty of Ghent was signed, the 
British Government issued orders for the increase of 
their naval force upon the lakes. The American Gov- 
ernment conceived it to be unwise to enter into a rival 
policy of naval increase, and accordingly instructed 
its minister at London to propose to the British Gov- 
ernment such an arrangement respecting the naval 
force to be kept on the lakes by both Governments as 
would demonstrate their pacific policy and secure their 
peace. It was suggested that this might be done by 
limiting the size and number of armed vessels to be 
kept by each nation upon the lakes, or by abstaining 
altogether from keeping an armed force there beyond 
that used for the revenue service.-^ 

Adams presented this profifer of the American Gov- 
ernment to Lord Castlereagh, who was unwilling to 
accede to it on the ground that a mutual stipulation 
against armament on the lakes would, because of the 
advantage of position of the United States, be unequal 

29 Monroe to Adams, Nov. i6, 1815; MS., Inst. U. S. Minis- 
ters, VIII., 3; 56th Cong., ist sess., H. Doc. 471; Moore, 
Digest of International Law, I., 691-692. 



460 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

and disadvantageous in its operation to Great Britain 
in time of war. On March 21, Adams renewed the 
proposal to "mutually and equally disarm upon the 
American lakes." He expressed the hope that the 
offer might be received in the same friendly spirit in 
which it was made, and " he emphasized the fact that 
there were abundant securities against the possibility 
of any sudden attack upon the colonies which the 
' guarded and cautious policy ' of Great Britain might 
fear."3o 

Great Britain, however, apprehensive of another war 
with the United States, and accepting the opinion of 
Wellington and other experts that the control of the 
lakes would determine the ultimate issue of any such 
war, was disposed to continue her policy of prepara- 
tion for future contingencies. Both in Great Britain 
and America there was a strong element which urged 
the policy of preserving peace by being prepared for 
war. Goulburn, one of the British commissioners at 
Ghent, wrote Clay as follows : " You are fighting the 
same battle in America that we are here, i. e., putting 
peace establishments on a footing not unbecoming the 
growth of population and empire in which they are to 
be maintained. It is impossible that either country 

^''Callahan, The Neutrality of the American Lakes, 69; 
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political 
Science, sen XVI., nos. 1-4. Moore, Digest of International 
Law, I., 692. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 46 1 

should feel jealous of the other so long as the aug- 
mentation does not exceed the necessity of the case, 
and I have not heard an argument anywhere to prove 
that it does so exceed in either case. I can relieve 
your apprehensions as to the hostile movement of Eng- 
land in any part of the globe." Adams, who followed 
with greatest anxiety the discussions in Parliament in 
connection with the military and naval establishment, 
was apprehensive that the augmentation of equipment 
foreshadowed war. In a letter to Monroe on March 30 
he wrote : " In all the late debates in Parliament upon 
what they call their Military and Naval Peace Estab- 
lishment the prospect of a new war with the United 
States has been distinctly held up by the ministers and 
admitted by the opposition as a solid reason for 
enormous and unparalleled expenditure and preparation 
in Canada and Nova Scotia. We hear nothing now 
about the five fir frigates and the bits of striped bunt- 
ing. The strain is in a higher mood. Lord Castle- 
reagh talks of the great and growing military power 
of the United States. The Marquis of Lansdowne, an 
opposition leader and one of the loudest trumpeters for 
retrenchment and economy, still commends the min- 
isters for having been beaten into the policy of having 
a naval superiority upon the lakes. And one of the 
lords of the admiralty told the House of Commons last 
Monday that bumboat expeditions and pinchbeck ad- 
ministrations would do no longer for Canada; that 



462 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

Englishmen must lay their account for fighting battles 
in fleets of three-deckers on the North American lakes. 
All this is upon the principle of preserving peace by 
being prepared for war. But it shows to demonstra- 
tion what will be the fate of the proposal for dis- 
arming."^^ 

Adams had argued against the policy of armament 
on the lakes that, besides the expense, the tendency 
would be to arouse suspicion and ill-will between the 
peoples of both nations. He believed that the " moral 
and political tendency of such a system must be to war 
and not to peace." He felt, under the circumstances, 
that there was very little likelihood of the acceptance 
of the proposal which he had made to the British 
Government. However, a few weeks later, Adams 
was happily surprised when he was informed by Lord 
Castlereagh that the British Government were ready to 
meet the proposal of the United States, " so far as to 
avoid everything like a contention between the two 
parties which should have the strongest force" on the 
lakes, and that they did not desire to keep any vessels 
in commission or in active service except those needed 
" to convey troops, occasionally." Adams did not feel 
himself properly instructed to conclude a treaty upon 
the subject, and so it was agreed that the negotiations 
should be transferred to Washington. Accordingly, 
instructions were sent to Charles Bagot, the British 
31 Callahan, Neutrality of the American Lakes, 70-71. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 463 

minister to the United States, who was given power 
to act with reference to armament on the lakes, and 
also in the matter of the fisheries.^- 

The formal opening of negotiations in Washington 
began when, on July 26, Bagot sent a note to Monroe 
informing him that the British Government were pre- 
pared to " cheerfully adopt " any reasonable system in 
connection with the naval armament on the lakes which 
would diminish the expenses, reduce the chance of col- 
lision, and prevent jealousy between the two countries. 
He requested information as to the specific arrange- 
ments proposed by the American Government.^^ 

Secretary Monroe replied, August 2, that the Ad- 
ministration was willing, "in the spirit of the peace 
which so happily exists between the two nations, and 
until the proposed arrangement shall be cancelled, . . . 
to confine the naval force to be maintained on the 
lakes, on each side, to the following vessels ; that is, on 
Lake Ontario, to one vessel not exceeding one hun- 
dred tons burden, and one eighteen-pound cannon ; and 
on the upper lakes, to two vessels of like burden and 
force; and on the waters of Lake Champlain, to one 
vessel not exceeding the like burden and force; and 
that all other armed vessels on those lakes shall be 
forthwith dismantled ; and, likewise, that neither party 

32 Callahan. Neutrality of the American Lakes, 7^-73- 

33 Bagot to Monroe, July 26, 1816; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 203. 



464 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

shall build or arm any other vessel on the shores of 
those lakes." It was further provided that the naval 
force thus retained by each party on the lakes should 
be restricted in its duty to the protection of its revenue 
laws, the transportation of troops and goods, and to 
such other services as would not in any way interfere 
with the armed vessels of the other party.^^ 

The British minister, while conceiving it necessary 
to transmit to his Government the project put forth by 
the American Government, informed Monroe that he 
was prepared to suspend immediately the further con- 
struction and equipment of armed vessels upon the 
lakes pending the outcome of the negotiations.^-"^ 
Monroe then sought to secure a provisional agreement 
of the project presented by him ; but the British min- 
ister expressed his inability to subscribe, even provi- 
sionally, to any precise agreement as to the exact 
manner in which the respective naval forces upon the 
lakes should be limited.^^ Monroe then accepted 
Bagot's offer to suspend further augmentation of the 
naval armament until the British Government should 
make tlieir reply to the American project. 

It was not until the spring of the following year, 

3* Monroe to Bagot, Aug. 2, 1816; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 203. 

35 Bagot to Monroe, Aug. 6, 1816; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 203-204. 

36 Bagot to Monroe, Aug. 13, 1816; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 204. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 465 

after Monroe had become President, that the actual 
reduction of the armament on the lakes took place. 
On April 28, 1817, Bagot informed Rush, then Acting 
Secretary of State, that the British Government had 
consented to reduce the naval armament upon the 
American lakes in the manner proposed by the Amer- 
ican Government.^'^ Rush, in acknowledging the re- 
ceipt of the British note, reciprocally pledged his Gov- 
ernment to the acceptance of the project.^^ It was 
agreed that the stipulation should remain in force until 
six months after either party should have given notice 
to the other of its desire to terminate it. 

Orders were immediately issued by both Govern- 
ments for carrying out the arrangement. Not until 
a year later, April 6, 1818, was the convention com- 
municated to the Senate. It was ratified by the Senate 
on April 16, and proclaimed by the President on the 
28th. No exchange of ratifications occurred. The op- 
eration of the convention was made effective through 
executive order from the date of the original exchange 
of notes.^^ 

This arrangement for mutual disarmament on the 

37 Bagot to Rush, April 28, 1817; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 205-206. 

38 Rush to Bagot, April 29, 1817; American State Papers, 
For. Rel., IV., 206. 

39 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 202; 56th Cong., 
1st sess., S. Doc. 301; 56th Cong., ist sess., H. Doc. 471, 15; 
Moore, Digest of International Law, I., 692. 

31 



466 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

lakes has undoubtedly been the greatest single factor 
in the continuance of peaceful relations between the 
United States and Great Britain during the last one 
hundred years. 

A fourth subject which was earnestly discussed in 
the peace negotiations was the northeastern fisheries. 
This question remained open for nearly a century after 
the treaty of Ghent was signed, and was the occasion 
of a very large number of specific negotiations. 

The British commissioners at Ghent took the posi- 
tion that the fishing privileges had become abrogated 
by the war, and they refused to renew them to the 
United States except for an equivalent. The Ameri- 
can commissioners held that the fishing "privileges," 
or " rights," as they preferred to consider them, were 
unaffected by the war since they were not granted by 
the treaty of 1783, but had been recognized by that 
treaty as belonging to the United States along with its 
independence.^" They did, however, ofifer, by a di- 
vided vote, to grant to the British a renewal of the 
privilege of the navigation of the Mississippi in return 
for the renewal of the rights to the fisheries. They 
also offered to sign a treaty omitting both subjects. 
The last proposition was the one finally accepted by 
the British commissioners. They thought that by 
drawing from the Americans the proposition to ex- 

*<> Extracts of letter from American Commissioners to 
British Commissioners; Monroe Papers, MS., XIV., 1810. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 46/ 

change the one privilege for the other they had gained, 
practically, the admission that the fishing privilege 
needed renewal to render it effective.*^ Nevertheless, 
the American commissioners argued so adroitly that the 
British were able to make little use of the American 
proposal as an argument against the claim of the Amer- 
ican commissioners. The alternative proposal of the 
American commissioners to drop the question altogether 
having been accepted by the British, the question of 
the fisheries was thus left subject to the interpretation 
of each state. 

When explaining to their Government their conduct 
with reference to the proposal to exchange the Missis- 
sippi privilege for that of the fisheries, the American 
commissioners stated that they regarded both subjects 
as unafifected by the war ; that when the British asked 
for the navigation of the Mississippi as a new claim, 
they had refused to grant it without an equivalent ; that 
if the request were made by Great Britain because it 
had been granted in 1783, then the claim of the United 
States to the liberty of the fisheries must be recog- 
nized ; that, " to place both points beyond all future 
controversy," the proposal to confirm both rights by 
treaty provisions had been presented by a majority of 
the mission. A proof that they considered the fishing 
privilege to stand on the same basis as before the war 

" Goulburn to Bathurst, Dec. 10, 1814; Wellington's Sup- 
plementary Despatches, IX., 471-472. 



468 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

was the fact that they had rejected the proposal of the 
British commissioners to refer both questions, the 
fisheries and the Mississippi, to future negotiations, 
although the acceptance of that proposition would have 
secured the 49th parallel as the boundary west of the 
Lake of the Woods.*- 

The fact that in the negotiations at Ghent the treaty 
of 1783 had been referred to, and that in the treaty of 
Ghent provision had been made to carry out stipulations 
as to the boundaries laid out by the treaty of 1783, was 
taken to prove that this treaty was still in force and, 
if in force in part, must be in force in its entirety. So 
the argument ran.*^ 

When plans were maturing for a commercial treaty, 
Adams attempted to secure the confirmation of the 
fishing privileges in that treaty in order to avoid future 
conflicts between the two states. The British Govern- 
ment refused to grant such confirmation, much to the 
displeasure of Adams, who in a letter to Monroe wrote : 
" It is impossible for me to express in terms too strong 
or explicit my conviction that nothing can maintain the 
rights of the people of the United States in the Ameri- 
can fisheries but the determined and inflexible resolu- 

*2 American Plenipotentiaries to Monroe, Dec. 25, 1814; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., III., TZ^-TZZ- 

43 Floyd to President Monroe, March 8, 1815; Russell Pa- 
pers, MS., No. 1119. Article from Canadian Courant; British 
Foreign Office, 5, 106. Adams to Bathurst, Sept. 25, 1815; 
MS., British Foreign Office, 5, 106. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 469 

tion of themselves and the Government to maintain 
them at every hazard."** Adams continued a vigor- 
ous correspondence with Lord Bathurst over the sub- 
ject, but secured no assurance of any new arrange- 
ment. 

In the summer of 1818 Richard Rush and Albert 
Gallatin were appointed to negotiate for the renewal 
of the commercial convention between Great Britain 
and the United States, which would expire by limitation 
the next year. They secured this object in a conven- 
tion signed October 20, 181 8. In addition to provid- 
ing for the continuance of the former convention for a 
period of ten years, the treaty embraced articles upon 
the settlement of the northwestern boundary ; an ar- 
rangement with reference to the Columbia River and 
joint occupation of the northwest coast; reference of 
the indemnity claims for slaves to a friendly Power ; 
and the renewal of the fishing liberty with some cur- 
tailment from that granted by the treaty of 1783. 

The treaty of 1818 granted the liberty to the inhabi- 
tants of the United States " forever " to " take fish of 
every kind on that part of the southern coast of New- 
foundland which extends from Cape Ray to the 
Rameau Islands, on the western and northern coast 
of Newfoundland, from the said Cape Ray to the 
Quirpon Islands on the shores of the Magdalen Islands, 

**J. Q. Adams to Monroe, Sept. 5, 1815; Bureau of Indexes 
and Archives, British notes, 19, No. 12. 



470 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

and also on the coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks from 
Mount Joly on the southern coast of Labrador, to and 
through the streights of Belleisle and thence north- 
wardly indefinitely along the coast." American fisher- 
men were allowed " to dry and cure fish in any of the 
unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks of the southern 
part of the coast of Newfoundland hereabove described, 
and of the coast of Labrador." as long as such territory 
should be unsettled. The United States renounced 
for its fishermen any right " to take, dry, or cure fish 
on, or within three marine miles of any of the coasts, 
bays, creeks, or harbours of His Britannic Majesty's 
dominions in America not included within the above 
mentioned limits ; Provided however, that the Ameri- 
can fishermen shall be admitted to enter such bays or 
harbours for the purpose of shelter and of repairing 
damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of obtain- 
ing water, and for no other purpose whatever. But 
they shall be under such restrictions as may be neces- 
sary to prevent their taking, drying or curing fish 
therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the 
privileges hereby reserved to them."*'' 

The treaty of 1783 had stated the privilege with re- 
spect to the fisheries within British jurisdiction in 
this way : " The inhabitants of the United States shall 

*^ Hertslet, Treaties and Conventions between Great Britain 
and Foreign Powers, V., 392 et seq. Malloy, Treaties and 
Conventions, I., 631-633. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 4^1 

have liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of 
the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall 
use (but not to dry or cure the same on that island) 
and also on the coasts, bays and creeks of all other of 
His Britannic Majesty's dominions in America; and 
that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry 
and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours and 
creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labra- 
dor, so long as the same shall remain unsettled ; but so 
soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it 
shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or 
cure fish at such settlements, without a previous agree- 
ment for that purpose with the inhabitants, proprietors 
or possessors of the ground."*" 

It will be noted that by the provisions of the treaty 
of 1818 the territory within which Americans might 
fish was greatly curtailed, and the privilege of drying 
and curing fish within British territory was practically 
withdrawn. The American fishermen petitioning that 
they be granted the privilege of the inshore fisheries, 
the right to which had been renounced in the convention 
of 1818, the question again became the subject of ne- 
gotiation. A reciprocity treaty for the temporary ad- 
justment of the subject was signed at Washington, 
June 5, 1854. The negotiators were William L. Marcy, 
Secretary of State of the United States, and Lord 
Elgin, special plenipotentiary of Great Britain. By 

4" Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 588. 



4/2 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

the provisions of this treaty American fishermen were 
again admitted to the inshore fisheries as described in 
the treaty of 1783, and the British fishermen were ad- 
mitted to the inshore fisheries on the eastern coast of 
the United States north of the 36th parallel of north 
latitude. In each case it was expressly declared that 
the " liberty " applied to sea fisheries, and that " the 
salmon and shad fisheries and all fisheries in rivers 
and the mouths of rivers " were reserved to each 
country exclusively for its own fishermen.^'^ It was 
provided that this reciprocal arrangement might be 
terminated by either party on twelve months' notice. 

This treaty was terminated in the year 1864 by an 
act of Congress. The fishing rights reverted again to 
the treaty arrangements of 1818. Between 1864 and 
1 87 1 a system of licenses was adopted by the Canadian 
Government granting American fishermen the right to 
fish in waters from which they were excluded by the 
treaty of 1818. In 1869 the Canadian Government 
enacted exclusive laws against American fishermen 
forcing them to keep outside the three mile limit.*^ 

Conflicts arising between the fishermen of New- 
foundland and the United States, negotiations were 

47 Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 668-672. Moore, 
Digest of International Law, I., 791-792. 

*s Correspondence respecting the Newfoundland fisheries; 
Parliamentary Papers, U. S., No. i. Speech by Sir R. Bond, 
58. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 4/3 

again renewed which resulted in the so-called treaty of 
Washington, which was signed May 8, 1871. It was 
stipulated that this treaty should continue for ten years 
or until terminated by twelve months' notice by either 
state.*^ By this treaty American fishermen were again 
allowed the privilege of the inshore fisheries in the 
waters of British North America. In return for that 
privilege the markets of the United States were opened 
to the fishery products of Newfoundland and Nova 
Scotia. This treaty was terminated by the American 
Government, July i, 1885. Once again the fishing 
privilege reverted to the basis of the treaty of 1818, 
and a modus vivendi was entered upon.^" 

In 1888 Great Britain attempted to negotiate another 
reciprocity treaty. These negotiations resulted in what 
is known as the Bayard-Chamberlain treaty. This 
was signed February 5, 1888, but was subsequently re- 
jected by the Senate. In the year 1890 the Govern- 
ment of Newfoundland, with the permission of Great 
Britain, entered upon direct negotiations with the 
United States. As a result an agreement, which has 
been called the Bond-Blaine convention, was reached. 
This arrangement, similar to the unratified treaty of 
1888, provided, in exchange for the fishing privilege, 
that the fishing products and crude copper ores of 
Newfoundland should be admitted free into the United 

^^ Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, I., 700 et seq. 
s*' Moore, Digest of International Law, I., 808-809. 



474 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

States. The Dominion of Canada objected to the 
arrangement, and the convention was never submitted 
to Great Britain, out of deference to the wishes of 
Canada. Attempts were again made in 1898 by Great 
Britain to bring about a reciprocal trade treaty, but 
these also failed. ^^ 

In 1902, as a result of a long series of negotiations, a 
convention known as the Hay-Bond treaty was signed. 
This treaty was made upon the same lines as those of 
1888 and 1890. It was opposed by the fishing interests 
of Massachusetts, and, after being before the Senate 
for three years, it was finally rejected. From October 
12, 1905, to October 6, 1906, an extended correspond- 
ence was carried on between the Department of State 
and the British Foreign Office over the fishing privi- 
leges. This resulted in an agreement upon a new modus 
vivendi, which was ratified by the American Govern- 
ment, October 6, 1906.'- By the terms of this agree- 
ment the Newfoundland Foreign Fishing Vessels Act 
of 1906, which imposed certain restrictions upon Amer- 
ican fishing vessels, and parts of an act of the previous 
year against which American fishermen had com- 
plained, were not to be enforced against American fish- 
ing vessels. The use of purse seines by the American 

^^Correspondence respecting the Newfoundland fisheries; 
Parliamentary Papers, U. S., No. i, Speech by Sir R. Bond, 59. 

^-Correspondence respecting the Newfoundland fisheries; 
Parliamentary Papers, U. S., No. i, Whitelaw Reid to Sir 
Edward Grey, Oct. 6, 1906, 42 et seq. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 475 

fishermen, which had been prohibited by law, was now 
allowed during the ensuing season ; and the " ship- 
ment of Newfoundlanders by American fishermen out- 
side the three mile limit was not to be made the basis 
of interference or to be penalized. "^^ 

On April 4, 1908, the United States and Great 
Britain concluded a general arbitration treaty. Acting 
under this treaty, the two countries signed a special 
agreement on January 27, 1909, which was formally 
ratified by both Governments, March 4, 1909, to submit 
to the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague 
the settlement of certain questions growing out of the 
fisheries controversy. The United States maintained 
that its rights to the Newfoundland fisheries were 
based upon the treaty of 1818, which had never been 
abrogated, and that the Government of Newfoundland 
in the passage of restrictive laws had infringed upon 
privileges guaranteed under that treaty.^* 

The Hague tribunal was, in particular, called upon 
to decide seven distinct points: One, had the Govern- 
ment of Newfoundland the right to restrict the Ameri- 
can fishery rights in Newfoundland by its own laws, 
without the consent of the United States; two, might 
American fishing vessels while exercising their fishing 

53 Correspondence respecting the Newfoundland fisheries; 
Parliamentary Papers, U. S., No. i, Whitelaw Reid to Sir 
Edward Grey, Oct. 6, 1906, 42 et seq. 

54 Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbi- 
tration; 6ist Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. 870, Vol. VIII., lo-ii. 



4/6 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

privileges be prohibited from employing as members 
of their crews persons who were not inhabitants of 
the United States; three, might the inhabitants of the 
United States be subjected, without the consent of the 
United States, to the requirements of entry or report 
at custom-houses, or the payment of light or harbor or 
other dues, or any other similar requirements or con- 
ditions or exactions; four, might restrictions be im- 
posed upon American fishermen, making the exercise 
of the privileges granted them by the treaty of entering 
certain bays and harbors for shelter, repairs, wood, or 
water, conditional upon the payment of light or harbor 
or other dues, or entering or reporting at custom- 
houses, or any similar conditions ; five, from what point 
should the three mile limit be measured in the case of 
bays which were more than three miles wide, from 
a line drawn from promontory to promontory, or from 
a line paralleling all irregularities of the coast ; six, did 
the treaty of 1818 give the inhabitants of the United 
States the same liberty to take fish in the bays, harbors, 
and creeks of Newfoundland as of Labrador; seven, 
were the fishermen of the United States to have for 
their vessels, when duly authorized by the United 
States in their behalf, the commercial privileges on the 
treaty coasts accorded by agreement or otherwise to 
United States trading vessels generally. 



55 



^^ Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbi- 
tration; 6ist Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. 870, Vol. VIII., 13, 87, 
97, 113, 117, 225, 257. 



SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 47/ 

Of the seven points discussed five were decided in 
favor of the United States and two in favor of Great 
Britain. The two questions interpreted favorably to 
Great Britain, or rather to Newfoundland, were the 
first and the fifth. By the decision relative to the first, 
Newfoundland was allowed to make reasonable regula- 
tions of the fisheries, such as determining the time 
during which and the methods by which fishing might 
be carried on along her coasts. The decision of the 
Arbitration Court upon the fifth question construed 
the three mile limit to be from a line drawn from head- 
land to headland and not from the coast indentations 
of the bays. The decision upon all points has justified 
the wisdom of the creation of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, for not only was a most vexed question 
of long standing settled, but settled in such a fair 
manner that the United States, Great Britain, Canada, 
and Newfoundland were all satisfied. The award was 
made September 7, 1910. The court in connection 
with its decision recommended the adoption by the 
United States and Great Britain of certain rules and 
methods of procedure under which all questions that 
might arise in the future with reference to the exercise 
of the liberties referred to in Article I of the treaty 
of 1818 might be settled in accordance with the prin- 
ciples laid down in the award. On July 20, 1912, 
representatives of the two countries signed an agree- 
ment which provided for the publication of laws, ordin- 



478 SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERTED QUESTIONS 

ances, or rules for the regulation of the fisheries, and 
for the creation of a Permanent Mixed Fishery Com- 
mission of three, which should decide upon the reason- 
ableness of future regulations. This treaty also gave 
effect to the decision of the Court of Arbitration rela- 
tive to bays by providing that the rule established by 
the said court should apply in all bays where the width 
of the entrance did not not exceed ten miles. Ratifica- 
tions over this convention were exchanged November 
15, 1912, and it was proclaimed by the President No- 
vember 16, 1912.^'' 

With the establishment of the Permanent Mixed 
Fishery Commission it is believed that all future dis- 
putes over the fishing privileges will find speedy ad- 
justment. This commission and the recently established 
International Boundary Commission illustrate a tend- 
ency toward permanent commissions to deal with 
questions as they arise, in place of special and tempor- 
ary commissions called into existence after differences 
have been augmented through a period of years. With 
permanent commissions of the character mentioned, 
with arbitration treaties, and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at The Hague, the prospects for continued 
peace with Great Britain are far more assuring than 
they were when the commissioners signed the treaty of 
Ghent one hundred years ago. 

56 Proceedings in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbi- 
tration; 6ist Cong., 3d sess., S. Doc. 870, Vol. XII., 2376-2380. 



INDEX 



Adams, John, 2, 3. 

Adams, John Quincy, minister to 
Russia, 143-145; mediation en- 
voy, 146, 147; attitude toward 
the war, 152; reports British 
attitude, 154; comments on ne- 
gotiation by commission, 157; 
urges reply of Russian Gov- 
ernment on mediation pros- 
pects, 161, 163; appointed 
peace minister, 167; services 
and abilities of, 169-171; 
leaves St. Petersburg, 190; 
use of private secretaries, 194; 
opposes British dictation of 
meeting place, 198; spokes- 
man for American ministers, 
200-202; presents nature of 
American instructions, 206, 
207; drafts protocol, 211; 
drafts despatch to Secretary 
of State, 214; prepares reply 
to British, 222; considers re- 
turn to St. Petersburg, 234; 
discusses British proposals, 
235, 236; records sentiment 
of Americans on British note 
of September 4, 238; opposes 
stipulation on Indians, 243; 
considers mutual disarmament 
on lakes beyond instructions, 
243; prepares note on In- 
dians and Indian boundary, 
244; opinion on British note 
of September 19, 257; pre- 
pares note, 257; prepares de- 
spatch to Russia, 268; frames 
reply to British, 275; state- 



ment on cession of Canada, 
275; drafts projet, 300, 301; 
opposes impressment article, 
301; position on navigation 
of Mississippi, 320; prepares 
draft of note to British, 321; 
proposes presenting British 
with deposition regarding ne- 
groes, 321; opens conference 
of December i, 324; opposes 
British demands, 347; signs 
and exchanges copies of 
treaty, 356; comments on 
signing of treaty, 357; opin- 
ion of treaty, 367; refuses to 
recognize vote ordering send- 
ing of papers to Washington, 
378; negotiation for treaty of 
commerce, 390-396; fisheries, 
468, 469; discusses disarma- 
ment on lakes, 462; nego- 
tiation on slaves, 400-403 ; 
states American position on 
slave trade, 408, 409; negotia- 
tions for convention on im- 
pressment, 441 ; instructs Rush 
on commercial treaty, 443 ; 
opposes British proposal on 
impressment, 44s; candidate 
for president, 379; Russell 
duplicate-letter controversy, 
379-381; submits to Congress 
alleged cases of impressment, 
449. 
Adams, William, British peace 
minister, 194, 196, 219; opin- 
ion on fisheries, 315. 



479 



48o 



INDEX 



Addington, Henry, signs treaty for 
settling slave claims, 404; au- 
thorized to conclude treaty on 
slave trade, 414; addresses 
note to Adams, 415. 

Allegiance, law of, 19; naturali- 
zation act of Great Britain, 

454- 

Amnesty, article on, 308; amended 
by Great Britain, 315; United 
States consents to drop arti- 
cle on, 322. 

Angus, Captain, 189, 214. 

Arbitration, treaty between Great 
Britain and United States, 
475 ; international court for 
settlement of fisheries dispute, 

475. 476, 477- 

Armistice, proposed by Russell, 
59, ^27, 138; refused by Cas- 
tlereagh, 137, 139; proposed 
by Admiral Warren, 60, 140; 
refused by Madison, 141; pro- 
posal of Sir George Prevost 
rejected, 60. 

Armstrong, John, minister to 
France, demands explanation 
of Berlin decree, 89; protests 
against French action in case 
oi Horizon, gz; against French 
decrees, 104-106; fails to se- 
cure satisfaction from France, 
107; opposes the embargo, 
108; notified of revocation of 
French decrees, 113. 

Aroostook war, 430. 

Auckland, Lord, 32, 33. 

Bagot, Sir Charles, 463-465. 
Baker, Anthony St. John, 198, 

199, 2iSi 216, 355, 356, 360, 

361, 362. 
Barclay, Anthony, 432-434. 
Barclay, Thomas, 421, 424. 
Baring, Alexander, 157, 158, 314. 



Barlow, Joel, 119. 

Bathurst, Lord, gives instructions 
on Indian pacification, 268; 
author of British note of Oc- 
tober 8, 274; urges Welling- 
ton to go to America, 304; 
instructs commissioners on 
islands and fisheries, 351, 352; 
defends British commissioners 
in Parliament, 377; negotia- 
tions with Adams over fish- 
eries, 469. 

Bayard, James, mediation envoy, 
146, 147; attitude toward 
war, 152; leaves for St. Pe- 
tersburg, 154; leaves St. Pe- 
tersburg for London, 162, 
186; peace plenipotentiary, 
167; services and abilities of, 
171, 172; attitude toward 
British proposal of meeting 
place, 188; questions British 
ministers on boundary line, 
202; corrects protocol, 211; 
drafts despatch to Secretary 
of State, 214; attitude toward 
British note of September 4, 
238; favors concession, 243; 
opinion on British note of 
September 19, 257; favors 
acceptance of article on In- 
dian pacification, 274; amends 
American note of October 24, 
291; opposes impressment ar- 
ticle, 301; position on fish- 
eries and navigation of Mis- 
sissippi, 321; favors yielding 
on islands but not on fish- 
eries, 347; votes that Adams 
transmit papers to Washing- 
ton, 378; sickness and death 
of, 396. 

Beasley, R. J., 139, 378. 

Blockade, directed against French 
West Indies, 67; illegal block- 



INDEX 



481 



ades, 68; effected by French 
decrees and orders in coun- 
cil, 85, 86; British position 
on. It 6, 117; one cause of the 
war, 121; protest of Secre- 
tary Marshall in 1800, 121; 
of American Government in 
1801 and 1803, 121; position 
of United States on, 122, 123; 
notification of, 123; United 
States protests against British 
order of May 16, 1806, 124; 
cessation of illegal blockades 
demanded as a condition of 
peace, 149; definition of 
blockade insisted on, 149, 
150; instructions to peace 
ministers, 176; article in pro- 
jet, 308; rejected by British 
ministers, 316; Americans con- 
sent to drop article, 322; in 
negotiations for treaty of 
commerce, 387, 389, 455; 
American position restated in 
1816, 456; protest against 
Brazilian blockades, 456; Mex- 
ican blockades, 456; defined 
by Mason, Secretary of Navy, 
457; Declaration of Paris on, 
457; discussion in second 
Hague Conference, 4s 7, 458; 
London Naval Conference, 
458; defined in Declaration of 
London, 458. 

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 91, 368. 

Boston, celebration of treaty, 366; 
meeting place of boundary 
commissioners, 424, 425. 

Boundary commissions, discussion 
of and arrangement for, 296, 
307. 311, 318, 322, 327, 362, 
421; questions to be decided 
by, 421; settlement of dis- 
puted islands in Passama- 
quoddy Bay, 421-424; dis- 



agreement on boundary from 
St. Croix to St. Lawrence, 
424-427 ; submission of dis- 
puted questions to arbiter, 
427-429; dissatisfaction with 
award, 429, 430; further ne- 
gotiations with Great Britain, 
430. 431; commission on 
northern boundary from St. 
Lawrence through Lake 
Huron, 432, 433; failure to 
agree on boundary from Lake 
Huron to Lake of the Woods, 
434; later settlement, 435. 

Boundary controversies, Indian, 
208-210, 212, 216, 217, 225- 
227, 237, i4o, 241, 251, 260; 
Maine, 217, 228, 248, 251, 258, 
259, 270, 288, 296; northeast- 
ern, 288-290, 428-431; British 
arguments on, 239, 240; Brit- 
ish instructions on, 288, 289; 
British proposal, 291; Ameri- 
can rejection, 307; commis- 
sions proposed, 307, 310; ar- 
ticles on, 318, 319. 

Buchanan, James, 456. 

Cadore, Duke of, 113, 114. 

Calhoun, John C, 127, 130, 445. 

Campbell, George W., 169. 

Canada, discussion of cession of, 
178; attitude on fisheries, 205, 
375; annexation of, 236, 238, 
239.244.251,271,275; bound- 
aries, 254, 25s, 288, 372, 375. 

Canning, George, British secretary 
for foreign affairs, 42; nego- 
tiation over Chesapeake, 44, 
46, 47; discusses effect of 
French decrees, 94, 100; com- 
plains of American embargo, 
100; justifies British orders in 
council, loi; criticises inter- 
diction of British ships, 102. 



32 



482 



INDEX 



Carroll, Henry, 358, 360. 

Cass, General, minister at Paris, 
416; protests against treaty 
of London, 416; criticises ar- 
ticle on slave trade in treaty 
of 1842, 417; discusses right 
of visitation and search, 418, 
4:9. 

Castlereagh, Lord, rejects propo- 
sal of armistice, 137, 139; 
proposes direct negotiations, 
165; notified of appointment 
of American peace ministers, 
190; of their arrival at Ghent, 
215; communicates with Brit- 
ish ministers, 231, 232; pro- 
poses provisional article on 
Indian pacification, 232; in- 
fluence of treaty of Paris on, 
242; ratified treaty delivered 
to, 363; invites Gallatin and 
Clay to interview, 385; nego- 
tiations over impressment, 390, 
440-444; negotiations over 
commercial treaty, 446; posi- 
tion with regard to Great 
Lakes, 459-462. 

Cathcart, Lord, 164. 

Chesapeake, the attack on, 42; ne- 
gotiations concerning demands, 
44-50; reparation offered by 
Great Britain, 51, 53, 55. 

Cheves, Langdon, 127, 404. 

Clancarty, Lord, 243. 

Clay, Henry, appointed peace min- 
ister, 167; services and abili- 
ties of, 172; leaves United 
States, 185; favors change of 
meeting place, 189; correction 
of protocol, 211; opinion on 
success of mission, 220, 221; 
prepares reply to British, 222; 
attitude toward British note 
of September 4, 238; opposes 
any stipulation on Indians, 



243; prepares despatch to 
France, 268; favors rejection 
of disarmament on lakes, 275; 
prepares draft of American 
note, 276; predicts abandon- 
ment of uti possidetis, 300; 
opposes privilege of naviga- 
tion of Mississippi, 300, 301, 
320, 321; drafts article on 
impressment, 301; attitude on 
fisheries, 320, 321; prepares 
draft of note to British, 321; 
disappointment with proposed 
treaty, 352; opposes plan for 
conference, 353; wishes rec- 
ord of vote on fisheries and 
other questions, 359; opinion 
of treaty, 367, 368; favors 
papers being sent to Wash- 
ington, 378; friendship with 
Russell broken, 381, 382; goes 
to London, 385; negotiations 
at London, 385, 386; leaves 
England for United States, 
397; Speaker of House, 397; 
Secretary of State, 415; re- 
plies to British note on slave 
trade, 415; presents alleged 
cases of impressment, 450. 

Cochrane, Vice-Admiral, 260, 261, 
270. 

Colonial trade, 61, 63, 66, 67, 70, 
71. ISO, 387. 389- 

Commercial treaty, preliminary ne- 
gotiations, 384-390; projet of 
American commissioners, 390, 
391; conferences of American 
and British commissioners, 
329. 393; treaty agreed upon, 
393; provisions, 394, 395; 
ratifications, 39s, 396. 

Committee on Foreign Relations, 
report of, on impressment, 
59; recommending war, 129- 
130. 



INDEX 



483 



Congress of Vienna, 293, 302, 312, 
3t3, 374- 

Continuous voyage, 77, 78, 83. 

Contraband, 25, 68, 76, 151. 

Convention, of 1818, commerce 
and fisheries, 469; of 1822, 
indemnity under award of 
Emperor of Russia, 403; of 
1824, slave trade, 411-414; 
of 1827, to submit boundary 
dispute to arbiter, 428; of 
19 12, northwestern fishery 
regulations, 477, 478. 

Cralle, Richard K., 128. 

Crawford, William H., 242, 243, 
334. 335. 368, 382-384, 445. 

Dallas, George M., 154, 214, 231, 
277. 

Dartmoor prison, killing of pris- 
oners, 405, 406. 

Daschkoflf, Count, 145. 

Declaration of London, on block- 
ades, 458. 

Declaration of Paris, 457; signa- 
tory Powers, 457. 

Duties, discriminating, purpose of, 
64, 65; proposed abolition of, 
387, 388; provision in com- 
mercial treaty, 391-394. 

East India trade, discussion of, in 
negotiations for treaty of 
commerce, 387, 388, 391, 392; 
provision in treaty of com- 
merce, 394, 395. 

Elgin, Lord, 471. 

Embargo Act, passed by Con- 
gress, 96; proposal for re- 
peal, 99; second act, 120; 
third act, April 4, 1812, 127. 

Erskine, Lord, 32, 51, 93, 109, 
110. 

Expatriation, 454. 



Federalist party, opposed to war, 
126, 131-133, 142; criticises ap- 
pointment of mediation en- 
voys, 148; opposed to Madison 
and Gallatin, 149; effect of 
British demands on, 223, 227, 
280; attitude on treaty of 
peace, 363. 

Fisheries, northeastern, Canadian 
protest against, 205; Ameri- 
can instructions, 205; British 
instructions, 287, 288; question 
of rights to, 295, 300, 307, 
328, 345; opinion of British 
ministers, 315, 332, 333, 342; 
position of American minis- 
ters, 320, 321, 327; proposal 
of articles on, as offset to 
navigation of Mississippi, 329; 
articles rejected by British, 
329; British report to home 
government, 332; British in- 
structed not to renew privi- 
leges in exchange for naviga- 
tion of Mississippi, 337; pro- 
posal to leave for future 
negotiations, 337, 339; Ameri- 
cans unwilling to renounce 
claim, 341; discuss proposi- 
tion, 345-348; reject British 
proposal, 349; proposal to 
omit in treaty, 349, 350; 
British agree, 351, 352; vote 
on proposal for mutual con- 
cession, 359; omitted from 
treaty, 372; Canadian de- 
mands, 375; negotiations in 
proposed commercial treaty, 
468; privileges renewed in 
treaty of 1818, 469, 470; 
comparison with provisions of 
treaty of 1783, 470, 471; 
modus vivendi of igo6, 474, 
475 ; agreement to submit dis- 
pute to Court of Arbitration, 



484 



INDEX 



475; claim of United States, 
475; settlement by Court of 
Arbitration, 475-477; conven- 
tion of 1912, 477, 478; Per- 
manent Mixed Fishery Com- 
mission, 477. 

Florida, territory, 151, 152; Brit- 
ish accusation, 239, 269, 274; 
refutation by American min- 
isters, 244. 

Foster, August J., 54, SS-S7- 

Fox, Charles, 30-34, 63, 81, 87. 

French decrees, Berlin, Novem- 
ber 21, 1806, 38; attitude of 
Great Britain toward, 39; pro- 
visions of, 85; Milan decree, 
December 17, 1807, 86; effect 
of Berlin decree on diplomatic 
negotiations, 88; protest of 
United States, 89; explana- 
tions of French minister, 89; 
modifications of, 90, 91; re- 
versal of French position, 92; 
attitude of France in enforce- 
ment of decrees, 103, 104; 
remonstrance of American 
minister, 104-106; Bayonne 
decree, April 22, 1808, 107; 
offer to revoke decrees upon 
recall of orders in council, 
iii; final repeal of decrees, 
119; effect of decrees on 
blockade, 455, 456. 

Gales, Joseph, 128, 129. 

Gallatin, Albert, appointed media- 
tion envoy, 146; Senate re- 
fuses to confirm, 147; attitude 
toward war, 152; leaves for 
St. Petersburg, 134; sounds 
feeling in European capitals, 
157; informs Baring of na- 
ture of instructions, 158; 
seeks new instructions, 159; 
favors omission of impress- 



ment, 159, 160; leaves St. 
Petersburg for London, 162; 
peace plenipotentiary, 168; 
vacates ofEce of Secretary of 
Treasury, 169; services and 
abilities of, 174; correspond- 
ence with Baring, 187; favors 
change of meeting place, 188; 
corrects protocol, 211; revises 
despatch to Secretary of State, 
214; prepares reply to Great 
Britain, 222; attitude toward 
British note of September 4, 
238; proposes mutual dis- 
armament on lakes, 243; 
drafts reply to British note, 
244; opinion of British note 
of September 19, 256, 257; 
prepares reply, 257; favors 
acceptance of article on In- 
dian pacification, 275; pre- 
pares draft of note, 276; fa- 
vors principle of status quo 
ante bellum, 282; prepares 
note, 291; propounds ques- 
tions to Secretary of State, 
29s, 296; suggestions on in- 
ternal policy, 297; drafts pro- 
jet, 300; opposes article on 
impressment, 301; position on 
fisheries and navigation of 
Mississippi, 320, 321 ; prepares 
draft of note to British, 321; 
proposes partial waiving of 
indemnities, 321 ; argument on 
fisheries, 345; drafts reply to 
British, 348; opinion on treaty, 
367; goes to London, 385; 
invited by Castlereagh to an 
interview, 385; negotiations 
for treaty of commerce, 386; 
bearer of treaty of commerce 
to United States, 394; offered 
former position, 397; ap- 
pointed minister to France, 



INDEX 



485 



397; appointed with Rush to 
arrange commercial treaty, 
400, 401, 445, 446; signs 
treaty on slave claims, 404; 
appointed minister to Great 
Britain on boundary disputes, 
427; secures agreement to re- 
fer them to arbiter, 428; pre- 
pares statement on boundary, 
429; negotiations for com- 
mercial treaty and other sub- 
jects, 469. 

Gallatin, James, 154. 

Gambler, Lord, British peace min- 
ister, 194, 195; addresses 
joint mission, 200; opinion 
on fisheries, 315; opens con- 
ference of December I, 324; 
signs and exchanges copies of 
treaty, 356. 

Ghent, place of peace negotiation, 
190; arrival of American min- 
isters, 192; suitability of 
place, 192; treaty signed, 355, 
356; celebration of citizens 
of, 360. 

Ghent, Treaty of. See Peace Ne- 
gotiations. 

Goulburn, Henry, British peace 
minister, 194-196; states points 
of British instructions, 201, 
202; presents substance of 
new instructions, 216; dis- 
cusses British proposals with 
Adams, 236; opinion on fish- 
eries, 315; defends British 
commissioners in Parliament, 
377; special plenipotentiary on 
commercial arrangements, 446; 
writes Clay about armament, 
460-461. 

Great Lakes, augmentation of na- 
val power on, 151; disarma- 
ment on, 217, 218, 459; Amer- 
ican opposition to British pro- 



posal, 227, 228, 24s, 259; 
British position, 239, 460; re- 
jection of British demands, 
249; withdrawal of sine qua 
non, 254; parliamentary dis- 
cussions concerning, 461,462; 
negotiations, 461-465; con- 
vention ratified, 465. 

Grenville, Lord, 10, 30, 42, 68-70. 

Guizot, M., 416. 

Hague Peace Conference (1907), 

on blockade, 457-458. 
Hamilton, William R., 192. 
Harris, Levett, 161. 
Harrowby, Lord, 23-27. 
Hawkesbury, Lord, 16, 21-23, 32, 

TZ, 75- 
Henry, John, 126. 
Holland, Lord, 32-34. 
Holmes, John, 421. 
Horizon, cargo confiscated by 

France, 92. 
Howick, Lord, 32, 42. 
Hughes, Christopher, 168, 199, 

211, 244, 257, 302, 321, 334, 

342, 358, 361. 
Hull, General, proclamation of, 

236, 251, 252, 260, 270. 
Huskisson, William, 404. 

Impressment, American claims, 4- 
34, 45 ; complaints of, 5-10, 
27; certification of seamen, 4, 
8, 12; negotiations on, 5-24, 
30-36; registry of crew, 7, 8; 
limitation of men to vessel, 
4; surrender of deserters, 12- 
t4. 35, 36, 56, 57; incon- 
sistency of British practice, 
20, 21, 26; British position 
on, 28, 35, 36, 47, 60, 137, 
158; British proposals, 34, 36; 
American position on, 40, 41, 
43, SO, 59, 60, 149; discon- 



486 



INDEX 



tinuance a condition of armis- 
tice, 137, 141; sine qua non 
in peace restoration, 149, 153; 
concession allowed, 151; Gal- 
latin's position on, 160; in- 
structions to peace ministers, 
176, 184, 185, 205, 206; pro- 
posal of American ministers, 
229, 230; reasons for modera- 
tion of American demands, 
230; instructions to British 
ministers, 287; British waive 
stipulations, 290; negotiations 
in connection with treaty of 
peace, 308, 323, 368, 438; 
with treaty of commerce, 387- 
390, 439-448; change in Brit- 
ish sentiment, 449 ; alleged 
cases in 1828, 450; Clay's 
statement on, 450; discussion 
of subject by Webster, 451, 
452; Ashburton refuses to 
consider subject, 452, 453; 
President Tyler's statement, 
453. 454; case of Mason and 
Slidell, 454", naturalization 
act of Great Britain, 454; 
United States navy regula- 
tions, 454, 455. 

Indemnities, instructions to peace 
ministers, 177; for losses in- 
curred without proper noti- 
fication of war, 183; article 
drafted by Adams, 301; ar- 
ticle in projet, 308, 309; in- 
admissible for losses before 
war, 311, 316; Gallatin pro- 
poses partial waiving of, 321, 
322; discussion over article, 
329-331; for slaves, 401, 404. 

Indians, trade with, 151, 295, 
389; territorial arrangement, 
203; discussion over territory 
of, 204, 208-210, 216, 217, 
225, 227; British position on 



territory of, 240, 241; Amer- 
ican position, 243-247, 261- 
263; peace with, 247; non- 
employment of, 248, 308, 315, 
322; rejection of British de- 
mands concerning, 249; Brit- 
ish denial of inciting, 252, 
271; British claim of abroga- 
tion of treaties of, 252; with- 
drawal of demand for bound- 
ary of, 253; proposal for mu- 
tual restitution, 254; British 
denial of American sover- 
eignty over territory of, 271, 
272; proposed article on paci- 
fication of, 272, 273; accept- 
ance of article, 275, 276, 283. 

Jackson, Andrew, 365, 430. 

Jackson, Francis, 53, 54. 

Jackson, George, 404. 

Jay, John, 68-70. 

Jefferson, Thomas, on impress- 
ment, 3, 4, 39, 40, 440; urges 
embargo act, 96; objects to 
proposed treaty of i8o6, 123. 

Jones, William, 168. 

King, Charles, 405. 

King, Rufus, American minister 
at London, negotiations on 
impressment, 6, 9, 10, 15; re- 
turns to United States, 17; 
treaty signed in 1803, 21, 32; 
secures modification of rule 
of 1756, 74. 

Landsdowne, Marquis of, 314,461. 

Larpent, Francis, 405. 

Lee, Charles, 15. 

Lievin, Count, 144, 156. 

Liston, Sir Robert, 13. 

Liverpool, Lord, 232, 274, 293, 

303. 
London Naval Conference, 458. 



INDEX 



487 



Louisiana, 239, 244, 259, 269, 284, 

310. 372- 
Lowndes, William, 127. 

McHenry, James, 14, 15. 

Madison, James, on impressment, 
18-21; notifies Monroe of 
ratification of treaty of 1803, 
21; instructions to Monroe, 
25, 31, 37; candidate for 
presidency, 47, 48; note to 
British minister, 49; instruc- 
tions to Pinkney, 50; war 
message, 58, 127; proposes 
discriminating duties, 64, 65; 
seeks explanation of Berlin 
decree, 90; replies to Erskine 
as to British order, 94; re- 
moves restrictions on French 
commerce, 113; calls Con- 
gress in special session, 119, 
120 ; defines American posi- 
tion on blockade, 122; ac- 
cepts Russian mediation and 
appoints envoys, 146; calls 
special session of Senate, 147; 
appoints Adams minister to 
Russia, 170; consults Cabinet 
on impressment, 230; trans- 
mits despatches of peace min- 
isters to Congress, 278; dis- 
trusted by British, 35s, 370; 
transmits treaty of Ghent to 
Senate, 361; transmits papers 
of peace negotiations to Sen- 
ate, 362; issues thanksgiving 
proclamation, 366; denounced 
by English press, 371; trans- 
mits Ghent papers to Con- 
gress, 379; transmits treaty 
of commerce to Senate, 396; 
proclaims treaty of commerce, 
396; recommends amendment 
to slave-trade act, 407; au- 
thorized to negotiate on slave 



trade, 410; recommends pro- 
hibition of employment of for- 
eign seamen, 438. 

Maine, boundary dispute, 430; 
Aroostook war, 430; negotia- 
tions over boundary, 217, 228, 
248, 251, 258, 259, 270, 288, 
296; Webster-Ashburton treaty 
on, 431, 432. 

Marcy, William L., 471. 

Marshall, John, secretary of state, 
on impressment, 1 1 ; submits 
cases of vessels seized, 72; 
instructs King on British seiz- 
ures, 73; protests against Brit- 
ish blockade, 121. 

Mason, John Y., 457. 

Mediation, proposed by Russia, 
143, 14s; accepted by LTnited 
States, 146; envoys appointed 
on, 146; instructions to en- 
voys, 149-152; reasons for 
British rejection, 155, 180- 
183. 

Melville, Lord, 23. 

Middle States, interest in Indian 
territory and boundaries, 281. 

Millegan, George, 154, 188. 

Mississippi, navigation of, British 
privilege discussed, 217, 300, 
319-321, 327-329, 332, 336, 
337; proposal for future nego- 
tiations on, 339, 340, 346; 
British proposal rejected, 349; 
offer to omit in treaty, 349; 
offer accepted by British, 352; 
vote on mutual concession, 

359. 
Monroe, James, American minis- 
ter to Great Britain, 17; in- 
structed by home government, 
21; negotiations on impress- 
ment, 22-31, 37, 56-58; nego- 
tiations over Chesapeake, 44- 
47; objects to seizure of ships. 



488 



INDEX 



under rule of 1756, 80; nego- 
tiations on neutral trade, 81; 
objects to British retaliation, 
117; maintains revocation of 
French decrees, 118; nego- 
tiations on impressment and 
repeal of British orders, 120; 
author of war manifesto, 128, 
129; accepts Russian media- 
tion, 146; instructs mediation 
envoys, 149-153; accepts of- 
fer of direct negotiation, 166; 
instructs peace ministers, 176- 
184; commends action of 
American ministers, 282; in- 
structs ministers on status 
quo ante bellum, 282; ex- 
changes ratification of treaty, 
362; transmits papers to Con- 
gress, 380; urges reciprocal 
method in commercial treaty, 
393; proposes submission of 
slave question to arbitration, 
400 ; transmits papers on slave- 
trade negotiation, 414; nego- 
tiations over disarmament on 
lakes, 463, 464; submits Brit- 
ish proposal on impressment 
to Cabinet, 444; opinion on 
British proposal, 445. 

Morris, Gouverneur, 65. 

Mulgrave, Lord, 28. 

Napier, Lord, 418. 

Navigation, freedom of, 391, 392. 

Negroes, alleged carrying away by 
British, 236, 321, 333, 334, 
359. 399-404; colonization of, 
415. 

Nesselrode, Count, 164. 

Neutral trade, affected by bellig- 
erency, 72, "jT,; under prin- 
ciple of continuous voyage, 
74; decision in case of Essex, 
Tj; complaint of United States 



against Essex decision, 78; 
effect of rule of 1756, 80; 
effect of coalition of Russia 
and Sweden, 80; instructions 
to Monroe and Pinkney, 82; 
provisions of unratified treaty 
of 1806, 82, 83; seizure of 
vessels a cause of war, 84; 
British orders in council and 
French decrees, 85, 86; ob- 
jections of United States to 
French decrees, 87; explana- 
tion of French minister, 89, 
90; reversal of French posi- 
tion, 92; exceptions in orders 
in council, 97; complaints of 
United States, 98; instruc- 
tions to mediation envoys, 
150, 151; proposals in nego- 
tiations for treaty of com- 
merce, 387; British position 
on, 387-389- 

New England States, concerned 
in the fisheries, 281; sug- 
gested plan of making treaty 
with, 355; British view of 
separation of, 372. 

New York, celebration of treaty 
of Ghent in, 365; financial 
conditions after signing of 
treaty, 368; meeting of north- 
eastern boundary commission- 
ers at, 425 ; meeting of north- 
ern boundary commissioners 
at, 432. 

New York legislature, condemns 
British demands, 278; urges 
more vigorous measures, 279. 

Non-Intercourse Acts, repeal on 
condition of revocation of or- 
ders in council, 109; repeal 
of, 110; withdrawal of repeal 
of, no; Act of May i, 1810, 
in; revived against Great 



INDEX 



489 



Britain, ii6; effect on France, 
119. 

North, Lord, 63. 

Northeastern boundary dispute, 
258, 259, 288-290; commis- 
sioners appointed, 424; meet- 
ing of commissioners, 424, 
425; points involved, 426; 
failure to agree, 426, 427; ne- 
gotiations at London, 427; 
agreement to refer to arbiter, 
428; statements of case, 429; 
decision of arbiter, 429; 
United States protests award, 
429; Great Britain consents 
to disregard award, 430; 
award rejected by Senate, 
430; negotiations with Great 
Britain renewed, 430, 431; 
Webster- Ashburton treaty, 431 ; 
line agreed upon, 431-432. 

Northern boundary, commission on 
line from St. Lawrence 
through Lake Huron, 432, 
433; on line from Lake 
Huron to Lake of the Woods, 
433, 434- 

Ogiivy, John, 432. 

Orders in council, prior to 1800, 
64, 66, 67; effect on neutral 
trade, 76; order of May 16, 

1806, 84; order of January 7, 

1807, 85; order of November 
II, 1807, 85; policy of British 
Government, 96; complaints 
against, by United States, 98; 
refusal of Great Britain to 
repeal, 99; order of Decem- 
ber, 1808, 103; proposal to re- 
peal on conditions, 108, 109; 
justified by British minister, 
116; adverse opinion of Brit- 
ish press, 135; revocation of, 
139; reasons for revocation, 



139; conditions of revoca- 
tion, 140, 141; relation to 
blockade, 455. 

Pakenham, Richard, 456. 

Passamaquoddy Bay, islands in, 
discussion over rights to, 219, 
311, 325, 326, 331, 336, 338, 
342, 343-352; article agreed 
upon in treaty, 353, 334.421; 
American claims, 422; British 
claims, 422, 423; decision of 
commissioners, 423 ; bound- 
ary marked, 424. 

Peace negotiations, offer of Great 
Britain, 165; acceptance by 
United States, 166; appoint- 
ment of American peace min- 
isters, 167; relations of min- 
isters to one another, 175; at- 
titude of public toward, 175; 
instructions to, 176-185; de- 
lay of British Government in 
appointing ministers, 187, 191; 
place of meeting, 187-190; ar- 
rival of ministers at Ghent, 
192, 198; character of British 
ministers, 194, 195; British 
proposals at first meeting, 
201-203; discussions at second 
meeting, 206-210; at third 
meeting, 216-219; unfavorable 
prospects of peace, 220; dif- 
ferences between American 
ministers, 221-223; American 
opposition to proposed Indian 
boundary, 225-227; discussion 
of disarmament on lakes, 227, 
228; summary of American 
opposition to British demands, 
228, 229, 231; attitude of 
British Cabinet, 233; immi- 
nence of rupture, 234; delay 
of British, 235; new instruc- 
tions to British, 237, 238; 



490 



INDEX 



charges against United States, 
238; explanation of British 
demands, 239-241; responsi- 
bility for rupture placed on 
Americans, 241, 242; Ameri- 
cans reject Indian boundary 
and British possession of 
lakes, 249; rupture in nego- 
tiations expected, 249; British 
seek additional instructions, 
250; British Cabinet attempts 
to avoid rupture, 250; British 
ministers present new note, 
251,252; modifications of sine 
qua non, 253, 254; character 
of British diplomacy, 256; 
sentiment of American min- 
isters, 256; American note of 
September 27, 258-263; pro- 
posal for Indian pacification, 
262, 263; effect of war news 
on negotiations, 264-266; Brit- 
ish ministers present projet 
on Indian pacification and 
discuss other subjects, 269- 
273; opinion of American 
ministers upon British ulti- 
matum, 274, 275; effect of 
publication of despatches in 
America, 278-280; attempt of 
American ministers to arouse 
feeling in United States, 281, 
282; effect on Great Britain 
of publication of despatches, 
283; Indian article accepted, 
283; British note of October 
21,290,291; proposal of prin- 
ciple of uti possidetis, 291; 
Americans deny recognition of 
principle, 291, 292; propose 
status quo ante bellum, 292; 
propose mutual presentation 
of projet, 292; effect in Lon- 
don of American rejection of 
uti possidetis, 293; feeling of 



the two missions, 293 ; effect 
of American victories on Brit- 
ish ministry, 294; British re- 
quest contre-projet, 294; Amer- 
ican ministers believe peace 
treaty impossible, 299; influ- 
ences effecting change in Brit- 
ish demands, 302; American 
ministers submit projet, 306 ; 
reply to British proposition 
on fisheries, northwest bound- 
ary, and uti possidetis, 306- 
308; Americans request contre- 
projet, 309; British refer pro- 
jet to home Government, 309; 
British withdraw principle of 
uti possidetis, 312; reasons for 
withdrawal, 312-314; British 
object to articles on non- 
employment of Indians, im- 
pressment, blockade, and in- 
demnities, 315, 316; suggest 
article on courts, 316; on 
prisoners of war, 319; Ameri- 
cans discuss fisheries and 
navigation of Mississippi, 320, 
321; consent to modification 
of projet, 322, 323; object to 
British article on restoration 
of territory, 324; differences 
over wording of article, 324, 
325; amendments to time limits 
for cessation of hostilities, 
325, 326; to article on islands 
in Passamaquoddy Bay, 326, 
327; to article establishing 
boundary commissions, 327; 
discussion of fisheries and 
navigation of Mississippi, 328, 
329; of article on indemnities, 
329-331; British receive in- 
structions, 335-337; request 
conference, 338; state in- 
structions on article on resti- 
tution, 338; offer to leave 



INDEX 



491 



fisheries and navigation of 
Mississippi to future negotia- 
tions, 339, 340; minor changes 
in projet agreed upon, 341; 
British report prospects of 
peace treaty, 341; Americans 
reject British alterations in 
article on restitution of terri- 
tory, 342; British refute Amer- 
ican objections, 343, 344; 
American position restated, 
344. 345 ; Americans propose 
general article on all unset- 
tled questions, 346; British 
refuse, 346; discussion over 
islands, 346-349; American 
ministers reject article on 
courts, 350; reject article on 
fisheries and navigation of 
Mississippi, 349-350; British 
ministers accept proviso in 
article on islands and omit 
fisheries and navigation of 
Mississippi, 352; peace pros- 
pects brighten, 352, 353; con- 
ference arranged, 353; altera- 
tions agreed upon, 353; war 
to cease upon ratification of 
treaty, 356; treaty signed in 
triplicate, 355, 356. 
Peace plenipotentiaries, American, 
appointment of, 167; charac- 
ter of, 169-17S; instructions 
to, 176-185; arrival at Ghent, 
191; negotiations at Ghent, 
198-356; commendation of, 
364; differences and personal 
animosities, 377, 378, 382-384; 
explain power to negotiate 
commercial treaty, 385; offer 
projet of treaty of commerce, 
390; mission ends with sign- 
ing of treaty of commerce, 
396. 



Philadelphia, celebration of treaty 
of Ghent, 365, 366. 

Pickering, Timothy, 6-9, 13. 

Pinckney, Thomas, 3, 5. 

Pinkney, William, instructed on 
impressment negotiations, 31; 
minister to Great Britain, 47; 
instructed on Chesapeake ne- 
gotiation, 50; requests recall 
of Jackson, 54; leaves Lon- 
don, 59; protests against 
British order in council of 
November 11, 1807, 95; ex- 
plains embargo act, 96; nego- 
tiates for repeal of orders, 
97-99. 103. 112; fails to con- 
vince British Government of 
revocation of French decrees, 
113; decides to return home, 
115; drafts war proclamation, 
130. 

Pitt, William, proposed commercial 
policy of, 62, 63; resigns as 
prime minister, 63; views on 
Canadian boundary, 284; death 
of, 29, 81. 

Porter, Peter B., 127, 432-434. 

Preble, William R., 429. 

Prevost, Sir George, 60. 

Prince Regent, 376, 377. 

Prisoners of war, 319, 322, 354, 
404-406. 

Prize Court, International, 458. 

Prize vessels, time limitation of 
seizure, 317, 318, 322, 323. 

Republican party, in favor of war 
of 1812, 12s, 126; reception 
of treaty of Ghent by, 363. 

Right of search, in connection 
with impressment, 444, 445; 
in connection with slave trade, 
408, 409, 412, 413, 416, 449; 
protest of United States 
against treaty of London, 416; 



492 



INDEX 



article in treaty of 1842, 417; 
resolution of Senate on, 419; 
limited right in treaty of 
1862, 420; statement of Web- 
ster on, 451, 452. See also 
Peace Negotiations. 

Robinson, Sir Frederick John, 385, 
446. 

Romanzoff, Count, 143-145, 155, 
156, 160-163. 

Rose, George Henry, 48, 49. 

Rule of 1756, applied in 1793, 66; 
modifications secured, 74; doc- 
trine of continuous voyage in 
connection with, 80. 

Rush, Richard, succeeds Adams as 
minister to Great Britain, 400, 
443; given power to conclude 
commercial treaty, 400, 443; 
instructed to conclude treaty 
on slave trade, 410, 411; ne- 
gotiations on slave trade, 411; 
on impressment, 444, 447, 448; 
learns of British acceptance 
of disarmament on lakes, 465; 
pledges American Government 
to proposal, 465; negotiates 
for commercial treaty and 
other objects, 469. 

Russell, Jonathan, charge d'affaires 
in London, 125; proposes ar- 
mistice, 136-138; leaves Lon- 
don, 139; appointed peace 
minister, 167; services and 
abilities of, 172, 173; ap- 
pointed minister to Sweden, 
173; arrives at Stockholm, 
188; notifies Swedish Govern- 
ment of change of meeting 
place, 191; leaves Stockholm, 
arrives at Ghent, 191; amends 
despatch to Secretary of State, 
214; favors impressment arti- 
cle, 301; opposes privilege of 
navigation of Mississippi, 321 ; 



insists upon fisheries, 348; 
requests record of vote on 
the two privileges, 359; opin- 
ion of treaty, 368; votes that 
Adams transmit papers to 
Washington, 378; returns to 
Stockholm, 396; member of 
Congress, 379; opposes Adams 
for presidency and favors 
Clay, 379; secures resolution 
calling for papers of treaty 
of Ghent, 379; letter to Mon- 
roe and duplicate letter of, 
379. 380; controversy over 
letters, 380, 381; explains di- 
versity of opinion in mission, 
382-384. 
Russia, Emperor of, offers media- 
tion, 143; arbiter on slave 
claims, 402. 

St. Croix River dispute, 424-426. 

Scott, General Winfield, 430, 431. 

Scott, Sir William, 16. 

Serrurier, French minister, 118. 

Shaler, William, 168, 334. 

Shelbourne, Lord, 63. 

Slave trade, article upon, pro- 
posed by British, 340 ; ac- 
cepted by American ministers, 
347; article in treaty, 406; 
act of Congress, 407; amend- 
ments to law proposed, 407; 
discussions in negotiations for 
commercial treaty, 407; Amer- 
ican principles on, 408, 409; 
law making slave trade pi- 
racy, 409; instructions to Rush, 

410, 411; negotiations by 
Rush, 411; convention on, 

411, 412; amended by Senate, 
413 ; rejected by Great Britain, 
413, 414; report of House 
committee, 414, 415; British 
note on, 415; reply to Clay, 



INDEX 



493 



415; attempt to secure adher- 
ence of United States to con- 
vention on, 415; American 
Government declines, 416; 
London treaty on, 416; Web- 
ster-Ashburton treaty, 417; 
criticism of article, 417; de- 
fended by Webster, 418; 
treaty between Great Britain 
and United States on, 420; 
United States party to gen- 
eral act to suppress African 
slave trade, 421. 

Slaves, restoration of, discussion 
over, 399, 400; proposed ref- 
erence of question to friendly 
Power, 400; claim of United 
States for indemnities, 401; 
Great Britain accepts proposal 
of reference, 401, 402; re- 
ferred to Emperor of Russia, 
402; mediation of Russia, 
403; treaty between Great 
Britain and United States, 
403; claims settled by treaty, 
404. 

Smith, John S., 54. 

Smyth, General, proclamation of, 
251, 252, 270. 

Southern States, interest in In- 
dian territory and boundaries, 
281. 

Status quo ante bellum, proposed 
by American ministers, 229, 
24s, 307, 308; accepted by 
British, 312, 317. 

Stoddart, Ben, 15. 

Territory, restitution of, 151, 324, 
32s. 331. 335, 336, 342, 343- 

Todd, J. Payne, 154. 

Treaty, of Amiens, 15, 2T, 74; 
of arbitration between Great 
Britain and United States, 
475 ; of commerce with Great 



Britain (1815), 396; of 1803 
(proposed), 16, 21, 22; of 
1806 (unratified), 40, 41, 82- 
84; of i8i8, on fisheries and 
commercial arrangements, 469, 
470; of 1826, on slave claims, 
404; of Ghent, signing of, 
355, 356; ratification of, 360, 
362; proclamation of, 362; 
reception of, by Republicans, 
363; by Federalists, 363, 364; 
commendation of American 
commissioners, 364; public 
demonstration over, 365, 366; 
opinion of, 366-368; effect on 
prices of, 368, 369; attitude 
of Canada on, 375; execution 
of, 399-436; of Greenville, 
226, 241, 246, 247, 252, 258; 
Hay-Bond (1902), 474; Jay 
(1794), 70-72; of peace 
(1783), failure to settle dif- 
ferences, I, 63, 68; of Wash- 
ington (187 1), 473; Webster- 
Ashburton (1842), 417, 431, 
435, 436, 453- 

Trent, affair of the, 454. 

Tyler, President, 417. 

Uti possidetis principle, proposed 
by British ministers, 291; re- 
jected by Americans, 307; 
withdrawal of, 312, 317, 320; 
reasons for withdrawal of, 
312, 313- 

Van Ness, Cornelius P., 424. 
Vincent, Lord, 16, 23, 32. 

Walpole, Lord, 161. 

War of 1812, causes of, 1-3, 58, 
59, 61, 127, 129; premonitions 
of, 29, 43, 45 ; measures pre- 
paratory to, 120; declaration 



494 



INDEX 



of, S8, 130; vote upon, 130, 
131; political aspects of, 125, 
126; sectional aspects of, 130, 
131; Madison's message, 127; 
British attitude toward, 135, 
136; difficulties of American 
Government, 298; financial 
difficulties of Great Britain, 
312; British losses, 372-374; 
British fears of American 
navy, 374; results of, 397, 
398; treaty of peace, 355, 356; 
discussion on cessation of hos- 
tilities, 317, 322, 32s, 361. 

Warren, Admiral, 60, 140. 

Washington, George, 65, 70. 

Washington, City of, burning of. 



277; copy of treaty arrives 
at, 361; celebration of treaty, 
366. 

Webster, Daniel, defends article 
on slave trade in treaty of 
1842, 418; negotiates Web- 
ster-Ashburton treaty, 431, 
435^436; statement on im- 
pressment, 451; on right of 
search, 452. 

Wellesley, Marquis of, 377. 

Wellington, Duke of, 303-303, 312, 
313, 460. 

West India trade, 70-72, 74, 387- 

389, 392, 394. 396. 
Wirt, William, 445. 
Wolcott, Oliver, 14. 



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